High CourtsSingle Bench(1935) 08 MAD CK 0011

Bellapragada Lakshmideviamma vs Godicherala Kesawarao and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 27 August 1935 · Citation: 159 Ind. Cas. 943

HON’BLE JUDGES
Wadsworth, J

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Judgment

29 paragraphs · 718 words

Wadsworth, J.—The only question now remaining in this appeal is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a one-third share in items Nos. 10 to 15

of the property specified in the schedule to the plaint These items were purchased in 1886 in the name of the plaintiff''s mother Man kayamma

under Ex. B which recites that the consideration proceeded from the stridhanam assets of Manikyamma, Manikyamma''s husband Krishaamurthy

executed a whole series of wills. In the first three of these wills he treated the properties purchased under Ex. B as the stridhanam property of his

wife. In the six subsequent wills he treated them as his own property and disposed of them as such. The last will is that with which we are now

concerned, viz., Ex. I, executed in the year 1912. That will gave the properties purchased under Ex. B to the five daughters to be divided equally.

The plaintiff and the other married daughters contested the will when it was presented for registration by the widow Manikyammal but it was

eventually registered. Manikyamma took under the will a life estate in the other properties not given to the daughters and she also acted on a

power of adoption given to her under the will. Some years after her death the plaintiff filed the present suit in which she challenges the will and

claims that even if the will is held to be valid she is entitled as one of the three married daughters of her mother to one-third share in the properties

purchased under Ex. B, they being the stridhanam properties of her mother. Both the lower Courts assumed that under the Hindu Law as applied

in this Presidency, the married daughters exclude the widowed daughters in the succession to the) stridhanam properties of the mother. It is not

necessary for me to go into the interesting question which has been raised regarding the correctness of this assumption. I will only remark that the

matter is by no means free from doubt. The lower Courts based their decisions on the fact that Manikayamma herself t who was the person

primarily interested in disputing the testator''s title to the properties under Ex. B acquiesced in the dispositions made in the last will, Ex. I, and held

that her conduct in getting this will registered and acting upon it in the face of the opposition amounts to an admission that she had no title to the

properties bequeathed to the daughters, which admission is sufficient proof that these properties were in fact the properties of the testator. It is

argued that there is no admission and that the registration of the will cannot be taken to connote on the part of the person who puts it forward for

registration anything; more than an admission of its genuineness.

2.

This argument seems to me to overlook many of the essential facts upon which the lower Courts based their inference, Manikyamma did not

merely register this will, she fought for it in the teeth of opposition and she adopted a son by virtue of a provision in the will itself giving her a power

of adoption and making arrangements for the devolution of the property in favour of the son she adopted. It seems to me therefore that the conduct

of Manikyamma is the strongest possible piece of evidence that the properties devised to the daughters were properties over which the testator

had a power of disposition. One might even go further and say with reference to Section 180 of the Indian Succession Act, which embodies the

equitable doctrine of election in testamentary matters that Manikyamma having accepted the office of executrix under the will and having acted on

the power of adoption given to her by the will has received a benefit thereby and has elected to waive any right which she might have m other

properties bequeathed by the testator to his daughters. She cannot approbate and reprobate. She has in fact approbated the will and supported it

in the face of opposition and her heirs cannot now be heard to say that the properties which the testator disposed of by that will were really the

properties of their mother whom they claim to succeed as stridhanam heirs. In this view I dismiss the appeal with costs.