Balwinder Singh And Another vs Ludhiana District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Limited

Anil Kshetarpal, J

By this judgment, ARB No.105 of 2018, FAOs No.5681 and 8497 of 2018 and CWP No.19753 of 2019, shall stand disposed of.

Learned counsels, appearing for the parties, are ad idem that all these petitions can conveniently be disposed of by a common judgment as the pivotal

issues, which require adjudication, are common and are stemming from an agreement dated 09.03.2015.

In the considered view of this Court, the following questions require adjudication:-

1) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, Section 55 of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act 1961, is applicable?

2) Whether arbitration can be directed to be held under a particular State Act, even after finding that the dispute which requires resolution does not fall

within its purview, merely because there was an initial/previous agreement to the contrary, between the parties? FACTS:-

The Ludhiana District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Limited (for short “the Milk Unionâ€) invited bids for giving on lease-The VERKA

Express Milk Bar-cum-Fast Food Joint, measuring 6500 square feet, situated in the premises of a Milk Plant, at Ludhiana. M/s Divjot Enterprises

(hereinafter to be referred as “the firmâ€) submitted a bid. The firm’s bid was declared successful and the firm was issued an allotment letter

on 23.02.2015. Subsequently, an agreement was signed between the parties on 09.03.2015. It was agreed that M/s Divjot Enterprises shall be entitled

to bring an Aircraft Hull, in the leased premises and convert it into a Restaurant.

For the purpose of arriving at the decision in this case, it is important to extract the relevant terms of the “Technical Bidâ€​, “Allotment

Letterâ€​ and “Agreementâ€​:-

“TECHNICAL BIDâ€​

b) In case of any dispute or difference arising between both parties during the period of the Lease Agreement, the matter will be referred to the sole

Arbitration of the Managing Director, The Punjab State Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation Limited, or his nominee, as required under The

Punjab State Cooperative Societies Act 1961 and the rules framed thereafter and as amended from time to time (as the case may be/whichever is

applicable). The proceedings shall be held at Chandigarh and the Civil Courts of Ludhiana only shall have the territorial jurisdiction. The award of the

Arbitrator will be final and binding on both the parties. Performance of this Lease Agreement shall continue during and upto the settlement of any

dispute. “ALLOTMENT LETTERâ€​

Arbitration:

In case of any dispute/question or controversy arising out of this order the same shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Managing Director, The

Punjab State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation, Chandigarh or his nominee whose decision shall be firm and binding on both the parties. The

provision of Arbitration and Conciliation/The Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 and as amended up to date (as the case may be/whichever

applicable) shall also apply to Arbitration Proceeding which shall be held at Chandigarh or Ludhiana.

“AGREEMENTâ€​:-

In case any dispute or difference arising between both the parties during the period of the Lease Agreement, the matter will be referred to the sole

Arbitration of the Managing Director, the Punjab State Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation Chandigarh or his nominee, as required under the

Punjab State Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 and the rules framed thereafter and as amended from time to time (as the case may be/whichever is

applicable). The proceedings shall be held at Chandigarh. The award of the Arbitrator will be final and binding on both the parties. Performance of this

Lease Agreement shall continue during and upto the settlement of any dispute.

The fundamental dispute in these petitions is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Arbitration is required to be held under

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act of 1996â€) or the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961

(hereinafter to be referred as “the Act of 1961â€). An ancillary question is whether the dispute, between the parties, falls within the purview of

Section 55 of the Act of 1996, and thereby, authorizes the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, to arbitrate or nominate the arbitrator. Section 55 reads as

under:-

“55. Disputes which may be referred to arbitration.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute

touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society arises-

(a) among members, past member and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased member; or

(b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any

officer, agent or employee of the society or liquidator, past or present; or

(c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or

the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased employee of the society; or

(d) between the society and any other co-operative society between a society and liquidator of another society or between the liquidator of one society

and the liquidator of another society, such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit

or other proceedings in respect of such dispute.

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the following shall be deemed to be disputes touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-

operative society, namely-

(a) a claim by the society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member,

whether such debt or demand be admitted or not;

(b) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor where the society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due

to it from the principal debtor as a result of the default of the principal debtor whether such debt or demand is admitted or not;

(c) any dispute arising in connection with the election of any officer of the society.

(3) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is or is not a dispute touching the constitution, management or

the business of a co-operative society, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court.â€​

The lease was for a period of three years, ending on 31.03.2018, which could be extended by mutual agreement. The parties could not arrive at mutual

agreement to extend the period of lease. On the one hand, the Milk Union filed an application under Section 55 of the Act of 1961, before the

Registrar, to arbitrate the dispute, whereas the firm invoked the jurisdiction of Additional District Judge, Ludhiana under Section 9 of the Act of 1996

and also, of this Court, under Section 11 of the Act of 1996, with a prayer to nominate an independent arbitrator. While examining the petition under

Section 9 of the Act of 1996, learned Additional District Judge, Ludhiana, found it to be maintainable. It has further been ordered that the firm shall be

liable to pay Rs.5,20,000/- per month, as use and occupation charges while restraining the Milk Union from forcibly dispossessing the firm, from the

disputed premises, till a decision is made by the Arbitrator, either during the proceedings of the Arbitration proceedings or in the award w.e.f.

01.04.2018. Two appeals, one by the firm and second by the Milk Union, have been filed, assailing the correctness of aforesaid order, passed by the

Additional District Judge, Ludhiana.

The Registrar nominated the Additional Registrar-1 to act as the Arbitrator. The firm filed an application under Order 14 Rule 2, read with Section 151

of the Civil Procedure Code, contending that the dispute, between the parties, do not fall within the scope of Section 55 of the Act of 1961 and

consequently, the Registrar had no power to nominate the Arbitrator. The Additional Registrar dismissed the application on 30.07.2018. A revision

petition, filed under Section 69 of the Act of 1961, challenging the aforesaid order, has also, been dismissed. A writ petition, has been filed, challenging

the orders passed by the Additional Registrar as well as the Financial Commissioner.

Initially, only the writ petition was listed before the Court on 02.12.2020. The arguments were heard at length and the judgment was reserved.

However, while examining the file, before dictating the judgment, it came to notice that three more connected petitions are pending and the decision, in

the writ petition, would have a bearing on the decision of the other petitions, as well. Therefore, it was considered appropriate to request Hon'ble The

Chief Justice, to examine the feasibility of listing all the cases together. Thus, on 07.12.2020, the case was directed to be re-listed for further

arguments. Learned counsels, for the parties, consented to address further arguments in all the cases and hence on 11.12.2020, the arguments were

heard and the judgment was reserved. Now, it is being released.

Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the firm, contends that the dispute in the present case does not fall within the scope of Section 55 of

the Act of 1961. He submits that the Registrar gets jurisdiction to act as the Arbitrator, only if the dispute falls within the scope of Section 55. He

further drew the attention of the court, to the allotment letter dated 23.02.2015, to contend that the arbitration should take place under the Act of 1996.

He contends that when the lease deed was executed, the firm was not a member of the society/union. No doubt, as per the agreement, the petitioner

was required to become a member, which it did on 10.03.2015, however, that itself would not be sufficient to hold that the dispute falls within the

scope of Section 55. Learned counsel, in support of his submissions, has relied upon a judgment passed in Panipat Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited

Vs. State of Haryana, 1986(1) PLR 393, which has been affirmed by the Division Bench in Gaje Singh Vs. Panipat Cooperative Sugar Mills Limited,

1997(3) RCR (Civil) 484.

Learned counsel, appearing for the petitioner firm, in the application under Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996, has submitted that since as per Section

12(5) and the Schedule-VII, introduced by amending Act No.3 of 2016, w.e.f. 23.10.2015, now, it is not permissible for a party to appoint his own

manager or employee or nominate another person, to be the sole arbitrator, therefore, the court should appoint the arbitrator. He, in support thereof,

relies upon the judgments passed by the Supreme Court in

TRF Limited Vs. Energo Engineering Projects Limited, (2017)8 SCC 37 7and Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and another Vs. HSCC (India)

Limited, 2020 AIR (SC) 59. Learned counsel further contends that the learned Additional District Judge, while passing the order granting interim

protection, erred in directing that the firm has to pay Rs.5,20,000/- per month, although Rs.1,20,000/- per month, was the amount of lease money

payable as per the contract, between the parties.

On the other hand, learned counsel, appearing for the Milk Union, has contended that as per the agreement (Annexure P-4) dated 09.03.2015, the

arbitration is required to take place under the Act of 1961 and therefore, the Registrar has correctly nominated Additional Registrar to arbitrate. He

contends that the petitioner became nominal member of the society on 10.03.2015, which was the pre-condition for grant of lease and therefore,

covered by Section 55. In support of his argument, he relies upon judgment passed by the Supreme Court, in Central Organization for Railway

Electrification Vs. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML, 2019 SCC Online Supreme Court 1635. He has submitted that in view of the aforesaid judgment, the

request was correctly made to the Registrar, who in turn nominated Additional Registrar as the Arbitrator. He further contended that the amount of

Rs.5,20,000/-, has been arrived at, on the basis of the highest bid received by the Milk Union, when the property was sought to be given on lease after

the period of lease, in favour of the firm, came to an end. He submits that the firm had no right to stay in the premises after 31.08.2018. He also

prayed for dismissal of the petition under Section 11 of the Act of 1996.

This Court has carefully analyzed the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper books.

Before I proceed further, it is important to note that the firm is stated to have surrendered the possession of the leased premises. On 11.12.2020,

learned Senior Counsel, on receiving instructions, made a statement that the firm has left the possession and removed its belongings. He further stated

that he has no objection if the Milk Union takes over the possession. Thus, the controversy now narrows down to determination of the amount of use

and occupation, payable by the firm, post the period of lease.

On careful perusal of the Technical Bid, Allotment Letter and the Agreement, it is apparent that there is no agreement that the arbitration would take

place under the Act of 1996. No doubt, in the allotment letter, the words “arbitration and conciliation†have been used, however, there is no

reference to the Act of 1996. Still further, it is recited that the parties have agreed to get their disputes adjudicated from the sole Arbitrator- the

Managing Director of the Federation or his nominee, as provided under the Act of 1961 and the Rules, framed thereunder. It may be noted here that

the resolution of the dispute, through the Arbitration, is not only confined to the Act of 1996. Under the National Highways Act, 1956, the parties have

been given option to get the matter resolved through arbitration, if the amount determined by the competent authority for compulsory acquisition of the

land, is not acceptable. It is provided in Section 3-G(5), that the Arbitrator would be appointed by the Central Government. Sub-Section 6 provides that

the provisions of the Act of 1996, shall apply to the arbitration under the National Highways Act, 1956. Similarly, there is a provision for arbitration

under Section 18 of The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, which provides that if the enterprise falls within the ambit of

the Act and it has a dispute with regard to the amount due under Section 17, it may make a reference to Micro, Small Enterprises Facilitation Council.

If the Council is unable to resolve the dispute through conciliation, then under Sub-Section 3, the Council can either itself take up to arbitrate the

dispute or refer it to any Institution or Centre, providing Alternate Dispute Resolution Services. Sub-Section 3 also makes a reference to the provisions

of the Act of 1996.

Now, let the Court analyze Section 55, of the Act of 1961. Section 55 starts with a Non Obstante Clause. However, the disputes which may be

referred to arbitration, under the Act, have been defined and explained therein. Sub-Section 1 of Section 55, uses three different combination of

words; “Touching the Constitutionâ€, “Management†or “The Business of a Cooperative Societyâ€. Sub-Section 2 defines and explains

what does the three combination of words, used in Sub-Section 1, connote. In the present case, the effort, of learned counsel for the respondent, is to

bring the dispute within the four corners of the word “business of the cooperative society†as explained in Clause-(a) of Sub-Section 2 of Section

On careful reading of Sub-Section (a), it becomes apparent that if the society has a claim with respect to any debt or demand against a member or

the nominee, heirs or legal representative of the deceased member, the dispute would fall within the four corners of Section 55 of the Act of 1961 and

therefore, could be referred to the Registrar or to his nominee, for arbitration.

In the present case, neither there is any dispute touching the constitution nor the management. Now, we are left with the phrase “the business of a

cooperative societyâ€. The question is “Whether the lease of the premises is covered by the word “business of a cooperative societyâ€? In the

considered opinion of the Court, the answer, to the aforesaid question, has to be in negative. The business, of the Milk Union, is to procure, process

and market the milk and its products. By extending the scope, one can at the most take related activities within its sweep. However, the lease, of the

immovable property, is not related to the business of the society. There is a milk booth and an open space, available for running a Fast Food Joint cum

Restaurant, located in a Milk Plant. It is also not in dispute that the Milk Union is not in the business of leasing the properties. Since, it is not the usual

business of the society, therefore, the dispute would not fall within gamut of Section 55, of the Act of 1961. In Panipat Cooperative's case (Supra),

Section 55 of the Act of 1961, came up for interpretation. A Cane-grower, who was also a member of the cooperative society, raised a dispute on the

ground that in a particular crushing season, despite the bond (agreement) between him and the Sugar Mill, the entire quantity of sugarcane was not

taken by the Sugar Mill. The Registrar referred the dispute under Section 55 of the Act of 1961, to the Arbitrator, who gave an award in favour of the

farmer. The High Court, while interpreting Section

55, held as under:-

“4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length, I find that the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents are

devoid of any merit. It is no doubt true that a dispute between a Society and its members touching the business of the Co-operative Society is

justiciable under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act but it does not imply that every dispute between a person who happens to be a

member of the Co-operative Society and the said Society is cognizable by the authorities under the Act. The dispute essentially has to be a dispute

which arises between the Co-operative Society and its member in his capacity as a member and not as an individual. The learned counsel for the

respondent No. 2 is not in a position to show me any provision of law which obliged him to supply his sugarcane to the petitioner Mill on account of his

being a member of that Co-operative Society. When a similar argument was raised before the Deputy Secretary on behalf of the petitioner, he

disposed of the same in the following manner:-

Secondly, the learned counsel for the Sugar Mill failed to show me any law whereby the proceedings under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act,

was barred under the Act. In fact the provisions of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act as well as other Act both available to members of the Co-

operative Societies but those who are not members of the Society can only take recourse to the provision of Punjab Sugarcane (Regulation of

Purchase and Supply) Act and not the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act. There is thus no force in the argument put forth by the learned counsel for

the Sugar Mill.

According to the Deputy Secretary, two different remedies are available to two similarly situated cane growers. It one happens to be a member of the

Co-operative Society which is running the Mill, then he can seek his remedies under the Act and the other who is not a member of the Co-operative

Society, has to seek his remedies under the provisions of the Punjab Sugarcane (Regulation of Purchase and Supply) Act, 1953. This approach and

conclusion of the Deputy Secretary is obviously untenable. The latter mentioned Act is the only Act which regulates the purchase and supply of

sugarcane required for use in sugar factories ;whether the factory is run by a Co-operative Society or a private individual does not make any

difference so far as the applicability of this Act is concerned. Similarly the fact as to whether the cane grower or supplier is a member of the Co-

operative Society which is running the Mill or is not such a member does not make any difference for the applicability of this statute.â€​

It may be significant to note that Letters Patent Appeal, against the aforesaid judgment, was dismissed by a Division Bench, upholding the

interpretation of learned Single Bench.

Now, the next issue which arises is “Whether in the present case, the dispute would fall within the language of Section 55(2)(a)�. In the

considered opinion of this Court, the dispute with respect to business of a cooperative society for debt or demand due to it, from a member or a

nominee, has its origin from the fact that such debt or demand should be connected to the business of a cooperative society. The words “any debt

or demand†cannot be read in isolation to the words “the business of a cooperative societyâ€. In other words, if the debt or demand due, is against

a member or the nominee, heirs or legal representative of the deceased member, is arising from the business of a cooperative society, then only, the

case would fall within the four corners of Section 55 and hence, referable to arbitration under Section 56. Further, Section 56 is wholly dependent upon

Section 55, of the Act. For facility, Section 56 of the Act of 1961, is extracted as under:-

“56. Reference of disputes to arbitration.- (1) The Registrar may, on receipt of the reference of dispute under Section 55,-

(a) decide the dispute himself; or

(b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf; or

(c) refer it for disposal to one arbitrator.

(2) The Registrar may withdraw any reference transferred under clause (b) of sub-section (1) or referred under clause

(c) of that sub-section and decide it himself or refer the same to another arbitrator for decision.

(3) The Registrar or any other person to whom a dispute is referred for decision under this section may, pending the decision of the dispute, make

such interlocutory orders as he may deem necessary in the interest of justice.â€​

On careful reading of Sub-Section 1 of Section 56, it is apparent that only those disputes shall be arbitrated, by the Registrar or his nominee, which fall

within the gamut of Section 55 of the Act of 1961. The attention of this Court has not been drawn that there is no other provision for holding

arbitration apart from the disputes falling within the purview of Section 55.

Now the question arises that if the dispute does not fall within the scope of Section 55, can the Arbitration take place under the provisions of the Act

of 1961. For that purpose, we will have to re-examine the relevant Clause in the agreement, which has been extracted above. On careful reading of

the Clause (b), it is apparent that the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to the sole arbitrator of the Managing Director of the Punjab State

Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Limited or his nominee, as required under the Act of 1961 and the Rules framed thereunder. At this stage, it is

significant to note the difference between the Punjab Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Limited and the Ludhiana District Cooperative

Producers Union Limited. The parties by agreement had agreed to get the dispute adjudicated from the Managing Director of the Federation or his

nominee. M/s Divjot Enterprises and the Ludhiana District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Limited, Ludhiana, are the two parties to the

agreement. The Punjab State Cooperative Milk Producers Federation is an Umbrella Organization of Cooperative Milk Producers Union, of various

Districts. In fact, the Federation is marketing the dairy products under the brand “VERKAâ€. Milk Plants have been established in various

Districts, in the State of Punjab. These Milk Plants are run by different District Cooperative Milk Producers Union. The products of these Milk Plants

are marketed under the brand name “VERKAâ€. Thus, the Managing Director of the Federation has an interest in one of the party i.e. the

Ludhiana District Cooperative Milk Producers Union.

On reading of the Bid Document, Allotment Letter and Agreement between the parties, there is no doubt that the parties agreed to resolve their

disputes/differences through arbitration. Once, it has been found that the arbitration cannot take place under the Act of 1961, then the Court is

required to now decide how to proceed. When they entered into the agreement, both the parties appear to be under a mistake of law with regard to

the applicability of the Act of 1961. They did not appreciate that the nature of dispute, which is likely to arise from the agreement,may not fall within

the scope of Section 55 and therefore, it would not be permissible to hold arbitration under the Act of 1961.

Since, the Act of 1961 is not applicable, therefore, one is left with no other option but to fall back upon the Act of 1996. However, the reference of

dispute to the arbitration of the Managing Director of the Federation under the Act of 1996, would not have posed any problem if the reference had

been sought before the amendment brought in by Act No.3 of 2016 (The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015), enforced w.e.f.

23.10.2015. By the amendment, Sub-Section 5 of Section 12, has been added which supersedes any prior agreement to the contrary and it has been

provided that any person whose relationship with the parties or counsel or the subject matter of dispute falls under any of the category specified in

VIIth Schedule, shall be ineligible to be appointed as an Arbitrator.

Now let we further examine VIIth Schedule. On careful perusal of Clause 5, it becomes apparent that the Arbitrator cannot be a Manager, Director

or part of the Management or has a similar controlling influence in an affiliate of one of the parties, if the affiliate is directly involved in the matters in

dispute, in the arbitration.

In these circumstances, neither the Managing Director of the Federation can act as an Arbitrator nor he can be permitted to nominate an Arbitrator.

This aspect has been conclusively laid down in two recent Hon’ble The Supreme Court judgments, in TRF Limited (Supra) and Perkins Eastman

(Supra). In these circumstances, this Court has come to a conclusion that if the Act of 1996 is applicable, then the Managing Director cannot act as an

Arbitrator.

This Court has also carefully examined the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Central Organization of Railway Electrification

(Supra). In the aforesaid judgment, their Lordships have, while reversing the judgment of the High Court, held that once the Arbitrator was permitted

to be nominated out of the panel maintained by the Railways, as per the general conditions of the contract (GCC) then the Court should not nominate,

as the same would be against the agreement. In the present case, attention of the Court has not been drawn to a panel of Arbitrators, maintained by

the Milk Union or the Federation. Hence, the aforesaid judgment, with greatest respect, has no application in the facts of the present case.

Although, this Court has not come across a direct judgment on the aforesaid issue, however, a clue can be taken from judgment of the Supreme Court

in (2005) 7 SCC 791, Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs. DLF Universal and anothe. rIn that case, the Supreme Court was examining the issue whether

by an agreement, the parties can confer jurisdiction on a Court which does not have territorial jurisdiction. After examining the issue with reference to

Sections 15 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it was held that the parties by an agreement cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court contrary to

the provisions of the Code.

Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, this Court has come to a conclusion that CWP-19753-2019, deserves to be allowed and the order passed on

30.07.2008, by the Additional Registrar, which has been confirmed in revision by the Principal Secretary on 22.07.2019, are liable to be set aside and

hence, are set aside. Consequently, the petition for appointment of Arbitrator filed under Section 11 of the Act of 1961 i.e. ARB-105-2018, also

deserves to be allowed and hence, is allowed.

Now the Court comes to FAO Nos.5681 and 8497 of 2018. In both the appeals, the correctness of judgment passed by Additional District Judge,

Ludhiana, on 28.08.2018, while deciding application under Section 9 of the Act of 1996, has been questioned. Learned Additional District Judge,

Ludhiana, has restrained the Milk Union, from forcibly dispossessing the firm from disputed premises till the direction is made by the Arbitrator, either

during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings or in the award, subject to the payment of a sum of Rs.5,20,000/- per month, along-with taxes

w.e.f. 01.04.2018, till the date of order of the Arbitrator or competent authority. As noticed in the beginning, the firm has already surrendered/offered

to surrender the possession. Hence, the appeal filed by the firm loses its substance because the injunction granted has become infructuous on

surrender/offer to surrender the possession. Other appeal has been filed by the Union challenging that the application under Section 9 of the Act of

1996, was not applicable. This Court has come to a conclusion that the Act of 1996, is applicable. Therefore, the appeals, filed by the Union as also by

the firm, are liable to be dismissed. It may be noted here that learned Additional District Judge, Ludhiana, had arrived at a figure of Rs.5,20,000/- per

month, on the basis of bid invited by the Milk Producers Union, in April, 2018, after the term of lease, in favour of the firm, came to an end. Thus,

there is no scope for interference with regard to quantum of the amount.

It is significant to note here that the Clause in the agreement for reference of the dispute to the Arbitrator uses the phrase “during the period of

lease agreementâ€. However, learned counsel for the parties have not contended that since the period of lease agreement has come to an end,

therefore, the Clause is not applicable. Hence, this Court refrains from adjudicating upon the aforesaid fact.

Keeping in view the aforesaid facts, there is no doubt that the amended Act, would be applicable. Hence, this Court is required to exercise its power

under Section 11 and make an appointment of the sole arbitrator, to decide the disputes and differences between the parties.

(a) Appointment of Arbitrator: Mr. Justice RajiveBhalla, a Former Judge of this Court, is hereby nominated to act as a Sole Arbitrator, to decide the

disputes and differences between the parties.

(b) Communication to Arbitrator of this order:

(i) A copy of this order will be communicated to the learned Sole Arbitrator, by the learned counsel for the petitioner, within one week from today i.e.

the date of the order being uploaded.

(ii) In addition, within one week of this order being uploaded, the Registry will forward an ordinary copy of this order to the learned Sole Arbitrator, at

the following postal address:

Arbitrator : Mr. Justice RajiveBhalla, Former Judge, Punjab and Haryana High Court.

Address : #257, Sector 10-A, Chandigarh Mobile No.:09780008111

(c) Disclosure: The learned Sole Arbitrator is requested to forward his statement of disclosure under Section 11(8) read with Section 12(1) of the

Arbitration Act, to the Registrar General, of this Court, referencing this arbitration petition, as soon as possible, and in any case sufficiently in advance

of his entering upon the reference to his arbitration. That statement will be retained by the Registrar General, on the file of this application. Copies will

be given to both sides.

(d) Appearance before the Arbitrator: The parties will appear before the learned Sole Arbitrator, physically or through video conferencing, on such

date and at such place, as he nominates, to obtain appropriate directions in regard to fixing a schedule for completing the pleadings, etc.

(e) Contact/communication information of the parties:

Contact and communication particulars are to be provided by both sides to the learned Sole Arbitrator, within one week of this order being uploaded.

The information is to include a valid and functional e-mail address.

(f) Application under Section 16: Liberty, to either side, to file an application before the learned Sole Arbitrator, under Section 16, in regard to any

matter or claim and its arbitrability, jurisdiction and competence of the arbitral tribunal.

(g) Interim Application(s):

(i) Liberty, to parties on both sides, to make an interim application or interim application including (but not limited to) interim applications under Section

17 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, before the learned Sole Arbitrator.

(ii) Any such application will be decided in such manner and within such time as the learned Sole Arbitrator, deems fit.

(h) Fees: The fees of Arbitral Tribunal shall be governed by the Punjab, Haryana and Union Territory, Chandigarh Arbitration and Conciliation Rules,

2003.

(i) Sharing of costs and fees: The parties agree that all arbitral costs and the fees, of the arbitrator, will be borne by the two sides in equal shares, in

the first instance.

(j) Venue and seat of arbitration: The venue of the arbitration shall be such place or places in the State of Punjab or Chandigarh, as may be fixed by

the Sole Arbitrator, in his sole discretion.

(k) Contentions kept open. All contentions, before the learned Sole Arbitrator, are specifically kept open.

Consequently, CWP-19753-2019 and ARB-105-2018, are allowed whereas FAO Nos.5681 & 8497 of 2018, are dismissed.

All the pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are disposed of, in view of the aforesaid judgment.