Bhupendra Veer Singh vs State Of U.P. & Ors.

Heard Mr. Santosh Kumar Singh Paliwal Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner, Dr. Santosh Kumar Shukla, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State and Mr. Om Prakash Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.6.

The present petition has been filed seeking quashing of the order dated 28.12.2018 passed by respondent no. 3. A further prayer has been made for issuance of a direction to the respondents to extend to the petitioner all post-retiral benefits to which he is entitled, including the benefit of regular pension.

Placing the brief facts of the case, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in Maharana Pratap Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Poonapar, Bhatauli, District Mau (hereinafter referred to as the “Institution”) on 04.07.1981. The Institution is a recognized institution and receives grant-in-aid from the State Government. The teachers and other employees of the Institution are paid salary in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1978 and the Rules framed thereunder (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules of 1978”).

It is further submitted that, under the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972, the services of teachers serving in institutions governed by the Board of Basic Education are regulated by the U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981. The petitioner, upon attaining the age of superannuation, i.e. 62 years, retired from service on 31.03.2017. Since the post-retiral benefits admissible to the petitioner were not released, the petitioner approached this Court by means of filing Writ-A No. 30207 of 2017 (Bhupendar Veer Singh vs. State Of U.P. And 3 Others), which was disposed of by order dated 14.07.2017 with a direction to the concerned respondent to consider and decide the grievance of the petitioner in accordance with law.

The claim of the petitioner for payment of his post-retiral dues came to be rejected by the order dated 19.04.2018, primarily on the ground that the petitioner had been working in two different Government Departments. In this regard, reports were called for, from the District Basic Education Officer, Mau, as well as the concerned Finance and Accounts Officer. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the aforesaid reports/communications, which formed the basis of the order, rejecting the petitioner’s claim, were never furnished to the petitioner, nor was he afforded any opportunity to submit his explanation with regard to the contents thereof. Thus, the impugned order came to be passed without providing the petitioner an opportunity of meeting the material relied upon against him.

Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that, earlier, the District Basic Education Officer, Mau, by his letter dated 26.12.2017, had submitted a report to respondent no. 2 recommending release of the retiral dues, including pensionary benefits, admissible to the petitioner. Pursuant thereto, respondent no. 2 passed an order directing payment of the retiral as well as pensionary benefits to the petitioner. However, subsequently, the said order was cancelled by respondent no. 2 without either calling upon the petitioner to furnish his explanation or affording him any opportunity of hearing.

Aggrieved by the order dated 19.04.2018, the petitioner approached this Court by means of filing Writ-A No.15316 of 2018 (Bhupendra Veer Singh vs. State Of U.P. And 5 Others). The said writ petition was disposed of with a direction to respondent no. 3 therein to pass a reasoned and speaking order, after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, uninfluenced by any observation made by the Court.

In compliance with the aforesaid direction, a notice was issued to the petitioner, to which he submitted his reply dated 14.08.2018. In his reply, the petitioner specifically disclosed that he had not been appointed as a regular employee in the Post and Telegraph Department; rather, he had been engaged as an Agent and was being paid time-related continuity allowance, which, according to him, was in the nature of commission. The petitioner further disclosed that his engagement with the Post and Telegraph Department had been duly intimated to the concerned authorities and that the income received by him from the said engagement had also been duly disclosed in his income-tax returns.

It is, however, submitted that the aforesaid explanation furnished by the petitioner was not considered in its proper perspective. Instead, respondent no. 3, by the impugned order dated 28.12.2018, recorded a finding that the petitioner had concealed the fact that he had been working in the Post and Telegraph Department since March, 1981 and had been receiving salary therefrom. On that basis, it was concluded that the petitioner had simultaneously worked in two different Departments and had, by misrepresentation and concealment of material facts, committed embezzlement. Consequently, a direction was issued for recovery from the petitioner of the salary and other financial benefits allegedly received by him.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was engaged in the Post and Telegraph Department as an Extra Departmental Agent and was never appointed as a regular or permanent employee of the Postal Department. He was not paid any regular salary; rather, the amount received by him was in the nature of commission, described as time-related continuity allowance, which could not legally be treated as salary drawn from regular Government service.

It is further submitted that the petitioner had duly disclosed the income received from the Post and Telegraph Department in his income-tax returns and had also intimated the fact of such engagement and income to the Education Department. Thus, there was neither any concealment nor any misrepresentation on part of the petitioner.

Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the department itself had sought an opinion from the learned DGC (Civil), who, upon consideration of the relevant material, opined in favour of the petitioner. It was specifically observed that the petitioner was engaged as an Extra Departmental Agent and was not a regular employee of the Post and Telegraph Department, and that the amount received by him was in the nature of commission for the services rendered as an Agent. The learned DGC (Civil), accordingly, recommended that the post-retiral dues and pensionary benefits admissible to the petitioner be released.

The relevant portion of the circular issued by the Post and Telegraph Department is extracted hereinbelow:

The circular issued by the Post and Telegraph Department clearly indicates that teachers receiving salary from the State Exchequer could, in appropriate circumstances, be engaged as Extra Departmental Agents. Such engagement was to be on payment of commission and, therefore, the remuneration so received cannot be equated with the regular salary payable to a permanent employee of the Post and Telegraph Department. Consequently, an Extra Departmental Agent engaged in the aforesaid manner cannot, merely by reason of such engagement, be treated as a permanent employee of the Post and Telegraph Department.

Thus, the impugned order, having been passed without due consideration of the representation submitted by the petitioner, the fact that he had duly disclosed in his income-tax return that he was working as an agent in the Postal Department, and the relevant circular issued by the Postal Department, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The order, having been rendered in disregard of the material facts and relevant departmental instructions, is arbitrary and violative of the principles of fairness and natural justice.

He further submits that the proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner after his retirement from service and, therefore, the same are wholly unwarranted and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. He submits that, in the absence of any lawful authority permitting the initiation or continuation of such proceedings after retirement, the proceedings are liable to be set aside.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Jena vs. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and ors., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 666, as well as upon the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Lucknow Bench of this Hon’ble Court in Service Single No.1213 of 2021 (Nandan Singh Rawat vs. State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Food & Civil Supply, Lko.& Ors) as decided on 18.01.2021. It has been observed therein that, in the absence of any specific provision, conferring jurisdiction upon the employer to initiate or continue proceedings for recovery against an employee after his retirement, and where no rules or regulations have been adopted by the Corporation, authorizing the passing of such orders after retirement, any such recovery order or notice issued subsequent to retirement would be without jurisdiction. Such proceedings, having been initiated in the absence of statutory authority, are rendered a nullity in the eyes of law.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dev Prakash Tewari v. Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Service Board, Lucknow and others, reported in (2014) 7 SCC 260. It is submitted that where disciplinary proceedings are initiated or continued against an employee after his retirement, the same cannot be sustained in the absence of lawful authority permitting such proceedings. It has further been contended that where the employee is not afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing in the course of such proceedings, the resultant action is rendered arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice. Thus, the proceedings initiated against the petitioner after his retirement, without affording him an effective opportunity of hearing and without the authority of any applicable statutory provision, are liable to be set aside.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court passed in Special Appeal No. 530 of 2025 (Singasan Sharma v. State of U.P. and others), decided on 17.12.2025. In the said judgment, this Court has observed that where the appointments of the employees had been duly approved by the competent authority and they had thereafter continuously discharged their duties for several decades, while receiving salary from the State Exchequer, denial of their retiral benefits could not be sustained merely by subsequently questioning the validity of their appointments. The Court further observed that the long, continuous and uninterrupted service rendered by the appellants therein, coupled with the payment of salary from the State Exchequer under the The Uttar Pradesh Junior High Schools (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1978, constituted a substantial and settled service record, which could not be disregarded while determining their entitlement to salary dues and retiral benefits.

Per contra, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for respondent nos. 3 and 4 submits that the impugned order has been passed after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, in compliance with the earlier order dated 19.07.2018 passed by this Court in Writ-A No.15316 of 2018 (Bhupendra Veer Singh vs. State Of U.P. And 5 Others). It is submitted that, pursuant to the said order, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner and a detailed reply thereto was submitted by him, thereby affording him full and effective opportunity of hearing.

He further submits that, in his reply to the show-cause notice, the petitioner himself admitted that, while he was posted as a Shakha Dakpal under the Dying-in-Harness Rules, he had also worked as an Assistant Teacher in Maharana Pratap Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Poonapar, Bhatauli, District Mau, and had received salary from the Education Department. On the basis of the aforesaid facts and the material available on record, the competent authority considered the matter and thereafter passed the order dated 28.12.2018, whereby the proceedings were disposed of.

He also submits that the Manager of the institution had informed the authorities in writing that the petitioner was appointed on 05.03.1981 as Shakha Dakpal at Poonapar Post Office Branch under the Dying-in-Harness Scheme. It is contended that, while continuing to hold the said post, the petitioner concealed this fact and secured appointment as an Assistant Teacher on 30.06.1981 in the concerned institution, and thereafter continued to draw salary in respect of both engagements.

It is further submitted that, after his appointment as Assistant Teacher in the said institution, the petitioner continued to discharge duties as Shakha Dakpal as well, and consequently received remuneration in respect of two posts simultaneously. According to the respondents, such simultaneous holding of two posts and receipt of salary therefrom was impermissible under the applicable rules.

Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel further submits that the then District Basic Education Officer, Mau, vide letter dated 18.12.2018, sought a clarification from the then Finance and Accounts Officer, Basic Education, Mau, and, thereafter, issued the office letter dated 28.12.2018. In the said communication, it was stated that, under the applicable rules, a Government servant could not be appointed substantively to two or more posts at the same period.

It is also submitted that, by letter dated 05.03.1981 issued by the Office of the Superintendent, Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department, the petitioner had initially been appointed as Dakpal on a provisional basis, subject to the condition that the provisional appointment would be subject to regularisation in accordance with the applicable procedure and that the petitioner would have no claim for appointment to any other post. According to the respondents, despite the aforesaid condition, the petitioner concealed his existing engagement as Dakpal and subsequently obtained appointment as Assistant Teacher in Maharana Pratap Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Poonapar, Bhatauli, District-Mau.

Thus, the case of the respondents is that the petitioner simultaneously, continued to hold the post of Dakpal and worked as an Assistant Teacher, thereby drawing remuneration in respect of both posts during the overlapping period, which, according to the respondents, was contrary to the applicable service rules.

He further contends that Clause 13 of the Postal Gramin Dak Sevak Niyamawali, 1994 specifically provides that school teachers may be appointed as Extra Departmental Agents only in exceptional circumstances and with the personal approval of the Postmaster General. It is, therefore, contended that the engagement of a serving school teacher as an Extra Departmental Agent was permissible only upon obtaining such specific approval from the competent authority.

Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel also submits that, despite the aforesaid requirement, the petitioner concealed the fact of his engagement as an Extra Departmental Agent and obtained appointment as an Assistant Teacher in the Basic Education Department without obtaining the requisite permission of the Postmaster General. According to the respondents, such appointment was consequently contrary to the applicable rules and the petitioner was not entitled to derive any benefit from the same.

It is further submitted that, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the Finance and Accounts Officer, Basic Education, Mau, vide office letter dated 09.04.2018, addressed a communication to the Senior Treasury Officer, Mau, requesting that the withdrawal of pension by the petitioner be stopped. Thereafter, the then District Basic Education Officer, Mau, passed the order dated 28.12.2019 directing recovery from the salary of the petitioner. He submits that the aforesaid action was taken in accordance with the applicable rules and, therefore, cannot be faulted in law.

On the aforesaid premise, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel also contends that the petitioner has failed to establish any illegality in the impugned action/order and, consequently, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

Learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 6 submits that it is an admitted position, on the basis of the statement made by the petitioner before the Postal Department, that the petitioner was simultaneously working in two departments and drawing remuneration from both. It is contended that the petitioner's own statement establishes that he was discharging duties in the Postal Department while also working in the Basic Education Department and was receiving salary from both establishments during the same period. Learned counsel further submits that the entire proceedings against the petitioner had been initiated prior to his retirement and, therefore, the plea that the proceedings were initiated after retirement is factually incorrect.

In support of his submissions, learned counsel for respondent no. 6 has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Regional Manager, Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahiya and ors., reported in (2008) 13 SCC 170. Reliance has particularly been placed upon paragraph 18 thereof, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered a case where the employee had accepted the finding of the Scrutiny Committee that the caste certificate furnished by her was false, with the consequence that the very foundation of her appointment stood vitiated. The Court observed that where an appointment has been secured by misrepresentation or deception, the fact that the employee had continued in service for a considerable length of time would not, by itself, validate such appointment or confer a right to continue in service.

It has further been submitted, relying upon the aforesaid judgment, that mere delay in referring a caste certificate for scrutiny, or the time consumed by the Scrutiny Committee in verifying the certificate, would not validate an otherwise illegal appointment. According to learned counsel, the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that delay, by itself, cannot confer legitimacy upon an appointment founded upon misrepresentation or fraud.

Learned counsel for respondent no.6 has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, reported in (2004) 2 SCC 105, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an appointment obtained by playing fraud cannot confer a constitutional protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India so as to perpetuate an appointment which was void from its inception. It was observed that where the very foundation of the appointment is vitiated by fraud, such appointment is void ab initio and the employee cannot claim protection merely on the basis of his subsequent continuance in service.

On the strength of the aforesaid decisions, learned counsel submits that, if the appointment of the petitioner itself stood vitiated on account of concealment or misrepresentation and he had simultaneously drawn remuneration from two departments in respect of the same period of service, his subsequent continuance in service or retirement cannot validate the alleged illegality. Consequently, according to learned counsel, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court.

Learned counsel for the respondent no.6 has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Meghmala and others v. G. Narasimha Reddy and others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 383. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the settled principle that where a person obtains an order or derives a benefit from a competent authority by making a material misrepresentation or by playing fraud, such an order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The Court has further emphasised that the law cannot permit a person to retain or derive benefit from an advantage obtained through fraud or misrepresentation.

He also submits that, in the present case, the petitioner himself, in his statement recorded before the Postal Department on 31.05.2017, stated that he was regularly discharging his duties as Dakpal on a day-to-day basis from 11:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. and thereafter from 12:00 noon to 2:30 p.m. According to learned counsel, the aforesaid statement is inconsistent with the petitioner's stand before the Basic Education Department that he was merely functioning as a commission agent and was not regularly employed in the Postal Department.

It is, therefore, contended that the petitioner cannot be permitted to derive any advantage from a position founded upon concealment or misrepresentation. Learned counsel for respondent no.6 has relied upon the principle reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that dishonesty or fraud cannot be permitted to yield a beneficial result to the person responsible for it and that a Court ought not to perpetuate or protect a benefit founded upon fraud or misrepresentation. On the aforesaid premise, it is submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The impugned order has been passed on the premise that the petitioner, while being appointed as a Branch Postmaster at Poonapar Post Office, concealed the fact of such appointment and, during the subsistence of the said engagement, obtained appointment as an Assistant Teacher at Maharana Pratap Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Poonapar, Bhatauli, District Mau. The competent authority proceeded on the footing that the simultaneous holding of both posts and the consequential receipt of salary and other financial benefits from both the establishments were impermissible in law.

Accordingly, a direction was issued to the District Basic Education Officer, Mau, to ensure, in accordance with the applicable rules, recovery of the amount of salary alleged to have been irregularly received by the petitioner and to deposit the same with the State Exchequer. The aforesaid order was stated to have been passed in compliance with the order dated 19.07.2018 passed by this Court.

The foundational fact which emerges from the record is that the petitioner was engaged in the Postal Department as Branch Dakpal and, during the subsistence of such engagement, obtained appointment as Assistant Teacher in the Basic Education Department. More importantly, the petitioner himself, in his statement recorded before the Postal Department on 31.05.2017, has acknowledged that he was regularly discharging his duties as Dakpal from 11:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. and thereafter from 12:00 noon to 2:30 p.m. The said statement assumes considerable significance, particularly when considered alongside the petitioner's assertion before the Basic Education Department that his engagement in the Postal Department was merely that of a Commission Agent. The two stands are not readily reconcilable.

The subsequent order passed by the Postal Department dated 06.02.2019 cannot efface or render nugatory the statement admittedly made by the petitioner during the course of the proceedings before that Department, nor can the pendency or conclusion of the proceedings before the Postal Department be ignored while examining the legality of the action taken by the Basic Education Department. The petitioner was required to make a full and candid disclosure of all material facts bearing upon his entitlement to hold the post of Assistant Teacher and to draw salary therefrom. The principle that a person seeking equitable and discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution must approach the Court with complete candour is well settled. A litigant cannot selectively disclose facts before one authority and adopt a materially different position before another authority and thereafter seek the protection of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

The reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondents upon R. Vishwanatha Pillai (supra), is apposite to the limited proposition that an appointment founded upon fraud or deliberate misrepresentation cannot acquire legitimacy merely by reason of the passage of time. The Supreme Court held that where an appointment itself is obtained by practising fraud, the appointee cannot claim a vested right to retain the post on the strength of such appointment. Likewise, the principle reiterated in Regional Manager, Central Bank of India (supra), as relied upon by the respondents, is that where the foundation of an appointment is displaced by established misrepresentation or deception, mere length of service does not, by itself, validate the appointment.

The principle that fraud or material misrepresentation cannot be permitted to become a source of advantage is also well recognised. However, the Court must distinguish between a case where fraud or misrepresentation is established on the basis of cogent material and a case where an irregularity is merely inferred from an absence of records or an administrative lapse. In the present case, the finding against the petitioner is not founded merely upon the absence of a document. It rests substantially upon the petitioner's own statement before the Postal Department regarding the discharge of duties as Dakpal, coupled with the admitted fact of his simultaneous engagement as Assistant Teacher. The factual foundation of the impugned order is, therefore, materially different from a case founded upon mere conjecture.

The contention that the proceedings were initiated after the petitioner's retirement also does not commend acceptance on the facts as pleaded before this Court. The respondents have specifically asserted, and the record relied upon by them indicates, that the proceedings had commenced while the petitioner was still in service. The subsequent retirement of the petitioner cannot retrospectively invalidate proceedings which had already been initiated during the subsistence of the employer-employee relationship. The principle laid down in Bhagirathi Jena (supra), is attracted where, in the absence of an enabling statutory provision, an employer seeks to initiate or continue disciplinary proceedings after superannuation for the purpose of reducing retiral benefits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in that case that, where no such enabling provision existed, the disciplinary inquiry could not continue after retirement. The said principle, however, cannot be mechanically invoked where the proceedings themselves had already been set in motion during service and the action impugned flows from facts which had arisen during the petitioner's tenure.

Nor can the petitioner derive any absolute protection from the general principles governing recovery of excess payments. In State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), reported in (2015) 4 SCC 334, the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised circumstances in which recovery of excess payment would be inequitable, particularly in cases involving retired employees and payments made without any misrepresentation on the part of the employee. The said principle, however, does not furnish immunity where the payment is alleged to have been secured or retained as a consequence of the employee's own misrepresentation, suppression of material facts or an impermissible simultaneous holding of posts.

The distinction is reinforced by High Court of Punjab and Haryana and ors. v. Jagdev Singh, reported in (2016) 14 SCC 267, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the protection against recovery recognised in Rafiq Masih (supra) would not operate in the same manner where the employee had furnished an undertaking to refund excess payments. More fundamentally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.D. Suri v. Union of India and another, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 553, while considering the question of simultaneous holding of two posts, held that a Government servant could not, in the circumstances governed by the applicable rules, claim salary in respect of both posts; the entitlement was regulated by the applicable service rules and did not permit unrestricted double remuneration.

The aforesaid principle assumes particular relevance here. The controversy before this Court is not a simple case of an arithmetical excess payment occasioned by an erroneous fixation of pay by the employer. The allegation, supported by the material relied upon by the respondents, is that the petitioner simultaneously continued to discharge duties in the Postal Department and in the Basic Education Department and received remuneration from both sources during the overlapping period. If an employee is not legally entitled to draw remuneration from two posts simultaneously, the State cannot be compelled to treat the duplicate remuneration as an indefeasible or permanently retainable benefit. The recovery in such circumstances is directed not towards depriving the petitioner of remuneration for work actually accepted by the State, but towards restoring the amount which, according to the finding of the competent authority, was drawn in respect of the second and simultaneously held engagement, contrary to the governing conditions.

At the same time, the distinction between recovery of duplicate remuneration and recovery of the entire salary paid for services actually rendered is of considerable legal significance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Man Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh through Secretary and o thers, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 726 has emphasised that even where an appointment is found to be irregular, the State cannot ordinarily take work from an employee without paying remuneration for the work actually performed. Similarly, the Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar Pandey v. State of U.P. and others reported in 2010 SCC Online All 1279 expressed serious reservation regarding recovery of the entire salary paid for a long period during which the State had actually taken work from the employee. These authorities, however, do not confer upon an employee a right to retain duplicate salary simultaneously drawn from two establishments contrary to the governing service conditions.

Consequently, the respondents would be justified in recovering only such amount as is demonstrably attributable to the petitioner's simultaneous and impermissible receipt of remuneration from the two departments, subject, of course, to the applicable rules and to an accurate determination of the overlapping period and amount. The State cannot, under the guise of recovery, seek restitution of remuneration which demonstrably represents payment for services actually rendered in a post during a period in which the petitioner was lawfully entitled to such remuneration. The impugned action must, therefore, be understood and confined to the alleged duplicate drawal, and not as an authority to recover indiscriminately every amount paid to the petitioner during his service.

The plea founded upon violation of natural justice also fails to persuade this Court. The record, as placed before the Court, indicates that the petitioner was issued a show-cause notice, submitted his reply and his defence was considered before the impugned order was passed. The mere fact that the conclusion ultimately reached by the competent authority is adverse to the petitioner does not amount to denial of an opportunity of hearing. The requirement of natural justice is one of fair opportunity, not of a favourable adjudication.

The authorities relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner concerning post-retirement proceedings and recovery of retiral benefits, including Bhagirathi Jena (supra), therefore, have to be appreciated in the factual and statutory setting in which they were rendered. They do not lay down a proposition that a retired employee is immune from every lawful financial adjustment arising out of a liability incurred during service, nor do they authorise an employee to retain an amount which he was never legally entitled to draw.

The Court is also conscious that the petitioner had rendered service for a considerable period. Length of service, however, cannot by itself confer legality upon an otherwise impermissible simultaneous receipt of remuneration. Equally, the Court cannot permit public funds to be retained contrary to law merely because the irregularity remained undetected for some length of time. The equitable jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked to perpetuate an advantage which, upon examination of the material on record, the petitioner was not legally entitled to receive.

In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of the principles of natural justice in the impugned order, warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The competent authority has considered the petitioner's explanation and has reached its conclusion on the basis of material which cannot be characterized as wholly irrelevant or extraneous.

In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order warranting interference in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The findings recorded by the competent authority do not suffer from any perversity or violation of the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the petition, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed.

No order as to cost.