Billu @ Taufiq & Ors. vs State Of U.P.

[PER: HON’BLE DIVESH CHANDRA SAMANT, J.]

The present Criminal Appeal has been filed under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12.02.1985, passed by the learned IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur, in Sessions Trial No. 208/M of 1984 (State of U.P. Vs. Billu @ Taufiq and Others) arising out of Case Crime No. 12 of 1984 under Section 302/34 Indian PenalCode (IPC), Police Station-Badshahi Naka, District-Kanpur.

By the impugned judgment and order, the Appellants were convicted and sentenced as follows:

It is clarified at the outset that appellant No. 1-Billu @ Taufiq and appellant No. 2 Mohd. Akhtar @ Lula, deceased during the pendency of this appeal. In absence of any application by their legal representatives to proceed, this appeal as to appellant No.1 and appellant No.2 abated pursuant to this Court's order dated 30.01.2025 and 13.01.2025 respectively. As a result, this judgment considers the merits of the appeal solely as to appellant No.3- Mohd. Ibrahim @ Musai.

It is also noteworthy that another co-accused Qausar, who was also sentenced to life imprisonment along with the appellants under Section 302/34 IPC by the impugned judgment, had separately preferred an appeal before this Court bearing Criminal Appeal No. 898 of 1985. Since the said convict/co-accused Qausar died during the pendency of this appeal, the Criminal Appeal No. 898 of 1985 stood abated vide this Court's order dated 18.09.2025.

Briefly, the prosecution's case as per the FIR is that accused Taufiq @ Billu, Mohd. Akhtar @ Lula, Mohd. Ibrahim @ Musai and Qausar are friends and they reside in Coolie Bazar, Kanpur and they used to gamble. Mohd. Hanif, the son of informant Peer Mohammad @ Kala Pathan, had asked them not to do so and when they insisted on gambling, Mohd. Hanif informed the police and these accused were arrested and challaned. Due to this, the accused bore enmity and on 26.01.1984 at about 6.45 p.m. they formed common intention to murder him and in pursuance thereof Taufiq @ Billu, Mohd. Akhtar @ Lula, Mohd. Ibrahim @ Musai being armed with country made Pistols and Qausar being armed with knife chased Mohd. Hanif in the street. Billu and Akhtar @ Lula fired one shot each at the fleeing Hanif, causing him to fall on the road below the Lohamandi Police Chowki. Musai then declared, "This fellow must not be left alive; he was the one who got us caught gambling." At this, Billu fired another shot from his pistol, which missed then Qausar stabbed him with a knife. The complainant's son, Hanif, kept tossing and turning in distress; just then a constable from the Lohamandi Police Out Post came downside challenging the miscreants from above, only then two other constables came from the side of Akhada Khatikana and, challenging the accused, went towards Kopar Ganj to arrest them. Many people in the market witnessed the incident. Kallu, son of informant, took the injured Hanif to Ursala Hospital in a rikshaw. At that time lights were on in the street and nearby shops. There was a lot of blood below the Lohamandi Police Outpost where Hanif had fallen.

The brief of investigations are as under:

Dr. K.L. Pillai (PW-3) conducted postmortem examination of the dead body of the deceased on 27.01.1984, at 04.00 p.m. and prepared a report ( Ex. Ka-2). Findings are as under:

Following ante mortem injuries have been reported on the body of the deceased:

During the internal examination of Mohd. Hanif’s body, the Doctor found significant internal injuries/symptoms:

Following the completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted the charge-sheet (Ex. Ka-5) against the accused Taufiq@ Billu, Mohd. Akhtar @ Lula, Mohd Ibrahim @ Musai and Qausar. Whereupon cognizance was taken by the concerned Magistrate on 30.04.1984. After being committed the case was registered in the Sessions Court as Sessions Trial No. 208/M/1984.

On 27.07.1984 the charges were framed against the accused by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur, which is being reproduced hereunder

The prosecution presented various documentary evidences which have been proved and exhibited and marked as under::

The following prosecution witnesses were examined before the trial Court:

Following witness and documents have been produced by the defence:

Peer Mohammad, father of deceased entered into the witness box as PW1. PW1 in his testimony stated that on 26.01.1984 at about 6:45 PM while he was going to Dr. Wasi’s Clinic with his son Kallu, he heard 1-2 gunshot from the Koparganj side. He saw Hanif (the deceased) running from that direction shouting “Bachao Bachao” chased by the accused, Billu, Musai, Akhtar and Qausar. Billu, Musai and Akhtar were carrying pistol while Qausar had a knife. Hanif fell in Lohamandi in an injured state. Billu shouted, “dont let him escape”. He fired, but missed. Qausar then stabbed the fallen Hanif with a knife. When the police raised an alarm, the accused fled towards Koparganj. The incident was witnessed by Dr. Wasi, Dr. Mehboob and many others. PW-1 got the Written Report written in haste, signed it and got it registered in the police station. The murder was committed in front of him. He explained the motive that Hanif had gotten them caught while gambling 2-3 months earlier, due to which they held a grudge against him. The Written Report is marked as Ex. Ka-1.

In cross-examination he denied defence suggestions that he was not present, that the FIR was written at the police station or that he had enmity with Lal Bukhara and Nafees. He admitted having 2-4 cases against himself with two conviction, but denied doing illegal business or being under police pressure. He further stated that the incident occurred in a crowded market with electric lights witnessed by people. Hanif was friends with Qausar. When Qausar started going to Atiq and Safique’s place, Hanif stopped going to Qausar. It is wrong that Hanif was a police informer. Police used to come to Hanif’s shop in connection with police work. He also stated that when he saw the Hanif first time, he was at Dr. Wasi shop. There were 5-10 people. Hanif came running towards me, screaming. At that time too he was drenched in blood and he had injuries. Hanif fell in front of Dr. Mehboob’s shop. The three accused were standing with pistol. Two constables came running from the direction of the Akhara that very day the Daroga took my statement. I reached the police station at 7:15PM in the evening 15-20 minutes after the incident. I got the news of the death after getting the complaint written. At the time of the incident, he was wearing jacket and trouser. The jacket was green in color and the trouser was white.

PW2-Constable Sultan Singh in his testimony deposed that around 6:45 PM on 26.01.1984, he heard two gun shots while at the outpost and saw Hanif running chased by Billu, Qausar, Akhtar @ Lullan and Musai. Hanif collapsed below the outpost near Dr. Mahmood Alam’s Clinic. He further deposed the accused Musai exhorted that “kill him, he got our gambling raided.” Billu fired but the shot was missed. He further deposed that Musai, Akhtar @ Lula had country made pistol while Qausar had a knife and Qausar inflicted stabbing injuries with knife to Hanif. The witness challenged the accused from the terrace and came down with constables Darshan Singh and Shri Ram Gupta, but the accused fled toward Koparganj. After 25-30 when he returned to the site of incident, he found that the brother of Hanif had taken Hanif to hospital.

In his cross-examination he had stated that after coming down, found Hanif lying face up. There was no crowd there. On the way, he did not see any blood fallen, there was blood where Hanif was lying. He denied defense suggestions that he did not witness the incident or that he did not know accused Billu from before.

K.L. Pillai, Senior Surgeon at K.D.M./K.P.M. Hospital, Kanpur, conducted the postmortem of Mohd. Hanif on 27.01.1984 at 4 PM. He estimated the time of death as around 9 PM on 26.01.1984. The body had 11 ante-mortem injuries: 8 incised wounds to the scalp, face, chest, and abdomen, and 2 gunshot wounds — one entry wound on the upper back near the right scapula and one exit wound on the right chest. The entry wound showed tattooing over a 10 cm x 10 cm area, indicating close-range firing. Incised wounds penetrated the chest and abdominal cavities, rupturing the liver and right lung, cutting major blood vessels, and fracturing the right scapula and ribs. About 625 grams of semi-digestible food was found in the stomach, suggesting Hanif had eaten within 6 hours of death. Rigor mortis was present and can persist up to 36 hours in January. The doctor opined that death was caused by shock and hemorrhage from the injuries. On cross-examination, he clarified that scalp injuries had clean-cut hair follicles, confirming use of a sharp-edged weapon like a knife or more likely a karoli, not a blunt weapon or varchhi. No skull fracture was found, but forceful blows with a knife may or may not cause fracture. Injury No. 6 (gunshot) was possible from 6 feet away, but if both victim and assailant were standing, the victim would need to be lower than the assailant for the bullet’s downward trajectory. He confirmed tapering and tailing are typical of incised wounds, and the postmortem report Exhibit Ka-2 bears his signature dated 10.10.1984.

PW-04 R.K. Singh, SI, Control Room City Kanpur, testified that on 26.1.1984 he was posted at P.S. Badshahi Naka. He initially stated that the case was registered in his presence, but later corrected himself saying he received the papers at Sabzi Mandi tri-junction around 7:30 PM and copied the Chik FIR there. He met the complainant at the police station, recorded his statement, and left for the crime scene at 8:30 PM. The scene was in a densely populated area. He prepared the site plan Exhibit Ka-3 starting 9:30 PM, taking about 1.5 hours due to its size and late hour. Blood-stained and plain earth were seized and Exhibit Ka-4 was prepared. He admitted not recording some statements due to time constraints and not conducting identification of accused at the spot. On 27.1.1984, K.K. Sharma, S.O., took over investigation when the case was converted from 307 IPC to 302 IPC.

During cross-examination, he clarified that the paan shop boy’s statement was taken by the I.O. as the boy wasn’t found due to shops being closed from fear. The incident began at the paan shop and ended below Lohamandi Chowki. He denied showing X1, X4 incorrectly in the map or preparing a false site plan. He confirmed Dr. Wasi’s dispensary and Mohd. Farooq’s shop locations but didn’t know if both doctors sat there. Kallu, son of Per Mohammad, met him at the crime scene where his statement was recorded before the inspection. Three constables witnessed the incident, including Darshan Singh who was present during inspection. He denied that Peer Mohammad was called to the police station, stating he met him at the scene.

On 27.1.1984, S.O. Ashok Sharma took over the murder case investigation from SI R.K. Singh. He filed charge sheet Ex. Ka-5. He confirmed blood was already collected by R.K. Singh and he did not verify the site map. He confirmed that he recorded the statement of constable Sulatn Singh and denied the fact that sultan singh was not present at outpost.

Regarding accused: Billu was a known history-sheeter with cases in other police stations. Akhtar alias Lula was Billu’s friend, resident of Hiramman ka Purwa as per FIR. Sharma raided Akhtar’s house on 26/27.01.1984. He denied falsely implicating Akhtar or Billu, denied asking Qausar/Musai to turn approver, and stated Qausar had 2 Arms Act cases but wasn’t a history-sheeter. No identification parade was done because the constable eyewitness knew the accused.

PW-06 SI Jaikaran Saroj testified that on 27.01.1984, while posted at P.S. Badshahi Naka, he prepared the inquest report (Inquest Report) of deceased Hanif at Ursala Hospital at about 8:45 AM. He proved the Inquest Report (Ex. Ka-6), Challan Nash (Ex. Ka-7), Photo Nash (Ex. Ka-8), and the C.M.O. letter for postmortem (Ex. Ka-9). He stated that he sealed the dead body and sent it for postmortem through constables.

He admitted that the names of the accused were not mentioned in the Inquest Report because he did not know them at that time. He denied the suggestion that the proceedings were fabricated. He further stated that the cause of death was recorded as firearm injury based on the informant’s statement, though it was not mentioned as knife injury. He also confirmed seizure of the deceased’s clothes and stated that he had personally examined the body thoroughly.

PW-07 Kamal Singh, Head Constable Moharrir at P.S. Badshahi Naka, testified that on 26.01.1984 he registered the FIR (Ex. Ka-10) under Section 307 IPC on the basis of the written report (Ex. Ka-1). After the death of injured Hanif at 8:40 PM, the case was converted to Section 302 IPC and corresponding GD entries (Ex. Ka-11 and Ka-12) were made by him. He detailed the movements of the Station Officer and stated that although the departure of R.K. Singh for investigation was not entered in the GD, his return at 11:40 PM was recorded. He further stated that the special report along with the chick FIR was dispatched at 11:15 PM through a constable, and copies of the FIR and GD were sent to the Investigating Officer through Veerpal Singh. He clarified that the chick FIR was sent to the C.O. office the next day as the office remained closed at night. In cross-examination, he denied allegations that the FIR was lodged later in consultation, fabricated subsequently, or that names of accused Qausar and Musai were inserted later. He maintained that the FIR originally recorded that Mohammad Hanif was fired upon with intent to kill.

PW-8 Constable Hakim Singh of P.S. Badshahi Naka, Kanpur, stated in his affidavit dated 15.10.84 that in January 1984 he was posted at P.S. Badshahi Naka along with Constable Shrikant Sharma. On 27.1.84 at 9:45 AM, he received the sealed dead body of deceased Mohammad Hanif and related documents at the U.H.M. Mortuary. He handed them over to Constable Shrikant Sharma, who took the body to the post-mortem house and gave it to the doctor. He confirmed that the sealed body and all related papers remained in his and Shrikant Sharma’s custody, and no person was given a chance to touch or tamper with them. He affirmed that his statement in paras 1 to 3 is true and nothing has been concealed.

The Learned counsel for the appellant submits that:

Per contra, learned A.G.A. submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through reliable oral and documentary evidence. He submitted that the appellant was specifically named in the FIR and had actively participated in the incident by exhorting the co-accused, thereby sharing the common intention to commit the offence. It was further submitted that the minor contradictions pointed out by the defence do not affect the prosecution case. The non-examination of independent witnesses is also not fatal as the prosecution witnesses are trustworthy. It was, therefore, submitted that the learned Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant and the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

Upon appreciation of the entire evidence, the Trial Court found the testimonies of P.W.1 Peer Mohd. and P.W.2 Sultan Singh to be reliable, consistent and trustworthy. Their ocular version was found to be corroborated by the prompt lodging of the F.I.R. and the post-mortem report, which established that the deceased Mohd. Hanif had sustained firearm and incised injuries.

The Trial Court rejected the defence objections relating to the relationship and antecedents of P.W.1, non-mention of P.W.2 in the F.I.R., absence of test identification parade, non-examination of certain police personnel and minor discrepancies, holding them insufficient to discredit the prosecution case. The plea of false implication due to previous enmity was also found unsubstantiated.

Accordingly, the Trial Court held that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, in furtherance of their common intention, assaulted Mohd. Hanif with firearms and knife, resulting in his death, and that the participation of the accused stood established from the evidence on record. Consequently, the accused were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

It is settled law that delay in lodging the FIR is not fatal to the prosecution case per se, provided such delay is satisfactorily explained.

In the present case, as per FIR, the incident occurred on 26.01.1984 at 18:45 Hours, whereas the FIR was lodged on the same day at 19:15 Hours at Police Station Badshahi Naka, situated at a distance of about three furlongs from the place of occurrence.

PW-1, the informant, stated that after the incident, he returned home and got the Written Report (Ex. Ka-1) prepared by Habib at his dictation and thereafter proceeded to the police station, reaching there at about 19:15 Hours. He further stated that it took about ten minutes to arrange a rickshaw for Hanif, a few minutes to reach home, 5–7 minutes to get the written report prepared and thereafter about 12–13 minutes to reach the police station. PW-7, Head Constable Kamal Singh, corroborated the registration of the FIR on the basis of Ex. Ka-1 and proved the Chick FIR (Ex. Ka-10), it's corresponding GD entry (Ex. Ka-11) and the formal entry of conversion of case in GD (Ex. Ka-12).

Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the FIR is ante-timed. It is submitted that the scribe, Habib, was not examined; the conduct of the informant was unnatural as he did not accompany Hanif to the hospital; and the FIR was lodged within about thirty minutes of the occurrence.

Learned A.G.A., on the other hand, has submitted that the conduct of the informant was natural, as Hanif was taken to the hospital by his brother Kallu, while the informant returned home, informed his family members and got the Written Report prepared by Habib. The submission merits acceptance. The mere fact that the informant did not accompany the injured to the hospital cannot, in the facts of the present case, render his conduct unnatural, particularly when the injured was promptly taken to the hospital and the FIR was lodged without delay.

The documentary evidence also militates against the plea of ante-timing. The Nakal Rapat Tarmimi (Ex. Ka-12) shows that Hanif was admitted to the hospital at about 19:30 Hours, while the Challan Nash (Ex. Ka-7) records his death at 20:05 Hours. The FIR (Ex. Ka-10) was registered at 19:15 Hours under Section 307 IPC, and the case was converted to Section 302 IPC only at 20:40 Hours. Thus, the oral as well as documentary evidence establishes that the FIR was lodged promptly.

The prompt lodging of the FIR leaves little scope for deliberation, consultation or concoction, preserving the spontaneous truth of the incident. Had the FIR been ante-timed, there was no occasion to register the case under Section 307 IPC when Hanif was alive. The subsequent conversion of the case after his death lends assurance to the prosecution version regarding the time of lodging of the FIR Consequently, the contention that the FIR was ante-timed is devoid of merit and is rejected.

For the adjudication of the present case, the place of occurrence assumes significance and is required to be examined in light of the evidence on record. The FIR mentions the road below Police Chowki-Lohamandi as the place where Hanif fell after sustaining injuries. It further states that Hanif was coming from the side of Laik Pan Shop and was chased by the accused persons, who were armed with country-made pistols and a knife. Thus, the place of occurrence extends along the road from Laik Pan Shop up to Police Chowki-Lohamandi.

PW-1, the informant and an eye-witness, has corroborated the place of occurrence mentioned in the FIR He stated that he was standing in front of the clinic of Dr. Wasi when he saw Hanif being chased by the accused. He further stated that Hanif fell in front of the shop of Dr. Mehboob. PW-2, Constable Sultan Singh, posted at Police Chowki-Lohamandi, also testified that he saw Hanif running from Akhtar Hussain Road while being chased by the accused and falling in front of the shop of Dr. Mehboob Alam. The site plan (Ex. Ka-3) materially corroborates the ocular account. It shows Hanif running from the side of Laik and Ishtiyaq's Pan Shop towards the shop of Dr. Mehboob Alam and ultimately falling at point X-2 in front of the said shop. The informant's position is shown at point X-3, from where the place of occurrence was visible without obstruction. The site plan also depicts several shops and houses along the intervening road and Police Chowki-Lohamandi situated on first floor opposite the place where Hanif fell. PW-4, SI R.K. Singh, the first Investigating Officer, proved the site plan and also deposed regarding the collection of blood-stained and plain earth from the spot.

Thus, the contents of the Written Report (Ex. Ka-1), FIR (Ex. Ka-10), site plan (Ex. Ka-3), and the testimony of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4, when considered together, consistently establish the place of occurrence as narrated in the prosecution case.

We have carefully considered the rival submissions and examined the ocular, medical and documentary evidence on record. There is no dispute that Hanif died a homicidal death. PW-3, Dr. K.L. Pillai, who conducted the post-mortem examination, found one firearm entry wound with a corresponding exit wound and ten incised wounds on the body of the deceased. He opined that death was caused by shock and hemorrhage resulting from the aforesaid injuries. Thus, the homicidal nature of death stands conclusively established.

The principal question for consideration is whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the manner and modus operandi of the offence and the participation of the accused persons therein.

The prosecution case, as disclosed in the FIR and supported by the evidence on record, reveals a concerted and pre-arranged assault executed by the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention. The evidence establishes that Hanif was chased by Billu, Akhtar @ Lula, Musai and Qausar from the side of Laik Pan Shop towards Police Chowki-Lohamandi. Billu, Akhtar @ Lula and Musai were armed with country-made pistols, while Qausar was carrying a knife. During the pursuit, firearm shots were discharged at Hanif, causing him to sustain firearm injuries. In an injured condition, Hanif continued to run but ultimately fell on the road near the Police Chowki-Lohamandi. After Hanif fell, Musai exhorted the co-accused not to spare him, referring to the fact that Hanif had earlier informed the police about their gambling activities. Thereafter, Billu fired another shot, which missed, and Qausar inflicted repeated knife blows upon Hanif. The assault ceased only when police personnel posted at Police Chowki-Lohamandi intervened, whereupon the accused fled towards Koparganj. The sequence of events clearly demonstrates that the attack was not sudden or isolated but was carried out in a coordinated manner with distinct roles assigned to the accused persons.

PW-1, the informant and father of the deceased, deposed that he heard gunshots and thereafter saw Hanif running in an injured condition while being chased by the accused persons, who were armed with firearms and a knife. PW-2, Constable Sultan Singh, posted at Police Chowki-Lohamandi, also heard the gunshots and witnessed Hanif being chased and subsequently assaulted. PW-2 specifically deposed regarding the exhortation by Musai and the knife assault committed by Qausar. The presence of PW-2 at the place of occurrence is wholly natural and his testimony lends independent assurance to the prosecution case.

The ocular account receives material corroboration from the site plan (Ex. Ka-3), which depicts the route of pursuit from Laik Pan Shop to the place where Hanif fell near the Police Chowki. The medical evidence also substantially supports the prosecution version. The firearm injury and ten incised wounds found on the body of the deceased are fully consistent with the prosecution case that Hanif was first subjected to firing and, after falling in an injured condition, was repeatedly assaulted with a knife.

What is material is that the evidence consistently establishes that firearm shots were heard, Hanif was seen running in an injured condition, he fell near the Police Chowki and was thereafter assaulted with a knife. The conduct of the accused persons also furnishes a significant circumstance. The accused were seen pursuing Hanif while armed with deadly weapons; firearm shots were discharged; Hanif was repeatedly assaulted after falling; and the accused fled only upon intervention by police personnel. Such conduct is wholly consistent with a premeditated and concerted attack carried out in furtherance of common intention.

Thus, the prosecution has successfully established the manner and modus operandi of the offence, namely: (i) pursuit of the deceased while armed with firearms and a knife; (ii) firing upon the deceased during the chase; (iii) exhortation by Musai to eliminate Hanif; (iv) repeated knife assault by Qausar after Hanif fell; and (v) flight of the accused upon police intervention. The ocular evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, duly corroborated by the medical and documentary evidence, establishes beyond reasonable doubt the manner in which the offence was committed and the participation of the accused persons therein.

The evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 establishes a consistent sequence of events. Hanif was chased by Billu, Akhtar @ Lula, Musai and Qausar from the side of Laik's beetle shop towards Police Chowki-Lohamandi. Billu, Akhtar @ Lula and Musai were armed with country-made pistols, while Qausar was carrying a knife. Firearm shots were fired during the chase, as a result of which Hanif sustained a firearm injury and fell near the police chowki. Thereafter, Musai exhorted the co-accused to kill Hanif, Billu fired another shot which missed, and Qausar inflicted knife injuries upon Hanif. The accused fled only upon intervention by the police. The presence and respective roles of the accused are thus established through direct evidence.

The testimony of PW-1 receives material corroboration from PW-2, an independent police witness who was posted at Police Chowki-Lohamandi, situated immediately adjacent to the place of occurrence. PW-2 heard the gunshots, saw Hanif being chased by the accused, witnessed his fall, heard the exhortation of Musai and saw Qausar assaulting Hanif with a knife. His presence at the spot is wholly natural and his conduct in intervening and pursuing the accused is consistent with his testimony.

The medical evidence further corroborates the broad sequence of the occurrence. The firearm injury corresponds to the firing alleged by the prosecution, while the ten incised wounds lend support to the allegation of repeated knife blows. The medical evidence does not contradict the ocular account merely because the precise posture of Hanif at the moment of receiving the firearm injury cannot be determined. PW-1 had first heard the gunshots and thereafter seen Hanif running in an injured condition; therefore, the firearm injury could have been sustained at an earlier stage of the pursuit.

As regards individual culpability, the evidence assigns distinct roles to the accused. Billu and Akhtar @ Lula are attributed the firing during the pursuit; Billu is further attributed the subsequent firearm shot which missed. Qausar is specifically attributed the knife assault, which finds substantial corroboration from the ten incised wounds. Musai is attributed the exhortation to kill Hanif and his presence as an armed participant throughout the assault. The absence of an injury corresponding to a particular act does not, by itself, discredit the specific ocular attribution where the overall sequence stands corroborated by independent and medical evidence.

The defence submissions regarding the antecedents of PW-1, previous enmity, the alleged absence of PW-2 from the police chowki and the omissions in the testimony have been carefully considered. None of these circumstances displaces the consistent account of the occurrence or the prompt identification of the accused in the FIR The alleged discrepancies relate essentially to matters of detail and do not affect the core prosecution version.

Thus, the evidence, when considered cumulatively, establishes not merely the presence of the accused but their respective acts in the execution of the assault. The prosecution has proved that the accused persons, armed with deadly weapons, jointly pursued Hanif, subjected him to firearm assault and, after he fell, Qausar inflicted repeated knife injuries, while Musai exhorted the others to ensure his death. Their concerted conduct, the nature of the weapons carried, the sequence of assault and their flight upon police intervention establish the manner of commission of the offence and the culpability of each accused.

It is contended by the learned counsel of the appellant that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution version. PW-3 Dr. Pillai stated that the firearm injury could not have been caused while the deceased was standing and was possible only if he was sitting or lying down. This medical opinion is inconsistent with the ocular evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, who also gave different versions regarding the place of occurrence. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the evidence of PW-3 Dr. Pillai clearly contradicts the prosecution story and creates serious doubt about the manner of the incident. It was argued that, in view of these contradictions, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

The argument proceeds on the premise that since the firearm injury could not have been caused while Hanif was standing and was possible only if he was sitting or lying down, the ocular version stands contradicted. However, the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 shows that neither witness claimed to have seen the precise moment when the firearm projectile struck Hanif. PW-1 first heard the gunshots and thereafter saw Hanif running in an injured condition while being chased by the accused. Likewise, PW-2 heard the gunshots and thereafter saw Hanif being pursued by the accused. Thus, the fact that Hanif was subsequently seen running cannot establish the posture in which he was situated at the exact moment when the firearm injury was inflicted.

The occurrence was not a static incident but a continuous and rapidly unfolding sequence. It is entirely possible that the firearm injury had been caused at an earlier point of the pursuit, when Hanif was in a different physical posture, before he came within the immediate view of PW-1 and PW-2. Consequently, the medical opinion regarding the possible posture of Hanif at the time of impact does not render the prosecution version inherently improbable.

Moreover, the medical evidence substantially corresponds with the prosecution case. The post-mortem examination disclosed a firearm injury as well as multiple incised wounds. The firearm injury corroborates the allegation of firing, while the incised wounds are consistent with the allegation that Hanif was thereafter assaulted with a knife. Thus, the medical evidence establishes the two relevant categories of injuries and, rather than contradicting the ocular account, substantially supports the sequence of firing followed by knife assault.

The alleged discrepancy regarding the place of occurrence also does not discredit the prosecution case. PW-1 and PW-2 occupied different positions at the relevant time—PW-1 was approaching from the direction of the clinic, whereas PW-2 was present at the police chowki— and their accounts nevertheless converge on the material features of the occurrence, namely, the gunshots, the pursuit of Hanif, his fall near the police chowki and the subsequent knife assault.

In these circumstances, the medical evidence does not completely rule out the prosecution version. The alleged discrepancy relates only to the precise posture of Hanif at the moment of impact, which cannot reasonably be reconstructed from the fact that he was subsequently seen running. The essential sequence of the occurrence remains consistent and is supported by the ocular testimony and medical evidence. Accordingly, the alleged contradiction between the medical and ocular evidence does not create a reasonable doubt so as to entitle the appellant to the benefit of doubt.

It has been contented by the learned counsel for the appellant that as per prosecution evidence non of the witness saw Hanif getting injured by the pistol shot fired by the accused-appellant and there is no evidence in this regard, the appellant Musai is not accused of shooting Hanif. It is further contented that prosecution has failed to establish any overt act or common intention on the part of the appellant.

Record shows that this case involves the daylight murder of a man named Hanif in a busy market, which left onlookers terrified. Medical reports and eyewitnesses confirmed that Hanif was chased by multiple armed accused and died from a gunshot wound and severe knife injuries. Because the case relies on both direct eyewitness accounts of the chase and circumstantial evidence like gunshots, it may be classified as a hybrid criminal case.

In legal practice, murder trials frequently combine direct and circumstantial evidence rather than relying purely on one. Courts evaluate the credibility of eyewitnesses for the parts of the crime they actually saw, while using circumstantial logic for the remaining sequence. Under the legal principles established in such cases, the court does not isolate these types of evidence but weighs them together to form a complete picture.

The prosecution invoked Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, which places the burden of explanation on the accused when facts are specially within their knowledge. Since the accusec were actively chasing the victim with holding arms in their hands, and failed to explain the intervening moments before his collapse, the law presumes they acted with a shared criminal intention to cause his death.

The appellant, Mohd. Ibrahim @ Musai, argued through his counsel that he did not directly fire a weapon or stab the victim, and that the main witness did not support claims that he shouted encouragement. The defence maintained that without proof of a pre-arranged plan, his conviction under Section 34 for joint criminal liability was unjustified.

The prosecution countered that common intention does not require direct proof and can be inferred from the conduct of the parties. Evidence showed that Musai was not a passive bystander, but actively participated in the armed pursuit alongside the co-accused, and another witness confirmed his active involvement in the design of the attack.

As per the written report (Ex. Ka-1), the appellant-Musai encouraged other co-accused by shouting that Hanif must not be left alive; he was the one who got them caught gambling. PW-2 in his testimony, has also supported the exhortation attributed to the acused appellant-Musai. PW-1 in his testimony did not state about the said exhortation by Musai and attributed the role of exhortation to the accused Billu. A perusal of the testimony of PW-1 shows that PW-1 was not cross-examined on this point, therefore, it appears that owing to lapse of time in recording the statemnet of PW-1 and his age, PW-1 ommitted to state about the exhortation made by the accused Musai. Since the fact of exhortation mentioned in the written report (Ex. Ka-1) is corroborated and proved by the testimony of eye witness PW-2, the trial court ultimately found that ingredients of Section 34 establishing joint liability when individuals commit a crime in furtherance of a common intention are met. Since the evidence demonstrated that Musai was armed, actively chased the victim, exhorted the other accused and remained present during the fatal assault, his conviction and shared responsibility for the crime are legally justified.

In the case law Sanjay Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that it is well settled that Section 34 does not create a substantive offence, but embodise a principle of joint liability, and its application necessarily require a proof of a pre-arranged plan or prior meeting of minds, which may be formed even at the spur of the moment but must nonetheless be clearly discernible from the material on record. The relevant paras are as under:

In the other case Brijendra Singh (supra), a coordinate Bench of this Court has placed its reliance on a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, relevant para is reproduced hereinunder :-

Evaluation of facts and circumstances arising from material available on records is very crucial part while deciding the conviction based on common intention. The Court's must be very cautious while dealing with the case where the principles of common intention applies. Right from pre-independence till date, the Hon'ble Privy Council and Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with this issue and settled the principle.

In a case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh Vs. King Emperor AIR 1925 PC 1, the Privy Council laid down the foundational principle for Section 34 IPC which says that the man who fires the shot is not the only man who is guilty, those who did not fire the shot are equally guilty if they were present and shared the common intention. A person standing by and encouraging is a liable as the one who acts. In the present case in hand, the Musai's own overt act limited to chasing and shouting, his presence with the group and his exhortation bring him within the settled proposition.

In the case of Mehboob Shah Vs. Emperor, the Privy Council cautioned that common intention requires a prior meeting of mind and cannot be inferred merely from similarity of conduct: it must be proved through evidence of a pre-arranged plan, which may be formed on the spot as well.

The contention that the absence of a specific overt act of causing injury by the appellant excludes the applicability of Section 34 IPC cannot be accepted. Once common intention is established, Section 34 does not require each participant to perform an identical or independent overt act. The relevant consideration is whether the accused shared the common intention and participated in the criminal act in furtherance thereof. In Pandurang (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that proof may be establish either by direct evidence of a prior concert, or by circumstances that inevitably lead to that inference, in other words, the incriminating facts must be incompatible with the accused’s innocence and must lack any reasonable alternative explanation.

In another case law Ramaswami Ayyangar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu; 1976 (3) SCC 779, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a person who instigates or encourages co-accused during the commission of an offence even without personally striking a blow, shares the common intention and is equally liable under Section 34 IPC Mere presence coupled with encouragement is sufficient participation. In the present case Musai's words urging the Hanif should not be left alive and his presence with the other accused persons while chasing the Hanif and also at the time when Qausar was stabbing are precisely this kind of encouragement/instigation during the commission of offence, making Musai equally liable with the other accused persons for the subsequent shot and stab injuries.

The circumstances proved in the present case are not confined to the mere presence of the appellant at the spot. His armed participation in the pursuit, the exhortation attributed to him during the occurrence, his continued presence with the other accused and his presence when the deceased was subjected to the subsequent knife assault, read with the motive arising from the deceased having informed the police regarding the gambling activities of the accused, provide a consistent basis for inferring his participation in the common intention. The motive is not, by itself, determinative, but lends support to the inference emerging from the ocular and surrounding evidence.

The reliance placed upon the relationship of PW-1 with the deceased also does not advance the case of the appellant. Relationship with the deceased is not a ground for discarding otherwise reliable testimony. In this regard, in the case of Daleep Singh Vs. State of Punjab; AIR 1953 SC 364, it has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a witness cannot be discarded merely because he is related to the victim: a related witness who has actually seen the occurrence is a natural witness whose testimony requires careful scrutiny and not automatic rejection. The evidence of PW-1 has to be assessed on its intrinsic worth and is, in material particulars, corroborated by PW-2 and the medical evidence.

In State of U.P. v. Kishan Pal, (2008) 16 SCC 73, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that motive assumes greater significance where the prosecution case rests purely on circumstantial evidence; where there is reliable ocular evidence, motive primarily serves as a corroborative circumstance. In the present case, the prosecution has established a motive against Musai arising from the deceased having informed the police regarding the gambling activities of the accused. This circumstance lends support to the ocular evidence showing Musai's participation in the pursuit of Hanif, his exhortation that Hanif should not be spared, and his presence with the other accused during the subsequent assault.

Further, in Kartar Singh v. State of U.P., (1994) 3 SCC 569, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained that instigation involves inciting, provoking or encouraging another to commit an offence. In the present case, the exhortation attributed to Musai, made during the course of the assault when Hanif was lying injured and helpless, constitutes a circumstance indicating that he was encouraging the co-accused to continue the assault. Read with his armed participation in the pursuit and his presence during the subsequent assault, the exhortation lends further support to the inference that Musai shared the common intention of the co-accused.

Having considered the evidence cumulatively, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was not merely present at the place of occurrence but participated in the occurrence in furtherance of the common intention shared with the co-accused. His failure to inflict any particular injury upon Hanif, therefore, does not absolve him of liability under Section 34 IPC. The principles relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant do not assist him on the facts of the present case. The contention regarding absence of common intention is, accordingly, rejected.

Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that that the statement of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was not properly recorded. It is submitted that Question No. 2 itself demonstrates that neither the learned Trial Court nor the prosecution was certain or consistent with regard to the identity and specific role attributed to the appellant. According to the learned counsel, such ambiguity goes to the root of the prosecution case and deprived the appellant of a fair and meaningful opportunity to explain the circumstances appearing against him.

Learned counsel has further relied upon Ashraf Ali (Supra.), to contend that every material circumstance appearing in the evidence and sought to be relied upon against an accused must be specifically put to him while recording his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It is argued that the omission to put such material circumstances, or putting a circumstance in an incorrect form, causes prejudice to the accused and may vitiate the trial. Particular emphasis has been placed upon Question No. 4, wherein the allegation of exhortation has been attributed to the accused Billu @ Taufeek and not the appellant Mohd. Ibrahim @ Musai. According to the learned counsel, the attribution of this material circumstance to another accused, rather than to the present appellant, demonstrates uncertainty regarding the prosecution case and substantially prejudices the defence.

The learned A.G.A., on the other hand, has opposed the submission and contended that the ocular evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 clearly establishes the prosecution case and that the statement of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C., when read as a whole, demonstrates that the material circumstances appearing against him were duly brought to his notice. It is therefore submitted that no prejudice has been caused to the appellant merely on account of an alleged defect in the framing of an individual question.

We have considered the rival submissions and examined the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. We find it proper to reproduce the relevant provision of Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure:-

Elaborating upon the importance of a statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in the case of Paramjeet Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand (2010) 10 SCC 439, the Hon'ble Apex court has held as under :-

The examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is an important safeguard of a fair trial, as it enables the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him. However, every omission or defect in putting a circumstance to the accused does not, by itself, vitiate the trial. The accused must demonstrate ‘actual prejudice or failure of justice’ occasioned by such omission. Where no such prejudice is shown, a mere technical or inadvertent defect in the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot override otherwise reliable substantive evidence or render the conviction unsustainable.

In Naar Singh Vs. State of Haryana (2015) 1 SCC 496 The Hon'ble Apex Court making observations in the relevant paras 16 to 20, has held that ommission by court to quote any material circumstance to accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. does not ipso fact vitiates trial and burden to prove prejudice caused to accused which occasioned failure of justice on such non compliance lies on the accused himself. The relevant paras are as under :-

A perusal of the statement of the surviving appellant, Mohd. Ibrahim @ Musai, recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., indicates that the material circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence were put to him. The relevant question and its answer are as under:-

The written report, Ex. Ka-1, however, contains a specific allegation that when Hanif fell on the road, the accused-appellant Musai exhorted that Hanif should not be spared as he had got them arrested in a gambling case, whereafter Billu opened fire at Hanif, which missed.

In this regard, the statement of PW-1, the informant, assumes relevance. He stated as follows:

It is thus evident that PW-1 did not specifically attribute the aforesaid exhortation to the accused-appellant Musai. However, the incident took place on 26.01.1984, whereas the statement of PW-1 was recorded on 14.09.1984, after a lapse of about nine months. PW-1 was 60 years of age at the time of recording his statement. The omission, therefore, cannot, by itself, be treated as sufficient to discard the specific allegation contained in the written report, particularly when PW-1 himself stated in his examination-in-chief that the written report, Ex. Ka-1, was written by his son Habib, was read over to him and thereafter he put his signature thereon. Thus, the contents of the written report were duly affirmed by PW-1. More importantly, PW-2, Constable Sultan Singh, an eyewitness, has specifically stated in his examination-in-chief that Musai declared that Hanif should not be left alive as he was the person who had got them arrested in gambling, whereafter Billu fired a shot from his pistol which missed. The allegation of exhortation, therefore, finds mention in the written report, Ex. Ka-1, and is specifically supported by the testimony of PW-2. The omission on the part of PW-1 to specifically attribute the exhortation to Musai, particularly in the backdrop of the time gap and his age, does not materially detract from the prosecution case in this regard.

The next question which arises is whether the omission to put the specific circumstance of exhortation to the accused-appellant while recording his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. causes any prejudice to him so as to vitiate the conviction. A perusal of the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. shows that the material circumstances relating to the participation of the appellant in the occurrence were duly put to him. His presence at the place of occurrence, his chasing Hanif along with the other accused while carrying a pistol, and his presence with the pistol when Qausar was stabbing Hanif with a knife were specifically brought to his notice. The circumstance relating to the exhortation attributed to him, however, does not appear to have been specifically put to him.

The purpose of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is to afford the accused an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence. In the present case, the circumstance of exhortation constitutes only one of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution. The other material circumstances relating to the presence and participation of the appellant in the occurrence were specifically put to him. The allegation of exhortation is also not the sole basis of the prosecution case against him. The same finds support from the written report, Ex. Ka-1, and the testimony of PW-2, while the prosecution case otherwise stands supported by the evidence available on record.

It is further relevant that, in response to the questions put to him under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant did not furnish any specific explanation with regard to the material circumstances appearing against him. He merely stated, in substance, that the police was pressurising him to give false evidence and that, upon his refusal, he had been falsely implicated. No specific circumstance was disclosed by him to explain his presence at the place of occurrence or the other incriminating circumstances put to him.

Thus, as per the discussions made hereinabove in this regard and in the light of the principles laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the omission to specifically put the circumstance of exhortation to the appellant, though an irregularity which ought to have been avoided, has neither caused any demonstrable prejudice to him nor resulted in failure of justice. The conviction, therefore, cannot be held to be vitiated on this ground. The prosecution case has been proved by the cogent and reliable evidences, therefore, it was the liability of the surviving accused appellant to show that a prejudice was caused to him due to the defective recording of Section 313 Cr.P.C.

It is contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the overwriting and cuttings in Inquest Report itself proves the malacious intention of the prosecution to falsely implicate the Appellant.

The submission regarding Inquest Report does not merit acceptance. The Inquest Report is not a substantive piece of evidence regarding the manner of occurrence or the identity and participation of the accused. Its purpose is limited to recording the apparent cause of death and the circumstances relevant thereto. In Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. and another: 2026 SCC OnLine SC 918, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that an inquest proceeding is a preliminary inquiry of a limited nature and is neither intended nor required to contain a detailed account of the occurrence or the names of the persons responsible for the death. The Court further cautioned that an omission or discrepancy in the inquest proceedings cannot be considered in isolation while ignoring the other substantive material on record.

In the present case, the alleged cuttings and overwritings in the Inquest Report, by themselves, do not establish any manipulation of the prosecution case or a design to falsely implicate the appellant. No material has been brought on record to demonstrate that such corrections have affected any material aspect of the prosecution case. The ocular evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, the medical evidence and the other circumstances established on record have to be assessed independently of such formal discrepancies. The contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant in this regard is accordingly rejected.

It has been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that, although the occurrence is alleged to have taken place in a densely populated locality, no independent public witness has been examined. It is further submitted that the presence of Constables Darshan Singh and Shri Ram Gupta, who are alleged to have reached the spot, is doubtful in view of GD Entries, Ex. Kha-1 and Ex. Kha-2, proved by DW-1. It has lastly been argued that the presence of PW-2, Constable Sultan Singh, at the place of occurrence is doubtful as he remained away from the police outpost for about one hour and fifteen minutes.

The contention regarding non-examination of independent public witnesses does not merit acceptance. There is no requirement in law that the prosecution must examine a particular number or category of witnesses. The credibility of the evidence adduced has to be assessed on its own merits. In the present case, PW-1, the father of the deceased, has given a consistent account of the occurrence, which is materially corroborated by PW-2, a police constable having no relationship with the deceased or the informant. His conduct is consistent with that of a natural witness confronted with a sudden and violent occurrence. His testimony cannot, therefore, be discarded merely because other persons present at the locality were not examined. The evidence of PW-2, being that of an independent eyewitness, further lends assurance to the prosecution case.

A perusal of Ex. Kha-1, the GD Entry dated 26.01.1984 at 17:45 hours, shows that Constables Ram Das and Bahadur Singh were sent on duty with rifles and cartridges. The entry, however, also records that Constables Darshan Singh and Shri Ram Gupta were deputed for patrolling on Akhtar Husain Road up to Akhada Khatikana. Ex. Kha-2, the subsequent GD Entry dated 27.01.1984 at 00:01 hours, records the return of the police personnel and handing over of the arms and ammunition to the officials deputed for subsequent patrolling. A conjoint reading of the two entries does not establish that Darshan Singh and Shri Ram Gupta were unarmed. The absence of a separate mention of rifles in Ex. Kha-1 cannot, by itself, contradict the prosecution version, particularly when the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 places both constables on duty at the relevant place. The submission in this regard, therefore, has no substance.

The contention regarding the presence of PW-2, Constable Sultan Singh, at the place of occurrence is doubtful does not have merit. The submission is not borne out from the record. PW-2 stated that he was posted at Police Outpost Lohamandi on 26.01.1984 from 06:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight and that he, along with Constables Darshan Singh and Shri Ram Gupta, chased the accused persons and returned after about 25-30 minutes, whereafter he found that Hanif had been taken to the hospital. His presence at the spot is further corroborated by PW-5, Inspector Ashok Kumar Sharma, who stated that PW-2 was present when he reached the spot at about 08:30 p.m. PW-4, SI R.K. Singh, also stated that PW-2 met him at about 08:40 p.m. or 10-15 minutes thereafter at the spot. His statement was not recorded that night as PW-4 was engaged in preparing the site plan. These circumstances sufficiently establish the presence of PW-2 at the relevant time and place.

Though not argued by the learned counsel for the surviving appellant, a perusal of record reveals that the accused Quasar has filed a certified copy of judgment and order in case No. 1527 of 1983 dated 26.07.1984, certified copy of judgment and order in case No. 1523 of 1983 dated 26.07.1984, certified copy of judgment and order in case No. 1517 of 1983 dated 06.01.1984,certified copy of chargesheet No. 39 in case No. 1154 of 1983 and a certified copy of affidavit of Mohd. Azad @ Mohd. Azam @ Kallu dated 22.05.1984.

The certified copies of the judgment shows that the Qausar was an accused in those cases who have been acquitted of the charges under Arms Act and Explosives Act and Excise Act. The affidavit of Mohd. Azad @ Mohd. Azam @ Kallu depicts that he has stated that he (Kallu) and his father (Peer Mohammad) reached the spot after receiving the information of incident. This Kallu has not been produced as a witness before the trial court.

The accused Mohd. Ibrahim @ Musai has submitted copy of following judgment:

Taufiq @ Billu has also submitted the copy of judgment of this Court passed in Criminal Appeal No. 2468 of 1979 whereby appeal was allowed and the accused including Billu were acquitted. Another judgment passed in Sessions Trial No. 299/M/83 whereby accused Taufiq @ Billu and Mohd. Akhtar @ Lula were acquitted. Perhaps these judgments have been filed to show that the accused were innocent people of the society and they were regularly implicated on false ground. Since the accused persons were acquitted in the above cases, it is very much possible that they have influenced the witnesses under threat to obtain judgment of acquittal.

The record reveals that the appellant No.1 Billu @ Taufiq was murdered in a police encounter and appellant No.2 Mohd. Akhtar @ Lula was murdered in the year around 1995, which shows their criminal activities, therefore, by submitting the judgments of acquittal passed in various cases cannot be accepted as innocence of accused appellants and neither can be inferred that accused appellants were falsely implicated due to various enmities.

The affidavit of Kallu has not been substantiated by calling him before the Trial Court to get the averment proved, therefore, no value can be given to such affidavit which is not proved before the Court.

On the basis of discussion made above and evaluation of all the evidences available on the record, this Court finds that during the occurrence the accused in their concerted participation, were armed with deadly weapons, they chased Hanif, during which firearm shots were fired, resulting in a firearm injury to Hanif, who fell on the road. Musai and Billu shouted and encouraged other accused to kill him then Qausar inflicted multiple knife injuries upon him while the other accused remained present at the spot armed with pistols.

The medical evidence establishes that the death was caused by shock and hemorrhage as a result of all the ante-mortem injuries. The absence of specific attribution of the firearm injury to any particular accused, in the facts of the present case, does not detract from the prosecution case where the participation of all the accused and their common intention have otherwise been established. The entire occurrence constitutes a continuous transaction and the proved circumstances, when considered cumulatively, establish that:

Motive: The accused targeted the deceased because he had previously reported their illegal gambling activities to the police.

Active Participation & Overt Acts: The accused acted in concert in a crowded market in broad daylight. The accused Billu @ Taufiq, Akhtar @ Lula and Mohd. Ibrahim @ Musai armed with pistols and Qausar with a knife chased the deceased while firing shots, causing him to fall. Upon explicit exhortation by accused Musai and Billu to kill him, accused Quasar inflicted multiple knife wounds while the rest stood guard with weapons before fleeing from police personnel.

Existence of Common Intention: The entire event formed a single, continuous transaction. Individual attribution of the specific gunshot wound is not necessary because medical testimony confirmed death resulted from the cumulative shock and hemorrhage of all ante-mortem injuries.

Act Done in Furtherance of Intent: The combined conduct of accused arming themselves, chasing, firing, exhorting, and stabbing —demonstrates a shared premeditated design and coordinated action to kill the deceased.

In view of the principles discussed here-in-above and upon a cumulative appreciation of the evidence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons acted in furtherance of their common intention and committed murder of Hanif. They are, hence, found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and are, accordingly, liable to be sentenced to imprisonment for life.

We have perused the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. The findings arrived at by the learned Trial Court are well-reasoned, supported by reliable evidence, and do not suffer from any factual or legal infirmity. Finding no scope for interference with the well-considered judgment of the learned Trial Court. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 12.02.1985 directing the accused appellants to undergo imprisonment for life under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC, as awarded by the trial Court, are hereby confirmed. Accordingly present criminal appeal is dismissed.

The execution of sentence suspended earlier stands revoked, and the bail bonds and surety bonds of the Appellant stand cancelled forthwith.

The Appellant is directed to surrender before the learned Trial Court within 15 days from today. In the event of failure to surrender, the learned Trial Court shall immediately issue a Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) against the Appellant to secure their arrest and commit them to prison to serve out the remaining sentence.

The Trial Court shall transmit a compliance report to the Registry of this Court within a period of four weeks.

Let the Trial Court Record (TCR) along with a certified copy of this judgment be transmitted to the concerned Trial Court forthwith for necessary information and compliance.

Before parting with the judgment, this Court places on record its appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by the Research Associate, Ms. Sadhana Singh, in researching the legal issues arising in the present matter and in assisting the Court in the Court in the preparation of the judgment. The Court acknowledges with gratitude her sincere efforts and assistance.