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Judgment
M.M. Kumar, J.—This is a tenant''s revision petition filed under Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Haryana (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for brevity, ''the Act'') challenging concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below. After the failure of the tenant-petitioner before the Rent Controller, Faridabad for determination of fair rent u/s 4 of the Act and Consequential relief of recovery and adjustment, he filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, Faridabad which met with the same fate. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on 7.1.1986 and feeling aggrieved against that order the tenant-petitioner has approached this Court by way of instant revision petition.
Facts necessary for deciding the controversy raised in the present revision petition are that the tenant-petitioner has been a statutory tenant under the landlord-respondent who filed an ejectment petition against him claiming rent at the rate of Rs. 450/- p.m. The tenant-petitioner had paid the rent at the rate of Rs. 35/- p.m. and yet to avoid ejectment, he tendered the rent as claimed by the landlord-respondent. However, he, lateron, filed Application No. 69/2 of 1983 on 26.7.1983 in which prayer was made for fixing the fair rent of the rented premises at Rs. 35/- p.m. exclusive of house tax etc. and also sought recovery of the excess rent paid. The present petition has arisen out of the proceedings initiated by Application No. 69/2 of 1983. The application was contested and on the basis of pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller framed the following issues:-
Whether the standard rent of the shop in question is liable to be declared at Rs. 35/- per month inclusive of house tax, as alleged? OPP
Whether the respondent is liable to adjust the sum of Rs. 4225/- in the rent towards the future interest? OPP
Whether the petitioner has paid a sum of Rs. 4225/- in excess towards the rent of the shop in question as alleged? OPP
Whether the respondent is liable to be restrained from recovering the rent of the shop in question till the amount of Rs. 4225/- is adjusted? OPP
Whether the petition is not maintainable? OPR
Whether the proper court fee has not been paid? OPR
Whether no cause of action to file the present petition, against the respondent? OPR
The Rent Controller recorded a categorical finding of fact that neither the date of construction of the building nor the agreed rate of rent between the parties was proved. In other words, the requirement of Sections 4 and 7 of the Act remained unsatisfied. Therefore, no relief either u/s 4 or Section 7 of the Act could be granted. The tenant-petitioner then filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority assailing the findings recorded by the Rent Controller in her order dated 3.8.1985. Accepting the findings recorded by the Rent Controller on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Authority observed as under:-
"I have given my considered thought to this aspect of controversy. Ex.R1 is the copy of statement made by the counsel for tenant in the previous petition. It states simplicitor payment of rent at the rate alleged by the respondent-landlord. Rent was tendered without any objection. It was no where alleged in that statement that the rent was being tendered without prejudice or just in order to avoid ejectment. If a party feels that it has to tender rent at the sought rate in order to avoid ejectment, it would in the normal course of things be expected to make a tender without prejudice. The fact that the tender in the previous proceedings was made without any objection qua the rate of rent, goes a long way to uphold the plea on behalf of the landlord-respondent that the rate of rent for the disputed premises was as alleged by him and not as alleged by the appellant-tenant.
The appellant has also not been able to prove that the rent was agreed as between him and the deceased landlady in the presence of Chander Pal. The statement of appellant (PW1) that Chander Pal had been summoned by the deceased landlady is given lie to by the statement of Chanderpal who stated that he had summoned by the appellant. It is conceded assertion that the rate of rent was not reduced to writing. In that view of things, the onus heavily lay on the appellant to prove, by adequately convicting evidence that the rate of rent had been agreed as Rs. 35/- per month. There being no other evidence on the file to substantiate that plea and the testimony of appellant and Chanderpal being contradictory to each other on the above stated point, the only inference deducible in the circumstances of the case, is that the appellant had not been able to prove the plea. In so far as the allegation with regard to fixing of fair rent is concerned, no specific issue on that part of controversy was framed by the learned Rent Controller, nor did the parties press any issue on this point. It would be pertinent to point out here that there is no material evidence on file on the basis of which fair rent could be fixed by the learned Rent Controller. The fact that no issue on the point of fair rent was framed by the learned Rent Controller and none seems to have been pressed by the parties, as also the fact that there is no evidence in that behalf, goes a long way to show that the parties did not want a finding on that point of controversy.
As far as the copies of house tax assessment record are concerned, those were placed on file and were relied upon on behalf of the appellant-tenant to plead that the rate of rent was record in those documents."
The aforementioned order has been challenged before this Court by pleading that the findings recorded on issue Nos. 1, 2 and 4 are absolutely erroneous and are liable to be reversed. It has further been pleaded that tendering of rent without protest in the earlier petition would not imply acquiescence and the tenant-petitioner would not estopped form filing a petition u/s 4 of the Act for determination of fair rent. In such a situation, it has been submitted that even the excess rent paid under protest could also be recovered u/s 7 of the Act because tendering of higher rent claimed by the landlady-respondent does not need to be conditional or under protest. In support of the plea, a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Bhim Sain v. Laxmi Narain, AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 155 and also a Single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Avtar v. Anand Sarup Mangla 1983 HRR 38 have been relied upon. It has further been pleaded that the entries made in the municipal record have been wrongly discarded by both the Courts below claiming that those entries were relevant pieces of evidence and were admissible.
I have thoughtfully considered the aforementioned pleas taken by the tenant-petitioner in this revision petition and do not feel persuaded to take a view different than the one taken by the Appellate Authority and Rent Controller because it cannot be concluded that the findings recorded by both the Courts below are perfunctory in nature. It can also not be concluded that only view possible was the contrary view as projected by the tenant-petitioner. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court would not go to the extent of exercising the power of a regular Appellate Court and a distinction between the revisional jurisdiction under Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act and the appeal has to be maintained.
The question concerning power of this Court in revisional jurisdiction made in the Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Vaneet Jain Vs. Jagjit Singh, . Dealing with Sub-section 6 of Section 15 of the Act their Lordships observed as under:
"Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself if an order passed by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority is in accordance with law. The question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction can reassess or re-evaluate the evidence only to come to a different finding than what has been recorded by the Court below. This Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, held, that the High Court cannot enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether such an order is in accordance with law. For that limited purpose the High Court would be justified in reappraising the evidence. In Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited, it was held that the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction can reappraise the evidence only for a limited purpose for ascertaining as to whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.
A perusal of Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act shows that the power of the High Court to revise an order is not an appellate power, but it is also true that it is not akin to power exercisable u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is no doubt true that the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order passed by the appellate authority if the legally or propriety of such order demands such interference. We are, therefore, of the view that it is not permissible for the High court to reassess or reappraise the evidence to arrive at a finding contrary to the finding of fact recorded by the Court below."
Similar view has been taken in the case of Shiv Lal v. Sat Prakash, 1993 2 SCC 345 and Bhoolchand and Another Vs. Kay Pee Cee Investments and Another, . Sub-section 6 of Section 15 of the Haryana Act also feel for consideration in the case of Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh (1995) 4 SCC 201. Placing reliance on Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury AIR 1963 SC 698; State of Kerala v. K.M. Charia Abdullah and Co. AIR 1965 SC 1585 and Neta Ram Vs. Jiwan Lal, , their Lordships pointed out the distinction between the revisional power under the Rent Act and the appellate power which reads as under:
"From the use of the expression "Legality or propriety of such order or proceedings" occurring in Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act, it appears that no doubt the revisional power of the High Court under the Act is wider than the power u/s 115 of the CPC which is confined to jurisdiction, but it is also not so wide as to embrace within its fold all the attributes and characteristics of an appeal and disturb a concurrent finding of fact properly arrived at without recording a finding that such conclusions are perverse or based on no evidence or based on a superficial and perfunctory approach. If the High Court proceeds to interfere with such concurrent findings of fact ignoring the aforementioned well-recognised principles, it would amount to equating the revisional powers of the High Court as powers of a regular appeal frustrating the fine distinction between an appeal and a revision. That being so unless the High Court comes to the conclusion that the concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below are wholly perverse and erroneous which manifestly appear to be unjust there should be no interference."
From the above enunciation of law laid down by the Supreme Court it is evident that despite wider nature of power of revision with this Court under the Act than the power of revision u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 a distinction has to be maintained between a revision and an appeal. The ground of revision are limited and can from the Supreme Court judgments be summed up as under:-
(a) Findings are perverse;
(b) Findings are bald and without evidence;
(c) Findings are based on perfunctory and superficial approach;
(d) Findings are wholly unreasonable;
(e) Findings cannot be reversed by re-assessing evidence merely because a view different than the one recorded by the Courts below is possible;
(f) Powers of revision under Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act do not extend to power of regular appeal."
The findings of fact have to be examined in the light of the principles extracted above. Before the Appellate Authority it remained undisputed that landlord-respondent had earlier filed a petition against the tenant-petitioner in which rent at the rate of Rs. 450/- p.m. was claimed and the same was tendered by the tenant-petitioner without a demur or without raising any objection. The Appellate Authority has taken into consideration the statement Ex.R-1 made by the tenant-petitioner in the earlier proceedings. It has further been pointed out that rate of rent was not reduced to writing and, therefore, on-us to prove this rate of rent heavily lay on the tenant-petitioner. The statements made by the tenant-petitioner and Chander Paul were found to be contradictory in respect of rate of rent. There is not even an issue framed on fair rent nor one claimed by the tenant-petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below suffer from any legal infirmity. Thus the petition is liable to be dismissed as there is proper application of mind to conclude that the tenant-petitioner has failed to prove the rate of rent or other relevant facts necessary for determination of fair rent.
For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed.