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Judgment
S.S. Saron, J.—This petition has been filed u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the order dated 15.1.2007 (Annexure-P.1) in pursuance of which the respondents have been discharged. A further prayer has been made for quashing the order dated 17.7.2007 (Annexure-P.2) whereby the revision against the order discharging the respondents has been dismissed.
The petitioner filed a complaint against the respondents on the allegations that on 29.4.2004 he held a meeting with the workers of Congress party. At that time Gharsa Ram, ASI was in-charge of the Police Post Khairpur. He started chasing the petitioner in Police jeep. At that time the complainant was accompanied by Rajender Kumar. When the complainant and Rajender Kumar reached the house, the accused entered into the house and asked the petitioner to visit Police Post Khairpur. On inquiry by the petitioner, they started abusing him. The petitioner was pressurized to cast the votes in favour of the government then in power.
When the petitioner refused to come on his turn, the respondents tried forcibly to abduct him and his companion. However, the petitioner was saved by his neighbours. The intimation of the incident was given to the Superintendent of Police, Sirsa and also to the Election Commissioner. After some days Gharsa Ram (respondent No. 2) again came to the house of the complainant and threatened him. On 2.5.2004, Jasbir Kumar (respondent No. 1) in collusion with Gharsa Ram (respondent No. 2) gave false application to the Superintendent of Police, Sirsa on the basis of which FIR No. 245 dated 7.5.2004 was registered against the petitioner and Rajender Singh for the offences under Sections 386, 342 and 34 IPC. The complainant gave application to higher officers but of no avail. In the aforesaid FIR No. 245 dated 7.5.2004 the petitioner has been acquitted. On the aforesaid allegations the petitioner filed a criminal complaint. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirsa recorded preliminary evidence and vide his order dated 15.1.2007 (Annexure-P.1) found no ground for summoning the respondents. Accordingly, the complaint filed by the petitioner was dismissed. Aggrieved against the said order the petitioner filed a revision petition before the Court of Session which has also been dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Tack Court), Sirsa vide order dated 17.7.2007 (Annexure-P.2). Both the orders are assailed in the present petition.
After hearing learned Counsel for the petitioner and perusing the record it may be noticed that the occurrence which the petitioner alleges against the respondents had taken place on 29.4.2004 when Gharsa Ram (respondent No. 2) had chased him and threatened him. Thereafter, on 7.5.2004 it has been alleged that FIR No. 245 was registered against the petitioner and his companion Rajender Singh for the offences under Sections 380, 342 and 34 IPC. However, the complaint itself was filed on 18.11.2005 i.e. after more than 18 months of the occurrence. There is no explanation forth coming for the delay.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that in view of the provisions of Section 473 Cr.P.C. the Court can extend the period of limitation in certain cases. Therefore, by invoking the said provisions the delay in filing the case is liable to be condoned.
I am unable to agree with the said contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Section 473 Cr.P.C. falls under Chapter-XXXVI Cr.P.C. which relates to limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences. Section 467 Cr.P.C. provides the definitions and it is mentioned that for the purpose of the said chapter i.e. Chapter-XXXVI, unless the context otherwise, requires, �period of limitation� means the period specified in Section 468 for taking cognizance of an offence. Section 468 provides the power to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. Section 469 deals with the commencement of the period of limitation. Therefore, the extension of period of limitation for certain cases is in relation to the provisions of Chapter-XXXVI Cr.P.C. It cannot apply to any and every case wherever there is delay in launching of the prosecution. The intent and tenor of the Courts below is that the proceedings have been initiated at a belated stage and not that it is barred because of delay as contemplated by the provisions of Chapter-XXXVI Cr.P.C.
Consequently, there is no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.