Bapi Haldar vs Indian Oil Corporation Limited & Ors.

“3.

That your appellant/applicant states that by profession is unemployed. The distance from Kolkata to the appellant/applicant’s residence is more than 250 kms. The appellant/applicant got the knowledge that the instant writ petition has been duly dismissed. The appellant/applicant due to long distance and scarcity of fund could not contact with the Learned Advocate on record to challenge the instant appeal. The appellant/applicant being a resident of remote village also could not requested the concerned Clerk for submission of the application of the certified copy.

4.

On the basis of the request of the appellant/applicant of second week of November, 2025 the concerned clerk submitted application for certified copy of the impugned order dated 13.01.2025 on 20.11.2025 and the same was delivered on 01.12.2025. The appellant/applicant has no deliberate intention to prefer the instant appeal in a delay of period of 313 days.

5.

That your appellant/applicant had spent huge money to construct the godown and shop room for running the LPG distributorship. The petitioner also took loan to construct the same. The petitioner also has not received the amount already paid before the respondent authorities and due to all these above mentioned facts, the appellant/applicant could not prefer this appeal within a period of 30 days from the date of order.”

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain

cases.—

Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

“120.

Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an “explanation” from an “excuse”. Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531]

148.

The recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is not an inter-parte proceeding. Condonation of delay essentially is a question that the court has to decide on the basis of the material on records and the relevant law. The role of the parties is only confined to brining on record the relevant material to assist the court in exercising its discretion. Unlike adversarial proceedings in a lis where competing claims and counterclaims of parties are adjudicated, the adjudication under Section 5 is primarily inquisitorial in nature, with the court being called upon to assess, on an objective consideration of facts and circumstances, whether the explanation offered is sufficient and reasonable so as to warrant an extension of time, from the material it has relied upon for furnishing such explanation.”

“21.

From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

21.1.

(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2.

(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3.

(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4.

(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5.

(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6.

(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7.

(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8.

(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9.

(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10.

(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11.

(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12.

(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

21.13.

(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.”