Bank Of Baroda vs Ashish Mittal & Ors.

TEJAS KARIA, J. (ORAL)

Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

The Application stands disposed of.

This is an Application filed on behalf of the Appellant seeking condonation of delay of 26 days in filing the present Appeal.

Having heard learned Counsel for the Parties and perused the averments made in the Application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present Appeal, the same is allowed. The delay of 26 days in filing the Appeal is hereby condoned.

Accordingly, the Application stands disposed of.

The present intra court Appeal has been filed by the Appellant assailing the order dated 09.04.2026 (“Impugned Order”) passed by the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition being W.P.(C) 2355/2024 (“Writ Petition”).

The brief facts leading to the filing of the present Appeal are as under:

a. The Appellant Bank claims that M/s Santosh Overseas Limited-Respondent No. 6 had availed various credit facilities from a consortium of lenders led by IDBI Bank Limited, and Respondent No. 1 acted as a personal guarantor for the said credit facilities of Respondent No. 6.

b. Due to certain alleged financial irregularities, the Appellant Bank declared the account of M/s Santosh Overseas Limited-Respondent No. 6 as ‘fraud’ on 11.11.2019. Subsequently, IDBI Bank Limited filed an FIR being RC No. 219 2020 E0005, with the CBI on behalf of all the lenders on 14.01.2020 and accordingly, CBI Complaint No. CBI/44/2024 (RC No. 219/2020) is pending adjudication before the learned ACJM-02-cum-ACJ, Rouse Avenue Courts (“Trial Court”).

c. Due to apprehension that the guarantors of Respondent No. 6 may flee to foreign jurisdiction to avoid repayment of the outstanding dues, the Appellant vide letter dated 29.07.2020 requested Respondent No. 2 to issue a Look Out Circular (“LOC”) against the directors and guarantors of Respondent No. 6 Company, including Respondent No. 1.

d. Aggrieved by the LOC opened against Respondent No. 1, the Writ Petition was instituted by Respondent No. 1 seeking setting aside of the LOC, which was allowed by way of the Impugned Order. Aggrieved thereby, the present Appeal has been filed by the Appellant.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge in the Impugned Order has proceeded on the assumption that the right to travel is an absolute right, however, the said right can be regulated by way of the procedure established by law. It was further submitted by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that reliance has been placed in a mechanical manner by the learned Single Judge on the decision in Shalini Khanna v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 837.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to consider that the judgment passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Viraj Chetan Shah v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1195, is under challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) Nos. 17194-17230/2024 and has not attained finality.

Heard the learned Counsel for the Appellant and perused the material placed on record. This Bench in Bank of Baroda v. Surender Kumar Bansal, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 4574, held that the power to issue an LOC is an exceptional coercive measure that directly impinges upon an individual’s fundamental right to travel. Accordingly, it was further held that such power must be exercised with due care and caution, and only in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, in the absence of compelling reasons, no person may be deprived of the right to travel abroad.

Further, this Bench in Bank of Baroda (supra) noted that the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Viraj Chetan Shah (supra) has quashed certain clauses of different Office Memorandums, which regulate issuance of LOC, to the extent that they permitted Chairman, Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers of all public sector banks to make request for issuance of LOC. Moreover, there is no stay of the operation of the judgement in Viraj Chetan Shah (supra) by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, LOCs issued at the instance of public sector banks are liable to be quashed.

Considering that Respondent No. 1 is not an accused in the proceedings pending adjudication before the learned Trial Court, in terms of the decisions in Bank of Baroda (supra) and Viraj Chetan Shah (supra), we do not find any infirmity with the Impugned Order passed by the learned Single Judge.

Further, it is noted that in case Respondent No. 1 intends to travel abroad, adequate safeguards are put in place in the Impugned Order, wherein it is made clear that Respondent No. 1 shall obtain prior permission from the learned Trial Court before travelling.

Resultantly, the present Appeal is hereby dismissed. Pending Application(s), if any, stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.