Baljit Kaljr vs United Insurance Company Ltd.

D.K. Jain, J.

(1) This application for judgment under Order 12 Rule 6, CPC has been filed in suit for ejectment, declaration, mandatory injunction, prohibitory injunction and recovery of mesne profits. The applicant claims that defendant No. I has admitted all factual averments in the plaint, which is disputed by the said defendant.

(2) The case of the plaintiff is that the suit premises were demised to defendant No. I under the lease deed dated 24 February, 1988 for a period of three years; the tenancy expired on 24 February, 1991 by efflux of time and again on 24 February, 1994, where after it became a tenancy from month to month; the last agreed rental was Rs. 43,063.00 p.m.: the said defendant defaulted in paying rent from July, 1995 till fully, 1996; there was a fire in the building in another portion in June, 1995, resultant whereto defendant No. 2, the Chief Fire Officer sealed the building and required installation of fire fighting- equipment; the plaintiff was willing to do so; but defendant No. 1 did not remove the locks and that she was not interested in having defendant No. 1 as her tenant; served a notice of eviction on 2 July, 1996 whereby the monthly tenancy of defendant No. 1 was terminated and thereafter the said defendant having failed to vacate the premises, she filed the present suit.

(3) Defendant No. 1 admits letting out of the premises for three years but with an option clause, in exercise of which the tenancy was extended twice; first on 24 February, 1991 and then mutually on 24 February, 1994 so as to last till 24 February, 1997. It is stated that the initial rent was Rs. 32>562.00 per month, which was enhanced in terms of the option clause to Rs. 37,446 .00 p .m. after three years of initial tenancy and thereafter to Rs. 43,063.00 p.m. w.e.f. 24 February, 1994. According to the said defendant the tenancy was continuing one and not monthly; the tenancy having been mutually extended, it was for the plaintiff to have the lease deed for the extended period executed and registered, which she did not do and claims that the plaintiff continued accepting rent for the extended period at the enhanced rate of Rs. 43,063.00 p.m. and Therefore, the eviction notice dated 2 July, 1996was bad and of no consequence, and the suit for ejectment is not maintainable as its possession is protected u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

(4) The defendant has also denied that the plaintiff was ready and willing to provide the fire fighting equipment and it is alleged that she in fact was not agreeable to the installation of the fire fighting equipment and did not join the other occupants in the building, who got it installed in unison and the defendant was forced to suspend payment of rent due to wrongful act of the plaintiff in depriving the user of the premises to the defendant, who is not liable to pay rent and interest thereon for the period it was not permitted to enjoy the property. plaintiff''s notice for eviction is termed as illegal and bad in law for the reasons stated.

(5) The dispute between the parties thus revolves round whether, (i) the extension of tenancy claimed by defendant No. 1 is in exercise of option for renewal stipulated in terms of clause (ii) of the lease deed and is lawful and, thus defendant No. I continued to be contractual tenant, (ii) is defendant No. 1s possession protected u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act or otherwise, and (iii) was the suspension of rent by defendant No. 1 lawful and the plaintiff''s not entitled to rent mesne profits or the interest for the said or any period, as alleged.

(6) As is obvious from the afore noted issues the points in dispute requiring determination are legal as well as factual. The factual disputes in main relate to the questions : (a) whether the alleged option for extension of tenancy beyond 24 February, 1994 was mutually exercised, as claimed by the defendant, and (b) whether the plaintiff was really willing to, or failed to join or pay for installation of the fire fighting equipment or it could not be done due to defendant No. l''s not removing the locks, etc., as alleged by the plaintiff. The factual disputes require evidence and cannot be decided without it.

(7) Although Rule 6 of Order 12, CPC is couched in wide terms but it can be acted upon only when admission(s) are clear, unambiguous and unequivocal. It is not intended to be put into operation where there are serious questions of fact or law to be determined, like in the instant case. It is well settled that a judgment on admission by the defendant under Order 12 Rule 6, CPC is a matter of discretion and not a matter of right and when a case involves questions which cannot be conveniently disposed of on a motion, under the rule, the Court may, in the exercise of discretion, refuse the motion.

(8) As noticed above, in the present case, defendant No. 1 has raised certain pleas which go to the very root of the suit and have to be decided after taking evidence. A judgment cannot, Therefore, be pronounced under Order 12 Rule 6 Cpc on the basis of alleged admissions.

(9) For the view I have taking it is not necessary to deal with the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the plaintiff, laying down die principles to be applied by the Courts while exercising discretion under Order 12, Rule 6, CPC.

(10) In the result, the application is dismissed.