Catering Inn vs The Addl. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes

Jayant M. Patel, J.—1. In view of the order passed in the Review Petition a while ago, we need to now address on the merits of the writ appeal, more particularly, concerning the aspects dealing with the contention as to whether the appellant-firm consisting of two women partners would be entitled to the benefit under Section 17(4)(ii) of The Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'' for brevity) or not.

The learned Counsel for the appellant reiterated the same contention and submitted that merely because the words used under Section 17(4)(i) are that of "a dealer being a woman", it cannot be restricted to mean a single woman only. If such a meaning is given, it would run counter to the definition of the word "Dealer" as provided under Section 2(1)(k) of the Act, which includes partnership firm or association of persons and therefore it should mean also to include a partnership firm of two women or more than one woman while interpreting the said sub-section.

Learned Counsel for the appellant in furtherance of his submission contended that for the subsequent year when it was brought to the notice of the Government, the said word is excluded so as to extend the benefit to all women.

Whereas, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Revenue contended that since the express language was used as that of "a dealer being a woman", the Officers of the Department had no option but to go by the said language, more particularly when in the subsequent years the amendment has been made and the benefit is extended to all.

We may record that as declared by the learned Counsel for the appellant, pending the aforesaid proceedings before the learned Single Judge, Division Bench and the Apex Court, the reply has been filed, the orders were passed but they are before the appellate forum on the other aspects and the issue of whether ''woman'' includes ''women'' is yet to be finalized.

In view of the aforesaid declaration made by the learned Counsel for the appellant, we find that when the review petition has been allowed and the writ appeal is to be considered on merits, it would be just and proper to consider the contention of the appellant on the said particular aspect and thereafter to further consider the merits of the appeal.

It is true that the language used in Section 17(4) (i) as well as under Section 17(4)(ii) of the Act, is "a dealer being a woman", but it is to be understood keeping in view the definition of the word "a dealer". The word "Dealer" is defined under Section 2(1)(k) of the Act, but as we are concerned upto clause(i), the same for ready reference is reproduced as under:

"[(k) "Dealer" means any person who carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods, directly or otherwise, whether for cash or for deferred payment, or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration, and includes-

(i) [an industrial, commercial or trading undertaking of the Government of Karnataka, the Central Government, a State Government of any State, other than the State of Karnataka], a local authority, company, a Hindu undivided family, an Aliyasanthana family, a firm, a society, a club or an association which carries on such business; "

The aforesaid shows that the definition is inclusive and it includes a local authority, a Company or Hindu undivided family or a firm or an association. The fact that it includes a partnership firm also, would necessarily mean the existence of more than one person as partners of such firm. If the restricted meaning is given to the word as described under Section 17(4)(i) and (ii) to ''a dealer being a woman'' in contra distinction to the word being ''women'', the resultant effect would be that it would not only run counter to the definition of the word "dealer" but it would narrow down and would give a different meaning to the principal definition of the word "dealer". Not only that, if the meaning of the word "dealer" is restricted only to an individual, it would nullify the wider definition of the word "dealer" as expressly provided under Section 2(1)(k) Clause-(i) and other clauses of the Act. The fact that the meaning of the word "dealer" is defined by way of an inclusive definition, any restricted meaning would run counter to the intention of the legislature.

Apart from the above, if we take aid of the General Clauses Act, and more particularly, Section 13 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899, the wider meaning of the word ''woman'' to include ''women'' becomes clear and apparent.

Section 13 of the aforesaid Act reads as under:

"13. Gender and number - In all enactments, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context -

(1) words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females; and

(2) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa."

On a consideration of the Act, we do not find that there is any repugnancy in the Act so as to control the meaning of the word "woman", by not including "women".

Under these circumstances, we find that if purposive interpretation is made to the word "a dealer being a woman'', it should mean that "a dealer being a woman'' would also include ''women''.

In view of the aforesaid observations and the discussion, we find that the view taken by the learned Single Judge at paragraph-9 cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside.

However, on the other aspects of submitting reply and the consideration thereof by the appropriate authority, we find that no interference may be made save and except that while giving effect to the provisions of Section 17(1)(4) (ii) of the Act, the Assessing Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall consider the matter in light of the observations made by us in the present judgment and shall take appropriate decision in accordance with law.

Under the circumstances, the appeal deserves to be partly allowed to the aforesaid extent.

Accordingly, the writ appeal shall stand partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. We make it clear that we have not made any observations on the other aspects which may be required to be considered by the Assessing Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, in accordance with law.

Considering the facts and circumstances, there is no order as to costs.