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Judgment
Bhutt, J.—This is plaintiff's appeal from the decree dismissing his suit for possession.
The land in dispute is plaintiff's Sir, field No. 296, area 1. 10 acres of mouza Baisakhuri. His case was that it was given to the defendant in lieu of rendering him service as a grazer. He claimed to enter on the field on the ground that the defendant was not rendering him service from the last 3 years.
The defence was that the field was leased out to the defendant's father in the year 1906-7 by the then proprietors of the village on an annual rent of Rs. 0-8-0. It was alleged that the tenure was permanent.
The suit was decreed by the trial Court but was dismissed in appeal. The lower appeal Court held that the defendant's father acquired the status of an ordinary tenant under the C.P. Tenancy Act of 1898, and that this right ripened into an occupancy tenancy under the new Act of 1920. In this view, the plaintiff's right of entry was negatived.
Both the Courts below have rejected the plaintiff's case of service tenure. Ex. D-2 is the settlement patta for 1906-7, in which the defendant's father is shown as an occupancy tenant of the field on the basis of a permanent patta granted by the thekedar. It was not, however, disputed that he could not be an occupancy tenant under the C.P. Tenancy Act, of 1898 even if a permanent patta was granted to him; he could only be an ordinary tenant as defined in Sec. 62 of the Act. It was, therefore, urged that as this is a case in which the holding consisted exclusively of Sir, the landlord had the right of entry vide Sec. 69 (c) of the Act, and consequently the defendant would not get any greater rights under the new Act of 1920.
Although the defendant had raised the plea that the lease granted to his father was "for ever", meaning that it was perpetual, no issue was framed on that point. The parties on this account did not offer any evidence on the nature of the original grant, nor have the Courts below given a finding thereon. It is true that in the settlement patta, Ex, D-2, mention is made of the ryoti patta of the Thekedar ''for all days'' but this entry would not be evidence of the terms of the lease. In the circumstances of the case, however, it is not necessary to remit this point for a finding as the suit is liable to be dismissed on other grounds.
The possession of the defendant is apparently that of a sub-tenant under Sec. 37 of the C.P. Tenancy Act, 1920, The view that an ordinary tenant under the Act of 1890 automatically became an occupancy tenant after the passing of the Tenancy Act of 1920, was doubtless expressed by Mohiuddin, A.J.C. in Liladhar vs. Moolchand 11 N.L.J. 41, but it has remained a dead letter. In Babu Kamtanath vs. Chudamansingh 20 N.L.J. 35 it was contemplated that the old ordinary tenant acquires the status of a sub-tenant under the new Act, the terms whereof would be governed by the contract between him and the landlord. This also follows from Sec. 38 of the new Act, which provides that a sub-tenant, except as otherwise provided for in the Act, shall hold on such terms as may be agreed upon between him and his landlord. The sub-tenancy could, therefore, be perpetual according to the terms of the grant. However, the defendant's position could not be worse than that of a sub-tenant from year to year. Therefore as held in Sheomangal vs. Nanhelal 14 Nag. L.R. 3 and Zingu vs. Ramji 26 Nag. L.R. 163, it required reasonable notice for terminating the tenancy before the plaintiff could claim to enter on the land. There was no allegation in the plaint that such a notice was at any time given. All that was alleged in para 3 of the plaint was that the defendant's possession was that of a trespasser since about 3 years. This statement does not mean that any proper notice terminating the tenancy was given. The suit was therefore, rightly dismissed although on different grounds.
As the appeal fails, it is not necessary to determine the nature of the tenancy. I leave that point open as it was not litigated between the parties. Subject to this, the appeal is dismissed. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs throughout.
