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Judgment
L. Narayana Swamy, J.—In these writ petitions, petitioners have sought for quashing the endorsement dated 03.10.2012, issued by respondent No. 2 at Annexure-N and to direct the respondents to initiate action as per the mandatory provisions and procedures of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or new enactment governing the acquisition, by affording opportunity to all the petitioners and to pass an award in respect of the lands of the petitioners, comprised in Sy. No. 95, 96 and 97 A1, A1 of Sakalabena village, Ankola taluk.
The petitioners were granted lands, in the year 1974, on an agreement for cultivation of forest land on temporary basis proportionate to the size of their family by the Government, on the recommendation of the then Deputy Commissioner, Karwar. As the petitioners are cultivating the Government land since from 30 years, they are entitled for regularisation of the same. When such being the case, without following any due process of law an attempt was made to evict them from the possession of the land.
Petitioners had filed O.S. No. 8/1990 before the Ankola Court, which came to the decreed on 09.08.1996 restraining the defendants by way of permanent injunction from evicting the plaintiffs - petitioners herein from the suit lands. The said decree was challenged by the State Government and the D.F.O. of Karwar by preferring R.A. No. 52/1996 before the Prl. Civil Judge (Sr. Dn), Karwar. The said appeal came to be allowed and against the same petitioners herein preferred R.S.A. No. 656/2001 before this Court. This Court allowed the appeal restoring the judgment and decree of the trial Court and setting aside the judgment of the first Appellate Court. The Authorities were restrained from evicting the petitioners.
The Tahsildar, Ankola, declined to continue the entries in column No. 12 of the Record of Rights in respect of said properties by stating that the extent of lands in question leased to the petitioners have been granted for the use of Sea Bird Naval Base Project, by the Forest Authorities. On 27.09.2006 a Notification was issued under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, notifying the lands proposed to be acquired for the purpose of the Naval Department, but the lands under the occupation of the petitioners were not mentioned in the said Notification.
In November 2007, the employees of Sea Bird Project visited the lands in question for the purpose of surveying the terrain and putting up a barbed wire enclosure fixed on cement pillars, thus blocking the ingress and egress to the lands granted to the petitioners. On 29.12.2007 petitioners submitted a representation to the respondents and in response to the same respondent had sent a letter to the respondent No. 2 directing him to take necessary and immediate action with regard to the petitioners'' representation. Petitioners issued a legal notice to the respondents calling upon them to take necessary steps with regard to the prayer made in their representation.
The petitioners herein preferred Writ Petition Nos. 60730-60762 of 2009 seeking a direction to the respondents to initiate action as per the mandatory provisions and procedure of the Land Acquisition Act. The said petition was withdrawn with liberty to pursue the representation dated 29.12.2007. The petitioners issued a letter to the Deputy Commissioner, Karwar, to consider their representation. On 03.10.2013 respondent No. 2 issued a letter to the petitioners conveying that the lands bearing R.S. No. 95, 96 and 97 A1 A1 of Sakalabena village, Ankola taluk, were not notified under the provisions of the LA. Act, and hence, no compensation can be awarded, and therefore, the representation was rejected. The petitioners filed W.P. No. 106428/2014 against the present respondents seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the endorsement dated 03.10.2013, which came to be dismissed for non-prosecution. Hence, the present writ petitions.
The learned counsel submitted that since the respondent - Special Land Acquisition Officer has not passed a detailed speaking order, Annexure - N is required to be set aside.
The learned Government Advocate submitted that Annexure-N, endorsement is a detailed order and it has been passed in compliance with the order passed in R.S.A. No. 656/2001.
Heard.
The grant made in favour of the petitioners in the year 1974 and the interference in the year 2006 is not in dispute. The petitioners'' possession has been established by the respondents as well as the petitioners and the denial of petitioners'' right over the lands should be considered while dismissing their claim. Even though the grant made in petitioners'' favour does not confer any right, but their continuous cultivation, possession and occupation of lands for more than three decades confers preference or privilege for consideration.
It is necessary to place reliance on the decision reported in Olga Tellis and Others Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others, .
In paragraph 32 of the said judgment it has been held as under-
The question to consider is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as apart of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life.
In paragraph 33 of the said judgment it has been held as under -
If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The State may not, by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to Ife conferred by Article 21 .
In paragraph 43 of the said judgment it has been held as under-
In the first place, footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public streets.
There is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put up constructions on pavements and that of the pedestrians to make use of the pavements for passing and repassing, are competing claims and that, the former should be preferred to the latter.
Petitioners have been in possession of the lands for more than three decades. They are not unauthorisedly cultivating the land. The grant order itself speaks that petitioners have been permitted to remain in cultivation of the forest land. Under these circumstances, this Court feels that it is appropriate to direct the Government to consider the case of the petitioners, in the light of the observations made in Olga Tellis''s case.
In the said decision the person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
In the grant order, in the terms and conditions, condition No. 7 states that, ''if any portion or entire land is required for any public purpose, the authority sanctioning the lease can resume the land after issue of three months'' notice to the lease and in such an event, no compensation whatsoever shall be paid to the lessee.''
Article 21 of the Constitution of India entails the person to claim compensation from the Government while using the public property which was in occupation of the petitioners for more than three decades.
In the light of the above said observations, the respondent - Government is directed to consider the case of petitioners by passing appropriate order in granting compensation or any such beneficial order within a period of three months. Accordingly, petitions are disposed of.