Bishnu Priya Mohanty & Ors. vs State Of Orissa & Ors.

A.K. Mohapatra, J. :

The FAO No.161 of 2024 has been filed by the Appellants, who are lecturers and retired lecturers at the Indravati Higher Secondary School, Jaipatna, with a prayer to set-aside the impugned judgement dated 22.01.2024 passed in GIA Case No.66 of 2023, by the State Education Tribunal, at Annexure-3, along with a further prayer to allow the GIA application bearing GIA Case No.66 of 2023.

Similarly, the FAO No.219 of 2024 has been filed by the Appellant, who is a retired lecturer at the Indravati Higher Secondary School, Jaipatna, with a prayer to set-aside the impugned judgement dated 22.01.2024 passed in GIA Case No.103 of 2023, by the State Education Tribunal, annexed at Annexure-3, along with a further prayer to allow the GIA application bearing GIA Case No.103 of 2023.

These two connected First Appeals, preferred under Section 24-C of the Orissa Education Act, 1969 (“the Act”), arise out of two separate but virtually identical orders, both dated 22.01.2024, passed by the learned State Educational Tribunal, Bhubaneswar, concerning the very same educational institution, namely, Indravati Higher Secondary School, Jaipatna, District Kalahandi (“the College”). Since the two appeals emanate from a common factual matrix and raise identical questions of fact and law, they were heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. In the interest of expediency, FAO No.161 of 2024 is treated as the leading matter and, the facts narrated hereinafter are, save where otherwise indicated, common to both appeals.

The central facts of the case, in short, are that the College, which is a private institution managed by its Governing Body, was established in the year 1984 with both +2 Science and Arts streams, as the second Science junior college of Kalahandi district, to cater to the educational needs of the largely Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities of the region. The College obtained government recognition and CHSE affiliation from the academic session 1985. Initially the College was operated on the donations from local residents and funding received from the Upper Indravati Hydro Electric Project (“UIHEP”). Later, the College was granted permanent recognition and CHSE affiliation w.e.f the academic session 2003-04 (formal permanent recognition having been accorded on 29.10.2003). The Governing Body of the College was first constituted and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 from the academic session 1987-88, and was approved by the Director, Higher Education under Rule 4(3) of the ‘Orissa Education (Management of Private Colleges) (Amendment) Rules, 1988’ on 25.03.1989. Subsequently, the Governing Body was reconstituted and re-approved on 19.09.1992 and 26.12.1995 under the ‘Orissa Education (Establishment, Recognition and Management of Private Junior Colleges/Higher Secondary Schools) Rules, 1991’.

On account of the College’s limited financial capacity, the matter of financial assistance was taken up with the UIHEP/Energy Department, resulting in a series of directions viz. letter No.2738 dated 08.02.1993, directing that the salary of Lecturers and staff be borne by the Project; letter No.8991 dated 25.04.1994, directing that the establishment cost be borne by UIHEP/Government until completion of UIHEP; and letter No.17752 dated 28.07.1994, directing that the establishment cost be borne by UIHEP/OHPC till its completion only and that the College to be treated as a private college for all purposes until taken over by the Education Department in accordance with the Act. The scale of pay of teaching and non-teaching staff was, in the meanwhile, revised at par with aided non-Government colleges first under the 4^th Pay Revision at Rs.2000-3500/-(ORSP Rules, 1989) with effect from 01.06.1992, and thereafter under the 5^th Pay Revision (ORSP Rules, 1998) with effect from 01.01.1996.

Consequently, the GIA Order, 1994 was enacted with retrospective effect from 01.06.1994. The College submitted its first Form-A application vide letter No.2997, dated 25.02.1995, to the Directorate of Higher Education, which was received on 28.02.1995. Since the GIA order was in force, the Government prepared a district-wise list of unaided colleges maturing for grant-in-aid under the GIA Order, 1994, wherein the College was placed at Serial No.105, being the first college of Kalahandi district in the said list. Despite repeated reminders from the Secretary of the Governing Body and the Principal of the College, the Opposite Party No.1 neither took any decision thereon nor communicated any order of rejection. It is relevant to note that the Degree wing of the composite institution, separated in 1991 as ‘Indravati Mahavidyalaya (Degree wing), Jaipatna’ though initially notified under the GIA Order, 2004, was subsequently notified as an aided institution under the GIA Order, 1994 itself vide Government Order No.26204 dated 26.10.2012, a circumstance to which reference shall be made later.

It is also material to note that, at the 3^rd and 4^th Control Board meetings of the UIHEP, held on 04.09.1997 and 24.06.1998 respectively, a considered decision was taken to handing over the institution to the control of the Department of Higher Education so as to lend it permanent institutional stability. Pursuant thereto, the Department of Energy addressed the Higher Education Department vide letter No.164, dated 05.01.1998, for taking over of the institution. The Higher Education Department responded vide letter No.24901, dated 19.05.1999, stating that while it was not administratively feasible to take over the institution as a Government college, its eligibility for Grant-in-Aid could be examined under the GIA Order, 1994. The institution, accordingly, resubmitted its Form-A proposal for a second time on 18.01.2002.

Faced with continued inaction despite the repeated applications by the institution, the teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution were constrained to approach this Court, initially in W.P.(C) No.20628 of 2009, which was disposed of on 22.03.2010 with a direction to the Secretary, Higher Education Department to consider the grievance, and later in W.P.(C) No.18488 of 2010 and a batch of connected writ petitions filed on 27.10.2010. During the pendency of the said writ petitions, a series of significant developments occurred:- at a High Power Committee (“HPC”) meeting held on 14.12.2012, the question of taking over such institutions into the Grant-in-Aid fold was considered. Pursuant thereto, a Committee was constituted and notified vide Odisha Gazette Notification No. 905 dated 04.02.2013. The said Committee, in its meeting held on 01.05.2013, took a decision to extend Grant-in-Aid to such institutions under the GIA Order, 1994. The Director, Higher Education, in compliance therewith, submitted a report to the Government on 23.05.2013 recommending that approval be accorded for inclusion of such institutions, including the Appellants’ institution, in the Grant-in-Aid fold in accordance with the provisions made for left-out colleges. The Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, by a decision recorded on the file on 13.08.2013, approved the said recommendation, noting in terms that the Higher Education Department had no objection to taking over such institutions under the Grant-in-Aid fold of the Government.

It was in this backdrop that a learned Single Judge of this Court, by order dated 16.04.2015, at Annexure-1, disposed of W.P.(C) No.18488 of 2010, W.P.(C) No.9236 of 2010 and the connected batch of writ petitions, directing that the Government take a decision to include the institutions in question (including the Appellants’ institution) under the GIA Order, 1994 and authorising the Director, Higher Education to undertake verification of the records of the institutions for approval of the posts and sanction of Grant-in-Aid in accordance with the provisions made for left-out colleges and directing that Grant-in-Aid, equivalent to 1/3^rd the salary cost, be paid to persons duly appointed against admissible posts with effect from 01.06.1994. The order further specified a time-frame of four months within which the entire exercise was to be completed.

In purported compliance with the said order, the Director, Higher Education, vide letters No.24580 dated 06.07.2015 and No.25995 dated 09.07.2015, called upon the President/Secretary of the Governing Body to submit a fresh Form-A application, which was accordingly submitted, for the third time, by the Sub-Collector, Dharmagarh-cum-President of the Governing Body, on 15.07.2015. Upon physical verification of the original records of the institution carried out on 30.08.2015 and 01.09.2015, the Director, Higher Education submitted his considered recommendation to the Government on 28.10.2015, at Annexure-7, recommending notification of the Appellants’ institution under the GIA Order, 1994, together with the tentative financial implication thereof.

Notwithstanding the aforesaid recommendation for notification under the GIA Order, 1994, the Government, in the School and Mass Education Department (“S&ME Department”), by notification dated 24.10.2017, notified the institution under the GIA Order, 2004 instead, ostensibly relying upon the fact of the interregnum repeal of the 1994 Order. Subsequently, however, in further compliance with the order dated 16.04.2015 of this Court, as well as pursuant to proceedings in Contempt Case No. 481 of 2019 (CONTC No. 481 of 2019), the S&ME Department issued a fresh notification dated 27.04.2021, re-notifying, inter alia, the Appellants’ institution to receive Grant-in-Aid in terms of the GIA Order, 1994, with effect from 01.06.1994.

It was at this stage that Respondent No.1-State, preferred Writ Appeal No.474 of 2021 (and a connected Writ Appeal No.401 of 2021), which came to be allowed by a Division Bench of this Court, thereby setting aside the order passed in the contempt proceeding. Thereafter, the Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, by an order dated 01.11.2021, at Annexure-10, unilaterally disentitled the appellants and similarly situated employees from the benefit of the GIA Order, 1994, notwithstanding the extant notification dated 27.04.2021, on the ostensible ground that, consequent upon the repeal of the GIA Order, 1994, no such benefit was any longer admissible.

Aggrieved thereby, the Appellants and certain similarly situated persons approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petitions registered as S.L.P.(C) Nos. 20178-20179 of 2021, which came to be disposed of vide order dated 04.10.2022. While declining to interfere with the order of this Court in the Writ Appeals (confined, as it was, to the contempt proceeding), the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted liberty to the Appellants to pursue any other remedy available in law. It was in pursuance of the said liberty that the Appellants approached the learned Tribunal by way of GIA Case No.66 of 2023 and GIA Case No. 103 of 2023 (FAO No.219 of 2024), invoking Section 24-B of the Act, seeking approval of their posts in terms of the GIA Order, 1994 and consequential release of salary and other service benefits, with a specific prayer for quashing of the order dated 01.11.2021 passed by the Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department.

The learned Tribunal took up both the GIA applications on 22.01.2024, ostensibly for admission and issuance of notice to the Opposite Parties, and proceeded to dismiss both applications at the very threshold, holding, in essence, that in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Odisha and Another v. Anup Kumar Senapati and Another, reported in (2019) 19 SCC 626, the GIA Order, 1994 was “no more in existence” and the applications were, accordingly, not maintainable. In GIA Case No.103 of 2023, the learned Tribunal additionally observed that the sole Appellant therein had no locus standi to maintain the application in his individual capacity under Section 24-B of the Act, with a prayer to notify the institution under the GIA Order, 1994, in alleged violation of Clause 7 read with Section 7-C of the Orissa Education Act, 1969. It is against these orders dated 22.01.2024 that the Appellants have preferred the present appeals under Section 24-C of the Orissa Education Act, 1969.

Heard Mr. B. Routray, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in FAO No. 161 of 2024, and Mr. D.N. Rath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in FAO No. 219 of 2024. Since the submissions made/grounds taken on behalf of the Appellants in both the FAOs are broadly identical, they may be summarised as follows;

a. That the learned Tribunal has wholly failed to appreciate that the Appellants’ institution was, since its inception, funded and financed by UIHEP/OHPC under the Energy Department only as a stop-gap arrangement pending its formal absorption into the Grant-in-Aid fold, and that a considered decision to hand over the institution to the Department of Higher Education had already been taken as far back as at the 3^rd and 4^th Control Board meetings of UIHEP held on 04.09.1997 and 24.06.1998, attended by the highest functionaries of the State.

b. That the learned Tribunal also failed to notice that the Principal Secretary, Energy Department, vide letter dated 04.08.2015, had specifically called upon the Higher Education Department to comply with the direction of this Court dated 16.04.2015 within the time-frame of four months prescribed by this Court. In fact, the Higher Education Department had already, vide letter No.14530 dated 04.07.2015, requested the Director, Higher Education to take appropriate action. Thereafter, the Principal Secretary, Energy Department, vide letter No.6764 dated 04.08.2015, called upon the Higher Education Department to ensure compliance. Resultantly, the Director gave his unequivocal recommendation dated 28.10.2015, after physical verification of records, for notification of the institution under the GIA Order, 1994.

c. Additionally, the impugned orders travel wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal inasmuch as a statutory application under Section 24-B of the Act (as amended in 1998) was summarily dismissed at the threshold of admission without issuance of any notice to the Opposite Parties and without affording them an opportunity of filing counter-affidavits, which was incumbent upon the Tribunal to allow. It was contended that on the aforesaid ground of procedural infirmity alone, the impugned order at Annexure-3 is liable to be set-aside.

d. Specifically with regard to the finding of the learned Tribunal that the Appellant in FAO No.219 of 2024 had no locus standi to maintain the application in his individual capacity, it was contended that such a proposition is factually and legally unsustainable, since the institution already stood notified under the GIA Order, 1994 vide notification dated 27.04.2021, and the prayer in the GIA application was confined to seeking quashment of the subsequent order dated 01.11.2021 which had, without notice and without justification, disentitled the Appellant from the benefit flowing from the extant notification, i.e. a relief squarely within the competence of the Tribunal to grant.

e. That the appellants fall squarely within the exception carved out by the decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court in State of Odisha and Another v. Ratnakar Mohapatra and Another, bearing F.A.O. No.509 of 2014 and connected matters, decided on 19.03.2025, since the claim of the Institution to which the Appellants belonged to was already solidified in light of the 28.10.2015 recommendation of the Director, Higher Education after verifying original records of the institution on 30.08.2015 and 01.09.2015. It was contended that such benefit under the GIA Order, 1994 had already accrued in favour of the Appellants, but, pending its disbursement, the Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, vide its order dated 01.11.2021, at Annexure-10, unilaterally, arbitrarily and without any justification, disentitled the Appellants from availing such benefits that had rightfully accrued unto them.

f. That the order dated 16.04.2015, by a Coordinate Bench of this Court, in W.P.(C) No.18488 of 2010 and the connected batch has attained finality since it has neither been set aside nor interfered with by any higher forum (including in Writ Appeal No. 474 of 2021, which was confined to the contempt proceeding), and continues to bind the Opposite Parties. As such, the entitlement of the appellants under the GIA Order, 1994, crystallised by that order, could not have been unsettled by the unilateral executive order dated 01.11.2021.

g. To further consolidate the Appellants’ claim to the benefits of the GIA Order, 1994, the learned senior counsel has demonstrated the following instances of teaching and non-teaching staff of other similarly placed institutions, which are on an identical footing to the present Appellants, and have already availed the benefits of the GIA Order, 1994; Firstly, Vindhya Vasini Junior College, Paikmal (in GIA Case No.338 of 2012, allowed on 28.02.2014, the State’s appeal being FAO No. 195 of 2016 dismissed on 07.02.2018 and the consequent S.L.P.(C) Diary No.21291 of 2018 dismissed on 17.09.2018); secondly, Panchayat Samiti Degree College (in GIA No.218 of 2012, allowed on 12.08.2013, the State’s appeal being FAO No.658 of 2014 dismissed on 31.07.2015, S.L.P.(C) No.25421 of 2017 filed against such dismissal was itself dismissed on 08.12.2017, and Review Petition (C) No.2134 of 2018 dismissed on 17.07.2018); thirdly, another batch of employees of Vindhya Vasini Junior College (in GIA Case No. 245 of 2012 allowed on 03.10.2013, upheld by this Court, the State’s S.L.P. Civil Diary No.26091 of 2018 dismissed on 17.09.2018, and the subsequent Review Petition (Civil) Diary No.2367 of 2020 dismissed on 02.06.2020, the latter after the pronouncement in Anup Kumar Senapati (supra), following which the State itself accorded approval under the GIA Order, 1994 to the teaching and non-teaching staff of that institution on 24.11.2020). It was submitted that these instances demonstrate that Anup Kumar Senapati (supra) was never treated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as an absolute and universal bar to all claims under the GIA Order, 1994, irrespective of when the underlying recommendation was made.

It is in light of the aforesaid contentions that the learned senior counsel and the learned counsel for the Appellants in both the FAOs urged before this Court that the impugned judgement dated 22.01.2024 of the Tribunal, passed in GIA No.66 of 2023 and GIA No.103 of 2023, be quashed and, the prayer of the Appellants made in such GIA petitions be allowed.

Heard Mr. D. K. Sahoo, learned AGA appearing on behalf of the Respondents. Since the learned Tribunal dismissed the GIA applications at the threshold itself without issuing notice, the State did not avail of any occasion to file a counter-affidavit or otherwise controvert the factual averments of the Appellants either before the Tribunal or, in the first instance, before this Court. That said, the sole plank on which the impugned orders rested and, have been defended before this Court, is that in view of the law declared in Anup Kumar Senapati (supra) no claim for Grant-in-Aid under the GIA Order, 1994, the order having been repealed with effect from 05.02.2004 by the GIA Order, 2004, could be entertained after the date of such repeal, and that the Appellants’ applications before the Tribunal, having been instituted long after 2004, were rightly, for this reason alone, not maintainable.

On a previous occasion, this Court, by order dated 21.07.2026, drew the attention of learned counsel for the State to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 25.03.2026 in Civil Appeal No.3904 of 2026, arising out of and affirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra), as well as to the order dated 06.04.2026 passed in the Appellants’ own S.L.P.(C) Diary No.13489 of 2026. The learned counsel for the State sought time to verify the position. On the matter being taken up thereafter, learned counsel for the State has once again taken the stand that there is no fault with the impugned orders of the Tribunal since the Appellants agitated their claim before the Tribunal well after the GIA Order, 1994 was repealed, and, as such, they cannot lay stake to the benefits flowing from the repealed GIA Order, 1994

Heard learned senior counsel and the learned counsel for the Appellants, along with the learned AGA for the Respondents. Perused the impugned judgement of the Tribunal along with other materials on record. The controversy involved in the present appeals lies within a fairly narrow compass, inasmuch as the Appellants’ institution, which was admittedly eligible in terms of the criteria prescribed under the GIA Order, 1994, and admittedly the subject of a favourable recommendation of the Director, Higher Education long before the GIA Order, 1994 was repealed in the year 2004, has been denied the fruits of that recommendation on account of misappreciation of the facts and an erroneous application of the dictum in Anup Kumar Senapati (Supra). Therefore, the primary question before this Court, in essence, is whether the fact of repeal of the GIA order, 1994 extinguishes the Appellants’ claim that had already matured administratively.

At the outset, it is clear that Section 7-C of the Act, inserted by the Odisha Education (Amendment) Act, 1994, empowers the State Government to set apart, within the limits of its economic capacity, monies to be disbursed annually as Grant-in-Aid to private educational institutions, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions prescribed in the orders made thereunder. In exercise of this power, the GIA Order, 1994 was notified on 21.11.1994 (with retrospective effect from 01.06.1994), and later repealed with effect from 05.02.2004 by the GIA Order, 2004, save for the purposes specified in Section 3(1) thereof. Section 4(2) of the GIA Order, 2004 further provides that institutions in receipt of Grant-in-Aid under the repealed GIA Order, 1994 shall continue to receive the same as if the GIA Order, 1994 had not been repealed.

The question of the survivability of claims for Grant-in-Aid under the GIA Order, 1994, after its repeal, fell for the consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anup Kumar Senapati (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court effectively laid down therein that the right to grant-in-aid must have accrued, vested and crystallised under the machinery of the 1994 Order before its repeal, and mere satisfaction of individual eligibility conditions or submission of an application is insufficient. In paragraph 18, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even completion of the prescribed qualifying period does not result in an “automatic accrual of right for receiving grant-in-aid”, grant-in-aid being dependent upon the Director’s assessment and selection of the institution. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that the Grant-in-Aid under the GIA Order, 1994 could never be claimed as a matter of right, being contingent upon fulfilment of numerous conditions and subject to the discretion of the Director and the economic capacity of the State. The Court also held that after repeal of a statute, what survives, in terms of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, is a right “acquired or accrued”, and not a mere “hope or expectation of, or liberty to apply for, acquiring a right”. The Hon’ble Apex Court also observed that the saving clause in Paragraph 4(2) of the GIA Order, 2004 preserves only the continuance of Grant-in-Aid already being received, and does not save either pending applications or the right to apply after the repeal. As such, there is “no vested, accrued or absolute right to claim grant-in-aid under the Act or the Order of 1994” merely upon fulfilment of educational and appointment criteria.

That said, a specific perusal of para 19 of the aforesaid decision discloses that the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court turned upon the specific fact that “there is no material on record that the institutions have duly applied in the particular academic year and within the time fixed for making application as per the Order of 1994 and there is nothing on the record indicating that the requisite information was furnished”. Such an observation, which would subsequently be clarified in principle in State of Odisha and Anr. v. Ratnakar Mohapatra and Anr., bearing FAO No.509 of 2014, decided on 19.03.2025 and the order of the Supreme Court dated 25.03.2026 in Civil Appeal No.3904 of 2026, assumes particular significance since it confines the ratio of Anup Kumar Senapati (supra) to instances where, prior to the repeal, the institution had made no application for grant-in-aid and no consequent recommendation had been made in favour of the concerned institution.

It was this qualification that formed the foundation of the subsequent decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra), rendered in a batch of appeals arising from orders of the Tribunal both allowing and rejecting claims for GIA order, 1994. Relying, inter alia, upon the information furnished by the Directorate of Secondary Education under the Right to Information Act, 2005, vide letter dated 21.01.2013 which disclosed that prior to repeal of the GIA Order, 1994 the Directorate had already recommended extension of Grant-in-Aid in favour of several unaided institutions, the learned Single Judge held, at paragraphs 6.1 to 6.3, that Anup Kumar Senapati (supra) could not be treated as an absolute bar in cases where the concerned employees/institutions were otherwise eligible under the GIA Order, 1994 and the requisite recommendation had been made by the competent Directorate before its repeal. The learned Single Judge also took note of similar orders affirmed by this Court, which had not been interfered with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Consequently, the State authorities were directed to verify, within six months, whether the claims in the individual cases had been recommended by the concerned Directorate prior to 05.02.2004, and, upon such verification, to pass appropriate orders regarding extension of the benefit of Grant-in-Aid under the GIA Order, 1994 in favour of the Appellants therein.

The aforesaid directions were thereafter carried to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3904 of 2026 and connected appeals. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, by judgment dated 25.03.2026, after examining the reasoning of the learned Single Judge, held in para 7 that the directions issued by the High Court were “completely in consonance with the reasoning therein” and declined to interfere. Further, taking note of the dismissal of numerous connected SLPs raising the same controversy, the Apex Court dismissed the appeals preferred by the State, directed that the cases of the private Appellants be dealt with in accordance with the directions of the High Court, and required the exercise contemplated therein to be completed within six months.

The cumulative effect of the aforesaid three decisions in Anup Kumar Senapati (supra), Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra) and the order of the Supreme Court dated 25.03.2026 in Civil Appeal No.3904 of 2026., therefore, is that Anup Kumar Senapati (supra) continues to govern the fundamental proposition that repeal of the GIA Order, 1994 precludes the institution of a fresh or uncrystallised claim thereunder and mere eligibility, expectation or a claim requiring further determination does not constitute an accrued or vested right surviving such repeal. Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra), however, recognised that the said principle could not be mechanically applied to cases in which the claim had already progressed to a material stage prior to repeal, particularly where the competent Directorate had made the requisite recommendation before the GIA order, 2004 came into force. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, by its order dated 25.03.2026 in Civil Appeal No.3904 of 2026 and connected matters, declined to interfere with that approach, that is to say, the appeals filed by the State were dismissed, and it was expressly directed that the claims of the private persons be dealt with in accordance with the verification exercise contemplated by the High Court. Thus, the repeal of the GIA Order, 1994 remains a bar to fresh and uncrystallised claims, but does not, by itself, constitute an absolute bar in respect of claims which had sufficiently crystallised prior to the repeal of the GIA Order, 1994 and fall within the factual and legal parameters recognised in Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra). The ultimate entitlement in such cases consequently turns upon verification of the pre-repeal status of the claim, rather than upon an automatic rejection by reference to Anup Kumar Senapati (supra) alone.

At this stage, it is pertinent to note that Appellants’ own Special Leave Petition bearing S.L.P.(C) Diary No.13489 of 2026 (@ S.L.P.(C) No.12532 of 2026) in Bishnu Priya Mohanty and others v. State of Odisha, preferred against an earlier order of the Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department dated 01.11.2021 disentitling them from the benefit of the GIA Order, 1994, came to be disposed of by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, on 06.04.2026, on the express concession of learned counsel for both the parties that “the issue as involved is covered by order dated 25.03.2026 passed by this court whereby the said batch of cases concerning Grant-in-Aid has already been disposed of” disposed of the said SLP “on the same terms” as the order dated 25.03.2026 of the Civil Appeal No.3904 of 2026.

Turning to the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 22.01.2024, it is pertinent to note that in Paragraph 1 of the impugned order itself, the Tribunal records that the matter was listed for admission “after hearing the issue at length from learned Counsels appearing for the parties”. As such, there is no factual foundation on the face of the record for any contention that the Respondents were denied a hearing before the Tribunal. In any event, even assuming such denial, a plea of denial of natural justice inheres in, and can be invoked only by, the party to whom the hearing was denied. It is not a ground available to the Appellants, who suffered no such denial, to assail an order passed against them.

On merits, upon a further scrutiny of the impugned order, this Court finds that the impugned order of the Tribunal itself proceeds upon a legal standard considerably stricter than the one primarily engaged within the submissions advanced on behalf of the Appellants. Paragraph 8 of the impugned order relies upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in State of Orissa and Another v. Lokanath Behera and Anr., bearing F.A.O. Nos.194 of 2016 and 58 of 2017, reported in 2018(II) ILR-CUT-535, decided on 11.09.2018, holding that no benefit under the GIA Order, 1994 can be granted, to any institution or its staff, after its repeal, save to institutions that had “already received such grant-in-aid” before the repeal. Similarly, paragraph 9 of the impugned order relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Ratikanta Tripathy, S.L.P.(C) No.33245 of 2018, where it has been held, at paragraph 31, that the only saving under Paragraph 4 of the GIA Order, 2004 is of the right to receive the grant where the grant-in-aid had actually been received on or before the repeal, and no other rights are saved. This is, in substance, a receipt-before-repeal test, which is materially stricter than the test in Anup Kumar Senapati (supra), or even the recommendation-based test as seen in Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra).

Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is undisputed that the first Form-A application was filed by the Appellants’ institution on 25.02.1995, followed by the second application on 18.01.2002. Thereafter, the institution became the subject matter of various proceedings and recommendations, including the HPC decision dated 01.05.2013, the recommendation of the Director, Higher Education dated 23.05.2013, the approval recorded by the Principal Secretary on 13.08.2013, the subsequent recommendation of the Director, Higher Education dated 28.10.2015 following physical verification of the original records, and the notification dated 27.04.2021. The GIA Order, 1994 had, in the meantime, been repealed with effect from 05.02.2004. The Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department thereafter passed the order dated 01.11.2021 disentitling the Appellants’ institution from the benefit of the GIA Order, 1994. The significance and legal effect of the aforesaid sequence of events, particularly in the light of Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra), are matters which, in the considered view of this Court, are appropriately left for examination by the competent authority in the first instance.

In view of the aforesaid factual position, this Court is of the considered view that it would not be appropriate, in the present proceedings, to finally determine whether the claim of the Appellants’ institution had, prior to repeal of the GIA Order, 1994, acquired the character of an accrued, vested or crystallised right, or whether the various recommendations and decisions made in favour of the institution, including those subsequent to the repeal, have any legal consequence in the light of the principles enunciated in Anup Kumar Senapati (supra) and subsequently considered in Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra). Such determination would necessarily require an examination of the entire record relating to the institution, the nature and status of the recommendations made from time to time, the authority by whom such recommendations were made, the stage at which the claim of the institution stood on the date of repeal, and the effect, if any, of the subsequent proceedings and recommendations.

Significantly, the decision in Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra), as affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by order dated 25.03.2026 in Civil Appeal No.3904 of 2026 and connected matters, itself contemplates an exercise of verification by the competent authorities before the claims of the individual institutions are ultimately dealt with. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while declining to interfere with the directions issued by this Court, directed that the cases of the private appellants be dealt with in accordance with the directions of the High Court. The subsequent order dated 06.04.2026 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P.(C) Diary No.13489 of 2026, arising from the case of the present Appellants, also assumes significance inasmuch as the said proceedings were disposed of on the same terms as the order dated 25.03.2026.

In the aforesaid circumstances, the question that arises for consideration in the present appeals is not one which ought to be conclusively answered by this Court on the basis of the material presently placed before it. The appropriate course, in the considered view of this Court, would be to require the competent authority to examine the case of the Appellants’ institution in its proper factual and legal perspective, particularly in the light of Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra) and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 25.03.2026, and to ascertain the relevance and legal effect of the various recommendations and decisions which, according to the Appellants, were made in their favour at different points of time.

Such examination shall not be confined merely to the recommendation dated 23.05.2013. The competent authority shall examine the entire relevant record of the institution, including the applications submitted during the currency of the GIA Order, 1994, the recommendations made by the competent authorities, the decision of the High Power Committee, the recommendation dated 23.05.2013, the subsequent recommendation dated 28.10.2015 following physical verification of the original records, the notification dated 27.04.2021, and the order dated 01.11.2021, together with such other material as may be relevant to the determination of the Appellants’ claim. The competent authority shall also examine the case in the light of the principles governing the survivability of claims under the repealed GIA Order, 1994, as explained in Anup Kumar Senapati (supra), Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra), and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 25.03.2026.

It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any final opinion, on the substantive entitlement of the Appellants to the benefit of the GIA Order, 1994. In particular, this Court does not record any concluded finding as to whether the claim of the Appellants’ institution had crystallised prior to repeal of the GIA Order, 1994, whether any particular recommendation made before or after the repeal is sufficient in law to sustain such claim, or whether the Appellants are ultimately entitled to the benefit claimed by them. All such questions are left open for consideration by the competent authority in accordance with law and in the light of the aforesaid decisions.

For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgments dated 22.01.2024 passed by the learned State Education Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in GIA Case No.66 of 2023 and GIA Case No.103 of 2023 cannot be sustained. The Tribunal, having proceeded to reject the applications at the threshold on the premise that the repeal of the GIA Order, 1994 constituted an absolute bar, did not undertake the factual and legal examination which is now required to be undertaken in the light of the subsequent pronouncement in Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra) and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 25.03.2026. The impugned judgments, at Annexure-3 to both the FAOs are, accordingly, set aside.

Consequently, the matter is remitted to Respondent No.1-State, through the competent authority, more particularly the Director, Higher Education, for examination of the case of the Appellants’ institution and the individual Appellants in accordance with law. The competent authority shall undertake a comprehensive verification of the relevant records and recommendations concerning the institution and shall determine, upon such examination, whether the case of the Appellants’ falls within the principles recognised in Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra), as affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its order dated 25.03.2026, and whether they are consequently entitled to the benefit claimed under the GIA Order, 1994. Such exercise shall be undertaken independently and uninfluenced by any observations made herein which may be construed as expressing a final opinion on the merits of the claim.

The aforesaid exercise shall be completed by the competent authority within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment, after affording the Appellants an opportunity to place all relevant materials and documents in support of their claim. A reasoned and speaking order shall thereafter be passed and communicated to the Appellants. Needless to say, the competent authority shall consider the claim in the light of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court in the decisions referred to herein and shall not reject the claim solely on the ground that the proceedings before the Tribunal were instituted after repeal of the GIA Order, 1994, without examining whether the case otherwise falls within the principles recognised in Ratnakar Mohapatra (supra).

The appeals are, accordingly, allowed to the aforesaid extent and disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.