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Judgment
P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.—In these writ petitions, common question of law arises and hence they are disposed of by this common order.
These writ petitions are filed seeking a direction to the respondents not to demand the payment of disputed tax for the year 1998-99 APGST (Pro.,) (April & May, ''98); and for the year 1997-98 APGST (Prov.,) respectively till the disposal of the appeals by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad. It is the contention of the petitioner (hat the stay granted by the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Legal), Hyderabad (fourth respondent) u/s 19 (2-B) of the APGST Act, 1957 (for short ''the Act'') during the pendency of the first appeals filed before the third respondent must be deemed to continue and be operative even during the pendency of the second appeal in the Tribunal. The same contention was rejected by a Division Bench of this Court (of which one of us was a member) in WP No.34611 of 1998 dated 24-12-1998. In that judgment, it was observed as follows:
"..... Any order passed u/s 19 (2-B) by the Joint Commissioner pending first appeal does not automatically enure to the benefit of the assesses till the disposal of the Second Appeal by the Tribunal. In our view, there must be a specific order of extension by the Joint Commissioner in terms of concluding clause of sub-section (2-C). The said clause - "only in a case where the Joint Commissioner on an application made to him by the dealer in the prescribed manner, makes a specific order to that effect" governs not only the stay granted under sub-section (2-A), but also the stay granted under sub-section (2-B). We cannot accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order under sub-section (2-B) having been passed by the Joint Commissioner himself, there is no need to extend the order again by the very same authority. We do not see any warrant for such interpretation. Whether it be a case of stay granted under sub-section (2-A) or under subsection (2-B), the legislative intent is to ensure the continuance of such stay pending second appeal only on a fresh consideration by the Joint Commissioner. In the light of the order passed by the appellate authority and the contentions raised therein, the Joint Commissioner has to address himself to the question of extension of stay afresh. This is obviously the scheme underlying the three provisions starting with sub-section (2-A) of Section 19."
Following the earlier decision we reject the contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The mere fact that Rule 33C deals only with the stay granted u/s 19(2-A) of the Act, but not u/s 19(2-B) of the Act, does not control the interpretation of Section !9(2-C) of the Act. Following the said judgment, we hold that there is no bar to recover the disputed tax so long as the Joint Commissioner/ Additional Commissioner (Legal) has not extended the stay. It is open to the petitioner to file an application before the said authority to extend the stay pending disposal of the appeal by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and if such application is filed, the same shall be disposed of with expedition. In order to enable the petitioner to approach the Joint Commissioner/Additional Commissioner (Legal), the stay granted by the Joint Commissioner shall be kept in abeyance for a period of three weeks from today.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to our judgment in WP No.8060 of 1998 dated 26-3-1998. In that writ petition, the question as to the scope and interpretation of Section 19(2-C) of the Act vis-a-vis the order passed u/s 19(2rB) of the Act was not specifically considered though there was a passing observation. It cannot be considered to be a precedent on the subject.
These writ petitions are dismissed subject to the above observations. No costs.