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Judgment
ORDER
By Hon’ble Mr. Mohan Pyare, Member (A)
Present Original Application has been filed by the applicant with the prayer for a direction to the respondents to appoint the applicant on the post of Gramin Dak Sewak in the post office-Singaha, District- Kushinagar in place of his father substitute and also prayed for a direction to the respondents to take action on the application/ representation dated 06.04.2018 (A-3 to this O.A.) of the applicant and decide the same within stipulated period fixed by this Tribunal.
Brief facts of the case are that the father of the applicant who was working as Gramin Dak Sewak in the post office Singaha, Page 1 of 7 District- Kushinagar suffered from paralysis and was under treatment since March 2001. The father of the applicant, being confined to bed, moved an application for granting leave for his treatment from 20.03.2001 to 20.05.2001 and made arrangement for his son to work as substitute to perform his duties and the name of the applicant was approved as substitute by the authority concerned. The applicant performed the duty as a substitute on the post of Gramin Dak Sewak without any break up to 15.08.2002 and was in receipt of the allowances. The applicant had performed his duty for more than 180 days in one calendar year and thereafter without any notice, the applicant was orally restrained from duty since 16.08.2002. The applicant approached the authorities concerned but no action was taken. Then the applicant gave a representation/ application through a registered post for his appointment on the post of Gramin Dak Sewak but till today no action has been taken on the same.
Heard learned counsel appearing for both the parties on the Delay Condonation Application.
Submission of learned counsel for the applicant is that the applicant has performed his duty as substitute of his father on the post of Gramin Dak Sewak since 20.03.2001 to 15.08.2002 without any break and from 16.08.2002 the applicant has been restrained from performing duty. He states that the applicant has been continuously approaching before the authority concerned for his appointment on the post of Gramin Dak Sewak in place of his father but no heed has been given by the authority concerned on the prayer of the applicant. Then the applicant moved an application under RTI Act on 10.01.2018. Pursuant to the application dated 10.01.2018 of the applicant, the authority concerned provided incomplete and misconceived information to the applicant on 30.01.2018. He states that the applicant filed an appeal against the information given to him under the RTI Act on 03.02.2018 on which the authority concerned did not provide complete information vide its reply dated 07.03.2018 against Page 2 of 7 which the applicant moved a second appeal under RTI Act on 21.03.2018 on which the Superintendent of Post Office Deoria has given reply on 24.03.2018 stating therein that there is no any record of the applicant with regard to appointment as substitute in his office. Then the applicant filed his objection on 27.04.2018 and again moved an application on 19.05.2018 for providing his records and proviso under which he has been given appointment as substitute to which the authority concerned again did not provide complete information. Aggrieved by the arbitrary action of the authority concerned, the applicant again moved the first appeal on 22.06.2018 and the appeals of the applicant were collectively decided on 03.07.2018 by the Central Information Commission. Then, having lost all hopes due to the arbitrary action of the respondents, the applicant approached this Tribunal. He states that the post of Gramin Dak Sewak in the post Office of Singaha, District- Kushinagar is still vacant and the applicant has experience of the same and being unemployed, he is ready to perform the duty. Thus, he states that delay that has occurred in filing the present Original Application is due to the above reasons and prays that the same may be condoned in the interest of justice otherwise the applicant will suffer irreparable loss and injury.
Submission of learned counsel for the respondents is that the applicant has worked as substitute in place of his father when he was on medical leave during 20.03.2001 to 20.05.2001 and after about 18 years he is claiming for his regularization in the department on the post of GDS MS. The applicant has not explained any reason of the delay in filing the Original Application. He states that the present Original Application is highly time barred in view of Section 21 of Central Administrative Tribunal Act 1985 and liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. He further submits that it is also held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Singh Vs. UOI and others (reported in 1992 ATC (21) 675 followed by the Full Bench Decision in the case of Jacob Abraham Vs. UOI and others reported in 1994 ATC Page 3 of 7 (28) 177 that making of successive representation would not give rise to fresh cause of action. 6. We have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire document on record.
Section 21 of Central Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 dealing with the subject of limitation reads as under:-
“(1)A Tribunal shall not admit an application, -
(a)in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;
(b)in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.
(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where –
(a)the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates ; and
(b)no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or , as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.
(3)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (10020) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section(2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period”.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India &Ors.(JT 1994(3) S.C. 126) has held that if the parties “.......... choose to sleep over their rights and remedies for an inordinately long time, the court may well choose to decline to interfere........”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Singh Vs. Union of India and others reported in (1992) 3 SCC 136, also held that:- “ Inordinate and unexplained delay or latches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner irrespective of the merit of his claim.” Further, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Harnam Singh reported in AIR (1993) SCC page 1367, has been pleased to observe that “The law of limitation may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigour and the Courts or Tribunals cannot come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow the period of limitation to expire.” In addition to this, Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in its judgment dated 17.10.2014 passed in Civil Appeal No. 9849 of 2014 titled State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others in paragraph had ruled that:
“23)The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under:
(1)Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
(2)However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
(3)However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.
24)Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did not chalelnge these cancelleation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not only there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above.”
The applicant has been disengaged from his duties since 16.08.2002. It must also not be ignored that the memo dated 23.04.2001 granting leave without allowance to Shri Paras Nath Tiwari, father of the applicant, has approved the applicant’s engagement as a substitute “on his risk and responsibility”. As per Section 21 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, the applicant ought to have approached this Tribunal within one year from the date when the cause of action arose whereas he has approached this Court in the year 2018 which is after a long time of 16 years after his disengagement. Mere filing of successive representations/ applications and appeals on part of the applicant at a belated stage will not extend the period of limitation as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.S. Rathore Vs. State of M.P. reported in 1989 4 SCC 582, wherein it has been pleased to observe that “repeated representation/reminders does not give rise to limitation.” Thus, the present Original Application suffers from the infirmity of delay and laches. Therefore, in view of the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above mentioned cases and the deliberations made hereinabove, the Delay Condonation Application is liable to be rejected. Thus, M.A./2611/2018 (Delay Condonation Application) is rejected.
Since the Delay Condonation Application is rejected, the Original Application No.1023/2018 also stands dismissed on the ground of delay without entering into the merits of the case. All associated M.A.s also stand disposed of. No costs.