Bhagwati Parshad and Others vs State and Others

V.K. Shali, J.—These are two petitions arising out of the two cross FIRs. The petition bearing Crl.M.C.No.407/12, is in respect of FIR No. 655/07, u/S 308/ 341/ 34 IPC registered by PS Ambedkar Nagar. The said FIR has been registered at the instance of one Bhagwati Parshad, S/o Sh.Mange Lal, R/o B-2,287, Madangir, New Delhi, aged around 26 years. He has stated that on 9.9.07, he was present at a shop when the incident took place in which he was attacked by Ramkumar, Briju, Ramesh and Sriram, with an attempt to cause homicide. He was also alleged subjected to wrongful restraint. On the basis of this, a case u/s 341 Cr.P.C. in furtherance of common intention was registered against them. After investigation, the charge sheet has been filed against all the four accused persons.

In Crl.M.C.no.398/12, an FIR No. 658/07 was registered on 12.9.2007, u/s 341/ 323/ 308/ 506/ 34 IPC against Bhagwati Prasad, Mahabir and Prabhu Dayal at the instance of these very four persons, who are the accused in the cross FIR.

It has been contended by the learned counsel that both the parties have settled the matter and therefore, both these FIRs against each other may be quashed.

The learned APP has opposed the quashing of the aforesaid FIRs on the ground that the trial against the petitioners is on and they have not disclosed, as to why they have decided to compromise, after expiry of five years. It has also been stated by him that statements of some of the witnesses have already been recorded and all the accused persons in both the FIRs are not the parties before this Court and therefore, the FIRs may not be quashed.

The learned counsel for the petitioners has contested the position of the learned APP saying that even if all the parties are not present, still the FIRs be quashed.

I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and gone through the FIRs. The learned counsel has not placed even a single order of the trial court nor any information has been furnished as to what is the stage of the case in the trial court. It has also not been clearly stated as to whether there are any other accused persons other than the petitioners who are before this Court in these two cases. Therefore, in the absence of this vital information and merely because the parties have decided to compound the offence at their own will, this cannot be a ground for quashing of the aforesaid FIRs and that too for a serious offence where both the parties had recklessly indulged in an attempt to cause homicide. Accordingly, I feel that for want of particulars, it will not be proper to quash the aforesaid FIRs at this stage, hence the petitions are dismissed.