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Judgment
Sashikanta Mishra, J.
The order passed by the District Registrar, Khordha, the appellate authority, in confirming the order passed by the Registering Authority refusing to register the sale deed presented by the petitioner is under challenge in this writ application.
The petitioner is the owner in possession of the schedule property, having purchased the same from its recorded owner namely, M/s- Aryans Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. by registered sale deed dated 12.01.2004. In order to meet the medical expenses of her treatment as well as of her husband, she decided to sell the land and building to the present Opposite Party No.4 by executing an agreement on 26.01.2026. She received the total consideration amount and sought to register the sale deed which was not accepted by the Registering Officer. She moved this Court in W.P.(C). No. 18345 of 2025, which was disposed of on 15.07.2025 directing the Registering Authority to receive the sale deed and to act in accordance with law. The sale deed was presented on 12.08.2025 but was refused to be registered by the Registering Authority by order dated 19.07.2025 on the ground that the petitioner has no right to transfer the land. The petitioner moved this Court again in W.P.(C). No. 33522 of 2025. By order dated 29.01.2026, this Court relegated the petitioner to the forum of appeal under Section 72 of the Registration Act. The petitioner thereafter, preferred appeal being Appeal No. 3 of 2026 before the District Registrar. By order dated 29.07.2026, the appeal was dismissed mainly on the ground that the Satwa of the land was recorded as Pattadar which does not give a transferable right to the landholder and secondly, the land is of ‘Jungle Kisam’. Said order is impugned in the present writ application.
The State has filed counter affidavit, inter alia, justifying the impugned orders by referring to Government instruction vide letter dated 19.06.2025 and 02.07.2025. It is stated that the Government has instructed not to allow transfer of land recorded as Pattadar. The nature and transferability of the land falls within the domain of the competent revenue authority, which is to be followed by the Registering Authority. On examination of the instrument, the Registering Authority as well as the appellate authority found that allowing its registration would contravene the Government instructions for which it was rightly refused to be registered.
Heard Mr. S.K.Dash, learned Senior counsel with Ms. P. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S.N.Patnaik, learned AGA for the State.
The first plank of argument of Mr. Dash, learned Senior counsel is that the impugned orders are product of adjudication by the concerned authorities, a power they do not possess. Entering into the question of status of the land and the transferability of the petitioner's title is entirely beyond the domain and competence of the said authorities. Even otherwise, law has been settled by this Court recently that changing the nature of the land from Stitiban to Pattadar or from Dakhalsatwa Sunya to Pattadar on the basis of administrative instructions is not permissible. Mr. Dash, further submits that the Government has itself laid down, by way of guidelines in 1990, that all such lands recorded as Dakhalsatwa Sunya are to be recorded as Stitiban, with full heritable and transferable rights.
Mr. Patnaik, learned State counsel seeks to counter the arguments made on behalf of the petitioner by submitting that the registering authority cannot allow registration of land which by its nature, is non-transferable. Since the Government circulars prohibits such transfers, the registering authorities rightly refused to register the document.
This Court has carefully perused the order of refusal passed by the registering authority on 19.08.2025 and the order of confirmation in appeal passed by the District Registrar-cum-appellate authority on 29.07.2026. Both the orders, on the face of it, are unsustainable in law for the simple reason that both are products of adjudication. Refusal to register a document can only be on grounds provided in the Indian Registration Act. Secondly, there is a fundamental distinction between transfer of land and registration of instrument of such transfer. The Registrar is concerned with the latter, not the former. This subtle yet potent distinction must be kept in mind before proceeding further. What both the authorities have attempted is to thwart the process of transfer which undoubtedly affects a citizen’s right to property as provided under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Of course, it has been done in the garb of refusing registration but the effect is the same. In the oft-quoted judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar1, it was held as follows:
“18.The registering officer is not concerned with the title held by the executant. He has no adjudicatory power to decide whether the executant has any title. Even if an executant executes a sale deed or a lease in respect of a land in respect of which he has no title, the registering officer cannot refuse to register the document if all the procedural compliances are made and the necessary stamp duty as well as registration charges/fee are paid. We may note here that under the scheme of the 1908 Act, it is not the function of the Sub-Registrar or registering authority to ascertain whether the vendor has title to the property which he is seeking to transfer.”
As is evident, the Supreme Court has gone to the extent of holding that registration of a document cannot be refused even if a person does not possess title over the property, the document in relation to which is sought to be registered. Needless to mention, the Registering Authorities have no power to embark upon an adjudicatory exercise to examine whether the executant of the document in question has transferable right or not. Of course, this Court would hasten to add that the document must still be examined to ascertain whether any of the relevant statutory provisions, including Section 22-A of the Registration Act, as amended in Odisha, and Section 34, have been violated and whether all statutory formalities have been complied with. Save and except the above, the registering authority cannot adjudicate upon the matter by arrogating to itself the powers of a civil Court.
Having held as above, it is not necessary to examine the correctness of the findings rendered by both authorities below. However, this Court would observe in passing that even otherwise, the reasoning adopted by them no longer stands in view of the ruling of this Court recently in the case of Gargi Dash & Ors. v. State of Odisha & Ors.2.
So, only because the Tahasildar corrected the ROR of the petitioner from Stitiban to Pattadar basing on an executive instruction, it does not take away her transferable title over the property. As regards the issues raised with regard to validity of the lease granted to the original lessee, this Court can only observe that these are matters falling outside the purview of the registering authorities. The appellate authority has also gone on to hold that recording of the Kisam of the land as Baje Fasal-II instead of Jungle is not appropriate. This Court can only wonder from where the appellate authority derived the power to decide so.
Thus, from a conspectus of the analysis of facts, law and the discussions made, this Court is satisfied that the impugned orders cannot stand the test of law. Resultantly, the writ application is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The Registering Authority is directed to register the sale deed already presented by the petitioner within three days from the date of production of certified copy of this order by the petitioner.