Bangalore University and Another vs St. John''s Medical College and Others

Rama Jois, J.—This writ appeal is presented by the Bangalore University aggrieved b the final order made by a judge in W. P. No. ON of 1979 declaring an ordinance made by the Syndicate of the University, empowering the Vice-Chancellor to issue a direction to any affiliated college to admit an eligible candidate to any course if, in his opinion, admission was unjustly denied notwithstanding the availability of a seat within the sanctioned intake, as also an order made there under.

The facts and circumstances leading to the presentation of the writ petition out of which this appeal arises are: The 1st respondent St. John''s Medical College, Bangalore, is a private medical college affiliated to the Bangalore University. It is established by the Catholic Bishops of India through a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960, called the C. B. C. 1. Society for Medical Education, who is the 2nd respondent in the appeal. The 3rd respondent is the Principal of the College. During the academic year 1978-79 the college invited applications for admission to the medical course. In response to the said invitation, the 4th respondent submitted her application to the said course. Though she was not selected, her none was included at S1. No. 2 in the waiting list. The sanctioned intake for the course was 60. The course commenced on 2nd August 19M About the middle of September 1978,'' a candidate, who had been admitted to the course, withdrew from the college. There after b letter dated 22nd September. 1978 (Ex- habit) the Dean of the college sought the permission of the University to admit the 4th respondent as against the vacancy so caused, as another candidate, who was placed at S1. No. I in the waiting list, had informed that she was not interested in joining the course. The University gave its concurrence for the admission by its letter dated 25th Sept. 1978 (Exhibit-D). Though such permission was given, the fourth respondent was not admitted. On the other hand by letter dated 12th October 1978 (Exhibit-E) the Dean informed the University that it was not possible to admit'' the 4th respondent to the course as it was not practicable for her to satisfy the attendance requirement and as the medical council had clearly stated that no student shall be admitted to appear for the I Year MBBS Examination unless the concerned student completes 18 months course. Aggrieved by the non-admission to the medical course by respondents I to 3, 4th respondent Wanted W. P. 11518 of 1978 before this Court seeking for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the 1st respondent college to admit her to I year M. B. B. S., during the academic year 1978-79. The said writ petition was dismissed on 31-10-1978 (Exhibit-L) hold that no writ of mandamus could be issued to the 1st dents-college, which is a private medical college. As regards the contention of the 4th respondent that the University had the authority to compel the 1st respondent college to admit the 4th respondent no opinion was ex pressed on the ground that it was not germane to the said writ petition.

After the disposal of the aforesaid writ petition, the Syndicate of the University made an Ordinance in its meeting held on 25th November 1978 . The said Ordinance made it obligatory for every head of. a college to ensure that admissions are made up to the limit of sanctioned intake. It also empowered the Vice-Chancellor to issue directions to the head of a college to admit eligible candidate if he was satisfied on enquiry that such candidate has been denied admission in spite of the fact that a seat was available. The Ordinance also made it obligatory on the concerned principal to comply with any order Issued by the Vice-Chancellor under the Ordinance. The ordinance was published on 5th December 1978 (Exhibit-J).Exercising the power under the said Ordinance, the Vice-Chancellor made an order dated 5th January 1979 (Exhibit-K) directing the 1st respondent college to admit the 4th respondent to I year M. B. B. S., during the academic year 1978-79. Challenging the legality of the Ordinance the order made there under by the Vice-Chancellor, respondents 1 to 3 presented W. P. No. 639 1979 During tendency of the, writ petition, the Syndicate in its meeting dated 24th March 1979 fixed 5th December 1978 as the date of commencement of the Impugned Ordinance in exercise of its power u/s 38(4) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred as the Act and a notification was also Issued to that effect on the same date (Annexure-1 to the statement of objections by the University). The said writ petition was allowed. The Ordinance made was struck down as having been made in contravention of the provisions of the Act and consequently the order made by the Vice-Chancellor was also set aside. Aggrieved by the said order of the learn single judge, the University has presented this writ appeal.

Sri S.Vijayashankar, learned counsel for the University urged the following contentions.

(i)The Ordinance impugned was made by the Syndicate and not by the Vice Chancellor as held by the leaned single Judge

(ii)The Ordinance came into force from Chi date of publication.

(iii) it W as competent for the Syndicate to fix a retrospective date for the commencement of the Ordinance, as such power is expressly conferred on it u/s 38 (4) of the Act.

He submitted that the view taken to the contrary in the order under appeal is erroneous.

Sri J. A. Sequeira, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3, strongly supported the view taken by the learned single judge. He however, submitted that if we am inclined to disagree with the view taken in the order under appeal on the questions held in favour of respondents 1 to 3, their other contentions which were not considered, as unnecessary by the learned single judge, may be considered. He urged the following contentions to sustain the order.

(i) The ordinance was beyond the ordinance making power conferred on the Syndicate u/s 37 of the Act.

(ii) Even if the Ordinance was within the competence of the Syndicate and was validly made, it could not be en forced against respondents 1 to 8 as it would amount to, an infringement of their right conferred under Article 80 of the construction.

(iii) Even if the Ordinance is valid, as the impugned order was made by the Vice-Chancellor without holding an enquiry after giving opportunity to the Ist respondent, the order was bad as it contravened the Ordinance itself as also the principles of natural justice.

5-6. The first contention urged for the appellant-University is that the view taken by the learned single judge to the effect that the Ordinance impugned was made by the Vice-Chancellor and not by the Syndicate is erroneous. There is no dispute that the meeting of the Syndicate was on 25th November 1978 and in the said meeting the Syndicate considered the draft of the impugned ordinance. The cost of the resolution assed by the syndicate available in pa records reads- ''Item No. 21. Draft Ordinances regarding admission of students to the various courses in the University.

The Ordinance proposed by the Vice Chancellor was discussed. Dr. H. L. Thimme Gowda gave a draft of Ordinance which was drafted by him. After discussion, the Ordinance as proposed by the Vice-Chancellor was accepted with several changes. The Vice-Chancellor was requested to see whether a sentence can be added stipulating that the college will be disaffiliated if the order is not complied with. The vice Chancellor he would consult the Legal Advisor and issue the Ordinance. This was agreed to."

Thereafter the Ordinance was published on 5th December 1978. In the writ petition it was contended for respondents I to 3 that by its resolution dated 25th November 1978 the Syndicate itself did not make any Ordinance but it only authorized the Vice-Chancellor to issue an appropriate Ordinance in consultation with the legal Advisor. It was also contended that as the several changes said to have been made to the draft Ordinance prepared by the Vice-Chancellor were not available In the original records it cannot be said that the Ordinance was made by the Syndicate. This contention of respondents 1 to 3 was upheld by the learned single judge. In coming to the said conclusion the learned judge relied on the office note put up before the actual issue of the Ordinance on 5th December 1978

It reads-

"Extract item No. 21 of the minutes of the meeting of the Syndicate held on 25-11-1978 is placed below.

Minutes of the Syndicate held on 25-11- 1978 on item No. 21 may be seen. The Ordinances as proposed by the Vice-Chancellor are stated to have been accepted with ''several changes''. The ''changes'' in corporate to the Ordinances proposed in the reference note is not forthcoming. Before issue of the Ordinance, the Advisor must also be consulted in the matter of adding a sentence, stating that the College will be defoliated if the order of the University is not complied with.

It is therefore submitted to indicate that the several changes made in the Ordinance as a roved by the Legal taking needful action.

For perusal.

ID/5.12. Sd/ 5-12-78.

Registrar; I was told that an amended Ordinance as approved by the Legal au

(Contd. on col. 2)

''Draft Ordinance considered by the Syndicate.

Every Principal of an affiliated college of the Bangalore University and every Head of a University college or Department of the University shall ensure that admissions are made to all courses to the limit of the sanctioned intake. Such admissions shall be made taking into account the qualifications prescribed in the regulations. If in any case it has come to the notice of the Vice-Chancellor that the sanctioned intake is not filled-up and the Vice-Chancellor has reason able cause to believe that an eligible Applicant to the college has been admission, he after conducting such enquiry The may consider necessary in the circumstances of the case, order admission of such applicant to the college or Dept., and the applicant shall be deemed to have been admitted to the college or Department from the date of the order.

(underlining by us)

1980 karnataka/10 VIII C-23 authorities has been received Plow send it to the registers.

P.S to V.C.

Id/- Id/-

5.12. 5.12 (underlining by us)

The above note disclosed that the several changes effected were not forthcoming, Learned single judge took the view that the Ordinance as published on. 5th December 1978 did not really reflect the Ordinance as made by the Syndicate and it was only made by the Vice-Chancellor who no competence to make an Ordain support of the submission that the Ordinance was in fact made by the Syndicate and not by the Vice-Chancellor as held by the learned judge, the learned counsel for the University refer. red to the, original records which were also produced at the'' time of hearing of the appeal. The original records "dose the for owing facts.

(i) In substance there Is no difference between the draft ordinance prepared by the Vice-Chancellor which was considered by Site in its meeting held on the 25th November 1978 and the -Ordinance published as per notification dated 5th December 1976. The contents of the dame are as follows:

Ordinance as published on 5.121978

Every Principal of an affiliated college of the Bangalore University and every Head of a University College or a Department of the University shall ensure that admissions are made to all courses up to limit Of the sanctioned intake. such admissions shall be made taking into account the qualifications prescribed in the regulations.

If in any case it has come to the notice of the Vice-Chancellor that the sanctioned intake is not filled up and the Vice-chancellor has reasonable cause to believe that an eligible applicant to the college has been admission though seats are available, he may after conducting such enquiry as he may consider necessary in the circumstances of the case, order admission of such applicant entitled to such admission to the college/Department.

The Principal or Head of the Department shall comply with such order from the date of the order."

The difference between the draft ordinance and the ordinance is, whereas the draft is in one paragraph the ordinance is in three paragraphs, and for the underlined portion in the draft, paragraphs is substituted. The rest is similar.

(ii) The word ''several'' found in the typed copy of the resolution of the Syndicate dated 25th November, 1978 is a mistake. The resolution stated that the draft Ordinance prepared by the Vice-Chancellor was accepted with relevant changes. Similarly the office note made 11 to the effect that the several changes made in the Ordinance by the Syndicate was not forthcoming, was also made on account of the mistake which had crept into the typed copy Of the resolution of the Syndicate,

(iii) The Vice-Chancellor certified the wording of the ordinance as approved by the Syndicate on 25th November 1978, on 5th December 1978. Thereafter the Notification dated 5th December, 1978 was issued.

(iv) The Ordinance published as per notification dated 5th December, 1978 was communicated inter alia to all the members of the Syndicate.

(v) Thereafter in the meeting of the Syndicate dated 27th January, 1979 one of the subjects was the confirmation of the proceeding meeting of the Syndicate held on 25th November, 1978 and the Syndicate affirmed the said proceedings.

On the basis of the above facts, learned counsel for the University submitted that the view that impugned ordinance was not made by the Syndicate and was only made by the Vice-Chancellor is erroneous. He submitted that the only question which was left for the consideration of the Vice-Chancellor was to find out by consulting the legal Advisor as to whether a sentence could be added to the Ordinance stipulating that- a defiant college would be disaffiliated if an order made by the Vice-Chancellor under the Ordinance is not complied with. He pointed out that even assuming that the Syndicate could not have asked the Vice Chancellor to add a sentence, to the Ordinance as approved by the Syndicate in consultation with the legal Advisor, the said circumstances would vitiate the Ordinance as no such sentence was added to the Ordinance.

On consideration of the original re cords, we are satisfied that the Ordinance in question was made by the Syndicate. As stated earlier, the draft Ordinance prepared by the Vice-Chancellor was placed before the Syndicate for its consideration in its meeting held on 25th November 1978. One of the members of the Syndicate Dr. H. L. Thimme Gowda also gave a draft of an ordinance prepared by him. However, after discussion, the Ordinance as proposed by the Vice-Chancellor was accepted with relevant changes and not with several changes as found in the typed copy of the resolution of the Syndicate Shortly thereafter- the Vice-Chancellor certified the wordings of the Ordinance as approved by the Syndicate on 5th December, 1978 and it was also published on the same date. in this behalf, it is necessary to point out that under Section. 12 of the Act the Vice-Chancellor is the principal executive of the University and he is also the Chairman of the Syndicate. Sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Act reads as follows:

"12. The Powers of the Vice-chancellor:

xx xx xx xx (4) He may, either himself or through any officer of the University authorized in writing by him convene the meetings of the Senate, the Syndicate, the Academic Council and the Finance Committee and shall perform all such acts as may be necessary to carry out and give effect to the decision of the said authorities"

The above sub-section empowers the Vice-Chancellor to perform all such acts as may be necessary to carry out and give effect to the decision of the said authorities and he presides over the meeting of the Syndicate. Therefore it is dear that when the Ordinance drafted by him was a ed by the Syndicate with certain changes and the Vice-Chancellor certified the wordings of the Ordinance as approved by the Syndicate, in the absence of any other material it is difficult to take the view that the Vice-Chancellor changed the wording of the Ordinance as approved by the Syndicate.

There an also other circumstances which go to show that the Ordinance was made by the Syndicate. They are:

(i) The Ordinance published an 5th December, 1978 was forthwith sent to all the members of the Syndicate.

(ii) The proceedings of the meeting dated 25th November, 1978 which included the acceptance of the Ordinance Published came up for confirmation before the meeting of the Syndicate on 27th January, 1979 and was confirmed by it without any objection.

(iii) Again on 24th March, 1979, the Syndicate itself fixed the date of the commencement of the Ordinance as 5th December, 1978.

The two circumstances, namely, that typographical mistake had occurred in the typed copy of the syndicate

Proceedings wherein for the word ''relevant'' , the word ''several'' was used and the circumstance that the Ordinance published as per notification dated 5th December, 1978 was sent to all the members of the syndicate and proceedings of meeting held on 27th January, 1979 has not been considered in the order under appeal. Learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 submitted that the above facts were not relied on by the University at the time of hearing of die writ petition. Learned counsel for the did not dispute the same. He submit that as directed by the Court he produced all the original records and he did not invite the attention of the learned Judge to the aforesaid two circumstances. e fact that the Ordinance as drafted b y the Vice-Chancellor was approved with only ''relevant'' changes as is clear from the original records and not with severer changes as shown in the typed copy of the proceedings, indicates that changes approved were minimal and of minor character Further the Syndicate also confirmed the proceedings of 25th November, 1978, on 27th January, 1979 by which re the Ordinance had been published and communicated to the Syndicate members, without any objection. Learned judge has also observed that the Ordinance pub listed on 5th December, 1978 broadly (conforms to the Ordinance placed before the Syndicate, in its meeting dated 25th November, 1978. On a comparison of the draft Ordinance considered by the Syndicate and the Ordinance as finally published, as extract ed earlier, it may be seen that the only change that Is incorporated is the last part of the draft ordinance which proceeded to state that on the issue of the direction of the Vice-Chancellor the applicant concerned shall be deemed to have been admitted to the college was omitted and a separate sentence was added to the effect that the principal head of the department show ate of such order from the ate f the order and in substance there is Do difference. This 6 in conformity with the original proceedings which state that the Ordinance was accepted with relevant changes only. Taking au me circumstances into account, we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned Ordinance was made by the Syndicate in exercise of its power under the Act.

We must however observe at this stage that the manner in which the of the proceedings of the Syndicate, which is the executive authority of the University, are maintained, is far from satisfactory. A proper recording of the proceedings of every meeting incorporating all the details in a regularly maintained proceedings book and the authentication of the proceedings of each meeting by the presiding authority, immediately after the meeting, is of utmost necessity. We are sure that the authorities will take note of the shortcomings and take steps for their removal.

The second contention urged for the University is that the Ordinance came, into force from the date of publication. This contention was negative by the learned single judge pointing out that sub-section (4) of Section 88 of the Act specifically provided that the Ordinances made by the Syndicate shall have effect from such date as it may direct and therefore unless a date was fired, the ordinance would not come into effect on the date when it was merely published. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned single judge that a date from which the Ordinance shall have effect should be fixed. While sub-section (1) of S. 88 of the Act prescribes the procedure to make Ordinances, sub-section thereof specifically provides that (4) Ordinances made by the Syndicate shall have effect from such date as it may direct. In view of the clear wording of Section 38 (4) of the Act, the act of the date for commencement of an ordinance is an act independent of making an Ordinance and unless the Syndicate in exercise of that power fixes a date for the commencement of the Ordinance, it does not come into force. In this behalf we may refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of The University of Mysore and Another Vs. C.D. Govinda Rao and Another, , while considering analogous provisions of the Mysore University Act, 1956. The relevant observations read:

"..............The statutory rules, thus framed and approved, come into force on the date of the publication of the Mysore Gazette, and the ordinances come into force from such date as the Chancellor may direct (vide S. 42 (5) of the Mysore University Act No. 28 of 1956)."

Hence we reject the second contention..

The third contention pertains to the competence of the Syndicate to fix a date for the commencement of an Ordinance made b it. The Syndicate is a creature of the Act and it derives its power to make Ordinance from the Act. It Is well settled that power to make a law with retrospective effect is an attribute of a over legislature and that a delegated or subordinate legislative authority has no power to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effort unless such a power is conferred very'' rightly the learned counsel for the University did not cow test this position in law. But he maintained that the power to give retrospective effect to an Ordinance is specially confer red on the Syndicate u/s 38 (4) of the Act He argued that the view taken to the contrary by the learned single judge is erroneous.

12A. In order to appreciate the third contention urged for the University, it is necessary to refer to the provisions pertaining to the commencement of statutes, regulations and rules found In Sections 36 (5) 89 (8) and 40 (4) of the Act. Section 86 of the Act regulates the making of statutes by the senate, Section 88 regulates the making of the Ordinances by the Section 89 (3) regulates of by the Syndicate regulates do making regulations, by the Academic Council and Section 40 regulates the making of rules by the authorities of the University empowered to make rules under the Act. The relevant part of the clauses in these sections which regulate the date of commencement of statutes ordinances, regulations and rules, respectively, are

"36. The Statutes - Their making -

xx xx xx xx (5) No statute, passed by the Senate shall have validity until assented to by the Chancellor.

xx xx xx xx 38. Ordinances - Their making,

xx xx xx xx (4) All Ordinances made by the Syndicate shall have effect from such date as it may direct

xx xx xx xx 39. Regulations,

xx xx xx xx (3) Every Regulation shall come into force on the date it is approved by the Chancellor or on such other date as the Chancellor may direct.

xx xx xx xx 40. Rules.

xx xx xx xx (4 ) Every rule made under this section come into force on the date it is approved by the Syndicate."

As can be seen from the above provision statute comes into force when it receives assent from the Chancellor. Ordinance takes effect from such date as the Syndicate directs, Regulation comes into force - one the date when it is approved by the Chancellor or on such other date as the Chancellor may direct Rules come into force on the date they are approved, by the Syndicate. The Legislature has different conditions for a commencement of statutes, ordinances, regulations and rules. It is only in respect of ordinance the wording used is shall have effect from such date as it may direct.

12B. Learned counsel for the University placed strong reliance on the afore-, said wording of -Section 88 (4) of the Act; In support of his third contention and made the following two submissions:

(i) The Syndicate has the power to 91" retrospective effect to an Ordinance made by it.

(ii) In any event in respect of an ordinance made by it, which is not given effect to immediately by fixing the date, the Syndicate has the power to fix any date for the commencement of an Ordinance i a., either the date on which the Ordinance was made or any subsequent date and as in the present case the Syndicate had made the Ordinance on 25-11-1978 and it was published on 5-12-1978, it was competent for the Syndicate to fix 5-12-1979 as the date of commencement of the Ordinance as it did by notification dated, 24-3-1979.

In support of the submission learned counsel for the University relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in B. S. Vadera v. Union of India AIR 1909 SC 118. In the said case the question for consideration was as to whether the President or the Governor, as the case may be, had the power to give retrospective effect to the rules which he was empowered to make under proviso to Article 80 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the wording of article 309 of the Constitution on the basis of which, it could be held ''that there was no power to give retrospective effect to the rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The relevant portion of the observation on which the learned counsel for the University re, lied on reads:

"24. It is also significant to note that the proviso to Article 309, clearly lays down that any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act''. The clear and unambiguous expressions used in the Constitution, must be given their full and unrestricted meaning unless hedged-in-by any limitations. rules, which have to be ''subject to the provisions of the Constitution'' shall have effect, ''subject to the provisions of any such Act''. That is, if the appropriate Legislature has passed an Act, under the rules Article 309, framed under the Proviso, will have effect, subject to that Act but, in the absence of ally Act, of the appropriate Legislature, on the matter, in our opinion, the rules, made by the President, or by such person as he may direct, are to have full effect, both prospectively and retrospectively. Apart from the limitations, pointed out above, there is none other, imposed by the proviso to Article 309, regarding the ambit of the operation of such rules In other words the rules, unless they can be impeached on ground such as breach of part III, or any other constitutional provision, must be enforced if made by the appropriate authority."

He argued that by applying the ratio of the said decision, it should be held that the Syndicate has the power to give retrospective effect to the Ordinance made by it u/s 38 of the Act. He pointed out that the wordings of sub section (4) of Section 38 of the Act was as to that of Article 309 of the Constitution, as it states that all Ordinances made by the Syndicate shall have effect from such date as it may

In support of the second submission made by the learned counsel for the University he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar Vs. M. Venkitachalam Potti and Another, . in the said case sub-section (8) of Section 1 of the Travancore Taxation on Income. Justification Commission) Act provided that the Act shall come into force on such date as the Government may by notification appoint The Act came into force on 22-7-1949. The notification by Section 1 (3) of the said Act was by Government on 20-7-1949 bringing do Act Into operation with effect from 22-7-1949. The validity of the notification was questioned on the ground that the Government had no authority to fix the date of commencement of the Act retrospectively, as there was no express empowering the Government to do so, The said contention was repelled by the Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the judgment on which reliance was placed is contained in pan 8% which reads :

"39. Re. (2): It is urged that the notification issued on 26-7-1949 was bad in that it purported to bring the Act into operation as from 22-7-1949 The reason relied upon is that the Government could not, in the, absence of express provision, authorizing it in that behalf, fix the commencement of the Act retrospectively. The reason for which the court disfavors retroactive operation of laws is that it may prejudicially affect vested rights.

No such reason is involved in this case Section 1 (3) authorizes the Government to bring the Act into force on such date as it may, by notification . In exercise of power conferred by this section the Government surely had the power to issue the notification the Act into force on any date subsequent to the passing of go Act There can, therefore, no objection, to the notification fixing the commencement of the Act on 22-7-190 which was a date subsequent to the passing of the Act.

So the Act has not been given retrospective operation, that is to say, it has not been made to commence from a to prior to the date of its passing it is true that the date of commencement a find by the notification is anterior to this date of the notification but that circumstance does not attract the principle disfavoring the retroactive operation of a statute.

Here there is no question of affecting vested rights. The operation of the notification itself is not retrospective. It only brings the Act into operation on and from an earlier date. In my case it was in term authorized to issue the notification bringing the Act Into force on any date subsequent to the passing of the Act and that Is all that the Government did.

In this view of the matter, the further argument advanced by the learned Attorney-General and which found favor with the Court below, namely, that the notification was at any rate good to bring the Act into operation as on and from the date of its issue need not be considered. There is Do substance in this contention also."

Relying on the above observation learned counsel for the University submitted that all that the Syndicate had done in the present caw also was to fix 5-12-1978 as the date of commencement of the Ordinance which had already been made on 25-11-1978 and published on 5-12-1978, and such a power is expressly conferred on the Syndicate u/s 88 (4) of the Act.

Both having regard to the Ian age of Section 88 (4) of the Act and the ratio of the decision in the case of Musalair, appears to us the submission made in support of the third contention is well founded. In our view, it was competent for the Syndicate to fix either the date on which the Ordinance was made or any subsequent date, for die commencement of the Ordinance even though such date was anterior to the date on which the Syndicate decided to fix the date for the ''commencement of the Ordinance. Therefore, disagreeing with the view taken by the learned single judge, we hold that the notification dated 24-3-1979 issued pursuant to the decision of the Syndicate fixing 5-12-1978 as the date the commencement of the Ordinance roars valid and consequently the Ordinance did come into force with effect from 12-1978. As the acceptance of the second submission made in support of the third contention is sufficient to hold that the notification dated 24th march, 1979 fixing the date of commencement of the Ordinance as 5th December, 1978 is valid. We consider it unnecessary to decide the larger question arising out of the first submission i. e., as to whether the Syndicate has the power to make an Ordinance with retrospective, in that, with effect any date even earlier to its making

As we are inclined to take a different view on the two contentions which were decided against the University, in the order under appeal, the further question for our consideration is, whether we should go Into the other contentions urged for respondents I to 3 including the one based on Article 30 of the Constitution. Though in the statement of objections filed on behalf of the University in the writ petition, the plea of respondents I to 3 that the 1st respondent institution is established and administered by a ''minority? was disputed, having regard to the sufficient materials placed by respondents 1 to 3 A their plea, learned counsel to appellant and respondent-4 conceded that respondent-1 institution is an institution established by a minority and; therefore. respondents 1to 3 could rely on the right conferred on minorities under Article 30 of the Constitution. However, we find it unnecessary to decide the other contention urged for respondents I to 3 as the impugned order has become unenforceable by efflux of time. This was also the position even before the writ petition was disposed of by the learned. single Judge as is Clear from para 8 of his order, which reads

"8.The factual position is that the academic year for which the direction was issued by the Vice-Chancellor has expired and that respondent No. 3 has not so far been admitted to the college. For these reasons ma facie the order has become incapable of compliance. But both sides did not take that stand and urged their respective cases on merits on the assumption that the order of the Vice-Chancellor is capable of compliance.

As stated earlier, the impugned order of the Vice-Chancellor directed the 1st respondent to admit the 4th respondent to the I Year M. B. B. S., course during the academic year 1978-79. The academic year came to an end even before the writ petition was disposed of on 8-8-1979. Learned Counsel for the University as also the learned counsel appearing for respondents I to 3 and 4 did not dispute that the order has become unenforceable by efflux of time. In the circumstances, as the writ petition has to be dismissed as having become unnecessary, we express no opinion on the correctness of the other contentions urged for respondents I to 3.

For the reasons aforesaid, we make the following order:

(1) Writ appeal is allowed and the order learned single judge in W. P. 639 of 1979 is set aside.

(ii) The wilt petition is dismissed as having become unnecessary.

(iii) No costs.

Order accordingly.