Bir Bhadra Dixit vs State of Govt. of U.P. and Others

The appellant before us was appointed as Helper (Motor Mechanic) in the central workshop of work-charge establishment by the Executive Engineer, Tube-well Division, Jaunpur. Later on he was asked to discharge the duties of a Mistri in the Tube-well Division. Jaunpur from 22/5/1974, which is a higher post. By an order made on 29/5/1987 the Superintending Engineer, Tubewell Circle. Jaunpur regularised the services of the appellant in the post of Mistri from the date the appellant had been working in that i.e. 22/5/1974. However, by an order made on 23/7/1988, the Superintending Engineer, Tubewell Circle, Jaunpur reverted the appellant to the post of Work- charge Helper and that order appears to have been passed on the basis of the order made on 1/4/1986 by the government. Aggrieved by this action of the Superintending Engineer, the appellant preferred a writ petition before the High court for quashing the said order. The High court dismissed the said petition and the appellant has approached this court in this appeal by special leave.

The fact that the appellant was appointed as Helper (Motor Mechanic) in the work-charge establishment and as Mistri in the Tube-well Division on 22/5/1974, which is a higher post. cannot be seriously disputed. If these two facts are correct then the order made by the Superintending Engineer on 29/5/1987 was only to recognise the fact that the appellant had been appointed in the post of Mistri from 22/5/1974. That order should not be taken as a fresh order having been made as on that date.

There is no ground upon which the appellant could have been reverted to the post of Helper (Motor Mechanic) as has been done now by the Superintending Engineer on 23/7/1988, merely because the government on 1/4/1986 in its order directed that there should be a freeze on the appointments as well as increase of the pay. That order would not come in the way of the Superintending Engineer having made the order as on 29/5/1987, which merely acknowledged the fact as existing as on an earlier date. In the circumstances the order made by the Superintending Engineer ought to have been quashed by the High court which has not been done. But we do so. As this order stands quashed, consequential orders made by the Executive Engineer shall also stand quashed.

The appeal stands allowed accordingly.