Bhograj Sao vs Smt. Malti Prasad

Binod Kumar Roy, J.—The defendant has come up in revision u/s 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter called ''the Act'') challenging the legality and propriety of the judgment decreeing the eviction suit filed against him on the grounds of personal necessity as well as expiry of the fixed term tenancy.

Mr. Vijay Nandan Sahay, learned Counsel for the tenant-petitioner assailed the impugned judgment on the following grounds:

(i) "The trial court has failed to appreciate that no tenant can sign an agreement for a fixed term tenancy of 11 months."

(ii) "The letting out of the disputed premises which is ''katra'' for a flour mill does not fall under the definition of the word Building defined u/s 2(b) of the Act".

(iii) "The finding in regard to personal necessssity is vitiated as the court below has not recorded any finding as to whether that need could have been satisfied only by the partial eviction of the petitioner".

Mr. Rameshwar Prasad No. 2, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party, replies that no evidence having been brought on the record by the petitioner that no tenant can agree for a fixed term tenancy for 11 months only the suit has been correctly decreed after recording a finding that the tenancy in question was for a fixed period of 11 months only. He further submits that the finding, besides admitted case of the parties, what was leased out was a katra and not a flour mill which comes within the meaning of the word building defined u/s 2 of the Act.

Mr. Sahay in support of his submission failed to point out any evidence before me and in that view of the matter, it is difficult for me to accept his bald submission. The question as to whether there was any fixed term tenancy of 11 months, has been dealt with in Paragraphs 10 to 15 of the impugned judgment and a categorical finding has been recorded after consideration of oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties in regard to which no infirmity was pointed out by Mr. Sahay and it was held that the tenancy in question was for a fixed period which expired on 30th January, 1985.

The next submission of Shri Sahay that the suit in question has been illegally decreed as the disputed premises is a flour mill to which the Act does not apply is such which to me appears to have been stated merely to be rejected. It was never the case of the plaintiff-opposite party that what was leased out to the petitioner was a flour mill, rattier his specific case was that a katra was leased out, which has also been submitted by the petitioner in his written statement as well as in his evidence. Section 2(b) of the Act runs as follows:

"Building" means any building, or hut, a part of building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes, and includes-

(i) the garden, grounds, and outhouses, if any appurtenant to such building or hut or part of such building or hut.

The word ''katra'' in Hindi language according to ''Bhargvas'' Standard Illustrated Dictionary of the Hindi language (Hindi-Edition) means a market surrounded on all sides by walls and according to National Hindi-English Dictionary means enclosed yard for residential purpose or turned into a market place. Thus from a bare perusal of the aforementioned Dictionary meaning of word katra, it is crystal clear that the katra in question stands squarely covered under the definition of the word building under ''the Act'' and thus there is no substance in this point argued by Shri Sahay which was not even convassed in the Court below.

However, there is substance in the last contention of Mr. Sahay but in view of the fact that the Judgment and decree cannot be set aside in view of the finding in regard to point No. (i) (supra) and no other submission having been made before me, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugment judgment and decree and consequently, this Civil Revision application fails and is dismissed but in the facts and circumstances without costs.