Balbir Singh vs The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patiala & Ors.

KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)

The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the award dated 21.7.2019 (Annexure P-12) passed by respondent No. 1, whereby the reference raised on behalf of the petitioner-workman was answered against him and his claim for reinstatement with continuity of service with full back wages was declined.

Briefly stated as per the pleaded facts, the petitioner joined services with the respondent-management on 20.11.1997 and worked continuously uptil 20.11.1998, when his services were terminated by the respondent-management without any notice, pay or retrenchment compensation, despite the fact that he had worked for more than 240 days of service in the preceding year. Aggrieved, the petitioner served a demand notice dated 01.1.1999 (for short ‘the Act of 1947’), claiming therein that his services were terminated in violation of the relevant provisions of the Act of 1947. Conciliation proceedings having failed, the appropriate Government referred the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court, Patiala, where it was registered as Reference No. 778 of 1999, calling upon the Labour Court to determine "whether the services or workman Balbir Singh were terminated in proper and justified manner by the management? If not so, what relief workman is entitled to?”

The petitioner filed his claim statement (Annexure P-5), to which the management filed its written statement (Annexure P-6) raising preliminary objections as well as contesting the claim on merits.

Upon completion of pleadings of the parties, the Labour Court framed following issues:-

Whether the reference is bad in law? OPM

(1-A) Whether there is relationship of master and servant between the parties?

Whether the reference is not maintainable? OPM

(2-A) Whether the petitioner is a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act ? OPW

Whether the petitioner has not put in 240 days of service in a calender year ? If so, its effect? OPR

Whether the termination of the services of the workman is justified and in order ? OPM

Relief.

Upon appreciation of the evidence available on record, the learned Industrial Tribunal, vide the impugned award dated 21.7.2009, answered the reference against the workman. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Industrial Tribunal has erred in dismissing the claim of the workman despite the evidence available on record establishing that he had worked with the respondent management from 20.11.1997 to 20.11.1998 and had completed more than 240 days of service during the preceding twelve calendar months. It is further submitted that the services of the petitioner had wrongly been terminated without payment of notice pay or retrenchment compensation. Thus, the relevant provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act of 1947 stood violated. It has also been submitted that the Labour Court did not appreciate the fact that the case of the petitioner was not covered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947, rather the same was covered under Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. Moreover, the Labour Court has also failed to appreciate the fact that the document relied upon by it were the result of the dominant position of the respondent-management. It is further submitted that the petitioner proved on record EPF documents, which demonstrated that the respondent-management was depositing the provident fund on behalf of the petitioner. Furthermore, the petitioner had specifically pleaded that after the termination of the petitioner, another person had been employed by the respondent-management. However, the said aspect has not been considered by the Labour Court. In support of his arguments, learend counsel has placed reliance on the judgments passed by the Madras High Court in case bearing Writ Petition No. 13159 of 1998, titled as ‘Workmen of Pmp Textiles, Coimbatore versus Management of Pmp Textiles and another, decided on 03.1.2011, and Writ Petition No. 19726 of 2023 titled as ‘S. VijayKumar versus M/s Larsen and Toubro Limited, decided on 30.10.2025. Therefore, it is prayed that the impugned award is patently illegal and deserves to be quashed.

Per contra, learned senior counsel for respondents No. 2 to 4 supports the impugned award. It is submitted that the petitioner had made a written request to the respondent-management for undergoing training with the respondent. The said request of the petitioner was accepted by the respondent-management, and vide letter dated 20.11.1997, he was engaged as a Trainee with the petitioner-management for a fixed period of six months. The terms and conditions of his engagement as a Trainee were duly accepted by the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner is not covered within the definition of workman as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947. It has also been submitted that during the said period, the performance of the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory. However, on repeated pleadings and assurance of the petitioner, the training period of the petitioner was further extended for a period of three months vide letter dated 20.5.1998. The performance of the petitioner was once again not found to be satisfactory during the said period, however, on the request of the petitioner his training period was further extended upto 20.11.1998 vide letter dated 20.8.1998. It is submitted that since the performance of the petitioner remained unsatisfactory and below average, the respondent-management relieved the petitioner on completion of training period vide letter dated 20.11.1998. However, the petitioner refused to accept the said letter. Thereafter, the copy of the relieving order was sent to the address of the petitioner vide registered letter No. 1267 dated 30.11.1998, which was received back undelivered. Moreover, vide letter dated 25.1.1999, a cheque bearing No. 0818416 dated 25.1.1999 amounting to Rs. 3029/- was sent to the petitioner through a registered cover, which was also received back undelivered. It is also submitted that the petitioner never remained employed or worked with the respondent-managment, and that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel places reliance upon the judgments passed by the Apex Court in case titled as ‘National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. Versus V. Lakshminarayanan’ (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 2014; ‘Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana versus Ram Pal’ 2007 (115) FLR 284; and ‘M.D., Karnataka Handloom Dev. Corpn. Ltd. Versus Mahadeva Laxman Raval’ 2007 AIR Supreme Court 631. Learned senior counsel accordingly contends that the findings recorded by the Labour Court are based upon due appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, are well reasoned, and call for no interference in exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant material on record.

At the outset, it deserves to be notice that the learned Labour Court, while considering the issues before it, has held in favour of the petitioner on the question of his being a “workman” within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and has also accepted that there existed a relationship between the parties. It has further held that the petitioner had completed 240 days of service during the relevant period. However, the Labour Court has rightly proceeded to examine whether, despite completion of 240 days, the cessation of the petitioner's engagement amounted to retrenchment so as to attract Section 25-F of the Act.

In this regard, the documentary record assumes significance. A perusal of the material on record reveals that the petitioner had submitted Ex.M2 seeking training in the factory of the respondent-management. Pursuant thereto, Ex. M3 dated 20.11.1997 was issued whereby he was engaged as a trainee for a period of six months commencing from 21.11.1997. The document specifically records the nature and duration of the engagement and further stipulates that the same was not to be treated as a letter of appointment and that the management would not be under any obligation to offer employment upon completion of the training period. The petitioner accepted the terms and conditions contained therein under his signatures. The initial period of training was thereafter extended for a further period of three months and subsequently for another three months vide Ex.M4 and Ex.M5. Thus, the petitioner's engagement continued for specified periods and the last such period expired on 20.11.1998. On completion thereof, the petitioner was relieved vide Ex. M6.

The Labour Court, upon appreciation of the evidence, found that the petitioner was engaged for a fixed period and that the engagement came to an end upon expiry of the stipulated period. Such finding is based upon the documentary evidence on record and cannot be said to be perverse.

Once the engagement is found to have been for specified periods and the last such period expired on 20.11.1998 without further renewal, the cessation falls within the statutory exception contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The termination of service consequent upon non-renewal of a contract of employment on its expiry, where the contract contains a stipulation in that regard, does not constitute “retrenchment”. Consequently, the requirements of Section 25-F, which operate in cases of retrenchment, are not attracted.

The mere fact that the petitioner had completed 240 days, therefore, cannot alter the legal character of the cessation. The Labour Court has specifically recorded that although the petitioner had completed 240 days, the said circumstance was immaterial in view of its finding that the case was covered by Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947. The contention based upon retention of juniors and alleged subsequent recruitment also does not advance the petitioner's case. Such provisions become relevant in the context of retrenchment. Once the cessation of the petitioner's engagement is found not to constitute retrenchment by virtue of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947, the reliance upon Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act of 1947 cannot result in the cessation being treated as retrenchment.

The reliance upon the Model Standing Orders also does not persuade this Court. The petitioner contended before the Labour Court that, after completion of the initial period of training, he was liable to be treated as a regular or confirmed workman. However, the record shows that the petitioner accepted the initial fixed period as well as the subsequent extensions of three months each. No material has been shown from the record to establish that, notwithstanding these written terms, the management had appointed him against a regular post or that the fixed-term character of the engagement had otherwise ceased to operate.

The petitioner's earlier apprenticeship with Hindustan Lever Limited also does not, by itself, establish that the subsequent engagement with the respondent-management was a sham as the subsequent engagement with the respondent-management was founded upon a separate application, Ex.M2, and the written terms contained in Ex.M3, followed by Ex.M4 and Ex.M5. The relevant question in the present proceedings is the nature of this subsequent engagement, and the material on record supports the Labour Court's finding that it was for specified periods.

No doubt, Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the Madras High Court in S. Vijaykumar’s case (supra), wherein the termination of a similarly-styled “trainee” was held to be illegal and reinstatement was directed. The said decision, however, does not assist the petitioner, as the factual foundation on which the relief was granted therein is materially different from the present case. In S. Vijaykumar’s case (supra), the subsequent engagement styled as that of a “trainee” was, on the evidence available in that case, found to be a camouflage for regular employment, the workman having in fact discharged the duties of a regular employee. No comparable finding exists in the present case. Here, the petitioner himself submitted Ex. M2 seeking training in the respondent-management's factory and was thereafter engaged as a trainee for a fixed period of six months under Ex. M3, which was expressly accepted by him; the engagement was subsequently extended for two further periods of three months each under Ex.M4 and Ex.M5, and upon expiry of the last such period he was relieved vide Ex.M6. Thus, the essential factual foundation of a sham or illusory trainee arrangement, which is relied upon by the petitioner to draw support from S. Vijaykumar’s case (supra), is absent from the present record, and the said judgment, therefore, does not advance the petitioner's case.

In light of the above, even though the petitioner was held to be a workman and was found to have completed 240 days of service, the cessation of his engagement was not retrenchment but was a consequence of expiry and non-renewal of the fixed-term engagement. The learned Labour Court has consequently rightly held that Section 25-F was not attracted and that the termination was proper and justified.

Trite to say that the scope of interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India over an award passed by the Labour Court is limited. This Court does not sit as an appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence or substitute its own view merely because another view may be possible. Where the Labour Court has considered the material placed before it and recorded findings on the basis of evidence available on record, interference is warranted only where such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, contrary to the material on record or otherwise suffering from a patent error of law or jurisdictional infirmity. No perversity, patent illegality or jurisdictional error has been demonstrated. This Court, therefore, finds no justification to re-appreciate the evidence or disturb the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court.

Consequently, finding no merit in the present writ petition, the same is dismissed.

Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.