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Judgment
S. Nainar Sundaram, J.—The petitioner was admittedly in unauthorised occupation of the premises in question. Earlier, proceedings were
initiated under the Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1960 (Act 27 of 1960), hereinafter referred to as ''the
Public Premises Act''. The petitioner stood evicted from the premises in question and it is accepted that the eviction took place in 1973.
Subsequently, proceedings have been initiated for levy of assessment under the Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act, 1905 (Act 3 of 1905)
hereinafter referred to as ''the Land Encroachment Act''. Initially levy was made by the, third respondent and that was modified'' by the Second
respondent and the levy was reduced to a considerable extent. Yet the petitioner is not satisfied and he is now before this Court by way of this
Writ Petition, impeaching the levy.
Mr. M.I. Meera Sahib, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would urge a subtle point and that is, the provisions of the Public Premises Act
having admittedly come into, force to the area in question and further in the instant case, the process under the said. Act having been set in motion,
the provisions of the Land, Encroachment Act cannot be resorted to because the said provisions have ceased to have force by virtue of Section 9
of the Public Premises Act. Section 9 of the Public Premises Act reads as follows:
Madras Act III of 1905 and Travancore Cochin Act 19 of 1951 not to apply to unauthorised occupation as defined in this Act - Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1905 (Madras Act 3 of 1905) and the Travancore-Cochin Land Conservancy Act,
1951 (Travancore-Cochin Act 19 of 1951) the provisions of those Acts shall, in any area in which this Act has come into force, cease to have
effect in relation to any unauthorised occupation as defined in this Act, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the date of the
commencement of this Act.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner says that this point was specifically taken in a representation to the first respondent on 6th January, 1978, and in
fart, the order of the first respondent, dated 9th April, 1979, which is being impugned in the writ petition, refers to this representation as item 3 in
the references cited and yet there had been no adjudication over this question. This submission is sound as the authority disposing of the revision,
the first-respondent must advert to all the relevant points taken by the party before him, and failure to consider the relevant aspects will certainly
cause prejudice to the party concerned. It is the duty of the revisional authority to advert to and adjudicate this question first and in the absence of
such adjudication by the first respondent, I do not think that this Court, exercising writ jurisdiction, would decide the question for the first time and
pass orders on merits. That would amount to this Court converting itself into the revisional authority and passing the orders, which the revisional
authority should have passed. However extensive the Writ jurisdiction may be, yet it is not wide or large enough to enable this Court to convert
itself into either a Court of Appeal or a Court of Revision, decide a point, which was omitted to be decided by the Appellate Authority or the
Revisional Authority and substitute its own orders in the place of the orders that ought to have been passed by such authority. The jurisdiction of
this Court is confined to quashing the impugned order, if there is a ground for doing so, and it shall not extend to substitution by this Court of its
own orders, thus depriving the authority of its discretion to pass orders on merits. Mr. P. Chandrasekaran, learned Government Advocate also
admits that the matter could be adjudicated by the revisional authority afresh and a decision given one way or the other, and if the petitioner is still
aggrieved, he can agitate the matter afresh. Learned Government Advocate would also submit that on a reading of Section 9 of the Public
Premises Act, it is not possible to say that the provisions of the Land/Encroachment Act even with regard to levy shall cease to have force and
Section 9 of the Public Premises Act could have reference only to eviction of unauthorised occupation. This point also could be considered by the
revisional authority. Since there is a failure on the part of the first-respondent to adjudicate the relevant aspects, I feel obliged to interfere in Writ
jurisdiction for the limited purpose of remitting the matter back to the revisional authority for him to consider the same afresh, adverting to and
adjudicating the above questions and passing the appropriate orders in accordance with law. This Writ Petition is allowed in the above terms. No
costs.