Balwant Singh and Others vs New Sutlej Transport Co. (P) Ltd. and Others

S.S. Sodhi, J.—The challenge here is to the award of the Labour Court, Jalandhar, of December 23, 1978, whereby the order of dismissal from service passed against the workmen was converted into one of discharge with the further direction to the management to pay them Rs. 1,800 each as compensation in lieu of reinstatement.

According to the workmen, the charge against them was vague and indefinite and no order of dismissal or discharge could be founded upon it.

It will be seen that no such objection was taken either before the enquiry officer or even the Labour Court. It is for the first time here that such a plea has been raised.

The charge as framed, at any rate, does not warrant its being branded as either vague or indefinite. The charge-sheet was accompanied by details of the allegations levelled against the workmen together with the names of the persons in whose presence they had misconducted themselves.

The charge reads as under:

You, in concerted manner, led some workers and entered the premises of the workshop on 20th September, 1972, atabout 4 p.m. While entering the premises, you were shouting provocating abusive slogans.

Mr. Ravi Nanda, counsel for the work men, sought to contend that this charge was defective as the precise slogans raised were not incorporated in it. This is a patently erroneous line of argument. The actual slogans raised would be a matter of evidence and evidence is not what is required to be incorporated in the charge. What is more, the charge has to be read with the details of the allegations accompanying it.

Further, it deserves to note that the domestic enquiry held against the workmen had to proceed ex parte. The finding of the Labour Court, in this behalf being, "the concerned workmen had in fact made up their mind from the very outset that they would boycott the enquiry on some pretext or the other." This observation has not in any manner been sought to be assailed. No wonder counsel '' failed to show that any prejudice was caused to the workmen by the charge being in this form or that they were in any way misled by it. The contention raised cannot, therefore, be sustained.

Equally devoid of merit was the other point canvassed, namely, that raising of provocative and abusive slogans in the premises of the workshop could not be held to be misconduct. It was claimed that this had been so held by the Supreme Court as a matter of law and in such wide general terms. Counsel, of course, failed to point out the case or the occasion for the Supreme Court to have so ruled. On the face of it, the proposition urged is too far-fetched to be countenanced.

The management, on its part, assailed the impugned award on the weighty ground that, having once approved the order of termination of services passed against the workmen, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to thereafter award compensation to the workmen in lieu of reinstatement.

A reading of the impugned award would show that, after upholding the findings of the enquiry officer, the Labour Court went on to convert the order of dismissal into one of discharge from service, on the ground that no hearing had been given to the workmen after the inquiry. This was clearly an erroneous approach as it is well-settled law now that it is not the requirement of the rules of natural justice that a second show-cause notice regarding the proposed punishment be served upon the delinquent workman. This was so held by the Division Bench of our Court in Notified Area Committee, Mahendargarh v. Mahavir Parashad (1984) LIC 464. The fact, therefore, that no hearing was granted to the workmen before they were dismissed from service, pro vided no occasion for the award of any compensation to them in lieu of reinstatement or otherwise.

The true scope of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act is, as spelt out by the Supreme Court in The Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. The Management and Others, where it is observed as under (at page 296):

If the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the misconduct is established, either by the domestic enquiry accepted by it or by the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the Tribunal originally had no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. Once the misconduct is proved, the Tribunal had to sustain the order of punishment unless it was harsh indicating victimisation. u/s 11A, though the Tribunal may hold that the misconduct is proved, nevertheless it may be of the opinion that the order of discharge or dismissal for the said misconduct is not justified (emphasis supplied). In other words the Tribunal may hold that the proved misconduct does not merit punishment by way of discharge or dismissal. It can, under such circumstances, award to the workman any lesser punishment instead. The power to interfere with the punishment and alter the same has been now conferred on the Tribunal by Section 11A.

In the present case, the Labour Court, no doubt, converted the order of dismissal into one of discharge, but it, at any rate, gave its approval to the termination of the services of the workmen. This approval must be held to have divested it of jurisdiction to grant any compensation to the workmen in terms of Section 11A of the Act. The part of the impugned award, namely, that relating to compensation to the workmen, cannot, therefore, be sustained and is accordingly hereby quashed.

In the result, the writ petition filed by the workmen is hereby dismissed while that of the management is accepted. There will, however, be no order as to costs.