Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs State Of U.P. & Ors.

“मेरे द्वारा इस संबंध में उपलब्ध कराये गये साक्ष्यों का अवलोकन एवं परीक्षण किया गया। प्रस्तुत किये गये साक्ष्यों में मुख्यतः प्रतिष्ठान के अधिकारियों द्वारा समय-समय पर निर्गत आदेश, कार्य संपादन संबंधी आब्जर्वेशन शीट, सी-आया सूचना पत्र, गेट पास, वेतन पर्ची, लाग-बुक, मशीन/क्रेन आपरेटिंग संबंधी परमिट आदेश एवं प्रतिष्ठान के अधिकारियों द्वारा जारी अनुभव चरित्र प्रमाण पत्र तथा पुरस्कार स्वरूप प्राप्त होने वाले प्रमाण पत्र भी सम्मिलित हैं। याची श्रमिकगण द्वारा प्रस्तुत सूची में उल्लिखित लगभग अधिकांश संविदा श्रमिकों के संबंध में इस प्रकार के साक्ष्य प्रस्तुत किये गये हैं। मेरे द्वारा पत्रावली में उपलब्ध समस्त साक्ष्यों का अध्ययन किया गया जिससे स्पष्ट है कि प्रतिष्ठान के अन्दर संविदा श्रमिकों द्वारा किए जाने वाले कार्यों पर संविदाकार का कोई नियंत्रण नहीं होता है। संविदाकारों की भूमिका मात्र श्रमिक आपूर्तिकर्ता की होती है। संविदा श्रमिकों को कार्य सौंपने से लेकर उनके कार्यों का पर्यवेक्षण एवं कार्य सम्पन्न करने का प्रमाण पत्र का अवलोकन प्रतिष्ठान के अधिकारियों द्वारा किया जाता है। इस तथ्य में कोई संदेह नहीं है कि याची संविदा श्रमिक प्रतिष्ठान के अधिकारियों के पर्यवेक्षण एवं निर्देशन में कार्य करते हैं और कार्यस्थल पर उनके ऊपर प्रतिष्ठान के नियम कानून लागू होते हैं। कार्यस्थल पर उन संविदा श्रमिकों के ऊपर संविदाकारों का कोई नियंत्रण नहीं होता है। प्रस्तुत किए गये साक्ष्य से यह भी स्पष्ट है कि प्रतिष्ठान के अधिकारियों द्वारा आदेश निर्गत करके उक्त संविदा श्रमिकों का आन्तरिक विभागीय स्थानांतरण भी किया जाता रहा है। इसी परिप्रेक्ष्य में प्रस्तुत साक्ष्यों के अवलोकन से यह स्पष्ट है कि याची संविदा श्रमिक अपने द्वारा सम्पादित किए जाने वाले कार्यों को सम्पन्न करने में कुशल हैं तथा यह स्वतंत्र रूप से भी उन कार्यों को भी सम्पन्न करते हैं जो नियमित कर्मचारियों द्वारा किया जाता है। प्रतिष्ठान के ड्यूटी रोस्टर से यह स्पष्ट है कि संविदा श्रमिकों से पम्प / मशीन / बास्ट इनकैप्सुलेशन प्लांट को आपरेट करने का कार्य स्वतंत्र रूप से करवाया जाता है। इस हेतु विभिन्न संविदा श्रमिकों को प्रतिष्ठान द्वारा निर्गत मशीन प्रचालन अनुज्ञा पत्रों का भी अवलोकन मेरे द्वारा किया गया। ड्यूटी रोस्टर से यह स्पष्ट होता है कि विभिन्न संविदाश्रमिकों को स्वतंत्र रूप से निर्धारित तिथि एवं शिफ्ट में प्लांट को आपरेट करने का आदेश दिया गया, जबकि उसी प्लांट को किसी अन्य तिथि व शिफ्ट पर आर्टीशंस ग्रेड-1 के नियमित कर्मचारी से चलवाये जाने का आदेश जारी किया गया है। मेरे द्वारा ऐसे साक्ष्यों का अवलोकन भी किया गया जिनके द्वारा संविदा श्रमिकों को एसेंबलिंग, वेल्डिंग, ब्रेसिंग, इलेक्ट्रिकल मेन्टीनेन्स, ड्राफ्टमैन, मशीनिस्ट इत्यादि कार्यों को सम्पादित करने से सम्बन्धित आदेश जारी किए गये हैं। इसी क्रम में संविदा श्रमिकों द्वारा चालक के रूप में कार्यरत होने के प्रमाणस्वरूप प्रस्तुत किए गये डीजल/पेट्रोल की माँग हेतु रिवीजीशन सम्बन्धी साक्ष्य को भी देखा गया। उपर्युक्त साक्ष्यों के अवलोकन से सेवायोजक पक्ष का यह तर्क असत्य सिद्ध होता है कि संविदा श्रमिक नियमित कर्मचारियों के सहायक के तौर पर अथवा कार्यालय में अटेंडेंट का कार्य करते हैं और प्रतिष्ठान द्वारा उनसे स्वतंत्र तौर पर कोई कार्य नहीं कराया जाता है। यह भी उल्लेखनीय है कि सेवायोजक पक्ष द्वारा अपने उक्त तर्क के समर्थन में कोई अभिलेखीय साक्ष्य प्रस्तुत नहीं किया गया है।

उपर्युक्त साक्ष्यों एवं अभिलेखों के अतिरिक्त मैंने प्रतिष्ठान में संविदा श्रम (विनियमन एवं उत्सादन) अधिनियम 1970 के अंतर्गत किए गये निरीक्षण पर उप श्रम आयुक्त, झाँसी क्षेत्र झाँसी द्वारा मुख्यालय को उपलब्ध करायी गयी आख्या एवं जाँच रिपोर्ट का भी अवलोकन किया। जाँच आख्या से यह स्पष्ट है कि अनुज्ञा प्रमाण पत्र प्राप्त किए बगैर संविदा श्रमिक नियोजित करने एवं निषिद्ध प्रक्रिया के कार्यों में संविदा श्रमिक नियोजित किए जाने विषयक उल्लंघनों के लिए किए गए निरीक्षण दिनांक 4.12.2002 में पाये गये उल्लंघनों के फलस्वरूप प्रतिष्ठान के विरुद्ध सक्षम न्यायालय में दिनांक 23.12.2002 को अभियोजन दायर किया गया है। इसके अतिरिक्त उपर्युक्त उल्लंघनों के फलस्वरूप प्रतिष्ठान के विरुद्ध कारखाना अधिनियम-1940 की धारा-62 एवं तत्सम्बन्धी नियमावली के नियम-70 के अंतर्गत भी विधिक कार्यवाही अपनायी गयी है।

इसी परिप्रेक्ष्य में मेरे द्वारा 30.10 शासन द्वारा निर्गत अधिसूचना संख्या 2162 (एल0आई0)/36-2-127 (एस0एम0)-90 दिनांक 24.4.1990 जिसके द्वारा 30.10 में स्थित इंजीनियरिंग उद्योग की समस्त इकाईयों में अनुसूची में उल्लिखित कुल 18 प्रक्रियाओं / संकायों में ठेका श्रमिकों का नियोजन निषिद्ध किया गया है, को भी संज्ञान में लिया गया। उक्त अधिसूचना के निर्गत होने के फलस्वरूप कोई भी इंजीनियरिंग उद्योग सम्बन्धी प्रतिष्ठान निषिद्ध कार्यों में संविदा श्रमिक नियोजित नहीं कर सकता है और न ही इस हेतु उसे अधिनियम की धारा-8 के अंतर्गत पंजीयन प्रमाण पत्र ही निर्गत किया जा सकता है। इसी प्रकार कोई भी संविदाकार निषिद्ध कार्यों में संविदा श्रमिक नियोजन हेतु लाइसेंस भी नहीं प्राप्त कर सकता है। परन्तु प्रश्नगत प्रकरण में बी0एच0ई0एल0 प्रतिष्ठान द्वारा बड़े पैमाने पर संविदा श्रमिकों को निषिद्ध कार्यों में नियोजित किए जाने के प्रमाण प्राप्त हुए हैं, जो नियमसंगत नहीं हैं।

प्रश्नगत विवाद से सम्बन्धित समस्त तथ्यों पर भलीभांति विचार करने के पश्चात् मैं इस निष्कर्ष पर पहुँचता हूँ कि मे० बी०एच०ई०एल०, झाँसी द्वारा अपने प्रतिष्ठान में विभिन्न ठेकेदारों के माध्यम से संविदा श्रमिकों का बड़े पैमाने पर ऐसे कार्यों में नियोजन किया जाता रहा है जिनमें अधिसूचना दिनांक 24.4.1990 द्वारा संविदा श्रमिकों के नियोजन को निषिद्ध किया गया है। यह तथ्य भी प्रमाणित हो चुका है कि संविदा श्रमिकों के कार्य सौंपने से लेकर कार्य का पर्यवेक्षण एवं उनका आंतरिक विभागीय स्थानान्तरण भी प्रतिष्ठान के अधिकारियों के आदेशों से ही किया जाता है और इन संविदा श्रमिकों के ऊपर प्रतिष्ठान के नियम एवं उप नियम लागू किये जाते रहे हैं। वर्तमान में प्रतिष्ठान द्वारा 441 संविदा श्रमिकों का नियोजन किया जा रहा है। यूनियन, 218 संविदा श्रमिकों का तुलनात्मक कार्य विवरण प्रस्तुत किया गया। इसके अतिरिक्त कई संविदा श्रमिक अभियन्त्रण उद्योग हेतु अधिसूचना दिनांक 24-04-90 द्वारा प्रतिबन्धित प्रक्रियाओं में नियोजित पाये गये। इस संबंध में महत्वपूर्ण बिन्दु जो समकक्ष/समान कार्य करने से संबंधित है का विनिश्चय भी उपलब्ध प्रमाणों एवं साक्ष्यों के आधार पर करते हुए मैं इस निष्कर्ष पर पहुँचा हूँ कि 265 संविदा श्रमिकों द्वारा वही कार्य किया जा रहा है जो प्रतिष्ठान के नियमित कर्मचारियों द्वारा किया जाता है। अनेक संविदा श्रमिकों के ऐसे प्रकरण भी पाये गये जहाँ वे स्वतंत्र रूप से अकेले ही सारे कार्य संचालित करते रहे हैं।

प्रस्तुत तथ्यों के आधार पर मेरे समक्ष ऐसा कोई कारण नहीं है कि जिसके आधार पर ठेकेदारों के माध्यम से नियोजित संविदा श्रमिकों को उनके समकक्ष प्रकार का समान कार्य करने वाले स्थायी व नियमित कर्मचारियों को दिये जा रहे वेतन से कम दर पर भुगतान किया जाये।

अतएव समस्त तथ्यों पर पूर्ण रूप से विचार करने के पश्चात् मैं आदेश पारित करता हूँ कि संलग्न सूची में उल्लिखित सभी 265 संविदा श्रमिक प्रतिष्ठान द्वारा सीधे नियोजित अकुशल नियमित कर्मचारियों के बराबर वेतन एवं अन्य भत्ते पाने के हकदार हैं। इस आदेश के फलस्वरूप संबंधित संविदा श्रमिक वेतन एवं अन्य भत्ते उसी दर पर एवं उसी समान प्राप्त करने के अधिकारी होंगे जिस दर पर बी० एच० ई० एल०, झाँसी में नियोजित स्थायी अकुशल श्रेणी के नियमित कर्मचारियों को वेतन एवं अन्य भत्ते दिये जा रहे हैं।

ये आदेश तत्कालिक प्रभाव से लागू होंगे। आदेश की प्रति संबंधित पक्षों एवं उप श्रमायुक्त, झाँसी को सूचनार्थ एवं प्रतिपालन हेतु प्रेषित की जायें।

"Sri Shashi Nandan, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri K.M. Asthana has accepted notice on behalf of respondent-3. Learned Standing Counsel represents respondent nos. 1, 2 and 4. They pray for and are granted three weeks' time to file counter affidavit. Rejoinder affidavit may be filed within one week thereafter.

List on 13th July, 2005.

Till the next date of listing recovery proceedings in terms of Labour Commissioner, U.P., Kanpur dated 5th January, 2005 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) shall remained stayed so far as it pertains to the petitioner. However, this order will not affect the right of the employees to enforce the recovery against the contractor in terms of order dated 5th January, 2005.”

“22.

One other fact which must be noted is that Civil Appeals Nos. 6648, 6647, 6572 and 6570 of 2002 do not deal with casual or daily-rated workers. These are cases of persons employed on contract. To such persons the principle of equal pay for equal work has no application. The Full Bench judgment dealt only with daily-rated and casual workers. Where a person is employed under a contract, it is the contract which will govern the terms and conditions of service. In State of Haryana v. Surinder Kumar [(1997) 3 SCC 633 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 844] persons employed on contract basis claimed equal pay as regular workers on the footing that their posts were interchangeable. It was held that these persons had no right to the regular posts until they are duly selected and appointed. It was held that they were not entitled to the same pay as regular employees by claiming that they are discharging the same duties. It was held that the very object of selection is to test the eligibility and then to make appointment in accordance with the rules. It was held that the respondents had not been recruited in accordance with the rules prescribed for recruitment.”

“Charanjit Singh (supra)

19.

Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are of the view that the authorities in the cases of Jasmer Singh [(1996) 11 SCC 77 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 210 : AIR 1997 SC 1788 : (1997) 2 LLJ 667] , Tilak Raj [(2003) 6 SCC 123 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 828] , Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology [(2003) 5 SCC 188 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 645 : (2003) 2 LLJ 968] and Tarun K. Roy [(2004) 1 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 225] lay down the correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The principle of “equal pay for equal work” has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in certain cases, make a difference. If the educational qualifications are different, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by the competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. Thus normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ court can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming equal pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this regard. In any event, the party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction can be issued by a court, the court must first see that there are necessary averments and there is a proof. If the High Court is, on basis of material placed before it, convinced that there was equal work of equal quality and all other relevant factors are fulfilled it may direct payment of equal pay from the date of the filing of the respective writ petition. In all these cases, we find that the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies without examining any relevant factors.”

“G.P. Sangeetha (supra)

8.

In the last century, following the decision in Randhir Singh v. Union of India, this Court treated equal pay for equal work as an expansive anti-exploitation principle under Articles 14 and 39(d), where the mere sameness of designation - teacher with teacher, accountant with accountant, clerk with clerk, driver with driver, etc. - was sufficient to claim parity. In this century, however, beginning with the decision in State Bank of India v. M.R. Ganesh Babuand ending with State of Bihar v. Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, the doctrine has been recast as a strict test based on service rules. Decisions are legion that equal pay cannot be claimed by merely showing identical work; the claimant-employee must establish complete parity in the source of recruitment, educational qualifications and experience, mode of appointment through a constitutional process, and nature of responsibilities and accountability. Mere functional similarity of work has been held to be no longer enough.”

“7.

The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104: ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233): Nagendra Nath v. Commr. of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240: (AIR 1958 SC 398) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168.”

“17.

The learned Single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally reappreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a tribunal, presided over by a judicial officer. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ court to warrant those findings, at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken. The Division Bench was not only justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the learned Single Judge and in ordering restoration of the award of the Tribunal. On being taken through the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as well as the order of the learned Single Judge and the judgment of the Division Bench, we are of the view that the Industrial Tribunal had overwhelming materials which constituted ample and sufficient basis for recording its findings, as it did, and the manner of consideration undertaken, the objectivity of approach adopted and reasonableness of findings recorded seem to be unexceptionable. The only course, therefore, open to the writ Judge was to find out the satisfaction or otherwise of the relevant criteria laid down by this Court, before sustaining the claim of the canteen workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact-finding authority and not embark upon an exercise of reassessing the evidence and arriving at findings of one's own, altogether giving a complete go-by even to the facts specifically found by the Tribunal below.”

“13.

Heard counsel for parties and perused the record.

14. Effect of an earlier Adjudication by Labour Commissioner :-

15.

The Labour Commissioner has adjudicated only an issue that contract employees of the BHEL, Jhansi were entitled to same pay and allowances as given to regular appointees of the BHEL, Jhansi. Issue of regularisation before any new recruitment was neither an issue nor decided. Therefore any findings of adjudication would have no bearing on present case. Though it was the admitted case of petitioners therein that they were appointed through different Contractors.

16.

Whether a issue that contract with Contractors by the BHEL is sham could be decided by High Court:

17.

It is not much under dispute that in order to decide the said issue, evidence is required to be produced. Terms of contract and manner of working is to be tested by statements and documents, therefore, to decide it writ jurisdiction is not the correct forum. The appropriate authority is the Industrial Tribunal. The Steel Authority of India (supra) has also held the same in its para 126 and for reference the same is again referred herein after :-

“126.

We have used the expression “industrial adjudicator” by design as determination of the questions aforementioned requires enquiry into disputed questions of facts which cannot conveniently be made by High Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, in such cases the appropriate authority to go into those issues will be the Industrial Tribunal/Court whose determination will be amenable to judicial review.”

18.

In view of above referred discussion, the issue that whether the contract is sham or not cannot be adjudicated by this Court under Writ Jurisdiction.

19. Effect of BHEL vs Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola (supra) :-

20.

In similar circumstances a claim of contract workers of BHEL, Haridwar for regularisation was rejected by Supreme Court after taking note of SAIL (supra) as well CLRA also. Expression “control and supervision” was also considered and adjudication by Labour Court and a judgment passed by the High Court for regularisation were set aside by returning a specific finding that- “There is nothing on facts to show that the contract labour that is engaged, even de hors a prohibition notification, is in the facts of this case “sham”.

21.

On basis of above discussion there is no ground to grant relief as prayed, therefore present writ petition is dismissed and interim order is accordingly, vacated.”

“The consideration 42. All the judgments noticed in paras 7 to 24 hereinabove, pertain to employees engaged on regular basis, who were claiming higher wages, under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”. The claim raised by such employees was premised on the ground, that the duties and responsibilities rendered by them were against the same post for which a higher pay scale was being allowed in other government departments. Or alternatively, their duties and responsibilities were the same as of other posts with different designations, but they were placed in a lower scale. Having been painstakingly taken through the parameters laid down by this Court, wherein the principle of “equal pay for equal work” was invoked and considered, it would be just and appropriate to delineate the parameters laid down by this Court. In recording the said parameters, we have also adverted to some other judgments pertaining to temporary employees (also dealt with, in the instant judgment), wherein also, this Court had the occasion to express the legal position with reference to the principle of “equal pay for equal work”. Our consideration, has led us to the following deductions:

42.1.

The “onus of proof” of parity in the duties and responsibilities of the subject post with the reference post under the principle of “equal pay for equal work” lies on the person who claims it. He who approaches the court has to establish that the subject post occupied by him requires him to discharge equal work of equal value, as the reference post (see Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case [Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 645] , UT Chandigarh, Admn. v. Manju Mathur [U.T. Chandigarh, Admn. v. Manju Mathur, (2011) 2 SCC 452 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 348] , SAIL case [SAIL v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya, (2011) 11 SCC 122 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 192] and National Aluminium Co. Ltd. case [National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout, (2014) 6 SCC 756 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 353] ).

42.2.

The mere fact that the subject post occupied by the claimant is in a “different department” vis-à-vis the reference post does not have any bearing on the determination of a claim under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”. Persons discharging identical duties cannot be treated differently in the matter of their pay, merely because they belong to different departments of the Government (see Randhir Singh case [Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 119] and D.S. Nakara case [D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145] ).

42.3.

The principle of “equal pay for equal work”, applies to cases of unequal scales of pay, based on no classification or irrational classification (see Randhir Singh case [Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 119] ). For equal pay, the employees concerned with whom equation is sought, should be performing work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same quality and sensitivity (see Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers case [Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 91 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 673] , Mewa Ram Kanojia case [Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, (1989) 2 SCC 235 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 329] , Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union case [Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 619 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 621] and S.C. Chandra case [S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 897 : 2 SCEC 943] ).

42.4.

Persons holding the same rank/designation (in different departments), but having dissimilar powers, duties and responsibilities, can be placed in different scales of pay and cannot claim the benefit of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” (see Randhir Singh case [Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 119] , State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn. [State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn., (2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 822] and Hukum Chand Gupta case [Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 493] ). Therefore, the principle would not be automatically invoked merely because the subject and reference posts have the same nomenclature.

42.5.

In determining equality of functions and responsibilities under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, it is necessary to keep in mind that the duties of the two posts should be of equal sensitivity, and also, qualitatively similar. Differentiation of pay scales for posts with difference in degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality, would fall within the realm of valid classification, and therefore, pay differentiation would be legitimate and permissible (see Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers case [Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 91 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 673] and SBI case [SBI v. M.R. Ganesh Babu, (2002) 4 SCC 556 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 568] ). The nature of work of the subject post should be the same and not less onerous than the reference post. Even the volume of work should be the same. And so also, the level of responsibility. If these parameters are not met, parity cannot be claimed under the principle of “equal pay for equal work” (see State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia [State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 71] and Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union case [Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 619 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 621] ).

42.6.

For placement in a regular pay scale, the claimant has to be a regular appointee. The claimant should have been selected on the basis of a regular process of recruitment. An employee appointed on a temporary basis cannot claim to be placed in the regular pay scale (see Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case [Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 645] ).

42.7.

Persons performing the same or similar functions, duties and responsibilities, can also be placed in different pay scales. Such as — “selection grade”, in the same post. But this difference must emerge out of a legitimate foundation, such as — merit, or seniority, or some other relevant criteria (see State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia [State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 71] ).

42.8.

If the qualifications for recruitment to the subject post vis-à-vis the reference post are different, it may be difficult to conclude that the duties and responsibilities of the posts are qualitatively similar or comparable (see Mewa Ram Kanojia case [Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, (1989) 2 SCC 235 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 329] and State of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy [State of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 225] ). In such a case the principle of “equal pay for equal work” cannot be invoked.

42.9.

The reference post with which parity is claimed under the principle of “equal pay for equal work” has to be at the same hierarchy in the service as the subject post. Pay scales of posts may be different, if the hierarchy of the posts in question, and their channels of promotion, are different. Even if the duties and responsibilities are same, parity would not be permissible, as against a superior post, such as a promotional post (see Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey [Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey, (2000) 8 SCC 580 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 56] and Hukum Chand Gupta case [Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 493] ).

42.10.

A comparison between the subject post and the reference post under the principle of “equal pay for equal work” cannot be made where the subject post and the reference post are in different establishments, having a different management. Or even, where the establishments are in different geographical locations, though owned by the same master (see Harbans Lal case [Harbans Lal v. State of H.P., (1989) 4 SCC 459 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 71] ). Persons engaged differently, and being paid out of different funds, would not be entitled to pay parity (see Official Liquidator v. Dayanand [Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 943] ).

42.11.

Different pay scales, in certain eventualities, would be permissible even for posts clubbed together at the same hierarchy in the cadre. As for instance, if the duties and responsibilities of one of the posts are more onerous, or are exposed to higher nature of operational work/risk, the principle of “equal pay for equal work” would not be applicable. And also when the reference post includes the responsibility to take crucial decisions, and that is not so for the subject post (see SBI case [SBI v. M.R. Ganesh Babu, (2002) 4 SCC 556 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 568] ).

42.12.

The priority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of the Government can also be a relevant factor for placing different posts under different pay scales. Herein also, the principle of “equal pay for equal work” would not be applicable (see State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn. [State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn., (2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 822] ).

42.13.

The parity in pay, under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, cannot be claimed merely on the ground that at an earlier point of time the subject post and the reference post, were placed in the same pay scale. The principle of “equal pay for equal work” is applicable only when it is shown, that the incumbents of the subject post and the reference post, discharge similar duties and responsibilities (see State of W.B. v. Minimum Wages Inspectors Assn. [State of W.B. v. W.B. Minimum Wages Inspectors Assn., (2010) 5 SCC 225 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 1] ).

42.14.

For parity in pay scales under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, equation in the nature of duties is of paramount importance. If the principal nature of duties of one post is teaching, whereas that of the other is non-teaching, the principle would not be applicable. If the dominant nature of duties of one post is of control and management, whereas the subject post has no such duties, the principle would not be applicable. Likewise, if the central nature of duties of one post is of quality control, whereas the subject post has minimal duties of quality control, the principle would not be applicable (see U.T. Chandigarh, Admn. v. Manju Mathur [U.T. Chandigarh, Admn. v. Manju Mathur, (2011) 2 SCC 452 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 348] ).

42.15.

There can be a valid classification in the matter of pay scales between employees even holding posts with the same nomenclature i.e. between those discharging duties at the headquarters, and others working at the institutional/sub-office level (see Hukum Chand Gupta case [Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 493] ), when the duties are qualitatively dissimilar.

42.16.

The principle of “equal pay for equal work” would not be applicable, where a differential higher pay scale is extended to persons discharging the same duties and holding the same designation, with the objective of ameliorating stagnation, or on account of lack of promotional avenues (see Hukum Chand Gupta case [Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 493] ).

42.17.

Where there is no comparison between one set of employees of one organisation, and another set of employees of a different organisation, there can be no question of equation of pay scales under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, even if two organisations have a common employer. Likewise, if the management and control of two organisations is with different entities which are independent of one another, the principle of “equal pay for equal work” would not apply (see S.C. Chandra case [S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 897 : 2 SCEC 943] and National Aluminium Co. Ltd. case [National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout, (2014) 6 SCC 756 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 353] ).”

“44.9.

In U.P. Land Development Corpn. case [U.P. Land Development Corpn. v. Mohd. Khursheed Anwar, (2010) 7 SCC 739 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 513] this Court noticed that the respondents were employed on contract basis on a consolidated salary. But, because they were actually appointed to perform the work of the post of Assistant Engineer, this Court directed the employer to pay the respondents wages in the minimum of the pay scales ascribed for the post of Assistant Engineer.”