Bhanu Pratap Singh vs State Of Jharkhand And Ors

This petition has been filed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 03.04.2017 passed by the Sessions Judge, Hazaribag, in Criminal Revision No.30 of 2016 whereby the vehicle bearing registration no. JH02T-7311 has been ordered to be released in favour of O.P. No.2.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the impugned order, has placed reliance on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar & Ors., reported in 2018 (3) SCC 1, and argued that in the aforesaid case it has been observed that the definition of owner under Section 2 (30) of the Motor Vehicle Act 1988 means the person in whose name motor vehicle stands registered and only when a person is a minor, the guardian of that minor would be treated as owner. It is submitted that in case of agreement of hire purchase or hypothecation the owner-ship will always be in favour of the person in whose name the vehicle is registered.

It is submitted that the court below has erred in passing the order for release of the vehicle in favour of O.P. No.2 by relying on the agreement of sale. It is submitted as per Section 2 (30) of the Motor Vehicle Act "agreement of sale" is not mentioned, therefore the purchaser under the agreement of sale is not the owner under Section 2 (30).

It is argued that the vehicle was not handed over to O.P. No.2 as an outstanding amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (two lakhs) was to be paid by O.P. No.2, in terms of the agreement. For the said reason, the vehicle was not transferred in the name of O.P. No.2, consequent thereto, the NOC was also not issued. It is submitted that though these are disputed question of fact, but the Sessions Court without considering and appreciating the material facts in its correct perspective, has erred in passing the order of releasing of the vehicle in favour of O.P. No.2.

It is argued that the court below has committed manifest error by recording the finding that O.P. No.2 is the owner. It is submitted that the finding is dehors the definition of the owner as enshrined in Section 2(30) of Motor Vehicle Act 1988. It is contended that the order is not sustainable in law or on facts and is fit to be set aside.

Per contra contended that decisions, of the learned counsel for the court below has Apex Court, rendered O.P. No.2 has relied on the in the case of Rajsthan State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Kailash Nath Kothari; AIR 1997 SC 3444 and HDFC Bank v. Reshma 2015 (3) SC 679, and rightly held that the definition of owner is not limited to the person in whose name motor vehicle is registered but it also includes the person in whose possession the vehicle is given under an agreement of sale. It is submitted that admittedly the vehicle was handed over to this petitioner/O.P. No.2 under an agreement of sale and as per the covenant, it was agreed that the vehicle would be registered in the name of O.P. No.2, after the entire installments were paid to the financier by O.P. No.2. That the O.P. No.2 had paid Rs.3,50,000/- to the petitioner in terms of the agreement. As per the covenant it is mentioned that the O.P. No.2 would get possession of the vehicle with all documents and the O.P. No.2 had to pay the installment amount of Rs.67,300/- per month to the financier. That the entire liability or responsibility of the vehicle from the date of agreement would be of O.P. No.2. He has to face the legal proceeding and consequences with respect to the said vehicle. It was agreed that if after payment of the entire dues to the financier, the registered owner failed to transfer the ownership, then the O.P. No.2 was entitled to get the ownership of the vehicle through the process of law.

That the vehicle was handed over to O.P. No.2 in terms of the agreement and he was plying the vehicle. Thereafter, the vehicle was forcibly taken by the petitioner and on the report of O.P. No.2, Moffasil P.S. Case No.22 of 2016 was registered. The police had seized the vehicle from outside of the house of the petitioner. It is submitted that after investigation the police had submitted the final form stating that the dispute was of civil nature but there is no finding that the O.P. No2's case was false. That O.P. No.2 had filed the protest petition and the father and brother of the petitioner were examined as enquiry witnesses, who have testified and admitted about the agreement between the petitioner and O.P. No.2.

Learned counsel has submitted that in the aforesaid decisions the Supreme Court has held that a person in possession of the vehicle as per agreement of sale, comes within the purview of definition of owner under Section 2(30) of the Act.

It is canvassed that the court below has considered the documents and evidence of the parties and rightly held that O.P. No.2 is the owner of the vehicle, hence the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or perversity meriting any interference by this court.

Heard. The crux of the matter revolves on the question 'whether a person who is in possession of the vehicle in terms of the agreement of sale comes within the purview of definition of owner?' For proper appreciation it will be profitable to read Section 2 (30) of the Act, as under;

"2 (30) "owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement."

Plain reading of the provision of Section 2(30) of the Act, reveals that in relation to a motor vehicle which is a subject of an agreement of lease, the person is possession of the vehicle under the agreement comes within the purview of definition of owner.

It is noticed that the petitioner has not controverted or rebuted the fact that he had executed an agreement of sale with O.P. No.2. The terms of the agreement has been elaborately dealt with by the court below.

In this context it is necessary to reiterate the terms of the agreement enumerated in the impugned order, wherein it is stated that the petitioner was facing difficulty in plying the vehicle and he intended to sale it but without getting clearance from the financier, the vehicle could not be transferred in the name of O.P. No.2. Petitioner has not denied that in terms of the agreement O.P. No.2 had paid him Rs.3,50,000/-. It is stipulated that O.P. No.2 would pay Rs.67,300/- per month to the financier. That O.P. No.2 will be in possession of the documents and of the vehicle. That the entire liability and responsibility with respect to the vehicle from the date of the agreement would be of O.P. No.2. He had to face the legal consequences in any matter relating to the vehicle. The terms of agreement has not been denied or disputed by the petitioner.

The fact that the vehicle was given to O.P. No.2 and the transfer of the vehicle in the name of O.P. No.2 would be made after payment of the loan amount to the financier has not been denied. In the obtaining facts and circumstances, the decision in the case of Naveen Kumar (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, does not support the contention of the petitioner, on the contrary it buttresses the argument of the learned counsel of O.P. No.2.

In the attending facts and circumstances in the considered opinion of this court no perversity or illegality has been committed by the court below directing the release of the vehicle in favour of O.P. No.2. It is abundantly clear that the court below has discussed the legal and factual aspects and relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court. For the foregoing reasons order impugned herein, does not suffer from any illegality.

It goes without saying that the liability relating to the vehicle shall be of O.P. No.2 in terms of the agreement dated 30.01.2012.

In the result this revision stands dismissed.