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Judgment
V. Narasingh, J. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Mohanty, assisted by Ms. Pattnaik, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. Swain, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State.
This criminal revision has been filed assailing the order dated 06.03.2026 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., (Sadar), Cuttack in G.R. Case No. 743 of 2024, whereby the prayer of the Petitioner under Section 239 Cr.P.C., 1973 to discharge her from the accusation of the offences under Sections 465/471/473 of the I.P.C. was partly allowed, in as much as, by the impugned order, while the learned Magistrate did not find a prima facie case against the Petitioner so far as the offence under Section 473 of the I.P.C. is concerned, the prayer for discharge in respect of the offences under Sections 465/471 of the I.P.C. was rejected and charge for commission of offence under Section 468 of the IPC, was added.
It is a case of the prosecution that on 12.12.2024 at 9.40 P.M., the IIC, Lalbag P.S., received the report through Dak from the office of the Collector, Cuttack, in which the Complainant, Shri Dattatraya Bhausaheb Sindhe, IAS, District Collector-cum-District Election Officer, Cuttack, alleged that two complaints were received against Smt. Bijayalaxmi Dash, Asst. Professor, Odia Department, Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, that she had produced some forged documents before her Authorities for her personal gain. Smt. Bijayalaxmi Dash, Asst. Professor, Odia Department, Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, had applied to the Registrar, Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, to attend the refresher course programme at Central University of Rajasthan scheduled from 9th April to 19th April, 2019. Further, she applied before the Registrar, Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, for leave from her duties w.e.f. 08.04.2019 to 20.04.2019 to attend the refresher course at Central University of Rajasthan by producing a forged letter bearing No. 742/Elec, dated 05.04.2019, purportedly issued under the signature of the Deputy Election Officer, Office of the District Election Officer, Cuttack. Copy of the said letter is marked as one of the documents relied upon reads as under;
Accordingly, the Registrar, Ravenshaw University, allowed Smt. Dash to attend the refresher course at Central University of Rajasthan from 09.04.2019 to 19.04.2019 and relieved her from her duties w.e.f. 08.04.2019 (FN) to 20.04.2019 (AN) vide his office order No. 1383 dated 06.04.2019. After attending the above course, Smt. Dash resumed her duty on 22.04.2019 (FN) and also submitted a Certificate of Participation for the above course at Central University of Rajasthan. On verification of the office records, it was ascertained that no such letter bearing No. 742/Elec, dated 05.04.2019, was issued to the Registrar, Ravenshaw University, under the signature of the Deputy Election Officer and that the signature of the Officer appearing on the said letter was also a forged one.
3-A. On receipt of the said report, an investigation was taken up. During the course of the investigation, the I.O. recorded the statements of the witnesses and also verified and seized the issue register of the office of the District Election Office, Cuttack, for the year 2019 and, on verification thereof, found that letter bearing No.742/Elec, dated 05.04.2019, was never issued from the office of the District Election Officer, Cuttack, in the year 2019. Thereafter, a notice was issued to the Registrar, Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, and, on going through the materials on record, including the enquiry report from the office of the Registrar, Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, which prima facie established the involvement of the accused-Petitioner. It came to the fore that the Petitioner, Asst. Professor in the Odia Department, Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, submitted the forged document at Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, vide letter No.742/Elec, as proof of non-allotment of election duty and availed academic leave for the period from 09.04.2019 to 19.04.2019 to attend the refresher course programme organised by Central University of Rajasthan. On the basis of the aforementioned investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the Petitioner under Sections 465/471/473 of the I.P.C.
As already noted, the learned Court in seisin has discharged the Petitioner of the accusation under Section 473 of the I.P.C., while the prayer for discharge in respect of the offences under Sections 465/471 of the I.P.C. was rejected and the charge for commission of offence under Section 468 of the I.P.C. was added.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Mohanty, assisted by Ms. Pattnaik, learned Counsel, submits that even if the entire prosecution case is accepted at its face value, the offence under Section 465 of the I.P.C. is ex facie not made out and reliance is also placed on the enquiry report of the University, wherein the Committee found that the letter as submitted was on account of an error of judgment, for which the Committee recommended censuring the Petitioner.
To fortify their submission, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the following judgments;
Vimla (Dr) v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 1963 SC 1572
Parminder Kaur v. State of U.P., (2010) 1 SCC 322
Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy v. State
of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1950
Per contra, Mr. Swain, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State, submits that a prima facie case is well made out against the Petitioner and the Petitioner had, in fact, availed academic leave from 09.04.2019 to 19.04.2019 on the basis of the forged letter. The submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel ought to be tested in a trial and, as such, no relief can be granted to the Petitioner.
The law governing discharge has been set at rest by the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568 and the said judgment has stood the test of time.
The rival contentions have to be tested on the touchstone of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Debendra Nath Padhi (supra).
While filing the charge sheet, the prosecution has relied on twenty witnesses, out of whom, it is stated by the learned Counsel for the State that the statements of CSW Nos. 1, 6, 12, 15, 16 and 17 are of significance for the present purpose, which indicate a well-orchestrated design of the Petitioner in committing the forgery and, also fortifying the stand of the prosecution that there is more than a prima facie case to proceed against the Petitioner.
In this context, the learned Counsel for the State relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. S. Selvi, (2018) 13 SCC 455, to buttress his submission regarding the contours of the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court while considering the question of framing of charge.
There is no embargo on this Court to sift the material on record to find out whether a prima facie case is made out or not. However, a roving analysis of the materials on record akin to a trial, as is being strenuously urged by the learned Senior Counsel, is beyond the scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
On a bare perusal of the materials on record, it is clearly borne out that the Petitioner had submitted the forged document to avoid being drafted for election duty so that she could go for the refresher course conducted by the Central University of Rajasthan. The fact that the duty chart of the personnel who were assigned election duty relating to Ravenshaw University did not ultimately contain the name of the Petitioner, which was heavily relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, is of no relevance for considering the prayer for discharge.
12-A. The stand of the Petitioner is that the entire forgery was done by one Suryamani Tripathy and that she had bona fide believed the said Suryamani Tripathy. In this context she relied on her FIR registered as Malgodown P.S. Case No.262 of 2024 dated 21.12.2024 under Sections 318(4)/ 319(2)/ 336(3) of BNS citing said Suryamani Tripathy as an accused. The same is still under investigation.
To fortify her innocence, the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner states that the said Suryamani Tripathy had instituted Malgodown P.S. Case No.178 of 2024 against the Petitioner under Section 471 of the BNS, which had culminated in the final report, as stated by the learned counsel, on instruction.
12-B. Hence, it is submitted that while evaluating the accusation in the case at hand, the aforesaid ought to weigh with this Court, since the same was not considered in its proper perspective.
12-C. In the considered view of this Court, the said defence has to be gone into at the time of trial, as rightly observed by the Trial Court in the impugned order.
On consideration of the materials on record, it is seen that the Petitioner has been charged with commission of offences under Sections 465/471/473 of the I.P.C. Section 463 of the I.P.C. deals with forgery whereas Section 415 of the I.P.C. deals with cheating.
The judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner are analyzed as under;
14-A. In the case of Dr. Vimla (supra), the Apex Court, while dealing with the order of the High Court setting aside her acquittal under Sections 467/468 of the I.P.C., held that an act of deceit would not by itself constitute "fraud" or "forgery", if there was no intent to cause economic loss or gain unlawful advantage.
14-B. In Parminder Kaur (supra) dealt with a case whereby the High court dismissed the application of the Appellant before the Apex Court accused under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing a proceeding relating to filing of the charge sheet under Section 420/467/468/471 of the I.P.C.
Paragraph-34 of the said judgment, germane for consideration, is extracted hereunder so also the relevant extract from paragraph-40 is culled out hereunder;
“34.The last offence which is alleged against the appellant is Section 471 IPC. This section is not applicable in the case of the appellant for the simple reason that we have already found that there was no dishonest intention on the part of the appellant nor had she acted fraudulently. This section applies only in case of the use of a forged document as a genuine document. Since we have found that there is no element of forgery at all, there would be no question of there being any valid allegation against the appellant.
xxx xxx xxx
40.In Para 2(e) of his submissions, Respondent 2 states:
“Now the petitioner has been raising the issue as to what benefit she was going to derive from forging the dates from 6-5-2002 to 16-5-2002 and from 7-5-2002 to 17-5-2002 and 27-5-2002. The correct answer to this has to be given by a person who has committed this fraud as is laid down under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. This is a self-confessional case in which the petitioner has mentioned categorically that the forgery in changing the dates has been committed by her advocate. She is habitual in committing fraud, whenever she gets opportunity to do so, just for greed of money and to get more and more material possession. If she was not going to derive any benefit from changing the dates from 10 to 20 days then why she has committed this fraud. She cannot be absolved from committing the forgery which requires her trial in the appropriate court. In fact it is not an ordinary case of condoning the delay of 10 to 20 days but is a part of deep-rooted conspiracy to usurp and grab the land of five families consisting of forty members whose future and livelihood has been put at stake by the petitioner. After the land was sold by her husband and her daughter through their attorney to common relations of both, Respondent 2 and the husband of the petitioner, the land prices had gone up by ten times which led the petitioner to file six cases after a period of 11 years with mala fide intention to grab the land.”
(emphasis supplied)
We have deliberately quoted the whole para in order to show that even Respondent 2 has not been able to show as to how the appellant could be benefited in any manner by changing the dates. We, therefore, find that since there was no question of the appellant gaining anything, she would not have made the aforementioned changes in the document. How the document is changed is not for us to explain. However, whosoever may have changed those documents, the said change did not and could not result in any illegal gains to the appellant or illegal loss to anybody. Such changes were, therefore, innocuous and did not give rise to any offences.
14-C. In the case of Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy (supra), the Apex Court has drawn an important distinction in criminal law by clarifying that a false statement or document would attract the provisions relating to cheating or forgery only where it materially influences the decision-making process of the concerned authority or results in a real and tangible fraudulent benefit, whereas a superfluous and legally unnecessary misrepresentation, where the person is otherwise entitled to the benefit, would not, by itself, invite penal consequences.
Paragraph-16 of the said judgment runs thus;
“16....... To attract penal consequences, it must be shown that the false representation was of a material fact which had induced the victim to either part with property or act in a manner which they would not otherwise do but for such false representation. In the absence of such vital link between the alleged false representation and the issuance of recognition/renewal of affiliation, the essential ingredient of offence is not satisfied.”
14-D. In fact, paragraph-16 of the said judgment, in the humble view of this Court if understood contextually sets at naught the endeavour of the Petitioner to seek discharge, considering the materials on record.
In this context, the approach to be adopted by a Court while considering a challenge to framing of charge can be gainfully restated, referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of S. Selvi (supra) relied upon by the prosecution.
Paragraph-10 thereof, which is germane for adjudication, is extracted hereunder:
“10.If on the basis of the material on record, the Court would form prima facie opinion that the accused might have committed the offence, it can frame charge, though for conviction it is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of charges, the probative value of the material on record has to be gone into and the Court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant conviction. The Court is required to evaluate the material on record at the stage of Sections 227 or 239 of the Code, as the case may be, only with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at the face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the Court has to proceed with the presumption that materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate such material with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose existence of the ingredients of the offence.”
On analysis of the materials, the learned Trial Court held as under;
“xxx xxx xxx ........The question of whether the accused was the author of the said forged document or had innocently used the forged document handed over to her by Suryamani Tripathy as alleged can be well ascertained when evidence is tendered in the course of trial and if the said person appears to have commited the offence, he can well be prosecuted u/s 319 CrPC, 1973. At this stage the Court cannot embark upon a mini trial to conduct a roving inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx”
On considering the rival submissions and on the touchstone of the judgments referred to hereinabove, including the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, this Court is not persuaded to hold that there is any infirmity in the order of the learned Court in seisin in rejecting the prayer of the Petitioner for discharge in terms of the impugned order.
The revision being devoid of merit stands dismissed.
Interim order stands vacated.