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Judgment
Mehar Singh, J.—This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Of the four Petitioners the first three are owners of land in village Panchhat in the jurisdiction of Kapurthala district and the fourth-Petitioner is a mortgagee of some area of land concerned in this petition. In Such. ''A'' to the petition are described the full particulars and the-areas of lands belonging to the Petitioners. The total area comes to 46 kanals. On 30th May, 1953 the Government issued Notification No. 5663/LA for acquisition of land for Juliunder Branch of the Bhakra Canal and in that Notification among the three villages within the areas of which the land was to be acquired is mentioned village Panchhat in tehsil Phagwara of Kapurthala district and the area to be acquired is stated as 33 acres. The Petitioners'' case is that at the instance of the Irrigation Department of the Punjab Government,, the Pepsu Government made enquiries from the Deputy Commissioner of Kapurthala district on the question where the alignment of the Jullundur Branch should be laid in the area of village Panchhat and the Deputy Commissioner reported back that it should be 2000 feet away from the village.
This suggestion was accepted and demarcation and excavation work for alignment of the Juliunder Branch started at that distance from the village but that in the month of October, 1953, under the influence of some important persons, the Pepsu State, Respondent No. 1, and the Deputy Commissioner of Kapurthala district, Respondent No. 2, arbitrarily, in an abuse of their power, changed the line of alignment from a distance of 2000 feet from the village to about 750 feet from the village In November, 1953, the Tehsildar of Phagwara delivered possession of the land of the villagers of Panchhat, including the Petitioners, to the executive Engineer of Alawalpur Division, and Shri K.K. Jagia, Sub-Divisional Officer incharge of Bhakra, Canal area of village Panchhat, respectively Respondents Nos. 3 and 4, who in their turn started digging operations on the land for the Juliunder Branch Canal through the contractors, Respondents No. 6.
Respondent No. 5, Shri Gopal Singh, is an Overseer incharge of the Bhakra Canal Area within the area of village Panchhat. The Petitioners further aver that Respondents Nos. 5 and 6 have encroached upon and put to use land of the Petitioners even beyond the area required for the width of the canal and have thus caused undue damage to them and further Respondents No. 6 have laid a. service-road through the Petitioners'' field as a result of which the Petitioners are not able to use their lands. It is said that the action of Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 in depriving the Petitioners of the possession of their land is illegal, ultra vires, void and without jurisdiction, because acquisition has not taken place according to the extant law and the Notification No. 5663/LA of 30th May, 1953, purporting to have been issued u/s 3 of" the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk. (Act No. 3 of 1995 Bk.), is not; valid as that Act was. repealed by the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 2006 Bk. (Act No. 4 of 2006 Bk.), and because statutory provisions regarding the manner and method of acquisition of land have not been complied with in this case.
The Petitioners claim that thus their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) to hold and possess their land has been infringed and consequently a writ, direction or order be issued ''to the Respondents (a) quashing-and setting aside-all illegal orders, if any, and actions taken there under, "
(b) directing the Respondents to take no further steps of excavation etc., on the Petitioners'' lands;
and (c) ordering and directing them to restore the Petitioners'' lands detailed in Sch. ''A'' in the condition as they originally were and also to pay appropriate damages for loss.
Separate replies have been made by the learned Advocate General of Pepsu on behalf of Pepsu State and the Deputy Commissioner of Kapurthala district, Respondents, Nos. 1 and 2, and by the learned Assistant Advocate General of Punjab on behalf of Respondents Nos. 3 to 52. No reply has been put in by or on behalf of the contractors, Respondents No. 6 The replies, of Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 cover the same grounds. The replies state that the Punjab Government in the Punjab P. W. D. Irrigation Department, under the. authority and decision of the Bhakra Control Board, and with the consent ''of the Pepsu State Government, is constructing the Jullundur Branch of the Bhakra Canal through Jllundur district of the Panjab and Kapurthala district of-Pepsu and that Canal will irrigate .the lands in both the .districts. At the instance of the Punjab Government, the Pepsu State Government issued Notification No. 5663/LA, dated 30th May, 1953, acquiring land, including 33 acres in the area of village Panchhat, of three villages through area of which the Canal is to be constructed, Kapurthala district. The Canal is being constructed to serve the common interest of both the States, the place of first alignment was 850 feet away from village Panchhat. Some villagers of village Panchhat made a representation to the Deputy Commissioner Kapurthala on 13th January 1953, objecting that the first alignment was too near the village habitation and upon that the Deputy Commissioner Recommended on 16th January 1953, to the Chief Engineer and Secretary P. W. D., Pepsu Government, that
the proposed canal will be very close to the village Abadi and the land which is proposed to be acquired for the canal is of the best quality. It will be in the interest of the village, the land-holders concerned and of the Grow More Pood Campaign, which is of national interest, if the alignment of the canal is so altered that the canal may be situated as much north of the village as possible.
Upon this recommendation of the Deputy Commissioner the'' second alignment for the canal was considered at a distance of 700 feet away from the first alignment, in other words at a distance of 1550 feet away from village Panchhat and not 2000 feet away as alleged by the Petitioners.
But the position taken on behalf of the Respondents is that no work at all was started at the place of the second alignment as alleged by the Petitioners. It is denied that reversion to the first alignment was due to influence of any person and it is also said that the Petitioners have not given names of any such person. The Respondents position is that according to sound engineering principles the canal should be laid straight and curves should be avoided and it was in consideration of these principles that reversion to the'' first alignment took place. Out of about 103 persons in village Panchhat whose lands have been taken possession of no body else has raised any objection excepting the four Petitioners and something like 45 villagers have already accepted compensation for damage to crops. It is further denied that the acquisition is-not according to law and the case of the Respondents Ts that the lands of the Petitioners have been'' acquired in accordance with and under the law of acquisition in force in Pepsu and so the Petitioners have no case under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The other objections on behalf of the Respondents are (a), that the possession of the lands was, according to the affidavits of field Qanungo Lachhman Singh and Overseer Gopal Singh, taken on 2nd December 1953, after announcement in this behalf by beat of drum in the village on 1st December 1953,-and the work on the Canal was started immediately with the result that about 75 per cent, of the construction work has been completed and about a lac of rupees have been expended and that the Petitioners delayed their petition till 19th January 1954, thus permitting the work to .go on with knowledge and taking no immediate action in the matter, (b) that no demand for justice has been made by the Petitioners from the Respondents, (c) that other adequate and efficacious remedies by way of regular civil suit or a claim for compensation under the Land Acquisition Act are available to the Petitioners, and (d) that the prayer of the Petitioners is too vague and ought not to be granted.
The Government Notification No. 5663/LA of 30th May 1953, was issued u/s 3, Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995'' Bk., stating among other matters, that
it appears to the Government that land is likely to be taken'' by Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, for acquisition of land for Jullundur Branch R.D. 160,000 to 190,000, it is hereby notified that the land in the locality noted below is likely to be acquired for the above purpose.
Then at the end of the Notification are named three villages of which the land was to be acquired and one of them is village Panchhat of which area required was 33 acres.
It is contended on behalf of the Petitioners that this Notification is invalid for two reasons: (i) because the Patiala Land Acquisition Act of 1995 Bk., had been repealed by the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act of 2006 Bk. and (ii) because, even if. the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 2006'' Bk., was not valid law because it had not been reserved for the consideration and assent of the President according to Article 31(3) of the Constitution, the repealing section in it did not require the assent of the President under Article 31(3) of the Constitution and so it was good law repealing the Patiala Land Acquisition Act of 1995 Bk., with the result that there was in fact no law with regard to the acquisition of land in Pepsu.
The reply on behalf of the Respondents is that under Article 31 (3) of the Constitution a statute relating to acquisition of land had to be reserved for the consideration of the President and could not be law until it received his assent and that the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 2006 Bk., was not so reserved and thus it was not effective and operative law with the result that the previous Act, namely, the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., remained in force and further that the repealing section in the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 2006 Bk., cannot be divorced from the main body of the Act and it was equally invalid as the main Act for want of the assent of the President as the intention of the Legislature was not (a) to create a vacuum in so far as the law relating to acquisition of land is concerned, and (b) the Intention must be taken to be that the previous Act continued. The learned Advocate General for Pepsu State made a statement that it was a fact that the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 2006 Bk., was not reserved for the consideration and assent of the President.
Article 31 (3) of the Constitution provides: "No such law as is referred to in Clause (2) made toy the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.
The words ''such law'' in this sub-Article refer to the law relating to acquisition and requisition as referred to in Sub-Article (2) of Article 31 of the Constitution. The Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 2006 Bk., was a law. falling within the scope of Sub-Article (2) of that Article. It not having been reserved for the consideration of the President and thus not having received his assent was ineffective and inoperative law.
That being so, it follows that it also failed to repeal the previous Act, namely, the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., but there is no doubt that apparently the repealing section in ACT NO. IV of 2006 Bk. was not law relating to acquisition or requisition of property and would not fall within the ambit of Article 31(2) of the Constitution and the learned Advocate General for Pepsu State had to admit that if the repealing section was a statute by itself and the Legislature in clear and un-mistakable terms stated that it was repealing Act No. III of 1995 Bk., then such a law would not attract the provisions of Sub-Article (3) of Article 31, but he further urged that the repealing section was a part of Act No. IV of 2006 Bk., and Section 2 of this Act leaves no room for doubt about the intention of the Legislature to have the law of acquisition in the State and therefore the intention of the Legislature was not to repeal the previous Act if Act No. IV of 2006 Bk. was not to be a valid and operative law.
Section 2 of Act No. 4 of 2006 Bk. runs thus:
(1) The Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995, is hereby repealed.
(2) All proceedings commenced, officers appointed or authorized, agreements published and rules made under the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995, shall, as far as may be, be deemed to have been respectively commenced, appointed or authorized, published and made under this Act.
(3) Any enactment or document referring to the Patiala Land acquisition Act, 1995, so far as may be, be construed to refer to this Act or to the corresponding portion thereof.
Sub-sections (2) and (3) of this section support the position taken by the learned Advocate General. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners presses that in spite of the intention of the Legislature to have a law of acquisition, it made its intention clear in Sub-section, (1) of Section 2 of Act 4 of 2006 Bk. repealing the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., and no argument can by implication revive that repealed statute.
In the Construction of Statutes by Crawford, 1940 Edition, at pages 652 and 653, this question is dealt with and the law is thus stated:
In the case of - ''Meshmeir v. State'' 11 Ind 482 (A) it was held that a repealing clause attached to an unconstitutional act of the legislature might repeal a former valid statute upon the same subject. The general principle announced in that case is undoubtedly correct, for it must be conceded that the legislature may use such language as to leave no doubt as to its intention to repeal a former law, in any event. In such case the law intended to be repealed would cease to exist even though the law to which the repealing clause was attached would fail by reason of being in conflict with the constitution.
Where, however, it is not clear that the legislature, by a repealing clause attached to an unconstitutional act, intended to repeal the former statute upon, the same subject, except upon the supposition that the new act would take the place of the former, the repealing clause falls with the act to which it is attached.
If the present case was covered by the first part in this statement of the law the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners would be valid, but in the present case the intention of the Legislature is clear from consideration of Section 2 of Act No. IV of 2006 Bk., that the intention of the Legislature could not have been to repeal the former statute, except upon the supposition that the subsequent statute would take the place of the former, and so the repealing clause in the subsequent statute falls with the unconstitutional statute to which it is attached. Upon this consideration the argument advanced by the learned Advocate General is sound and must prevail. Therefore, the repealing Section in Act No. IV of 2006 Bk., would also be ineffective and inoperative as that Act itself. The consequence is that the.. Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., still held the field. In the meantime and during the pendency of this case the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (Act No. 5 of 1953), has been enacted as an Act of the President of India during the time the Government has been taken over by the President under Article 356 of the Constitution.
Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of that Act provides:
(1) The Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., and the Patiala and East, Punjab States Union Land Acquisition Act, 2006 Bk., are hereby repealed:
Provided that anything done or any action taken, including any order, notification or rules made or issued in the exercise or purported exercise of the powers conferred by or under either of the Acts aforesaid shall, in so far as chewy are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under the Land Acquisition Act as if that Act was in force on the date on which such, thing was done or such action was taken.
It is now clear that before the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 1953, the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., held the field and since the date of the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 1953, anything done or any action taken under the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., is to be deemed to have been done or ''taken under the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 1953,; the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., haying been repealed by Section 5 of Act No. 5 of 1953.
The Pepsu Land Acquisition Act 1953 applies to Pepsu the Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1394), with certain saving provisions. The Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., was in so far as the provisions relating to acquisition are concerned a practical copy of the Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894, with, so far as is material for the purposes of the present case, an additional provision in Sub-section (1) of Section 18, which section corresponds to Section 17, Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is nobody''s case that in the present case the acquisition of land took place in the normal and ordinary way and consequently the ''provisions relating to acquisition of land in this, way either under the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., or the Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894, do not come for consideration. In the present case the position taken on behalf of the Respondents is that it was a case of ''extreme urgency'' under which possession of the land was immediate taken and so the case was dealt with according to Section 18(1), Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk.
That Sub-section is as follows:
(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the Ijlas-i-Khas so directs, the Collector though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, Sub-section (1) or in cases of extreme urgency immediately after the issue of a notification u/s 3, take possession of any waste or arable land needed for State purposes, for a local body or for a company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances.
For the sake of comparison Sub-section (1) of Section 17, Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is reproduced:
(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector,. though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, Sub-section (1), take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a Company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government,, free from all encumbrances.
It will be seen that the Patiala Act deals with two cases (a) that of urgency, and (b) that of extreme urgency. The Central Act deals with only one case that of urgency. The provisions in both the, Acts concerning the cases of urgency are substantially the same, but in the Patiala Act there is an additional provision covering cases of extreme urgency, and this provision is not to be found in the Central Act. Again it is no party''s case that possession of the lands of the Petitioners was taken as a case of urgency and the reason is quite simple, because provisions regarding notice as in Section 9 (1) of, either of* the Land Acquisition Acts have not been complied with. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the Respondents was obliged to fall back on the additional provision in Section 18 (1), Patiala Land Acquisition Act 1995 Bk., about cases of extreme urgency. It is stated in this section that in such cases immediately after the issue of a Notification u/s 3, Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995, which corresponds to Section 4 of the Central Acquisition Act, 1894, the Collector may take possession of the land- and that will be whenever the Government so directs.
In the first place, there is no direction of the Government in this behalf. The learned Advocate General refers to a letter, dated 18th November 1953, addressed by the Chief Engineer and Secretary P. W. D., Pepsu, to the Deputy Commissioner Kapurthala, informing him that the original or the first alignment in the area of Panchhat was to be adhered to and asking him to take immediate steps to hand over the possession of the land to the officers concerned. It is true that this is a letter signed by an officer who was both the Chief Engineer and Secretary to the Pepsu Government in the Public Works Department, but the letter itself does not say that this was a direction by the Government to the Deputy Commissioner. It on the face of it is a communication by an officer to the Deputy Commissioner and it is not clear that, when making this communication, he was doing so as a Chief Engineer or as a Secretary to the Government.
Consequently, the Notification u/s 3 of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., was issued on 30th May 1953, and the possession of the lands of the Petitioners was taken on 2nd December 1953, that is, nearly seven months, after the issue of the Notification, and on no consideration can that be said to be immediate taking possession of the land required for acquisition so as to indicate it to be a case of extreme'' urgency. In the case of urgency possession can be taken by the Collector fifteen days after notice u/s 9(1), Land Acquisition Act, whether Central or of Patiala, but in the present case possession was not taken about seven months after the issue of the Notification u/s 3 of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk. It is thus clear that on the facts and the circumstances of the case it was not a case of ''extreme urgency'' in which immediate possession of the land had to be taken within the scope of Section 18 (1) of that Act. The learned Advocate General for Pepsu State has pointed out that the delay in taking possession was in consequence of the consideration of the representations of the villagers of village Panchhat and as soon as a final decision was given on those representations the possession was immediately taken and so the case is covered by Section 18(1), Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk.
But if the authorities could wait for seven months before taking possession and waste that time in consideration of the representations, it was certainly not a case of ''extreme urgency'' ''requiring immediate taking possession of the land. The authorities might well have followed the normal course in the matter of acquisition and should have acquired the land in accordance with the provisions of law. It was not a case of ''urgency or ''extreme urgency'' either within the scope of Section 18(1). Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., or of ''urgency'' u/s 17(1), Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894. So in the present case acquisition of land and dispossession of the Petitioners from their lands has not taken place according to the provisions of either the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995 Bk., or the Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Obviously, therefore, the act of Pepsu State authorities in depriving the Petitioners of the possession of their lands is not valid and is contrary to law.
The last question for consideration is whether in the circumstances of the present case a mandamus will issue directing the Respondents to. deliver possession of the lands to the Petitioners. It has to be borne in mind that Schedule ''A'' to the petition giving description of the lands of the Petitioners leaves no doubt that each one of the Petitioners has a small parcel of land and the parcels of land of the Petitioners are not contiguous but are scattered about. Their total area is 46 Kanals which comes to near about 41/2 acres, and. this area is part of the total area of 33 acres of village Panchhat that has been taken possession of for the construction of the Canal for the benefit of the farmers of the Kapur- that district. This by itself would of course be no ground for not giving the Petitioners the relief due to them, but there is Anr. factor which must also be taken into consideration, and that is that on 1st December 1953, it was announced by beat of drum in village Panchhat that the authorities were taking possession of the land for the construction of the Canal and possession was actually taken on the next day.
The Respondents do not say that the Petitioners were present when the possession was taken, but there can be no doubt that they must have had notice that the possession was being taken on 2nd December 1953. The villagers of village Panchhat had been making representations about the place of the alignment of the Canal and they knew that for that purpose the authorities were going to take possession of the land at the place of one of the two alignments. When on 1st December 1953, it was announced by beat of drum that the lands falling under the first alignment were to be taken possession of by the authorities, the Petitioners cannot turn round and say that they had no notice of the intention of the authorities to acquire land and of their intention to take possession of the same.
After possession had been taken on 2nd December, 1953, the Petitioners did not file their petition till 19th January 1954, and thus for a little more than a month and a half they allowed the canal authorities to go ahead with the work of the construction of the canal. The result was that the authorities expended considerable amount of money in that construction and after they had gone a long way then the Petitioners came and filed the petition. Having notice of the intention of the authorities to take possession of the land for the purposes of the construction of the canal, the Petitioners should have come forward to make the petition immediately so that the authorities would not have gone on with the construction work and spent huge amount on the work. It is true that the reply on behalf of Pepsu State was filed on 15th February 1954, and it is in this reply that the statement is made that, 75 per cent, of the work has been carried out and a lac of rupees had been spent. All this work could not have been carried out and all this money could not have been spent within the period after the filing of the petition and the Petitioners have filed no affidavits to prove such a fact.
It is not in every case that the delay of little more than six weeks in the filing of the petition would affect the question of relief to be granted, but this is a case in which this delay has materially altered the conditions and during the period of this delay the authorities have gone a long way in the construction of the canal. The averment of the Petitioners that the authorities are using land beyond that taken possession of for the purposes of the canal has been denied and it has also been denied that the service-road is beyond the limits of that area. If the Petitioners had been prompt in coming to the Court the authorities would not have gone on with the construction work to such an extent. They had to speed up the work because it is clear from the affidavit of the Sub-Divisional Officer in charge of the village Panchhat Canal area, Shri K.K. Jagia, that the construction of this part of the Jullundvr Branch has to be completed by April 1954.
This is a factor which cannot be lost sight of in consideration of what relief is available to the Petitioners in the present case. The learned Advocate General for Pepsu has produced a Notification No. RD. 2(118) Gen-54/58, dated 18th February, 1954, issued by Pepsu Government under the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 1953, taking steps towards acquisition of the land subject matter of the present petition, for the purposes of the Jullundur Branch of the Bhakra Canal. This has already been done and if a writ is issued in favour of the Petitioners directing the Respondents to deliver possession of the lands to the Petitioners, then that writ will be rendered inoperative and futile by completion of the acquisition proceedings that have already been started under the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 1953. In Halsbury''s Laws of England, Vol. 9, Second Edition, at page 772 it is stated that
a mandamus will not go when it appears that it would be futile in its result, nor will a mandamus be granted if the party complained of has powers which would enable him to make the writ inoperative.
Besides Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 being subordinate officers cannot be issued writ to deliver possession of the land as they acted in obedience orders of their respective governments.
In the same volume of Halsbury''s at page 763 it is pointed out that
a writ of mandamus will not be granted against one who is an inferior or ministerial officer, bound to obey the orders of a competent authority, to compel him to do something which is part of his duty in that capacity.
The Deputy Commissioner of Kapurthala is an inferior officer to Pepsu Government and Respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are subordinate officers of the Punjab Government and what they have done, they have done so in obedience to the orders of their superiors. Therefore, a writ of mandamus cannot issue against them directing them to deliver possession of the lands to the Petitioners. The State of Punjab is not a party to this petition and even if it were a party such a writ will not issue to it as it is not subject to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court nor does it reside within the jurisdiction of this Court: - Election Commission, India Vs. Saka Venkata Subba Rao and,
But it is contended on behalf of the Petitioners upon the strength of - ''Sarada Singh v. Custodian Muslim Evacuees Property'' AIR 1952 Pepsu 12 (C), that a writ of mandamus can issue to the Pepsu State Government to obtain back possession from the Punjab State and then deliver it to the Petitioners. In that case a person to whom land had been allotted had been dispossessed by the Custodian who had given possession of it to an Oil Company, and the Court directed the Custodian to gain back possession and then deliver it'' to the Petitioner. The case appears to support the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners to some extent and if otherwise a writ of mandamus could be issued in the present case, it would have been necessary to give consideration to this argument.
However as pointed out, in the present case the writ of mandamus directing delivery of possession, to the Petitioners cannot issue for the reasons (a) because the Petitioners so delayed the petition as to stand by while major part of the construction work of the canal went on and was carried out before they came to the Court, and (b) because the Government has already taken steps to acquire the land of the Petitioners under the provisions of the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, 1953, and the issue of the writ would thus be rendered inoperative and futile as soon as the acquisition proceedings are complete.
It is true that at present the possession of the authorities of the lands of the Petitioners is not in accordance with law but as the Government has already taken steps in the direction of acquisition of the land so no purpose will be served in issuing writ of mandamus for delivery of possession to the Petitioners as they will soon be dispossessed of it in accordance with law. Their remedy is to recover compensation as soon as the acquisition proceedings are complete under the Land Acquisition Act and damages for any through a regular loss prior to the acquisition suit in a civil court.
In consequence, the petition fails and is dis missed, but in the circumstances of the case and the manner in which the Government has dealt with the question of acquisition in this case, the parties are left to their own costs.