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Judgment
L. Narasimha Reddy, J.—The petitioners are Employees in the Mahabubnagar Branch of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (for short ''the Corporation''). The Corporation has extended the facility of Leave Travel Concession (LTC) to its employees. The petitioners herein availed that facility in the year 2002. The respective petitioners intended to travel various places in the country at different points of time, viz., February, April and May, 2002. They were paid advance of about Rs. 5,000/ -, each. The petitioners submitted bills, after completion of the travel. Different amounts were paid to them, after verification.
All the petitioners were issued charge-sheets, dated 16.07.2005, alleging that they have engaged one and the same vehicle and the verification undertaken, in this regard, indicates that the travel agency, which issued the bills, is non-existent, and that the bills are fictitious. Explanations were submitted by the petitioners. Not being satisfied with the explanations, the 1st respondent appointed an Enquiry Officer. He submitted individual reports, holding that the majority of the charges framed against the petitioners are proved. Show cause notices were issued, on the basis of the enquiry report. On consideration of the explanations submitted by the petitioners, the 1st respondent passed orders dated 21.08.2006, uniformly imposing the punishment of recovery of the amounts paid to the petitioners, and deduction of their basic pay by two stages, permanently. The petitioners filed appeals before the 2nd respondent. The appeals were rejected through order dated 26.03.2007. Hence these four writ petitions.
The petitioners contend that, except that the 1st respondent entertained a doubt, as to the genuineness of the bills, he did not indicate the basis therefor. They submit that, in the departmental enquiry, not a single witness was examined on behalf of the Corporation and the Enquiry Officer proceeded as though it is for the petitioners to prove that the allegations made against them are not true. They further submit that the punishment imposed against them, is not provided for under the Service Rules.
Individual counter-affidavits are filed by the respondents. It is stated that the very fact that one and the same vehicle is said to have been used for the tours undertaken by the petitioners, and that different amounts are claimed for travelling the same distance, throws any amount of doubt as to the genuinity of the bills. According to them, the disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly, in accordance with the relevant provisions of law, and that the punishment imposed against the petitioners is in consonance with the Service Rules.
Sri P. Bala Krishna Murthy, learned Counsel for the petitioners, submits that it is not even alleged that the petitioners did not undertake tour, and that only on the basis of suspicion, disciplinary proceedings were initiated. He contends that the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, are based on no evidence, and that the same cannot constitute the basis for imposing any punishment. Learned Counsel further contends that the imposition of punishment reducing the basic pay, that too, permanently, is unknown to law.
Ms. Sudha, learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the petitioners have misused the facility of LTC and submitted fictitious and non-existent bills. She contends that the prescribed procedure was meticulously followed in the enquiry conducted against the petitioners, and that ample opportunity was given, at every stage. Learned Counsel submits that this Court cannot sit as an Appellate Authority, over the punishment imposed against the petitioners, as long as the prescribed procedure was followed. She places reliance upon certain decided cases.
With slight variation as to the content, the charges against the petitioners are that they have not conducted tour through a vehicle arranged by M/s. Basha Travels, as stated in the LTC bills, and thereby, they have defrauded the Corporation. It was alleged that the acts and omissions on the part of the petitioners constitute misconduct and attracts penalties, specified under Regulation 39(1)(a) to (g) of the L.I.C. (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (for short ''the Regulations''). The petitioners submitted detailed explanations stating that they undertook tours, at different points of time, to various places, and the mere fact that the same vehicle was engaged, does not constitute misconduct. The explanations were not accepted and an Enquiry Officer was appointed. He took the view that the bills submitted by the petitioners are not genuine and the claim of the petitioners, that they have gone on tour is doubtful. After receipt of the report, another show-cause notice was issued to each petitioner and based on the explanations submitted thereto, uniform punishments of a) recovery of amount paid to the petitioners and b) "reduction of basic pay by two stages, permanently, in the time-scale of the pay applicable to the cadre", in terms of Regulation 39(1)(d); was imposed. A serious objection is raised by the respondents as to the very maintainability of the writ petition. This Court is of the view that three questions arise for consideration, viz.,
a) Whether the writ petition is maintainable?
b) whether the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioners suffer from any legal infirmity? and
c) whether the punishment imposed against the petitioners, accords with the Regulations?
The objection raised by the respondents, as to the maintainability of the writ petitions is mainly in the context of the quantum of punishment imposed by them. By placing reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Divisional Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C. Vs. H. Amaresh, ; Chairman and M.D., Bharat Pet. Corpn. Ltd. and Others Vs. T.K. Raju, ; Maharashtra State Seeds Corpn. Ltd Vs. Haridas and Another, Janatha Bazar (South Kanara Central Co-operative Whole Sale Stores Limited) Etc. Vs. The Secretary, Sahakari Noukarara Sangha Etc., and U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Vinod Kumar, it is pleaded that the scope of judicial review to interfere with the quantum of punishment is very limited, and that once the charge is proved, it should be left to the discretion of the disciplinary authority to impose punishment.
It is fairly well-settled by this time, that the disciplinary authority has the discretion to choose the relevant punishment against a delinquent employee, once the ingredients, which lead to a misconduct, are proved. It is only in exceptional cases, where the punishment is found to be totally unconscionable and not commensurate with the gravity of the charge proved, that there exists some possibility for this Court to interfere. The interference would be still slower, if the adjudication into the matter is undertaken by a Labour Court. Most of the precedents, referred to above, cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents, fall into that category.
Where, however, the complaint of an employee is that serious defect has crept into the disciplinary proceedings themselves, such as the enquiry having been ordered or conducted by a person, not competent in law, that the consequent conclusions are not based on evidence or, that the punishment imposed, is not provided for under the service regulations; the Court cannot remain oblivious. Refusal to exercise jurisdiction in such cases, would amount to abdication of constitutional duties, which the High Court is endowed with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
This is not a case, where the jurisdiction of the High Court is taken away, as in the case of the service matters of State and Central Government employees. This is also not a case where the dispute was adjudicated by a Labour Court, and that the findings of fact have assumed finality. From the point of view of the writ petitioners, this is the first scrutiny of the matter, by a Court of Law. Therefore, the objection raised by the respondents, as to the maintainability of the writ petitions is rejected.
The second question is, as to whether the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners suffer from any legal infirmity. The Regulations provided for conducting of enquiry, whenever the disciplinary authority has framed charges and the employee has denied the same. An Enquiry Officer is appointed for this purpose. It is before the Enquiry Officer, that the management, on the one hand, and the charged employees, on the other hand, advance their respective contentions. Since the charges are framed by or at the instance of the management, the burden rests upon it, to prove them. The relevant information, be it, the statements recorded by any individuals or any documents, that constituted the basis for framing the charge, must be placed before the Enquiry Officer. The persons whose statements were recorded, must be offered for cross-examination by the employee. It is then and only then, that the management can be said to have discharged its burden. If any findings adverse to the employees are recorded, in the absence of such material, they get vitiated, as based on no evidence.
Reverting to the facts of the case, the 1st respondent appointed an Enquiry Officer on receiving explanations from the petitioners, denying the charges against them. The allegations against the petitioners were, that they did not conduct any tour at all. These allegations can be made only on the basis of information received from the persons, who are supposed to be aware of those facts. Another possibility is, where a responsible official of the Corporation or its authorized agent has verified the relevant facts, either from the travel agent, or from the hotels or other places, where petitioners, together with their family members are said to have stayed. The third possibility is akin to the one of alibi, i.e., where it is found that the petitioners were seen at places different from those, which they are alleged to have toured, on the relevant days.
The report of the Enquiry Officer reveals that none of these contingencies were presented or pleaded before him. Not a single witness was examined by the Corporation. The entire proceedings turned around the discussion relating to the genuinity of the bills. The basis for suspicion was that all the bills related to the same vehicle. The fact that the tours undertaken by the respective petitioners were separated by months together, was not even adverted to. This is a case not only where the report of the Enquiry. Officer is based no evidence, but also the one, in which suspicion was given the status of an absolute truth.
It is true that a disciplinary enquiry cannot be equated to a trial, in a regular Court. At the same time, the basic norms of enquiry cannot be ignored. The very purpose of appointing an independent person as an Enquiry Officer and providing for presentation of cases before him by the employer, on the one hand, and the employee, on the other hand, connotes the importance of the proceedings. Any conclusion arrived at by an Enquiry Officer must be objective and based upon the relevant material. He cannot jump to conclusions on the basis of surmises. All these basic elements are lacking in the instant cases. The report of the Enquiry Officer was accepted by the. 2nd respondent, and punishment was imposed.
Therefore, this Court holds that the proceedings initiated against the petitioners are vitiated.
The finding on the second issue must be sufficient to set aside the impugned proceedings. However, it needs to be verified whether the punishment imposed against the petitioners'' accord with the Rules; assuming that the enquiry report and thereby, the other proceedings is not otherwise vitiated. The nature of punishment imposed on the petitioners has already been pointed out in the preceding paragraphs. In addition to directing recovery of the paid amount, the basic salary of the petitioners was reduced by two stages, permanently. The 1st respondent treated Regulation 39(1) is the source of his power to impose the said penalty. The provision reads as under:
Regulation-39(1): Without prejudice to the provisions of other regulations, any one or more of the following penalties for good and sufficient reasons, and as hereinafter provided, be imposed by the disciplinary authority specified in Schedule I on an employee who commits a breach of regulations of the Corporation, or who displays negligence, inefficiency or indolence or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interest of the Corporation, or conflicting with the instructions or who commits a breach of discipline, or is guilty of any other act prejudicial to good conduct
(a) censure;
(b) withholding of one or more increments either permanently or for a specified period;
(c) recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by negligence or breach of orders;
(d) reduction to a lower service, or post, or to a lower time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale;
(e) compulsory retirement;
(f) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment;
(g) dismissal.
While Clause (1)(b) relates to withholding of increments, which are due to an employee, in future; Clause 1(d) empowers the management to deny the benefit of the increments, that have already accrued. Regulation 39(1)(d) does not provide for reduction of basic pay, that too, on permanent basis.
It is sought to be urged that the punishment is the one of reduction to a lower stage, in a time-scale. The expression used, however, is the "basic pay". The very concept of "basic pay" connotes that it is basic to the post, and the salary for the post cannot be less than that. A literal meaning of the punishment imposed against the petitioners is that, for the rest of the career, they have to languish at a pay, which is far less than the basic, stipulated for the post. Neither the Regulation provides for it, nor such a practice is in vogue, in any other organization.
The 2nd respondent did not bestow his attention to these aspects, while dealing with the appeals preferred by the petitioners, and has mechanically dismissed the same.
Therefore, the writ petitions are allowed, and the impugned orders are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.