Bharat Verma vs State of U.P. & Ors.

Per: Hon’ble Chandra Dhari Singh,J.

The instant writ petition has been filed seeking following main reliefs:-

The prosecution case, in brief, is that the complainant, namely, Yashwant Singh has lodged an F.I.R. on 18.07.2024 against Jagat Singh @ Tansu, Mukesh Kumar Jain and Neeraj Jain @ Banti Jain for the offence under Sections 111, 318, 61(2), 352 and 351(3) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 alleging inter-alia that he had filed a written complaint addressed to the Superintendent of Police, District Lalitpur, stating, inter-alia, that they are residents of Village Satlinga, Police Station Mahrauni, District Lalitpur. Their agricultural land had been acquired for the Bharat Dam Project, for which they had received compensation. It was further stated that Jagat Singh alias Tansu, Mukesh Kumar Jain and Neeraj Jain alias Bunty Jain approached them and represented themselves to be agents of LUCC Company. They assured them that if they opened an account/ID with the said company and deposit money therein, the amount so deposited would be doubled after a period of five years. Believing the representations made by the aforesaid persons, the informant and others deposited the following amounts with the company through its agents on 26.03.2019:

The aforesaid agents, namely, Jagat Singh alias Tansu, Mukesh Kumar Jain, and Neeraj Jain alias Bunty Jain, reiterated that upon completion of five years, the amount deposited by the informants would be returned to them in double. The maturity period of the aforesaid IDs expired on 26.03.2024. Thereafter, when the informant and others demanded repayment of the amounts deposited by them with the said company, the aforesaid agents continued to evade the matter and assured them that the entire amount would be returned after some time. However, despite repeated demands, they continued to put off them on one pretext or another. On 15.07.2024 at about 10:00 a.m., the informant went to the residence of Jagat Singh alias Tansu. Mukesh Jain and Neeraj Jain were also present. When he demanded repayment of the amount deposited by him with the company, the aforesaid persons abused him and threatened him with dire consequences. In the impugned F.I.R., it is further alleged that the accused persons have committed fraud and by preparing forged and fabricated documents have also misappropriated their money, and threatened that if any legal action was initiated against them, they would kill him. Accordingly, he made a request to the Superintendent of Police, District Lalitpur, to direct registration of the case and to take appropriate legal action against the accused persons. They further prayed that the money allegedly misappropriated be recovered from the said company and its agents and be refunded to them.

After registration of aforesaid principal F.I.R., several other F.I.R.s containing the same allegations, arising out of same grievance, facts, and cause of action, have also been lodged. The comparative chart of the F.I.R. is placed below for ready reference:-

Hence, the instant writ petition has been filed along with the prayer as stated in aforesaid paragraphs.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the allegations made in the FIRs are mala fide, vexatious and made with ulterior motive, just to harass the petitioner. He submits that perusal of all the above-said FIRs lodged against the petitioners, it can be seen that the allegations are exactly the same, though the FIRs have been filed by the different complainants/informants. He submits that the above-said fact clearly shows that all the FIRs have been filed with premeditated mind by the complainants in different police stations only to harass the petitioner. He further submits that the filing of multiple FIRs alleging the same allegations and offence in different police stations or districts is a gross abuse of the process of law and the same has been done only to harass the petitioner with ulterior motive.

The case of all the informants is that they have invested the money in the Company/Society i.e. LUCC and the money has been invested on the request/inducement of the ordinary member of the Society. It is submitted that all the persons who are making the complainants, were also the members of the Society either they were ordinary members or they were nominal/associate members. It is submitted that all the complainants have deposited their money due to their own free will and without any pressure or endorsement.

Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the petitioner has no say working of the Society nor he was in the capacity to manage the affairs of the Society. The affairs of the Society were being managed by the duly elected Committee which constitutes of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Directors. The petitioner is only an ordinary member and therefore, he could not be held vicariously liable for the act of management/promoters of the Society. The petitioner is at par with the complainant and he has been implicated in the present case only for the reasons that some of the complainants have invested their money with the Society after getting in touch with the petitioner.

Though, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that under the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the Cr.P.C. (Corresponding Sections 173, 174, 175, 176, 181, 189, 190 and 193 B.N.S.S.), only the earlier or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 Cr.P.C. Therefore, there cannot be a second F.I.R. and consequently, there cannot be any fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or the same incidents giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is trite law that the right of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is a statutory right over which the Court does not possess any supervisory jurisdiction under the Cr.P.C./B.N.S.S. The plenary power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is, however, not unlimited and the same is subject to well-recognized limitations. He submits that where the police transgresses its statutory power of investigation, the High Court, under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, can interdict the investigation to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

It is submitted that subjecting an individual to numerous proceedings arising in different police stations in different districts on the basis of the same cause of action cannot be legally permissible. A fresh investigation or a second FIR on the basis of the same or connected cognizable offence would constitute an abuse of the statutory power of investigation and a gross misuse of the State machinery.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that all the subsequent FIRs registered relating to non-payment of deposits maturity amounts be clubbed/consolidated, merged and proceeded with first FIR bearing Case Crime No.612 of 2024, under Sections 111, 318, 61(2), 352 and 351(3) of B.N.S., Police Station – Kotwali Lalitpur, District Lalitpur by treating the said FIR as the Principal FIR to the extent that relates to the petitioner.

In support of his submissions, learned counsel has preferred the following cases:-

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of aforesaid arguments and submissions, the instant writ petition may be allowed.

Per contra, learned A.G.A. for the State vehemently opposed the instant writ petition and submitted that the prayer made in the writ petition cannot be allowed due to the sole fact that all the FIRs have been lodged by the different complainants, residing in different places arising out of different cause of actions. He submits that though the allegations are of similar nature, the parties are different and the investigation are yet to be properly started in the aforesaid FIRs. Learned A.G.A. for the State vehemently submitted that the Supreme Court in several cases under Article 32 and Article 142 of the Constitution of India allowed the clubbing of multiple FIRs, however, in the instant case, the same cannot be done due to the distinguishing factors in the above-said FIRs. He submits that in each case, the facts and circumstances are different and taking account of this fact a straight jacket formula for clubbing all multiple FIRs cannot be adopted. He submits that where occurrence occurred at different times involving different persons, with no commonality of purpose and thereafter, emerged from different circumstances, they cannot be termed as forming part of the same transaction or offence. Therefore, different FIRs cannot be clubbed together. He further submits that clubbing all the FIRs will cause a lot of difficulties to the complainants, as they reside in different places and would have to travel to the place where the first information report has been lodged to participate in the trial, if it proceeds. It is submitted that it is settled law that the accused persons cannot be given the right to choose the place of his trial.

In support of his submissions, learned A.G.A. has referred the following cases:-

Learned A.G.A. for the State submitted and prayed that in view of the above-said facts and submissions the instant writ petition is devoid of merit and is to be dismissed.

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned A.G.A. for the State at length and perused the material on records.

On perusal of the contents of the F.I.R. and comparing the same with the subsequent FIRs, it can be seen that the allegations in the FIRs are exactly the same. Therefore, it is apparent that the allegations made in the above-said FIRs are the same in nature and the accused persons named in the FIR were working on the behest of the same company or same person. The issues regarding filing of the first FIR and subsequent filing of the second FIR has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of T.T. Antony (supra), wherein the Supreme Court discussed in details about the procedure of filing of first FIR and its consequences. In this regard, the following observations of the Supreme Court are extracted here-in-below:-

In the above-said case of T.T. Antony (supra), the Supreme Court has also discussed the right of police to investigate into cognizable offence, which is statutory right over which the Court does not possess any supervisory jurisdiction under the Cr.P.C. However, it is mentioned that the plenary power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is not unlimited and the same is subjected to certain well-recognized limitations. It is also mentioned that where the police transgresses its statutory power of investigation, the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India or Section 482 Cr.P.C. (528 B.N.S.S.) in an appropriate case, can interdict the investigation to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court in the above-said case, in respect of the successive FIRs has observed as follows:-

From the above observations of the Supreme Court, it is discernible that on the same facts and same allegations, two FIRs cannot coexist. In that event, coexisting being clearly beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 of CrPC. It is also discernible from the aforesaid observation that fresh investigation based upon the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter case filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction, then the subsequent FIR may be an abuse of power and in that event, the same shall be a fit case for exercise of power under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

Following the same principles of law, the Supreme Court in the case of Babubhai (supra) has observed as follows:-

In the case of Anju Chaudhary (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that there cannot ordinarily be more than one FIR in respect of the same incident, as the registration of second FIR for the same offence would offend the principles of fair investigation and may result in abuse of the investigation process. At the same time, it was clarified that where the subsequent incident is distinct or falls outside the ambit of the earlier FIR, registration of a second FIR would not be barred. The relevant observations are reproduced below:-

A conjoint reading of the aforesaid decisions leaves little room for doubt that there is no absolute prohibition against the registration of a second FIR. Equally, it is well-settled that a successive FIR cannot be sustained where it relates to the same transaction or the same incident. The guiding test is not only as to whether the alleged offences are similar or whether they took place within the jurisdiction of different police stations, but as to whether the subsequent FIR pertains to a distinct incident or whether both FIRs form part of one continuous or same transaction. It is this “test of sameness” which has been applied to the facts of the present case.

In order to determine whether the impugned FIRs arise out of single or continuous transaction, or relate to separate and distinct incidents, it is first necessary to examine the allegations contained in each of the FIRs. In the opinion of this Court, a comparative reading of the allegations, the time and place of the alleged incidents, the nature of the acts attributed to the petitioners, and the sequence in which the events are stated to have unfolded would be necessary for applying the “test of sameness” laid down by the Supreme Court.

We have perused the chart which is placed in the foregoing paragraphs. We found the contents of the FIRs are same in nature. The foundation of all the FIR is also one.

The Supreme Court in the case of Babubhai (supra) has held that while examining the validity of successive FIRs, the Court is required to apply the ‘test of sameness’ to determine whether the FIRs relate to the same transaction or to distinct incidents.

Applying the said principles to the facts of the present case, and on a comparative reading of the FIRs, this Court finds as follows:-

From the above-said factual matrix, it is evident that the distinct features sought to be pointed out by the State are confined primarily to the fact that the incident has took place at the different point of time in the jurisdiction of different police stations and therefore, the FIRs were registered at different police stations. In the opinion of this Court, these circumstances, by themselves, do not alter the character of the alleged incident in question, when the prosecution itself alleges that all the FIRs arise from one continuing incident on the same day, by the accused persons. In the considered opinion of this Court, the facts of the present case satisfy the ‘test of sameness’ as there is unity of purpose and design, proximity of time and place and continuity of action.

In the case of State (NCT Delhi) Vs. Khimji Bhai Jadeja reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 19, while dealing with the issue of clubbing of several FIRs into a single FIR, the Supreme Court has held as follows:-

From the above-said observations, it is clear that every case will have different facts and that has to be seen in terms of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court as to whether that passes the test of ‘same transaction’ or ‘sameness’ as discussed above. In the instant case as discussed above to ‘test of sameness’ has already been passed.

In this connection, the case of Amit Katyal & another (supra) can also be referred to, wherein the Supreme Court has observed that permitting multiple FIRs and investigations in different jurisdictions on the same set of facts would not only be contrary to the settled legal position, but would also result in avoidable multiplicity of proceedings, conflicting findings and serious prejudice to the petitioners. It was also observed that consolidation of such FIRs at one place would subserve the ends of justice by ensuring a coordinated, effective, and complete investigation, which also safeguards the right of the petitioners to mount an effective and meaningful defense in a single proceeding.

From the above discussions on the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases, it is discernible that in appropriate cases, multiple FIRs can be allowed to be clubbed together and for that purpose, the first FIR can be treated as the primary FIR and other FIRs can be treated as statements under Section 161 of CrPC (180 BNSS). However, there is no straitjacket formula for doing so and the allegations in the FIRs as well as other factors like modus operandi, number of transactions, parties to the offense and whether the cause of action is same, are relevant factors. The test of sameness and one transaction are relevant criteria for treating the subsequent FIR as a second FIR, which is not permitted under the law. Where several offenses are part of the same transaction, the test of sameness has to be applied to find out whether they are so related to one another on the point of purpose or cause and effect, so as to result in one continuous action.

In the instant case, the allegations made by different complainants in all the FIRs are exactly the same. The allegations made in FIRs are the same in nature and the accused persons named in the FIR were working on the behest of the same company or same person, therefore, on perusal of all the FIRs this Court does not find any difference or distinguishable fact in above-said all the FIRs.

Taking into account the principles as discussed above in foregoing paragraphs, this Court is of the considered opinion that the allegations narrated in all the FIRs are same, though filed in different places.

In view of the above-said facts, this Court is of the opinion that allowing all the FIRs to independently go ahead will be an abuse of the process of law. It will also be contrary to the settled legal position, which will result in much avoidable multiplicity of proceedings, conflicting findings and serious prejudice to the petitioner in the instant case. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the first FIR i.e. F.I.R. dated 18.07.2024, Case Crime No. 612 of 2024, under Sections 111, 318, 61(2) 352 and 351 (3) of B.N.S., Police Station-Kotwali Lalitpur, District-Lalitpur is directed to be treated as the Principal FIR and all subsequent FIRs and further proceedings arising therefrom shall be clubbed with the Principal FIR i.e. Case Crime No. 612 of 2024 and their contents shall be treated as statements under Section 161 of the CrPC (180 BNSS).

It is accordingly, directed that all subsequent FIRs shall be forthwith transferred to the police station where the Principal FIR is lodged i.e. Police Station - Kotwali Lalitpur, District-Lalitpur, provided that charge-sheet has not been submitted before the Court concerned, so that the investigation in the principal FIR can proceed without any delay.

In case, cognizance has already been taken by any Court in any subsequent FIR/criminal cases, shall also stand transferred/clubbed with the principal FIR such cases shall be tried by the Court having jurisdiction to try the principal FIR.

With the aforesaid observations and directions, the instant writ petition stands disposed off.

Before parting with the judgment, I would like to express my appreciation to my Research Associate, Mr. Md. Saif Ali Khan for his thorough research and assistance to the Court in the instant case.