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Judgment
The appeal is by a person who was undoubtedly injured in an accident that took place on May 13, 1999 in central Calcutta.
The victim was immediately admitted to the nearby Medical College and Hospital. The victim suffered fractures in the ribs, but appears to have recovered and resumed his normal life. The appellant-victim applied under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and obtained an award for payment of a sum of Rs.25,000/-. The payment has been received by the appellant and the insurance company does not appear to have preferred any appeal.
The appellant applied under Section 166 of the Act for a much larger sum, claiming that the appellant had suffered permanent disability, had undergone pain, trauma and suffering and had lost earning opportunities. The appellant sought a compensation of Rs.4.50 lakh. It is submitted by the appellant that the amount claimed was subsequently reduced to Rs.2.50 lakh. The appellant insists that the tribunal ought to have awarded him the amount as claimed.
There is no doubt that the appellant suffered injuries and rib fractures, but there does not appear to be any evidence of the appellant having suffered any permanent disability. To this court's query as to whether any permanent disability certificate was produced by the appellant before the tribunal, Advocate for the appellant draws this court's attention to Section 140 of the Act. Section 140 of the Act provides for interim compensation in the event of death or permanent disablement. The argument on behalf of the appellant is that since a nominal amount was awarded by way of interim compensation and there was no appeal against the same, the permanent disability suffered by the appellant could no longer be questioned.
Before the tribunal, the appellant herein established that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving by the driver of the offending vehicle. There is no dispute in such regard. However, it appears that the appellant returned to the appellant's previous employment and there was no loss of earning of the appellant. Indeed, there was no evidence as to the amount expended on account of medical expenses, or any other charges for that matter. Upon assessing the claim, the tribunal awarded a token amount of Rs.5,000/-, but did not even dignify the quantum by awarding any interest in support thereof. The appellant invokes the high authorities of the Supreme Court as in the case of R.D. Hattangadi (reported at (1995) 1 SCC 55) and the case of Govind Yadav (reported at (2011) 10 SCC 683). The appellant also refers to a recent judgment of another Division Bench of this court in FMAT 201 of 2018 with COT 41 of 2018 (Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited v. Anjali Mondal) rendered on October 3, 2018 to suggest that the appellant herein ought to have been awarded damages under several other heads.
In R.D. Hattangadi, the initial paragraphs of the report would reveal that the victim was trapped between the dashboard of his ambassador car and the seat and had to be extricated after considerable effort. He was admitted at a local hospital before being referred to Mumbai and suffered complete paraplegia from waist downwards. In the case of Govind Yadav, the victim had suffered amputation of his left leg above the knee. In the recent judgment of this court, a young boy suffered permanent disfigurement and permanent disability to the extent of 10%. He had no growth of hair over the right parietal region and the court observed that the boy looked remarkably different from other boys of his age.
In this case the victim broke a few ribs no doubt, but after he recovered therefrom, there is no case of any other damages made out. In such a situation, the case of the victim cannot be compared to any of the cases covered by the judgments relied upon since every case depends on its facts. The legal position will be vastly different in a case where the extent of permanent disability is nil or, upon the accident victim recovering from the injuries, there is no physical impairment other than the memory of the traumatic experience.
There was no evidence of any medical expenditure incurred by the appellant herein and it does not appear that the appellant here qualifies to obtain any compensation on account of any of the six heads enumerated in Govind Yadav. There was no loss of earning in the appellant's case and no loss of future earnings. There was no evidence of future medical expenses and the pain and suffering that the appellant suffered has been adequately compensated by the award of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.5,000/- in his favour. The appellant has not lost any amenities. There is no proof of loss of expectation of life or even of the prospects of his marriage being less than normal. Indeed, there is no permanent disability certificate.
For every mischievous claimant as the present appellant, there must be at least five or ten genuine victims who suffer on account of only the court time that is wasted. For quite some time it has become difficult to assess whether the compensation awarded in motor accident claims trickle down to the victims or the heirs of the deceased-victims and to what extent. The passion with which some of the claims are pursued before the tribunals and courts leave little room for doubt as to who the principal beneficiaries may turn out to be. No effort is spared, as in the present case, to invoke sympathy, to browbeat the court with Supreme Court judgments that may not be applicable on facts and to fall back on the last resort of flattery to somehow obtain an order for enhanced compensation. It is high time that the system is given some shape and direction so that pretenders and charlatans are weeded out and most of the compensation is not waylaid before it reaches the claimants.
This present case is a clear instance of the appellant perceiving the accident to be a kind of a lottery ticket. There is no doubt that the appellant suffered injuries and the appellant would have been reimbursed the medical expenses incurred, had there been any evidence thereof. The appellant was treated at the Medical College and Hospital and may not have had to pay anything therefor. The appellant suffered pain and even trauma and the appellant has already been awarded Rs.25,000/- and a further sum of Rs.5,000/- therefor. But the appellant does not appear to have suffered any disability, notwithstanding the disingenuous argument as to the scope of proceedings under Section 140 of the Act as proffered herein. It may be observed in such context that since Section 140 of the Act is confined to interim compensation, even if the issue as to lack of permanent disability is not raised during proceedings under Section 140 of the Act, at the time of assessing final compensation, such question may be gone into. That is not to say that the final order on the interim compensation may be undone; only that the tribunal must be satisfied that there is permanent disability before proceeding to award damages under Section 166 of the Act, irrespective of whatever may have been the fate in the proceedings under Section 140 thereof.
The appellant herein did not adduce any evidence as to future medical expenses. There is no loss of opportunity, no loss of amenities, no truncating of life expectancy or the like in the present case and the appellant is not entitled to any damages on such counts.
It appears that merely for the trouble undertaken by the appellant in applying for damages, the tribunal awarded Rs.5,000/- by the impugned award. The appellant, however, is correct in the appellant's assertion that once some amount has been awarded, the tribunal ought to have awarded interest to run thereon in accordance with law.
Accordingly, the order impugned is not interfered with, save to provide for interest at the rate of 8% per annum in respect of the sum of Rs.5,000/-, if not already paid, which has been awarded. Such interest will be payable from the date of lodging the claim till the receipt of payment.
The respondent-insurance company should ensure that the payment due in terms of this order is reached to the bank account of the appellant by the end of October, 2019. For such purpose, Advocate for the appellant should furnish the bank account details of the appellant to Advocate for the insurance company within a fortnight from date.
FMA 1726 of 2000 is disposed of without any order as to costs.
Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.