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Judgment
The present petition is filed assailing the orders dated 26.09.2025 passed by the respondent no. 4 District Magistrate, Singrauli which was duly affirming by the order dated 7.4.2026 passed by the Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of externment has been dismissed.
It is the case of the petitioner that in pursuance to the letter written by the City Superintendent of Police, Vindhyanagar addressed to the Superintendent of Police, Singrauli, pointing out a report for initiating externment proceedings under Section 5 of the M. P. State Security Adhiniyam, 1990 against the petitioner, on the ground that the petitioner is habitual offender and as many as 12 criminal cases are registered against him. The Superintendent of Police, submitted a report to the District Magistrate, Singrauli and requested for initiation of externment proceeding under Section 5 of the Act, 1990. Based upon the report submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Singrauli, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner which was duly replied by the petitioner with detailed explanation and documents pointing out that some of the case have been closed against him on the basis of the compromise. The petitioner has also made a complaint to the higher authorities for a fair inquiry into the matter, even before registration of the FIR.
It is argued that the petitioner is a licensed money lender operating registered financial business. Without considering the reply submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice, the proceedings were continued and District Magistrate passed the externment order on 26.9.2025 directing the petitioner to leave the district for a period of one year within 24 hours. Appeal preferred against the same under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, has been dismissed by the Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa in mechanical manner without considering the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. Therefore, this petition is filed.
It is argued that a list of 15 criminal cases registered against the petitioner has been shown by the respondents. In the Crime no.1174/2020 registered at Police station Baidhan the petitioner has been acquitted. In the Crime no.686/2020 registered at Police Station Baidhan the case was closed in Lok Adalat on the basis of Compromise. In the Crime no. 485/2021 registered at Police Station Baidhan the trail is pending. In the Crime no.552/2021 registered at Police Station Baidhan the same is closed in Lok Adalat on the basis of compromise. In crime no.955/2021 registered at Police Station Baidhan the petitioner was acquitted. In the Crime no. 405/2021 and 411/2011 registered at Police Station Nawanagar the trial is pending. In the crime no. 202/2022 registered at Police Station Baidhan the petitioner was acquitted. In the Crime no.447/2022, 997/2022, 656/202 and 1054/2024 registered at Police Station Baidhan, trail are pending and In Istaghasha no.80/2021 and 196/2023 was registered at Police Station Baidhan under section 110 CrPC and Istaghasha no.168/2024 under section 126 BNS Act.
From the aforesaid, it is clear that the petitioner has been acquitted in 3 cases and 2 cases have been closed on the basis of the compromise in Lok Adalat and 3 cases are related to Ishtaghasha and for other 6 cases, trial are pending. The petitioner has not yet been convicted in any of the cases registered against him.
It is argued that last case was registered against the petitioner in the year 2024 and since thereafter, the petitioner is not involved in any of the criminal activities, therefore, requirement in terms of Section 5 of the Adhiniyam, 1990 is not fulfilled and the impugned order is in violation of Section 5 and 5 (b) of the Adhiniyam, 1990. He has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Ramgopal Ragjhuvanshi vs. State of M.P. and others, 2014(4) MPLJ 654 and Sanju @ Sanjay Ben Vs. State of M.P. and others, 2005 (4) MPHT 102. It is argued that the old and stale cases cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of externment proceedings. The authorities have to show the close proximity of the petitioner with the commissioner of offence.
He has also relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Ashok Kumar Patel vs. State of M.P. and others, 2009 (4) MPLJ 434, wherein a definite opinion with respect to the witnesses who are not willing to come forward to give evidence should be recorded and the order could be passed. The same is not reflected from the impugned order or from the report submitted by the Superintendent of Police. Therefore, he has prayed for quashment of the orders impugned in this petition.
On notice being issued, a reply has been filed by the respondents authorities supporting the impugned orders. They have denied the petition averments. It is argued that Madhya Rajya Surksha Adhiniyam 1990 (for brevity mentioned as Act 1990) is an special act and was enacted to provide for the security of the State, maintenance of public order and certain other matters connected therewith. As per the statement of object and reasons the Act, was warranted for want of adequate enabling provisions in existing laws for taking effective preventive action to counteract activities of antisocial elements Government have been handicapped to maintain law and order. In order to take timely and effective preventive action the Government is armed with such a provision as provided under the Adhiniyam, 1990, therefore, the action was taken against the petitioner. Prior to passing a final order in the matter, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the District Magistrate based upon the report submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Singrauli who has recommended for externment of the petitioner. If the recommendation submitted by the Superintendent of police is seen, then it is clear that as many as 15 criminal cases are registered against the petitioner and preventive proceedings were also initiated against the petitioner being the habitual offender.
The provisions as contained in Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 13 of the Act are duly complied with by the authorities prior to issuing the externment order. Even the appeal preferred against the order passed by the District Magistrate has been dismissed and the order of the District Magistrate was affirmed by the Commissioner. There is concurrent finding recorded by both the authorities. SHO, Police Station Kotwali, District Singrauli vide its letter dated 19.9.2024 written to the Superintendent of Police, Singrauli reveals that the petitioner is having a long criminal history and report is also giving details of the list of the witnesses.
In terms of Section 8 (1) of the Act, 1990, notices have been issued to the petitioner on 25.9.2024 and on 14.10.2024 the counsel for the petitioner appeared the Collector and thereafter, on 2.12.2024 reply was submitted by the petitioner and the Collector after hearing the parties passed the order on 26.9.2025 whereby the petitioner was externed from District Singrauli and its adjoining districts for a period of one year. Therefore, initiation of proceedings of externment was started way back in 2024 itself. The authorities have shown direct connectivity of the petitioner and has close proximity with the commission of offence, therefore, the externment is required.
Counsel for the respondents/State has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.277/2024 Leela @ Leeladhar Jatav Vs. State of M.P. & others vide order dated 21.02.2024, wherein it is held that the provision of M.P. State Securities Act is for the purpose to ensure the security of the State, maintenance of the public order and certain other matters connected therewith. Therefore the subjective satisfaction of the authority would be required in order to pass order of externment. In the present case there is subjective satisfaction recorded by the authority in the order passed by the Commissioner. It is further contended that no case is made out warranting interference by this Court in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction. They have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Admitted facts are that the petitioner is having a long criminal record of 15 cases registered against him starting from 2020 till 2024. After registration of a criminal case against the petitioner in 2024 for offence under Sections 296, 127 (1), 351 (2), 3 (5) of BNS and Section 3/4 of Madhya Pradesh Protection of Debtors Act, SHO, Police Station Kotwali District Singrauli has written a letter to the Superintendent of police, Singrauli on 19.9.2024 pointing out the fact that the petitioner is a habitual offender and despite initiation of proceedings on earlier occasion, there is no improvement in his activities and is continuously carrying out with criminal activities, as a result of which, there shall be a threat to the society at large and there is a possibility of law and order situation. Therefore, as proposed to take action for stopping his illegal activities. In pursuance to the same, the matter was considered by the Superintendent of Police, Singrauli and after considering all the criminal activities of the petitioner and observing his subjective satisfaction with respect to criminal case continuously carrying out by the petitioner since 2020, the recommendation was made by the Superintendent of Police taking note of 12 criminal cases registered against the petitioner vide recommendation dated 24.9.2024. The relevant of the recommendation reads as under :-
From perusal of the aforesaid recommendation it is apparently clear that the Superintendent of Police has taken note of 12 criminal cases registered against the petitioner and has observed that there is a gradual increase in the criminal activities of the petitioner and there is threat perception in the local residence of the community. There is a possibility of the law and order situation. There is no improvement in the activity of the petitioner, therefore, recommended for taking initiation of the externment proceedings against the petitioner. In pursuance to the said recommendation made by the Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate, District Singrauli has issued a show cause notice to the petitioner which was duly replied by the petitioner. The District Magistrate after considering the reply of the petitioner and hearing him, passed the externment order on 26.9.2025.
The record indicates that the proceeding of externment was started way back in 2020, therefore, arguments advanced before this Court that the last case was registered in the year 2024 and the order was passed on 26.9.2025 is no help to the petitioner. Reply submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice clearly reflects that he has been acquitted in 3 criminal cases. Two cases have been closed based upon the compromise took place between the parties in Lok Adalat and 6 cases are pending trial. The petitioner has not been convicted in any of the cases till date.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of N.C.T. of Delhi v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 181 had an occasion to deal with Section 47 of the Bombay Police Act, 1978, which contains provisions similar to Section 5 of the Act of 1990 and while referring these essential conditions for passing an order under section 47 of the Delhi Police Act which are also similar to the provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 1990, has held as under :
“Section 47 consists of two parts. First part relates to that satisfaction of the Commissioner of Police or any Authorised Officer reaching a conclusion that movement or act of any person are causing alarm and danger to person or property or that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in commission of enumerated offences or in the abetment of any such offence or is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large hazardous to the community. Opinion of the Concerned Officer has to be formed that witnesses are not willing to come forward in public to give evidence against such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards safety of person or property. After these opinions are formed on the basis of materials forming foundation therefore the Commissioner can pass an order adopting any of the available options as provided in the provision itself. The three options are — (1) to direct such person to so conduct himself as deemed necessary in order to prevent violence and alarm or (2) to direct him to remove himself outside any part of Delhi or (3) to remove himself outside whole of Delhi.”
The second condition which is required to be satisfied for passing of an order of externment against a person is the opinion of the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate has to opinion that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by a reason of apprehension on their part as regards safety of person or property. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gurbachan Singh vs State of Bombay, (1952) 1 SCC 683 while construing a parimateria provision with Section 27 of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902 has observed as under :
“The law is certainly an extra-ordinary one and has been made only to meet those exceptional cases where no witnesses for fear of violence to their person or property are willing to depose publicly against certain bad characters whose presence in certain areas constitute a menace to the safety or the public residing therein.”
In the light of the aforesaid, if the case of the petitioner is analyzed, then it is seen that the District Magistrate in the impugned order has baldly stated that the list of offences registered against the petitioner reflects that he is a habitual criminal and because of his fear and terror in public, nobody is coming forward to depose against the petitioner and the opinion was formed by the District Magistrate for externment. However, the fact remains that who are the witnesses who are not coming forward to depose against the petitioner or the witnesses of the criminal cases which are registered against the petitioner, whether they have approached the Court or in public to give their statements against the petitioner, is not reflected from the opinion of the District Magistrate.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of N.C.T. of Delhi vs Sanjeev alias Bittu (supra) has held that it is not the sufficiency of material but the existence of material which is sine qua non for passing an externment order. The relevant is as under:
“It is true that some material must exist but what is required is not an elaborate decision akin to a judgment. On the contrary, the order directing externment should show existence of some material warranting an order of externment. While dealing with question mere repetition of the provision would not be sufficient. Reference to be made to some material on record and if that is done the requirements of law are met. As noted above, it is not the sufficiency of material but the existence of material which is sine qua non.”
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar v. Dy. Commissioner of Police, State of Maharashtra reported in (1973) 1 SCC 372 had an occasion to consider the similar issue and placing reliance upon the judgment in the case Gurbachan Singh vs State of Bombay, has held that care must be taken to ensure that the terms of sections 56 and 59 of the Bombay Police Act (which is in pari materia with the provisions of 5 of the Adhiniyam) are strictly complied with and that the slender safeguards which those provisions offer are made available to the proposed externee.
The Madhya Pradesh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 imposes serious restrictions on the fundamental right to freedom under Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India as well as right to personal liberty in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Until and unless the conditions mentioned under Section 5(b) of the Adhiniyam, 1990 are strictly satisfied, an order of externment could not have been passed by the authorities. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Patel vs State of M.P. (supra) had an occasion to deal with the similar issue and it is held as under :
"Unless the conditions mentioned under section 5(b) of the M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 are strictly satisfied, an order of externment, will have to be quashed by the Court. The two conditions, for passing an order of externment against a person, to be satisfied are:
(i)There are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is engaged or is about to be engaged in commission of an offence involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII or under section 506 or 509 of the Penal Code, 1860 or in the abetment of any such offence; and
(ii)In the opinion of the District Magistrate, witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property.
In the instant case, the District Magistrate has in the impugned order only baldly stated that the list of offences registered against the petitioner reflects that he is a daring habitual criminal and because of this there is fear and terror in the public and has not recorded any clear opinion on the basis of materials, that in his opinion witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by a reason of apprehension on their part as regards safety of their person or property. Hence, in the absence of any existence of material to show that witnesses are not coming forward by a reason of apprehension to danger to their person or property to give evidence against the petitioner in respect of the alleged offences, an order under section 5(b) of the Act of 1990 cannot be passed by the District Magistrate by merely repeating the language of section 5(b) of the Act of 1990. The two conditions for an order of externment stated in section 5(b) of the Act of 1990 do not exist in this case and the order passed by the District Magistrate and the appellate order of the Commissioner are liable to be quashed.
The coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Nagpure vs State of M.P. and others : WP No. 22524 of 2024 decided on 14.10.2024 has observed as under :
12.If the facts of present case are considered, then it is clear that six criminal cases for offence under Sections 323, 294, 506, 34 of IPC were registered against the petitioner. One offence was registered in the year 2012, one was registered in the year 2018, two were registered in the year 2020, one was registered in the year 2022 and the last one was registered in the year 2023. The recommendation for initiating proceedings under Section 5 of M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam was sent by Superintendent of Police, Balaghat on 17/10/2023.
13.It is well established principle of law that the criminal history must have close proximity with the proceedings under Section 5 of M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that offences registered against the petitioner in the year 2012, 2018, 2020 had any close proximity with the recommendation sent by the Superintendent of Police, Balaghat for initiating proceedings under Section 5 of M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam.
14.So far as the offences under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC are concerned, the same are trivial in nature. No offence of any nature except under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC was ever registered against the petitioner. There is nothing on record that in which case the witnesses had not appeared before the Court on account of pressure/ terror of the petitioner. Old and stale cases cannot be taken into consideration...
17.If the facts and circumstances of this case are tested on the anvil of judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of Deepak (supra) as well as judgments passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the cases of Gangaram (supra) and Meena Sonkar (supra), it is clear that old and stale cases have been taken into consideration. Another two offences which were registered in the year 2022 & 2023 are trivial in nature. There is no material on record to suggest that witnesses were afraid of the petitioner and were not willing to come forward to depose against him. Kamal Singh Gehlot, SHO Police Station Gramin Navegaon in his statement had stated that petitioner has been convicted in some of the trials which clearly means that witnesses were not afraid of the petitioner and they were deposing against him. Furthermore, it is clear from the statement of SHO Police Station Gramin Navegaon, District Balaghat that the very purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 5 of M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam was to keep the petitioner away from election proceedings.
The coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Gangaram vs Commissioner, Indore Division, reported in 2021 SCC OnLine MP 6019 had an occasion to deal with the object and reasons of the Adhiniyam and considering the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :
10.It is also not disputed that in the show cause notice, reference of only one case was made, which was registered on 24-9-2018; and the show cause notice was issued on 11-9-2020 i.e. after almost two years of the registration of the offence, whereas the impugned order has been passed by the District Magistrate, Burhanpur on 7-12-2020. Thus, it is apparent that not only that the impugned order has been passed after two years of the case registered against the petitioner, but it also contained reference of one more case registered against the petitioner on 14-10-2020. This Court in the case of Sudeep Patel v. State of M.P., (2018) 3 MP LJ 413 passed in M.P. No. 904/2017 on 9-1-2018 has already held that the purpose of initiation of extemment proceedings is to restrain a person from committing another offence in the near future and in such circumstances the order of extemment must be passed within the close proximity of the offences committed by the petitioner. The relevant paras of the same are reads as under:—
“8.In the considered opinion of this Court, the learned District Magistrate while passing the impugned order was oblivious of the statement of object and reasons of Madhya Pradesh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 which provides as under:
“STATEMENT OF OBJECT AND REASONS
For want of adequate enabling provisions in existing laws for taking effective preventive action to counteract activities of anti-social elements Government have been handicapped to maintain law and order. In order to take timely and effective preventive action it is felt that the Government should be armed with adequate power to nip the trouble in the bud so that peace, tranquility and orderly Government may not be endangered.
(2)xxx xxx xxx
(3)xxx xxx xxx
(4)xxx xxx xxx”
9.Even according to section 3 of the Adhiniyam of 1990 which is in respect of power to make restriction order, it is for preventing any person from acting prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. Thus the sole purpose of the Adhiniyam of 1990 is to act timely and effectively to initiate preventive action against a wrongdoer, which object, in the considered opinion of this Court has been totally lost sight of while passing the impugned order. As is already observed that the show cause notice was issued on 11-6-2015, the reply was filed by the petitioner on 14-7-2015 and thereafter the final order was passed by the District Magistrate after recording the statements of various police personnel on 23-5-2017, whereas the District Magistrate ought to have proceeded with the matter expeditiously without affording any undue adjournments to either of the parties and passed the order within a reasonable time but the matter was kept pending for almost two years. In such circumstances, although no period of limitation is provided in the Adhiniyam, but still, the order should have been passed by the District Magistrate within a reasonable time frame. The order in itself was passed by the District Magistrate within a period of around two years and during this entire period the petitioner was roaming around freely and there is no allegation that during this period also he committed any offense, thus the application of the provisions of Adhiniyam appears to be totally redundant.
10.The District Magistrates, exercising their powers under the Adhiniyam must understand that it is not a mere formality which they have to perform before passing the order of externment under the Adhiniyam which directly affects a person's life and liberty guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India. This Court is of the opinion that in a way, the preventive detention is akin to the provisions of externment under the Adhiniyam for both these measures are preventive in nature and are enacted with a view to provide safe environment to the public at large. The only difference being that in case of preventive detention, the threat is imminent and serious whereas in case of extemment, its degree is somewhat obtuse and mollified and is not as serious as it is in the case of preventive detention. The necessity to pass an order of preventive detention has been emphasized by the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande, (2008) 3 SCC 613 which is equally applicable to the cases of extemment. The relevant paras of the same read as under:—
“Preventive detention : Meaning and concept
32.There is no authoritative definition of “preventive detention” either in the Constitution or in any other statute. The expression, however, is used in contradistinction to the word “punitive”. It is not a punitive or penal provision but is in the nature of preventive action or precautionary measure. The primary object of preventive detention is not to punish a person for having done something but to intercept him before he does it. To put it differently, it is not a penalty for past activities of an individual but is intended to pre-empt the person from indulging in future activities sought to be prohibited by a relevant law and with a view to preventing him from doing harm in future.
33.In Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B. explaining the concept of preventive detention, the Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking through Ray, C.J. stated :
“19.The essential concept of preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. The basis of detention is die satisfaction of the executive of a reasonable probability of the likelihood of the detenu acting in a manner similar to his past acts and preventing him by detention from doing the same. A criminal conviction on the other hand is for an act already done which can only be possible by a trial and legal evidence. There is no parallel between prosecution in a Court of law and a detention order under the Act. One is a punitive action and the other is a preventive act. In one case a person is punished on proof of his guilt and the standard is proof beyond reasonable doubt whereas in preventive detention a man is prevented from doing something which it is necessary for reasons mentioned in section 3 of the Act to prevent.”
34.In another leading decision in Khudiram Das v. State of W.B. this Court stated :
“8.… The power of detention is clearly a preventive measure. It does not partake in any manner of the nature of punishment. It is taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the community. Since every preventive measure is based on the principle that a person should be prevented from doing something which, if left free and unfettered, it is reasonably probable he would do, it must necessarily proceed in all cases, to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. pointed out in State of Madras v. V.G. Row that preventive detention is ‘largely precautionary and based on suspicion’ and to these observations may be added the following words uttered by the learned Chief Justice in that case with reference to the observations of Lord Finlay in R. v. Halliday, namely, that ‘the Court was the least appropriate tribunal to investigate into circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory action must be largely based’. This being the nature of the proceeding, it is impossible to conceive how it can possibly be regarded as capable of objective assessment. The matters which have to be considered by the detaining authority are whether the person concerned, having regard to his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances and other relevant material, would be likely to act in a prejudicial manner as contemplated in any of sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Clause (1) of sub-section (1) of section 3, and if so, whether it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from so acting …”
35.Recently, in Naresh Kumar Goyal v. Union of India the Court said :
“8.It is trite law that an order of detention is not a curative or reformative or punitive action, but a preventive action, avowed object of which being to prevent the anti-social and subversive elements from imperiling the welfare of the country or the security of the nation or from disturbing the public tranquility or from indulging in smuggling activities or from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, etc. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The authorities on the subject have consistently taken the view that preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it, and to prevent him from doing so. It, therefore, becomes imperative on the part of the detaining authority as well as the executing authority to be very vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in securing the detenu and executing the detention order because any indifferent attitude on the part of the detaining authority or executing authority will defeat the very purpose of preventive action and turn the detention order as a dead letter and frustrate the entire proceedings. Inordinate delay, for which no adequate explanation is furnished, led to the assumption that the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped. (See P.U. Iqbal v. Union of India, Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Admn. and Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of T.N.)”
11.Thus, testing the validity of the impugned order on the anvil of the principles so laid down by the Apex Court, it becomes manifestly clear that the order is flawed and cannot be sustained as there is an inordinate delay in passing the impugned order, which has led to loose its effectiveness.”
Again, in the case of Meena Sonkar vs State of M.P. , reported in (2017) 2 MP LJ 565, this Court relying upon the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Patel (supra) has held as under :
16.Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Patel v. State of M.P., 2009 (4) M.P.L.J. 434 after considering section 5 of the Act held thus: “8. The expression is engaged or is about to be engaged” in the commission of offence involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII or under section 506 or 509 of the Penal Code, 1860 or in the abetment of any such offence, shows that the commission of the offence or the abetment of such offence by the person must have a very close proximity to the date on which the order is proposed to be passed under section 5(b) of the Act of 1990. Hence, if a person was engaged in the commission of offence or in abetment of an offence of the type mentioned in section 5(b), several years or several months back, there cannot be any reasonable ground for believing that the person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of such offence.”
If the aforesaid observations are taken into consideration, then it is apparently clear that the recommendations made by the Superintendent of Police should reflect the subjective satisfaction recorded by him. The Superintendent of Police has observed that there is a threat of the petitioner in the society and the people are not coming forward to depose against the petitioner. The recommendation is silent about the aforesaid effect that who are the people who are not coming forward to depose against the petitioner. The effect of acquittal of the petitioner in three cases and closure of two cases on the basis of the compromise have not been taken into consideration by the Superintendent of Police. Merely on the basis of the report submitted by the SHO, the Superintendent of Police has made recommendation to the District Magistrate for initiation of externment proceeding against the petitioner.
The M.P. Rajya Surakasha Adhiniyam, 1990 has been enacted to provide for the security of the State, maintenance of public order and certain other matters connected therewith. Section 5 thereof under which the order of externment has been passed, is important and quoted hereinbelow -
“5.Removal of persons about to commit offence. - Whenever it appears to the District Magistrate -
(a)that the movements or acts of any person are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property; or
(b)that there are reasonably grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII or under section 506 or 509 of the Penal Code, 1860 or in the abetment of any such offence, and when in the opinion of the District Magistrate witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property; or
(c)that an outbreak of epidemic disease is likely to result from the continued residence of an immigrant; the District Magistrate, may by an order in writing duly served on him or by beat of drum or otherwise as the District Magistrate thinks fit, direct such person or immigrant -
(a)so as to conduct himself as shall seem necessary in order to prevent violence and alarm or the outbreak or spread of such disease; or
(b)to remove himself outside the district or any part thereof or such area and any district or districts or any part thereof, contiguous thereto by such route within such time as the District Magistrate may specify and not to enter or return to the said district or part thereof or such area and such contiguous districts, or part thereof, as the case may be, from which he was directed to remove himself.”
From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is apparently clear that there should be reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence as mentioned under Section 5(b) of the Adhiniyam, 1990. The order of externment has to be passed considering the close proximity of time when the offences are committed by the accused. The second aspect which is required to be considered is the opinion of the District Magistrate to the effect that the witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property. These two conditions are required to be satisfied by the authorities prior to passing the externment order.
However, prior to passing such orders, the District Magistrate has to follow the entire procedure as provided under the Adhiniyam. An opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the concerning person before passing any order of externment under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Adhiniyam. If such a person makes an application for the examination of any witness produced by him, the District Magistrate shall grant such application and examine such witnesses unless for reason to be recorded in writing, the District Magistrate is of opinion that such application is made for vexation purpose or to cause delay. Any written statement made by such person shall be a part of the record.
The entire procedure as contemplated is not followed by the District Magistrate while passing the impugned order, even the grounds raised by the petitioner in his appeal have not been considered by the Commissioner. The learned Commissioner has affirmed the order passed by the District Magistrate without analyzing the factual and legal aspect of the matter.
The Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Deepak Vs. State of M.P., reported in AIR 2022 SC 1241 has held that the order of externment restraining the accused from entering a particular area infringes his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (d) of the Constitution of India.
If the aforesaid principles are applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is clear that old and stale cases have been taken into consideration by the authorities for forming an opinion to pass the externment order against the petitioner. There is no material placed on record to suggest that who are the witnesses who are not coming forward to depose against the petitioner. There was no concrete material to show that witnesses in pending criminal cases were refusing to testify in court due to apprehension of harm. Further, there was no recent incident of violence or grave threat close to the date of the externment order that could demonstrate an immediate and ongoing risk to public order or property. The order of externment cannot be justified merely on the basis of old, stale and largely minor cases. There must be a live link between the person’s current conduct and the perceived threat to society.
Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case and in the backdrop of the settled legal proposition enunciated in the aforesaid cases, this Court finds that the order passed by the District Magistrate, District Singrauli for externing the petitioner from the District Singrauli and nearby places does not stand the judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, the same is unsustainable.
Hence, the order dated 7.4.2026 passed by the Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa and the order dated 26.9.2025 passed by the District Magistrate, District Singrauli, are hereby quashed.
Consequently, the petition is allowed and disposed of finally. No order as to costs.
Record be returned to the Government Advocate.