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Judgment
Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, J
Heard Mr. Yadev Sharma, learned Counsel for the Applicant and Ms. Pritima Sunam, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 and 2. The present
application was listed for hearing on 04.07.2018 when the learned Counsel for the Applicant sought time to prepare for the matter and the application
was listed for hearing on 09.07.2018. Mr. Yadev Sharma would seek to rely upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in re: N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy , in which it was held:
“11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek
their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-
span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of
time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each
remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on
public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis Mum (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy
promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.â€
This is an application seeking condonation of delay for a period of 122 days in filing the Appeal against the judgment of the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, West Sikkim at Gyalzing (Motor Accident Claims Tribunal) preferred under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the said Act)
which provides:
“173. Appeals.-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days
from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:
Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has
deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court.
Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.â€
Section 173(1) of the said Act therefore mandates that any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the
date of the award, prefer an Appeal to the High Court. The proviso thereto however, gives discretion to the High Court to entertain the Appeal after
the expiry of the said period of 90 days, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the Appeal in time. What
is “sufficient cause†is although not explained in the said Act is however, well understood. The expression “sufficient cause†is used in
different Acts. The Supreme Court has explained the expression “sufficient cause†appearing in different Acts in the following manner:
In re: Surinder Singh Sibia v. Vijay Kumar Sood the Supreme Court would interpret the expression “sufficient cause†as appearing in Section
14 (3) of the Himachal Pradesh Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1972 in the following manner:
“2. Sub-section (3) of Section 14 is extracted below:
“14. (3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possessionâ€
(a) in the case of a residential building, ifâ€
(i) he requires it for his own occupation: Provided that he is not occupying another residential building owned by him, in the urban area concerned:
Provided further that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the application, in the said urban
area;â€
It enables a landlord to obtain an order for eviction of the tenant if he requires the building for his own occupation and he has no other building in the
area concerned. This right however stands deferred under second proviso for a period of five years if the landlord has vacated a building in his use
without sufficient cause. The question is how the expression, „he has not vacated such building without sufficient cause‟ in the second proviso
should be construed. It has two aspects one whether the proviso applies to voluntary vacation only or it extends to vacating under pressure of legal
proceedings such as requisition order by competent authority. Second even assuming that the expression „vacate such building‟ is given wide
interpretation does giving up possession in consequence of a requisition order amount to vacation without sufficient cause? Vacate, normally, means to
go away, to leave. The setting or context in which the word has been used does not indicate any different meaning. Nor it is necessary to decide if it
applies to voluntary vacation only as it was urged that even assuming that giving up possession in pursuance of requisition order is included in the
proviso can it be said to be without sufficient cause. Sufficient cause is an expression which is found in various statutes. It has been construed liberally
in keeping with its ordinary dictionary meaning as adequate or enough. That is, any justifiable reason resulting in vacation has to be understood as
sufficient cause. For instance economic difficulty or financial stringency or family reasons may compel a landlord to let out a building in his occupation.
So long as it is found to be genuine and bona fide it would amount to vacating a building for sufficient cause. And the bar of second proviso stands
lifted. In other words if the vacation of the building was not a pretence or pretext the proviso could not frustrate the right of landlord to approach the
Controller for necessary direction to tenant to hand over possession to him.â€
In re: Sankaran Pillai v. V.P. Venuguduswami the Supreme Court would once again examine the expression “sufficient cause†used in a Rent
Act Legislation and interpret it thus:
“3. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions shows that where an application for eviction has been filed against a tenant on the ground of default in
payment of rent the tenant is required (i) to deposit all the arrears of rent due in respect of the building with the Controller or the appellate authority, as
the case may be; (ii) the tenant is further required to pay or deposit the rent which may subsequently fall due in respect of the building until the
termination of the proceedings; (iii) the said deposit of rent is required to be paid or deposited within the time provided and in the manner prescribed;
and (iv) if the deposit of rent is not made, the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause
to the contrary, stop all proceedings and pass an order of eviction against the tenant.
It is true that the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, if the tenant shows sufficient cause may permit the tenant to contest the
application filed by the landlord for his eviction. The question that is required to be seen is, what does the expression “sufficient cause†mean in
sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act. It is no doubt true that the expression “sufficient cause†has to be liberally construed to do substantial
justice between the parties. But the expression “sufficient cause†necessarily implies an element of sincerity, bona fide, and reasonableness. It
has to be shown by the tenant who has not deposited the rent within time, as directed by the Controller, that non-deposit of the rent was beyond his
control and there was no element of negligence or inaction or lack of bona fides on his part in not depositing the rent within time. Viewed in this light,
what we find in the present case is that the tenant was required to deposit the rent by 3-8-1990. But the arrears of rent were not deposited by that
date. On 7-81990, when the order of eviction was passed, no application was moved by the tenant before the Rent Controller for revoking the order
striking out defence as he could not deposit the arrears of rent on account of reasons beyond his control. On the contrary, the tenant denied the
relationship of landlord and tenant before the Rent Controller.
The tenant's subsequent deposit of the arrears of rent before the appellate authority being requirement of law for hearing the appeal on merits, cannot
be treated as bona fide deposit. Further, the tenant did not deposit the month to month rent as required under Section 11(1) of the Act and reiterated
his stand that he is a landlord and not a tenant of the premises in dispute. Even before the High Court it was not the case of the tenant that under
some bona fide mistake he could not deposit the arrears and month to month rent and, therefore, delay may be condoned. It appears that, after the
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit filed by the tenant for specific performance of the agreement, the tenant has now come forward with
a plea that since he under mistaken belief did not deposit arrears and month to month rent and, therefore, default may be condoned. As noticed earlier,
this plea of non-depositing of arrears of rent on account of sufficient cause was not a case set up by the tenant before the Rent Controller, the
appellate authority and the High Court. The tenant's consistent stand was that he was not required under law to deposit any arrears of rent and month
to month rent as he himself was the landlord of the premises. This plea of the tenant now advanced is an afterthought and is not bona fide and,
therefore, we do not find it to constitute “sufficient cause†as to condone the non-deposit of arrears and also month to month rent which was
required to be deposited by the tenant. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants.â€
In re: Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh the Supreme Court would have occasion to explain the expression “sufficient cause†appearing in the
provisions of Order 22 Rule 9(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973 (CPC) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
“34. Liberal construction of the expression “sufficient cause†is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence
or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the court should condone the delay;
equally there would be cases where the court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does
not reflect “sufficient cause†as understood in law. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edn., 1997)
The expression “sufficient cause†implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word “sufficient†means adequate enough, as
much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to
accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men.
The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These
provisions give the courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law
does not stand frustrated.
We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting
bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether
or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. (Advanced Law Lexicon,
P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., 2005)â€
In re: Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta the Supreme Court would hold:
“14. We can now deal with the reasoning on which the High Court in the present case justified its order of remand. It realised that by making the
order it was depriving the appellant of one of its chances to object to the valuation, namely, the chance under Section 139, but it felt that by upholding
that right of the appellant it would be depriving the Corporation of its rates wholly as the time-limit prescribed by Section 131(2)(b) had expired. It
thought that it was faced with two evils and that it would be choosing the lesser of the two if it allowed the Corporation a chance to collect its rates.
With great respect, we find this line of reasoning altogether unsupportable. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. A statute must of course be given effect to whether a
court likes the result or not. When the High Court found that Section 131(2)(b) had been attracted to the case, it had no power to set that provision at
nought.â€
In re: Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Limited the Supreme Court would hold that after expiry the period of limitation to file any specific proceeding
before the appropriate forum a valuable right which has been accrued in favour of other party could not be disturbed or struck down unless sufficient
cause is made out. The Apex Court would hold as under:-
“In construing section 5, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of
limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this
legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be lightheartedly disturbed.â€
In re: R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhvaneswari the Supreme Court would hold:
“6. A large number of judgments were cited before us by learned counsel. It is not necessary at this stage to discuss each and every judgment
cited before us for the simple reason that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay down any standard or objective test. The test of
“sufficient cause†is purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treated alike. The statute of limitation
has left the concept of “sufficient cause†delightfully undefined, thereby leaving to the court a well-intentioned discretion to decide the individual
cases whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are
never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the court as such.â€
In re: Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai the Supreme Court would explain expression “sufficient cause†used in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the following manner:
“14. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions and carefully scrutinised the record. The law of limitation is founded on public
policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court
for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till
the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is
shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.
The expression “sufficient cause†used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to
apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the
applications for condonation of delay but over the years this Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that
substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay.
What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired
certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.
What colour the expression “sufficient cause†would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the
explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona
fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent
in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.â€
In re: Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer the Supreme Court would have occasion to examine the expression “sufficient cause†once
again and hold:
“11. The expression “sufficient cause†should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be
decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100]
and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never
an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.†The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura
lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the lawâ€, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not†a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken
diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.â€"The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations
namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale
claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.â€
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may
have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat
and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik
Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially
engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay
v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause†which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to
the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature.â€
A composite and a wholesome reading of the judgments of the Supreme Court would draw the following principles:-
i. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken
diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale.
ii. The law of limitation has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for
vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till
the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature.
iii. An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may
have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.
iv. Sufficient cause is an expression which is found in various statutes. It has been construed liberally in keeping with its ordinary dictionary meaning
as adequate or enough. That is, any justifiable reason resulting in vacation has to be understood as sufficient cause.
v. The reasons must be found to be genuine and bona fide.
vi. The expression “sufficient cause†necessarily implies an element of sincerity, bona fide, and reasonableness.
vii. Liberal construction of the expression “sufficient cause†is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or
inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable.
viii. The expression “sufficient cause†used in statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves
the ends of justice.
ix. There can be instances where the court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the court must exercise its discretion
against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect “sufficient cause†as understood in law.
x. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired
certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.
xi. The expression “sufficient cause†implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word “sufficient†means adequate enough, as
much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended.
xii. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the court
without any unnecessary delay.
xiii. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
resulting from its operation. A statute must of course be given effect to whether a court likes the result or not.
xiv. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
xv. It is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for
making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has
accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be lightheartedly disturbed.
xvi. The test of “sufficient cause†is purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treated alike. The
statute of limitation has left the concept of “sufficient cause†delightfully undefined, thereby leaving to the court a well-intentioned discretion to
decide the individual cases whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause.
xvii. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever.
In the application under consideration for seeking condonation of delay it has been pleaded that there is a delay of 122 days in filing the Appeal. In
fact it is pertinent to examine the pleadings of the applicant which is reproduced below:
“1. That the Appellants has filed the above said Appeal in this Hon‟ble High Court under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 against the
Judgment and award dated 17.08.17 passed by the Learned Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, West Sikkim at Gyalshing in M.A.C.T. Case
No. 23 of 2016 as has been stated in the different paragraphs of the said memorandum of appeal.
That there is only “122†Days delay in filing the above said Appeal due to the following reasons:
a. That, the Impugned award was passed by the Learned Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, West Sikkim at Gyalshing in M.A.C.T. Case
No. 23 of 2016 on 17.08.17.
b. That the order/ award was pronounced on 17.08.17 as such the appeal ought to have been filed within a period of 90 days.
c. That the Kolkata Branch office after receiving the award/judgment copies forwarded the same to the Jaipur Head Office for preferring the instant
appeal.
d. That as per the internal procedure the Jaipur Head office had again sent back the file to Kolkata division office for appointing an advocate for
defending the instant case, but due to other practical problems, the file took considerable amount of time to reach the Kolkata Branch office.
e. That finally the appellant had appointed the undersigned counsel for defending the instant case.
f. That the judgment had been pronounced by the Learned Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, West Sikkim at Gyalshing in M.A.C.T. Case
No. 23 of 2016 on 17.08.17. The Appellant was forwarded the copy of the judgment through the court of the Ld. Motor Accident Tribunal on
19.08.2017.
g. That after receiving the said mail the appellant had immediately applied for the certified copy which was applied by the appellant on 25.08.2017 and
the same was ready on 25.08.2017 itself.
That the reason assigned in filing the appeal constitutes sufficient cause and there is no deliberate delay. The Hon‟ble Court may kindly take liberal
approach in this regard.
That, it is settled position of law, that Government and Governments undertaking has been permitted some flexibility in case of condonation of delay
due to the fact that it takes time to get papers processed by such offices and the Hon‟ble Apex Court as well as the Hon‟ble High Court has upheld
the said view in condoning the delay commissioned by such institution.
That the appellants submit that it has a good case and the Appellants will suffer irreparable loss and injury if the delay in filing the above said
Appeal is not condoned.
That the award impugned in the present appeal suffers serious defects as well as it is against the law laid down by the various courts.
That the delay in filing the abovesaid Appeal is neither intentional nor willful but due to the good and sufficient reasons shown hereinabove. Interest
of justice demands that the present application is allowed and the delay in filing the Appeal is condoned so that the matter can be adjudicated upon on
its merit.
That the present application is made bonafide and has been made for the interest of justice.â€
The said application is contested by the Respondents No. 1 and 2. The contesting Respondents pleads that the Applicant has failed to furnish
neither relevant details nor the relevant dates to the facts stated in the application. It is pleaded that the judgment was pronounced on 17.08.2017 and
copy thereof was forwarded to the Applicant on 19.08.2017 itself. It is also pleaded that certified copy of the judgment was applied for on 25.08.2017
which was ready on the same date itself and therefore even though the judgment was received on time by the Applicant no “sufficient cause†has
been shown by the Applicant and thus the claim of the Applicant that there was “sufficient cause†in approaching this Court after the delay
appears to be false. The Learned Counsel for the contesting Respondents would draw the attention of this Court to the order passed by a Single Judge
of this Court in re: Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd v. Mr. Kezang Kazi and another10 in which on identical facts the application for delay of 115
days of the Applicant had been rejected. A perusal of the said order makes it evident that the callous attitude is repetitive even in the present case.
10 2018 SCC OnLine Sikk 128
The Applicant seeks to assail the judgment of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, dated 17.08.2017. In paragraph 6 of the said judgment it is
noted:
“6. The O.P. No.3 failed to appear either through pleader or through any authorized person to contest/refute the claim despite due service of notice
(which as reflected in order dated 04.02.2017 was found to have been duly delivered at the office of the O.P. No. 3 at Siliguri on 25.01.2017, as per
the track record obtained from the India Post-site). Hence, when the matter was posted for hearing on settlement of issue, on 02.03.2017, the O.P.
No. 3 being absent, was accordingly proceeded exparte.â€
It is seen that despite service on 25.01.2017 the Applicant has deliberately chosen to stay away from the proceedings before the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal during the entire period till the impugned judgment was rendered on 17.08.2017. It seems quite clear that the Applicant didn’t
even bother to find out the result of the proceedings although they were aware of it. Application for certified copy was made only on 16.10.2017 well
two months after the date of judgment although the Applicant was notified about the passing of the judgment on 19.08.2017.
Even after the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal notified the Applicant of the judgment rendered by it the pleadings in the application praying to
condone the delay smacks of negligence, insincerity, lack of bonafides and genuineness. The reasons pleaded not only fails to satisfy the test of
“sufficient cause†as laid down above but suffers from vice of utter callousness and devil may care attitude. There is no legal or adequate reason
to invoke the discretionary power of this Court in spite of construing the expression “sufficient cause†liberally. The reasons pleaded do not
answer the purpose intended viewed from the standards of a practical and cautious litigant. There is not even an attempt to show that it had taken all
possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay even if this Court were to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. Although it is evident that the delay is more than 122 days and not as pleaded by the Applicant
even the admitted delay of 122 days has not been sufficiently explained and there is not an element of sincerity or genuineness in the pleadings. In fact
the sequence of facts of the present case suggests that the Applicant is resorting to dilatory tactics to delay payment.
This Court has also perused the pleadings in the Appeal. The applicant very candidly admits in paragraph 2 thereof:
“That on 02.03.2017 the Appellant/Insurer remained absent despite due service of notice therefore, the Appellant/Insurer was proceeded
exparte.â€
In fact there is not even a semblance of explanation as to why the applicant had not appeared in the proceedings before the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal giving a clear indication that it was not beyond their control and that it was in fact deliberate. When the Applicant who has suffered
an ex-parte judgment is absolutely nonchalant about it there is no reason for this Court to permit the beneficiary of the judgment to suffer any further.
For all the aforesaid reasons this Court is of the view that it would not be justified in condoning the delay deliberately caused by the Applicant. The
application for condonation of delay i.e. I.A.No.01 of 2018 in Mac Appeal No.04 of 2018 is rejected.
Consequently Mac Appeal No. 04 of 2018 is dismissed.