Bhairo Prasad vs Harihar Prasad

Sir Ali Imam, Kt., J.—The facts of this case are shortly these. The petitioner was defendant in an account suit before the Subordinate Judge of Saran and the opposite party was the plaintiff. The suit was valued at Rs. 19,000. It appears that there was a compromise recorded and the defendant was under the compromise to pay Rs. 4,000 to the plaintiff. Some payments were made, and it appears that at one stage of the case an application was made by the plaintiff to execute the compromise decree to the extent of about Rs. 3,000. A question was raised before the Subordinate Judge as to whether or not by the various payments made by the defendant the decree obtained had been satisfied. This question culminated in an application by the defendant to the Subordinate Judge, praying for sanction to prosecute the plaintiff under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, and amongst them section 210 of that Code. The learned Subordinate Judge duly granted the sanction under the latter section.

There was an appeal preferred by the plaintiff to the learned District Judge praying for revocation of that sanction. The learned District Judge entertained the application and revoked the sanction granted by the learned Subordinate Judge. The petitioner, being dissatisfied with the order of revocation passed by the learned District Judge, has approached this Court and prays for the setting aside of that order. His application was admitted on the ground that the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain an application with reference to a decree made in a suit valued at above Rs. 5,000.

The contention of the petitioner is that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to revoke the sanction. Babu Ram Prasad, who appears on behalf of the petitioner, contends that on a proper interpretation of section 21 of Act XII of 1887 it would be clear that the District Judge is not the authority to whom appeal from the Subordinate Judge ordinarily lies, and he contends that if that proposition be sound, under sub-clause (a) of sub-section 7 of section 195 of the Code the District Judge would have no jurisdiction. I have carefully examined the language of section 21 of that Act. It is evident that the Legislature intended to classify the cases under which appeals would lie to the District Judge and to the High Court respectively. The Legislature also makes it quite clear that the position of any proceeding arising out of an original suit should be on the same plane with the suit itself in matters of appeals therefrom. A reading of section 21 of that Act, therefore, gives the result that all original suits not exceeding in value Rs. 5,000 or any procedure arising out of such suit would be subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the District Judge and that any other case, whether an original suit or any proceeding arising therefrom, would be subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. Reading, as I do, this section, I feel no hesitation in holding that the learned Subordinate Judge''s Court is one from which some appeals lie to the High Court and some to the District Judge. In view of the provision contained in section 195, clause (a), sub-clause (a), it is evident that the Court of inferior appellate jurisdiction would be the Court to which application for revocation of sanction must be made. I, therefore, hold that the District Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the application on which he passed his order revoking the sanction granted by the Subordinate Judge.

Babu Ram Prasad contends that inasmuch as the proceeding, in the course of which the alleged offence was committed and with reference to which sanction was given, was one in execution of a decree in an original suit of the value of more than Rs. 19,000, the jurisdiction of the District Judge was barred. This is a contention with which I am unable to be in sympathy. The point is concluded by the decision given in Maduray Pillay and Another Vs. H.T. Elderton, and Ganga Dei Vs. Sher Singh, . These authorities have laid down that the valuation of the original suit, or for the matter of that of the proceeding arising therefrom, is immaterial to the question as to the Court to which an application u/s 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for revocation or for order granting sanction should be made. As I have held before, the question of valuation of the suit is of no importance for the disposal of the present application. The point is concluded by the language of sub-clause (a), sub-section (7) of section 195 of the Code.

In the circumstances the application is rejected.