Bijay Kumar Biswal vs State Of Odisha & Another Vs

Chittaranjan Dash, J.

By meanns of this application, the Petitioneer seeks the indulgence of this Court praying to quash the order of cognizance dated 09.06.20166 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Koraput in 1CC Case No.02 of 20016, wherein, the Petitioner has been implicated in the offence underr Sections 143/448/149 of IPC.

The backkground facts of the case are that on 14.09.2011, the complainant, Bijaya Laxmi Sahu, lodged a report at Sunabeda Police Station alleging that two years earlier, in the abbsence of her husband Baikunthanath Sahu, several individualls including Dandapani Swain and the present Petitioner, Bijay Kuumar Biswal, unlawfully entereed their house at night by breaking the lock. It was alleged that Swain, accompanied by his son-in-law (thhe Petitioner) and others, continnued to occupy the house despite the complainant’s objections. The genesis of the dispute, however, lies inn a monetary transaction betwween Baikunthanath Sahu and Dandaapani Swain. Sahu had defaullted on instalments for a Housing Board quarter (MIG-1) allottedd to him, resulting in its cancellation in 2002. Nonetheless, in 2008, to meet his brother’s medical expenses, Baikunthanath accepted Rs. 92,000/- from Swain aggainst a total consideration of Rs. 1,40,000/- and handed over possession of the quarter without disclosing the cancellation status. Thhe agreement was notarized, annd the Petitioner, as a witness and rellative, signed the receipt. Swaain later occupied the house, spent money on its repair through the Petitioner, and conducted a hoousewarming ceremony. Yearss later, when property values rose, Baikunthanath allegedly demandded more money, which Swain refused, prompting the Sahu family to initiate police complaints, which weere treated as civil disputes. The matter resurfaced through a private complaint leading to the cognizance order. This petition has therefore been preferred to quaash the said order, asserting that the dispute is essentially civil in nature and that the criminal proceeddings amount to an abuse of thee process of law.

Mr. Bhokta, learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the entire caase stems from a property dispute between private parties, and the allegations made in the complaint, even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the commission of any criminal offence by the Peetitioner. It was contended that the Petiitioner, being the son-in-law of one of the accused and a local conntractor, was merely a witness to a notarised transaction between the complainant’s huusband and Dandapani Swain and haad no role in any alleged trespass or intimidation. Mr. Bhokta asserts that the dispute revolves around possession and consideration relating to a Housing Board quarter, which had already been canccelled due to default in payment. Counsel further pointed out that thee police, after thorough investigation, submitted a Final Report cateegorising the matter as a “Misstake of Law” due to lack of material and witness support. He submmits that despite this, the complainant filed a private complaint after an unexplained delay of four years,, which was entertained withoout due regard to the earlier findings. Mr. Bhokta finally submits that the complaint is nothing but a civvil grievance being given a criiminal colour, and the continuation of proceedings against the Petittioner amounts to abuse of the process of law, warranting interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Ms. Mohhanty, learned counsel for the State opposed the petition and submitted that the allegations made in thhe complaint disclose the commission of cognizable offences, includding criminal trespass and inttimidation, and that the learned Maagistrate was justified in taking cognizance based on the materials available before him. Shee argued that the complainant has consistently alleged unlawful entry into her premises and forcible occupation by the accused persons, including the present Petitioner, and such allegations are suufficient at the stage of cognizance to proceed with trial. Ms. Mohannty further contended that the delay in filing the complaint may be attributed to the complainant’s unsuccessful attempts to seek police intervention, and such delay alone should not defeat the case at the threshold. She also submitted that the veracity of the alllegations, the role of the Petitioner, annd the nature of the dispute aree all matters for trial, and the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashment at a premature stage ouught not to be entertained.

Upon perrusal of the case record, it is evident thhat the entire case arises out of a dispute surrounding Quarter No. MIG-1 of the Housing Board Colony, Sunabeda, which was initiallly allotted to one Baikunthanath Sahu, husband of the complainant, by the Orissa State Housing Board in 1998. Despite paying the initial down payment, Baikunthanath failed to pay further instalments, leading to cancellation of the allotment in 2002. Notwithstandding this, he continued in poossession of the house without clearing dues. Subsequently, in September 2008, to meet medical expenses for his ailing younger brrother, Baikunthanath received ₹92,000/- from one Dandapani Swaain as part of a ₹1,40,000/- consideration, relinquishing possession and handing over keys of the house to Swain. A notarised acknowledgement was executed, signed by both parties and witnessed by others, including the presennt Petitioner, who is Swain’s son-in-law. The material on record reveals that Swain, facing retirement and needing accommodation, shifted into the quarter in Seeptember 2009. Prior to this, a groupp comprising Swain, the Petitiioner, and others had visited the houuse to assess repair costs. When Swain misplaced the key and the complainant refused to providde a duplicate, the lock was broken to gain entry. Swain then occupied the house, undertook repairs, reconnected utilities, and organized a “Griha Pratistha” ceremony attended by local residents annd even, as claimed, members of the complainant’s family. It also emmerges that the Petitioner, being a locaal contractor, had invested around ₹60,000/- to repair the complainant’s current residence in MIIG-2 as part of an oral understandding for the remaining considderation.

It is also relevant to note that Baikunthanath re mained silent for nearly two years after Swain’s occupation. Only after a rise in the property’s value did he demand an additional ₹1 lakh from Swain, which was declined. This triggered a seriees of police complaints by Baaikunthanath and the complainant, cul minating in a report dated 14.09.2011 that led to the present proceeeding. Upon investigation, thee police concluded the matter was civil in nature and filed a Final Report dated 31.08.2012 categorizing the case as a “Mistake of Law” under Sections 143/448/149 IPCC, owing to absence of material evidence or corroborating witnesses. Despite the Final Report, the complainant filed a complaint in 2016, four years later, allegging identical facts, without explaininng the delay. Based on this, thhe learned S.D.J.M., Koraput, took coognizance on 09.06.2016 for offences under Sections 294, 447, 448, 506, and 34 IPC. This order forms the subject of challenge in the present petition.

The complaint, when viewed in its entirety along with the police report andd supporting materials, reflects that the crux of the dispute is the possession and transfer of a residenntial quarter, involving monetary transactions, informal agreements, and failure to fulfil Housing Board obligations. The incidennt regarding breaking the lockk and entry into the house appears to be part of the transactional chaain between Baikunthanath and Dandaapani Swain, where the Petitiooner was only a witness and an assisting relative. There is nothing to indicate any criminal intent or indeppendent overt act attributable too the Petitioner. In fact, his role, as peer the record, appears limited to assisting in repairs and witnessing a monetary transaction betweeen close relatives.

The Supreme Court has consistently held thaat the power under Section 4882 Cr.P.C. can and should be exercissed to quash proceedings wheere the allegations are manifestly absurd, civil in nature, or intended to harass. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its decision in the matter of State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlaal reported in 1992 Supp(1) SCCC 335, has laid down the following guidelines for exercise of power under Section 482:-

“(1) Wherre the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie consstitute any offence or make out a case against the accuseed.

(2) Wheree the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not discllose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purvieew of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or coomplaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence annd make out a case against the accused.

(4) Wheree, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognnizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplatedd under Section 1555(2) of the Code.

(5) Wheree the allegations made in the FIR or commplaint are so abssurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which noo prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Wheree there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerneed Act (under whhich a criminal proceeding is instituted)) to the institutionn and continuance of the proceedings and/or where theere is a specific provision in the Code or the concernedd Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Wheree a criminal proceeding is manifestly atttended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

And furthher held in Naresh Kumar & Anr. Vs. The State of Karnataka & Anr. reported in 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2288 –

“6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhaand (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recoognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court muust not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essenttially of a civil nature. This is what was held:

“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Sectionn 482 of the Code the High Court hass to be cautiouus. This power is to be used sparingly annd only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any Coourt or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whetheer a complaint discloses a criminal offeence or not deppends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whetheer essential ingredients of criminal offennce are present or not has to be judged by the High Coourt. A complaaint disclosing civil transactions may alsso have a criminal texture. But the High Court muust see whetheer a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situatioon, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adoptedd as has happened in this case, the Highh Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceeedings to prevent abuse of process of the Court.”

(emphasis supplied)

Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Courtt in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. (20021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannnot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. Inn Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2023 SCCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentiallyy of a civil nature, is given a cloakk of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashhed, by exercisingg the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

In the insstant case, the allegations of criminal trespass and intimidation are not only stale being raised years after the alleged incident but aree also unsupported by any material that could establish mens rea or any criminal intent on the part of the Petitioner. The complainant has offered no explanaation for the inordinate delay of four years in filing the complaint after the police had already submmitted a Final Report categorising thee matter as a mistake of law. Despite this, the learned Magistrate proceeded to take cognizance without examining the earlier police findings or considering the civil complexion of the dispute, whicch appears to stem from an aboorted housing transaction and post-factoo grievances.

A perusal of the Final Form further reveals that the core issue relates to disputes over ownership and occupationn of a quarter allotted by the Housing Board, specifically involving non-payment of instalments, cancellation of allotment, and informal agreements concerning posseession. The allegations that the accuseed, including the Petitioner, foorcibly entered the premises do not disclose any criminal motive but rather relate to a contested claim of possession following a monnetary transaction. In this background, the Court below ought to have carefully scrutinised the factual matrix before entertaining a crriminal complaint in what is, at its core, a civil dispute.

In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds it pertinent to reiterrate that the extraordinary power underr Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised with caution and circcumspection.

However, such power must be invoked when it becommes necessary to prevent maniffest abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice, especially where the alleegations are demonstrably absurd, inherently improbable, or intended to harass. In the case at hannd, the material placed on record and the sequence of events clearly reveal that the dispute arises out of a failed transaction involving a Housing Board properrty and is predominantly ciivil in nature. The complainant, after a prolonged silence and following adverse police findings, sought to revive the matter by clothhing it with criminal allegations, without any foundational bassis or specific material implicating the present Petitioner.

As a resuult, this Court is of the considered opinion that the continuation of thhe criminal proceeding against the Petiitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of law. No prima facie case is made out so far as the Petitioner is concerned, and hiss prosecution in this context woould be unwarranted.

Accordingly, the Criminal Miscellaneous Casee is allowed. The order of cognizance dated 09.06.2016 passed byy the learned S.D.J.M., Korapuut in 1CC Case No.02 of 2016, so far as it relates to the present Petitioner, is hereby quashed. Needless to say, this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and all other grounds taken by the defence in the annexures are left open.

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