Canara Bank vs Vijay Kumar Shinde

K.L. Manjunath, J.—Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dated 23.8.2011 in W.P. 37091/10 the present appeal is filed by the appellant.

The matter was argued at length by the learned counsel for the appellant. Since the respondent''s counsel was not present, in order to provide an opportunity, the matter was adjourned to 23.2.2015. Since the respondent''s counsel was not present on that day, the matter was adjourned to this day. Today also the respondent''s counsel was not present in the morning so also at 3.20 P.M. In the circumstances, we are constrained to consider the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant.

The brief facts are as follows.

The respondent was working as a Cashier. On 21.2.2007 there was a cash shortage of Rs. 1,49,000/-. Since the respondent did not give proper clarification or account for shortage, he was placed under suspension pending enquiry into the matter w.e.f. 22.2.2007. An enquiry was held. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report stating that the charge leveled against him is proved. After issuing a second show-cause notice, since respondent pleaded ignorance of the matter, the Disciplinary authority dismissed the respondent without notice. Challenging the same, the respondent filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The appellate authority considering the case of the respondent set aside the order of dismissal and reduced the punishment by bringing down the pay of the respondent by two stages for a period of two years with cumulative effect and also held that the period of suspension shall not be treated as on duty. Being not satisfied by the relief granted by the appellate authority, the respondent filed a writ petition. The learned single Judge by his order dated 23.8.2011 has allowed the writ petition on the ground that the appellate authority has found that the petitioner has to be exonerated on the ground that he cannot be entirely blamed and based on the same he interfered with the order of punishment and reduced the pay scale by one stage instead of two stages for a period of two years with cumulative effect and also held that the period of suspension shall be treated as "on duty". This order is called in question by the appellant. 4. It is the specific case of the appellant''s counsel that the appellate authority has not exonerated the respondent from the charges as stated by the learned single Judge in the impugned order. Taking us through the order of the appellate authority, it is contended by the appellant that the appellate authority has not interfered with the findings of the Enquiry Officer or with the disciplinary authority. Considering the peculiar facts, by giving benefit of doubt in favour of the respondent, has modified the punishment from dismissal without notice to bringing down to lower stage in the scale of pay by two stages for a period of two years with cumulative effect. The relevant finding of the disciplinary authority are as under:

"In view of the foregoing, though I do not find any reason to interfere either with the findings of the Enquiry Officer or with the orders of the Disciplinary Authority, considering the facts and circumstances of the case under which the misconduct was committed, I am inclined to give benefit of doubt in his favour and accordingly modify the punishment from "Dismissal without notice" to "Bringing down to a lower stage in the scale of pay by two stages for a period of two years with cumulative effect, and I order accordingly." 5. Relying upon this portion of the order, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned single Judge has committed an error in interfering with the punishment imposed by the appellate authority. According to her, time and again the Hon''ble Supreme Court in plethora of decisions has taken the view that the judicial review is permissible in rare cases where the punishment is so disproportionate to the established charge that it would appear unconscionable and actuated by malice. She also contends that the if the charges are proved and the charges are serious in nature, the Court cannot interfere with the order of punishment. Therefore, she requests the Court to interfere with the impugned order and to set aside the same.

Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant the only point that arises for consideration by us in this appeal is:

"Whether the learned single Judge was justified in interfering with awarding of punishment by the appellate authority?" 7. By looking into the order passed by the appellate authority, it is clear that the appellate authority did not interfere either with the findings of the enquiry officer or of the disciplinary authority so far as the charges leveled against the respondent. When he has concurred with the findings of the enquiry officer and disciplinary authority exercising the discretionary power vested in the appellate authority, the appellate authority interfered with the punishment and reduced the same. Therefore, the question is "whether this Court can further reduce the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority when the charges leveled against the respondent is proved?". As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Courts shall not interfere with the quantum of punishment awarded and replace its view when the charges leveled against the respondent is proved and when the appellate authority has set aside the penalty of dismissal without notice by reducing the scale of pay by two stages. The punishment imposed by the appellate authority will not shocks the conscious of this Court. Therefore, we are of the view that the learned single Judge has committed an error in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the appellate authority.

In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned single Judge is hereby set aside. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the respondent-is/dismissed.