Brijinder Singh vs Bank Of Baroda

Per: Barun Mitra, Member (Technical)

Present is an appeal which has been filed by the Appellant-Brijinder Singh under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, (‘IBC’ in short) challenging the order dated 03.02.2025 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Division Bench, Court–V, New Delhi) in I.A. No.3223/2022 in C.P. (IB) No.189/ND/2022.

This appeal has been e-filed on 29.03.2025. The Appeal has been accompanied with I.A No. 7024 of 2024 which is an application praying for condonation for 9 days delay in filing of the appeal. The prayers contained in I.A No. 7024 of 2024 read as follows:

The Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the NCLT registry had informed the Appellant on 04.02.2025 about the Impugned Order dated 03.02.2025 through e-mail. However, due to certain reasons beyond the control of the Appellant, the appeal could be filed on 29.03.2025 with delay and hence the present application seeking delay condonation. Making further submissions, it was pointed out that the reasons for delay as recorded in the accompanying application was on account of time taken in obtaining certified copy of the impugned order; ill health of the counsel and time taken in coordinating with the Registry. It was also submitted that the delay caused was neither intentional nor deliberate and therefore if the delay is not condoned, it will gravely prejudice the interests of the Appellant.

The submissions made by the Appellant in the aforesaid I.A. seeking delay condonation is as extracted here-under:

 “The Applicant above named states that the Applicant/Appellant herein has preferred the present appeal under Section 61 of the Code impugning the order dated 03.02.2025 passed by the Hon'ble National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi, Bench IV in I.A. No. 3223/ND/2022 in Company Petition No. (IB)- 189 (ND)/2022. The impugned order dated 03.02.2025 was informed to the Appellant on 04.02.2025 through email from the registry.

 It is submitted that the Appellant thereafter through counsel applied for the certified copy of the Impugned Order on 06.03.2025. The registry informed that the certified copy of the order would be ready in two weeks. The clerk of the Appellants counsel went to the registry on 17.03.2025 initially when he was informed that the certified copy would be ready within 2 days. The clerk thereafter went on 19.03.2025 however the same wasn't ready. He went the very next day i.e. 20.03.2025 when he was informed that the copy was printed however unstamped and was asked to come on Monday. The clerk thereafter on Monday i.e. 24.03.2025 went and learned that the copy was printed and stamped on 21.03.2025 however, the registry still did not handover the copy to the clerk stating that an authority letter from the Appellant or his counsel would be required in order to receive the copy which came as a shock to him since he was the one who filed for applying the certified copy and had the receipt of the application of certified copy in his hands. The counsel for the Appellant was extremely ill while suffering an attack of chronic pancreatitis and was strictly subjected to complete bed rest since the pain suffering is unbearable in such kind of condition in consequence of which he could not provide the authority letter on account of which the certified copy of the Impugned Order is still lying with the registry of the Hon'ble Tribunal and the clerk had to file the memorandum of appeal without the certified copy.

 It is most humbly submitted that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate and solely on account of such unforeseen circumstances. It is submitted that the actual delay was only 3 days on account of the ill health of the counsel and the other 3 days on account of the miscommunication and misunderstanding between the registry and the clerk. It is submitted that the in case the delay is not condoned, grave prejudice and irreparable loss shall be caused to the Appellant who has absolutely no mistake and simply seeking relief from this Hon'ble Tribunal. It is submitted that the Appellant who is a senior citizen, has approached this Hon’ble Tribunal with folded hands and clean intent and Bonafide. That the Applicant further states in case the delay is not condoned, the irreparable loss and prejudice shall be caused to the Appellant. That the Applicant further states if the delay is condoned, no prejudice shall be caused to the Respondent. It is further stated that there has been no gross negligence, inaction or lack of bonafide on the part of the Appellant and the delay was purely inadvertent and beyond the control of the Appellant and a liberal approach may be taken by this Hon'ble Tribunal while deciding the current application.”

We have heard the Learned Counsel for the Appellant at length and perused the records.

Coming to the statutory construct of the IBC, the limitation for filing an appeal under Section 61(2) of the IBC is 30 days which period is extendable for a further period of 15 days if the Tribunal is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within limitation. Section 61(2) reads to the effect:

When we look at the facts of the present case, we notice that the impugned order was passed on 03.02.2025. We also notice that the Appellant has admitted that the NCLT Registry had informed the Appellant about the impugned order on 04.02.2025. It is well settled that for the purpose of computation of limitation, the date of e-filing of the Appeal is to be treated as the date of filing and we notice that the present appeal was e-filed on 29.03.2025. For counting the statutory period of 30 days for filing the appeal, the same is to be counted from the day after the date of pronouncement of the impugned order. Calculated accordingly, the statutory period of 30 days for filing the appeal in the present case stood expired on 05.03.2025. The further extendable period of 15 days in terms of proviso to Section 60 (2) ended on 20.03.2025. However, since the present appeal has been e-filed on 29.03.2025, it clearly lies beyond the outer limit of thirty plus fifteen days provided under Section 61(2) of the IBC.

The counsel for the Appellant tried to justify the delay on the ground of time taken in obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order. When an order is passed by the Adjudicating Authority, it casts an obligation upon the aggrieved party to apply for a certified copy within the period of limitation if the benefit under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is sought to be claimed. It is well settled law that an application for certified copy made after the expiry of the prescribed limitation period cannot be relied upon for exclusion of time for which reliance is placed on the judgment of this Tribunal in Gaurav Agarwal Vs CA Devang P Sampat Liquidator of Maa Mahamaya Steels Pvt. Ltd in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 916 of 2022 which is reproduced below:

It is an admitted fact that the Appellant had applied for the certified copy of the impugned order on 06.03.2025. In the present case since the certified copy of the impugned order was sought by the Appellant on 06.03.2025 which date was clearly after the expiry of the 30 days limitation period, the benefit under Section 12 of the Limitation Act does not accrue to the Appellant in the present case.

We are therefore of the considered view that this Appeal has been filed beyond the condonable period of 15 days. The jurisdiction of this Appellate Tribunal to condone delay being strictly limited by statute, we are unable to condone the delay in filing the Appeal.

Present is another appeal which has been filed by the Appellant-Ratna Singh under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, (‘IBC’ in short) challenging the order dated 03.02.2025 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Division Bench, Court–V, New Delhi) in I.A. No.3220/2022 in C.P. (IB) No.191/ND/2022. This appeal has been e-filed on 31.03.2025. The Appeal has been accompanied with I.A No. 7060 of 2024 which is an application praying for condonation for 11 days delay in filing of the appeal. The reasons for delay given in I.A No. 7060 of 2024 are similar to I.A No. 7024 of 2024 in Company Appeal No.1801 of 2025. We also notice that in this case too, the Appellant has admitted that the NCLT Registry had informed the Appellant about the impugned order dated 03.02.2025 on 04.02.2025. Like in the Company Appeal No.1801 of 2025, even in the present case too, the statutory period of 30 days for filing the appeal in the present case stood expired on 05.03.2025 and the further extendable period of 15 days in terms of proviso to Section 60 (2) ended on 20.03.2025. Keeping in mind that the present appeal was e-filed on 31.03.2025, the date of filing is clearly beyond the condonable period of 15 days and therefore beyond the condonable jurisdiction of this Appellate Tribunal.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that both the Appeals have been filed beyond the condonable period of 15 days. The jurisdiction of this Appellate Tribunal to condone delay being strictly limited by statute, we are unable to condone the delay in the filing of both these Appeals. Accordingly, the delay condonation applications are dismissed. Consequently, both the Memos of Appeal and related I.A.s are rejected.