Bharpur Singh vs Union of India

S.C. Malte, J.

This letters patent appeal is against the judgment dated 14.5.1996 passed by the single Judge of this court in civil writ petition No. 1783 of 1994. The undisputed facts giving rise to this writ petition may be summarised as follows .

The matter pertained to proceedings initiated under the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925. A notification under Section 3(2) of the said Act had been issued on August 25, 1959, by which a Gurdwara was declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara, and the property in question was notified in a consolidated list, and thereby it was claimed that property belongs to Sikh Gurdwara. The petitioners challenged that notification by filing a petition before the Tribunal constituted under the said Act. That Tribunal rejected that petition by order dated 28.8.1963. Against that order, appeal was taken to the High Court, which was also dismissed on February 24, 1972. Meanwhile, on the basis of the decision thus confirmed by the Tribunal under the said Act, a suit under Section 25A of the said Act had been filed before the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal constituted under the said Act. It was decreed by judgment dated 10.11.1971. Against that decision, Regular First Appeal No. 17 of 1972 was filed in this Court, which was dismissed on 4.10.1982. That is how it has been adjudicated that right, title or interest in the immoveable property which is the subject matter of this litigation, belonged to the Gurdwara, and the Gurdwara was entitled to take possession of it by executing the decree thus passed under Section 25A of the Act of 1925.

In order to appreciate the nature and consequence of the decision given in this case under the various provisions of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925, it would be apt to make a brief reference to the various provisions under which the proceedings in this case commenced and ended in decision holding that the Gurdwara in question is a Sikh Gurdwara and the properties belonged to that Sikh Gurdwara, and it is under the management of the Committee of the said Gurdwara respondents 4 and 5. Section 3(1) of the said Act Provides that any Sikh or the present officeholder of the Gurdwara specified in the schedule I may forward to the State Government, within a specified period of limitation, a list signed and verified by himself, and thereby indicate all rights, titles or interests in the immoveable properties inclusive of the Gurdwara and other monetary and endowments yielding recurring income or profit received in Punjab, which he claims to be belonging to the Gurdwara. Clause (2) of Section 3 provides for publication of the notification of such list. Clause (3) of Section 3 provides that individual notices should be served on the persons who are shown in the list as persons claiming right, title or interest, etc. The persons interested in the properties mentioned in petition under Section 3, are supposed to raise contention under Section 5 of the said Act. Such petitions are heard before a Tribunal constituted under Section 12 of the said Act. Section 14 provides the disposal of such petitions. In this context it may be mentioned that all these steps have already been taken before the Tribunal, Against the order of the Tribunal, the matter had been taken to the High Court which was ultimately decided against the claim raised by the appellants. After the conclusion of the question regarding right, title or interest in the Gurdwara and in the properties mentioned in the list, the further step began with the filing of the suit under Section 25A of the Act for getting possession of the Gurdwara which was held to be a Sikh Gurdwara and the properties belonging to that Gurdwara. That suit was also decreed. As mentioned above, against that decree, Regular First Appeal No. 17 of 1972 before this Court also came to be dismissed.

The next step, therefore, pertains to the execution of the decree thus passed. It is an admitted position that the execution proceedings had been initiated through the General Attorney of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee. The Additional District Judge, Bathinda, before whom the execution proceedings were thus initiated, by his order dated December 5, 1990, ordered that as far as the Gurdwara building was concerned, the decree was executable. It was further observed that no objection has been raised by either party in respect of the Gurdwara building. However, in this Letters Patent Appeal, it was contended that the appellants are still in possession of the Gurdwara building. That aspect is not presently before us for adjudication. In so far as it pertains to the properties of the Gurdwara, the executing Court observed that it was necessary to fix the identity of the properties in view of the change of the survey numbers of the land, consequent upon proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. It was further observed that one Jaswant Singh and Hazura Singh seem to be the tenants on the land and they cannot be physically ousted from the land unless their rights to hold property as tenants came to be adjudicated by a competent court. Against that decision in the execution proceedings, a Civil Revision Petition No. 1556 of 1992 was filed, and it is still pending.

In the background of these factual events now the question raised by the appellants is that in view of the provisions of The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, (for short to be referred as the Act No. 42 of 1991), a private Gurdwara cannot be converted into a Sikh Gurdwara, and consequently the decree passed by the Tribunal cannot be executed and the appellants cannot be divested of the management of the Gurdwara, and also of the properties attached to that Gurdwara. It was contended that Section 4 of the Act No. 42 of 1991 declares that the religious character of place of worship, as it existed on the 15th day of August, 1947, shall be retained as it was than, and no change of "conversion" of it would be permissible. It was contended that since the proceedings intimidation on the basis of notification issued under Section 3 of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925, are still continuing in the form of Civil Revision No. 1556 of 1992 challenging the order of the executing Court, as mentioned above, the provisions of Section 4 of the Act No. 42 of 1991 would be applicable and such proceedings should abate, The counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that when the question of title, right of interest in the Gurdwara and its property has been already finally adjudicated by way of decree for possession, the execution proceedings is nothing but giving effects to the rights already adjudicated, and cannot be said to be proceeding in which such right, title or interest are still under dispute.

In the order to appreciate the rival contentions, a brief reference to the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Act No. 42 of 1991 would be necessary. Section 2(b) defines the term "conversion", which, with its grammatical variations, includes alteration or change of whatever nature. The term "conversion" has been used in Section 4 of the said Act No. 42 of 1991. The learned single judge has reproduced that provision. It is reproduced below for ready reference :

"Declaration as to the religious character of certain places of worship and bar of jurisdiction of courts, etc. (1) It is hereby declared that the religious character of a place of worship existing on the 15th day of August, 1947, shall continue to be the same as it existed on that day.

(2) If, on the commencement of this Act, any suit, appeal of other proceedings with respect to the conversion of the religious character of any place of worship, existing on the 15th day of August, 1947 is pending before any Court, tribunal or other authority, the same shall abate, and no suit, appeal or other proceeding with respect to any such matter shall lie on or after such commencement in any court, tribunal or other authority;

Provided that if any suit, appeal or other proceeding, instituted or filed on the ground that conversion has taken place in the religious character of any such place after the 15th day of August, 1947, is pending on the commencement of this Act, such suit, appeal or other proceedings shall not so abate and every such suit, appeal or other proceedings shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1).

(3) Nothing contained in subsection (1) and subsection (2) shall apply to :

(a) Any place of worship referred to in the said subsection which is an ancient and historical monument or an archaeological site or remain covered by the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958), or any other law for the time being in force :

(b) any suit, appeal or other proceedings, with respect to any matter referred to in subsection (2), finally decided, settled to disposed of by a court, tribunal or other authority, before the commencement of this Act;

(c) any dispute with respect to any such matter settled by the parties amongst themselves before such commencement;

(d) any conversion of any such place effected before such commencement by acquiescence;

(e) any conversion of any such place effected before such commencement which is not liable to be challenged in any court, tribunal or other authority being barred by limitation under any law for the time being in force."

(Emphasis supplied)

Perusal of these provisions clearly indicate that the term "other proceeding" referred to in section 4 of that Act pertains to the proceedings with respect to "conversion" of religious character of any place of worship. Proviso to clause (2) of Section 4 also puts an emphasis that the other proceedings contemplated is the one in which the question raised, is whether the conversion has taken place in the religious character of any such place. Therefore, it is obvious that the term "other proceedings" use in Clause (2) of Section 4 is confined to the proceeding in which the question regarding the conversion of any religious character of any place of worship is still under consideration. That provision, therefore, does not pertain to the proceeding in execution, for the simple reason that in the execution proceeding in this case, there is no question that can be raised and adjudicated upon in respect of conversion of religious character; because that question had already been adjudicated in the long chain of litigation referred above. In the context of that, it is pertinent to note, clause (b) of sub section (3) of Section 4 in clear words states that the provisions of subsection (1) and subsection (2) of Section 4 shall not apply to any suit, appeal or other proceeding, with respect to any matter referred to in sub section (2), finally decided, settled or disposed of by a court, tribunal or other authority, before the commencement of the said Act No. 42 of 1991. That provision in clear words spell out that any question pertaining to the conversion of religious character of a place of worship, (as contemplated under subsection (2), if finally decided by a competent Court, it would not be covered by the provisions of Section 4. This position is further more clear in view of clause (e) of sub section (3) of Section 4 which provides that any conversion of any such place effected before the commencement of the Act, and which is not liable to be challenged in any Court, Tribunal or other authority, being barred by limitation under any law for the time being in force, are excluded from the operation of the said Act.

Briefly stated, therefore, even plain reading of Section 4 as a whole clearly indicates that it does not contemplate the reopening of the issue which have been finally adjudicated by a competent Tribunal or Court and thus the question of right, title or interest involved in the place of religion has been finally set at rest. In this case, the appellants have raised question as regards their right, title or interest, that has been finally decided upon the High Court, In the execution proceedings now initiated, the question raised would be pertaining to the reaping the fruits of the decision already obtained. That does not contemplate the reopening of the issue or the question which have been already decided by passing a decree for possession, confirmed by the High Court. The counsel for the appellants brought our attention to the case of Mohammad Hanif and another v. Khairat Ali, AIR 1941 Patna 577. In that case their Lordships dealt with principle of lis pendens which extends to the stage of execution proceedings also. That authority certainly does not help the appellants because in that authority the question pertained to the applicability of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the principle of lis pendens. In this case the question of application of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not involved. Another ruling referred to by the counsel for the appellants is in the case of Nahar Singh v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, 1993(3) R.R.R. 525 : 1993(1) PLR 33. That case has also no application because in that case the conversion of the place of worship was sought to be effected during the consolidation proceedings. That decision has no relevance to the present case. The counsel for the respondents brought our attention to the case of Bajinder Singh v. The Assistant Collector, 1983 PLJ 116. In that case their Lordships were considering the question as to whether the provisions of an Act introduced subsequently by amending Act would be in a position to set at naught the judgments and decrees rendered by the competent Court over the period of about 20 years prior to the amendment. Their Lordships observed as follows :

"As already noticed, it is well settled that a judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction validly rendered, cannot be reversed and abrogated by a mere legislative fiat because the judicial and the legislative wings are separate and distinct and cannot trespass or trench into each other''s fields, Just as a Court of law cannot legilate and enact laws, the legislature cannot possibly adjudicate on the individual rights and liabilities of the parties and rendered judgment itself, nor can it abrogate such an adjudication validly made by the Court by reversing or nullifying the same. In essence even a single judgment validly rendered cannot be overridden or declared non est by legislative mandate alone."

Moreover, a total reading of Section 4 of the Act No. 42 of 1991, makes it quite clear that it excludes from operation of the Act those matters or right, title or interest, which have been already finally decided by competent Court. The execution proceeding in this case is nothing but giving effect to the decree already passed. The learned single judge has also taken the view that the various matters culminating into declaration of the right, title and interest of the parties, has attained finality prior to the commencement of Act No. 42 of 1991. What is now left is only to get the possession of the properties in respect of which a right, title and interest had already been adjudicated upon finally, We therefore, find no substance in this appeal. Hence it is dismissed with costs.