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Judgment
D.H. Waghela, C.J.—At the request of learned counsel, the appeal is taken up for final disposal, at the admission stage.
The appeal is calling into question successive interim orders culminating into the last order dated 24.07.2014 in the pending WP No. 9667/2014 whereby, some general directions unrelated to the issues arising in the pending petition are alleged to have been issued.
Learned counsel pointed out that the original WP No. 9667/2014 has been filed by five petitioners with the prayers as under;
"WHEREFORE, it is humbly prayed that in the interest of justice and equity, this Hon''ble Court be pleased to:
a) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order directing the Respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 29,81,72,870 (Rupees Twenty Nine Crores Eight One Lakhs Seventy Two Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy only) together with interest at 12% p.a. as compensation for the loss of life as claimed in the Legal Notice marked as ANNEXURE-M.
b) Issue any other appropriate writ or direction, as this Hon''ble Court deems fit and proper to grant in the circumstances of the case.
c) To order for cost of this proceedings."
During pendency of the petition, the Court has issued successive orders among which some orders contained tentative remarks against the officers of the appellant herein and some directions which have the effect of expanding the scope of the litigation beyond the necessary issues of fact and law arising in the petition. The latest of such directions contained in the impugned order dated 24.07.2014 reads as under;
"The respondent-Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike, is directed to place before Court, the total number of transformers installed on or above the footpaths in the city of Bangalore and the time within which it would remove those transformers to ensure that footpaths are kept free of obstacles.
The respondent/BESCOM and its Engineers to forthwith undertake inspection and submit a report over the total number of transformers installed either on roads, on or over footpaths in Bangalore City and submit a report to this Court by 28.7.2014."
Before the above directions could be implemented, the appellant herein had approached this Court calling into question the earlier interim order dated 18.07.2014 in the same petition and the division bench was inclined to stay further proceedings before learned single Judge, by order dated 28.07.2014 in WA No. 1652/2014.
Learned counsel, Sri Sriranga S., appearing for the appellant submitted that the interlocutory orders made in the pending petition, more particularly, the orders dated 04.06.2014, 12.06.2014, 25.06.2014, 07.07.2014, 09.07.2014, 16.07.2014, 18.07.2014 and the impugned order dated 24.07.2014 tended to expand the scope of the petition making it virtually a public interest litigation. Therefore, the appellant was constrained to file the appeals to challenge the directions, issuance of which was not within the jurisdiction of learned single Judge in view of the distribution of work in the High Court by way of roster, for allocation of judicial work.
Learned counsel relied upon the decision of full bench consisting of five Judges of this Court in State of Karnataka and Others Vs. B. Krishna Bhat and Others, ; and pointed out the following observations therefrom;
"51. There is no doubt that the learned single Judge has acted with best of intentions. But, the question is whether the Orders are legal and valid. In matters relating to law and justice; as in several other fields, the end does not necessarily justify the means. Further judicial review under Article 226 is concerned more with the decision making process than the decision itself."
"52. There were no pleadings in regard to the subject matter of any of these orders. Any complaint or grievance aired before the learned Judge regarding a matter of public interest, either orally or by letters or reports in the media were taken cognizance by the learned Judge, and the learned Counsel for the concerned Local or other authority were directed to be present. After hearing the views of the learned Counsel for Petitioners in the Writ Petition and the concerned Authority, on the subject matter of public grievance, these orders were passed periodically. The orders are not with reference to any specific violation of any private or public right by any authority, except in one case which is separately dealt with. The relevant statutes and Rules were not considered. The budgetary constraints and financial implications were ignored. Relevant files and documents were not called for. The several options, alternatives and priorities that will usually be considered by a Legislature or the Executive in taking policy decisions were not examined. On the other hand, a particular remedy suggested by Counsel, or thought of by the learned Judge himself were discussed and orders were passed on that basis. No opportunity was given to the concerned authorities to test the feasibility of the remedies or solutions put forth or directed by the learned Judge in his orders. The proceedings were more like a public hearing on grievances by a Minister; and the orders were some times in the nature of expression of opinion by an Arbitrator; some times in the nature of suggestions by a Conciliated(sic) and some times having the trappings of Judicial orders. The orders are an innovative amalgam of suggestions, directions and threats, in an attempt to cut red tape and reach the core of the matter at issue and give immediate relief to the public. As noticed above, the orders related to a wide range of subjects erection of sewage disposal plant in the Cubbon Park; replacing petrol by LPG gas as the fuel for Autorickshaws; introducing wormiculture as an effective way of disposal of garbage and convert garbage into manure; levying fine on persons entering Cubbon Park with or without vehicles after specified hours; directing erection of gates around Cubbon Park; regulating construction of Buildings; repairing Roads and side walks; coordinating the work of several authorities so as to avoid frequent digging and cutting of roads/sidewalks; improving street lighting; preventing pollution; protecting ecology; fixing fines or fees and directing Authorities to collect spot fines without notice or enquiry and punishing statutory Authorities for omissions and commissions, by awarding compensation or levying fines."
Ultimately, the full bench has, inter alia, come to the following conclusions in paragraph-96 of the judgment;
"96. The above discussions lead to following conclusions:
(i) The Chief Justice''s discretion in determining the roster, that is, Constitution of Benches and allocation of judicial work is absolute.
(ii) But in regard to fixing the quorum for hearing the different category of cases, the Chief Justice should follow the statutory provisions or Rules. The power of Chief Justice in regard to constitution of Benches and allocation of judicial work has nothing to do with fixing of quorum for hearing of cases, u/s 9(xii) of the H.C. Act.
(iii) However, he has the discretion to refer any mater(sic) in regard to which a quorum has been fixed, to a larger Bench. Therefore, the Notification dated 8-7-1997 allocating single Judge matter to Division Bench is valid.
(iv) Neither the single Judge nor a Division Bench has any power to entertain or decide any matter, which is not allocated by the chief Justice to such single Judge or Division Bench.
(v) A single Judge does not have the power to entertain any Writ Petition unless the said subject (and any sub-classification thereof) is allocated to him by the Chief Justice under the Roster. Section 9(xii)(a) of the H.C. Act does not enable a single Judge to do so."
As submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, in a private litigation among the parties for determining liability in an unfortunate accident, the Court ought not to have and did not have the jurisdiction to travel beyond the scope of the case and controversy before the Court. He submitted that a private litigation cannot be converted into public interest litigation at the discretion of a learned single judge, when the subject of public interest litigation is not entrusted to him. Therefore, learned single Judge was not justified in making periodical orders which had no relevance for deciding the issues arising in the petition pending before him.
Learned counsel for the respondents partly supported the submissions made on behalf of the appellant in so far as the directions and observations were unnecessary for deciding the case before learned single Judge and they expressed no objection to quashing such irrelevant, unnecessary or derogatory observations and directions against the respondents, so as to expedite the hearing and disposal of the petition in its original form.
Accordingly, practically by consensus about the limited issue arising in the present appeal, the appeal is allowed, so as not to disturb the relevant and necessary directions in furtherance of hearing of the original petition, but quashing the general remarks and unnecessary directions issued to any of the respondents in the original petition. More particularly, the aforesaid last two paragraphs of the impugned order dated 24.07.2014 are quashed. We are sure that the salutary principles laid down by the full bench of this Court will be kept in view by learned single Judge while proceeding further in hearing and disposal of the original petition.
In view of the above order, I.A. No. I/2014 and I.A. No. III/2014 do not survive for consideration.