AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
K. Chandru, J.—Heard both sides.
The petitioners, who are claiming to have their shops inside the Victoria Public Hall compound (for short VP Hall) and were claiming to pay
licence fees to the VP Hall Trust Board, have challenged two notices issued by the Corporation of Chennai. The first notice was issued by the
Corporation, dated 5.8.2009. The said notice directed the occupants/licensees to vacate their respective premises within seven days and hand
over vacant possession to the Corporation, failing which appropriate legal action will be taken against them.
The reason given by the respondent Corporation in the impugned notice was that the Victoria Public Hall Trust Board on 11.3.2009 passed a
resolution to hand over to the Corporation its movable and immovable properties. The petitioners without any valid lease or licence are running
their shops in the place leased out to the Victora Public Hall. In view of the resolution, there was no right for the petitioners to carry on their
business there. It was also stated that the Victoria Public Hall Trust Board itself was a lessee under the Corporation of Chennai. They have no right
either to lease or rent out the premises under the terms of the lease. It was also stated that the VP Hall was almost 120 years old and it was in a
damaged and dilapidated condition. The Corporation of Chennai had decided to restore the building to its old glory as an heritage building. In view
of public interest, the Corporation wanted to repair and restore the building.
The petitioners challenging the said notice have moved this Court. A status quo order was granted on 11.8.2009, which was continued
subsequently by frequent extensions. The first respondent had filed counter affidavits, dated 26.8.2009.
The history of forming the V.P. Trust Board was briefly as follows:- It is seen from the records that in a public meeting of the inhabitants of
Madras, on invitation of the Sheriff of Madras, on 17.3.1882, it was resolved to erect a Town Hall to be vested in the Trustees for the use and
benefit of the public. Subsequently, the Corporation allotted an area in the People''s Park abutting the Poonamallee Road to an extent of 57
grounds with 99 years of lease at a rent of eight annas per ground per annum. It was renewable at the end of each term of 99 years for a like
period. Subsequently, the Town Hall was constructed in the said site, which was named as VP Hall. It was decided to let the property for
promotion of welfare and recreation of the inhabitants as the trustees may decide and dispose of the rents.
Subsequently, the Advocate General of Madras had filed a scheme suit before this Court in its original side being C.S. No. 263 of 1921.
Accordingly, by a judgment and decree, dated 27.09.1921, a scheme was framed by this Court. Thereafter, when attempts were made to hand
over the VP Hall to the Corporation of Chennai, that was also challenged before this Court. A compromise decree was arrived at between the
trustees in CS. No. 98 of 1957, by an order, dated 15.09.1961. In that compromise decree apart from reconstituting the Board of Trustees, a
clause provided the trustees to sublet, mortgage build upon, pull down, rebuild and alter buildings upon or otherwise deal with the said piece or
parcel of land forming the said site of the Town Hall. Therefore, the petitioners claimed that by virtue of that clause, they were entitled to enter into
licence or lease agreements with the VP Hall Trust Board. It was thus, they came into possession of the premises and they have located their
shops. The superstructures were put up by them. The petitioners also claim that inasmuch as the trustee were entitled to hold the land on a lease for
99 years, which was renewable, their continuance in the premises with the permission of the trust was also valid.
It was also stated that the rents payable to the second respondent have been paid upto 31.3.2009. Thereafter, the rents were not received by
the second respondent for reasons best known to them. It was also claimed that renovation of main VP Hall will in no way be an hindrance due to
the presence of the petitioners since their shops were situated on the eastern side of the premises, whereas the hall is located in the midst of the
land with entrance on the Southern side. It was also claimed that the present notice issued by the Corporation was without jurisdiction. The
Commissioner as well as the Mayor of the Corporation are members of the Trust Board and when they had entered into lease or licence, they
were parties to the decision taken by the VP Hall Trust Board. Therefore, the Corporation also is bound by the decision of the Trust Board.
Granting of seven days to vacate the premises was illegal. The income derived from the shops is the sole income for the petitioners. Any action for
handing over the land can be taken only by taking recourse to by filing an application before this Court u/s 92 of CPC for getting possession of the
land. They cannot expect the V.P. Hall Trust Board to surrender possession of their lands, which was allotted to them. Hence the decision of the
Trust Board was also illegal.
It is seen from the counter affidavits filed by the first respondent that the original lease granted for 99 years had expired in the year 1985 itself. It
was neither extended nor renewed by the Corporation in favour of the second respondent Trust. The Trust in its meeting held on 11.3.2009 had
passed a resolution not to press for extension of lease of the existing land with its building. The land and the building were handed over to the
Corporation of Chennai on 1.4.2009. The handing over of land and building for restoration of the VP Hall was also accepted by this Court. The
main object of the trust was to restore and preserve the hall as an heritage building. The building needs urgent restoration to be utilized as a Town
Hall. The building has to be used for public and private meetings, exhibitions, lectures, concerts, dinners, theoretical and musical performance, etc.
without reference to the caste, creed or nationality. It must be restored to its original glory. The VP Hall is more than 100 years old and it is the
first Town Hall of the city of Chennai and it is an heritage and a monument. In order to preserve such buildings by the Corporation, the guidelines
issued by the Archaeological Survey of India was being followed. As per those guidelines, there should not be any construction within 100 meters
from the preserved monument.
It was also stated that the petitioners'' shops were located in the property of the Corporation of Chennai. Even the original lease agreement,
dated 18.2.1888 clearly showed that the lessee will not erect upon the said land or not to build except in specific manner and part thereof any
dwelling house or building other than the VP Hall. It was also stated that the petitioners have no valid reason and licenses issued by the second
respondent Trust will be illegal. Even if such licenses were granted during the original period of lease by the second respondent Trust, after its
expiry in the year 1985, the other sublease will also come to an end. It was further stated that the renovation of VP Hall was estimated at a cost of
Rs. 10 crores. Funds were also sanctioned by the Corporation Council with the concurrence of the State Government.
It was also stated that the shops situated on the eastern side of the VP Hall is required for free entry to the VP Hall for the construction and for
the front elevation with necessary landscaping. The amounts sent by the petitioners by way of cheques for a consolidated amount were not
accepted by the Corporation as there was no legal relationship between the petitioners and the first respondent. It was also further claimed that the
matter is purely of a civil nature and writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to enforce a non-existent right are not maintainable.
The petitioners in order to show that they were paying rents to the VP Hall Trust Board, have filed some receipts in a bulky typed set. The
petitioners in their correspondence have stated that the superstructures were put up by them and they were also paying tax to the Corporation. The
minutes of the meeting, dated 11.3.2009 of the VP Hall Trust Board was also produced. In that, the trustees had mentioned about the suit filed by
them in O.S. No. 1349 of 1985 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras for specific performance of the contract by the Corporation to renew
the lease for another 99 years. During April, 1993, the suit was decreed in favour of the second respondent Trust. However, the Corporation of
Chennai preferred an appeal before the VI Additional Judge, City Civil Court in A.S. No. 334 of 1993. The said appeal was dismissed. Against
which the Corporation had preferred a Second Appeal. During the pendency of the second appeal, a compromise memo was signed and filed
before this Court. It was accepted by this Court. The second respondent Trust had agreed not to press for the extension of lease and wanted the
property to be handed over to the Corporation. Pursuant to the compromise memo, resolutions were passed stating that the land belonged to the
Corporation, was handed over to it for future maintenance and to restore the VP Hall to its original glory and to serve its purpose as a Town Hall.
With this object in mind, the following resolutions were passed at the Trust Board meeting held on 11.3.2009.
Resolution No. 4. It is resolved that the Trust will handover the possession of the building to the Chennai Corporation from 1st April 2009. It is
also resolved that the assets, investments, deposits, savings and amount in the current account of the V.P. Hall Trust Board may be handed over to
the Chennai Corporation.
Resolution No. 5. There are sub-lessees around the V.P. Hall building like Picnic Hotel, Chennapuri Andhra Maha Sabha, S.I.A.A., occupying the
portion of the Ground floor and shops on the Road side leading to the Sub-urban Railway Station. Appropriate action has to be taken to evict
them. Hence, it is resolved that the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai is authorised to take necessary appropriate action against the sub-
lessees of the V.P. Hall Trust.
It was also resolved that an appropriate petition will be filed before this Court u/s 92 CPC by the Advocate General after obtaining leave of
this Court and on behalf of the State Government. It must be stated that the decision taken by the trustee of the second respondent Board is not
under challenge before this Court. The petitioners being sublessees/Sub tenants with the trust cannot collaterally attack the resolution passed by the
trust board. On the contrary, pursuant to the Trust Board''s resolution, the properties were handed over to the Corporation. The Corporation
claimed as per its counter affidavit, that they have got council''s sanction for the amounts to do the restoration work.
In the second batch of cases, i.e. W.P. Nos. 16363 to 16376 of 2009, the petitioners were aggrieved by the order, dated 8.8.2009 passed by
the Zonal Officer, Zone-III, Corporation of Chennai, referring the earlier notices issued under Sections 279 and 287 of the Chennai City Municipal
Corporation Act, 1919, dated 30.07.2009. In the said notice, it was stated that since the petitioners have failed to comply with the show cause
notice served on 1.8.2009 issued in order to improve the public health conditions of their trade as they were doing activities contrary to the
conditions of licence. Since the petitioners were continuously running their trade violating the rules, thereby endangering the customer of their trade.
In public interest and public health, the licences to run their shops within the VP Hall were revoked.
Pending these writ petitions, this Court also granted status quo orders on 11.8.2009 and it was also continuing. The show cause notices, (a
copy of which enclosed in the typed set), were given on behalf of the Health Officer and it was alleged that the petitioners were running their
business in violation of conditions of licences issued u/s 287 of CCMC Act. They were required to comply with the conditions within one day from
the date of receipt of the letter, failing which prosecution will be launched against them and the provisions of Section 379A of the CCMC Act will
be invoked preventing them from continuing their business. In the reverse of the notice, several reasons were set out including whitewashing was
not done, no proper drainage facility were provided, premises were kept unhygienic, smoke outlets were not proper, fly control measures were not
done and the food handlers licence were not taken, etc.
The petitioners contended that such a notice is per se illegal as it was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice since no hearing was
given to the petitioners. The replies sent by the petitioners were not considered. It was also stated that since they have already challenged the
eviction notices, the grounds raised therein can also be taken into account as part and parcel of the present affidavits filed in support of the WPs.
Section 287 enables the Chennai Corporation to licence the premises for purposes mentioned in Schedule VI. Persons who did not possess
licences were prohibited from doing their business. It is stated that the Commissioner if he was satisfied with the conditions, after making an
investigation including the suitability of place, can grant such licences. If the holder of a licence without a reasonable cause had failed to comply
with the conditions subject to which the licence has been granted or has contravened any provision of the Act or Rules without prejudice to any
other penalty, his licence can be revoked by the first respondent.
u/s 379-A of the same Act, the Commissioner can by notice require the person to alter or remove or as for as practicable restore to its original
state the whole or any part of any property, whether movable or immovable within a time frame. He can also enter into the property of any building
or land and take all steps as are necessary to prevent the continuance of such act.
Before proceeding with the rival contentions, it is necessary to record the concession made by the learned Advocate General regarding the
second batch of cases relating to the revocation of licenses. In respect of the notices, dated 8.8.2009 which are impugned, the learned Advocate
General fairly stated that such notices are not final and the Corporation, after affording opportunities, will take appropriate steps to pass
considered order. Till such time, the impugned notices will not be enforced. He also stated that before revoking licences, opportunities will be given
to the petitioners. Therefore, this Court need not dwell upon the validity of such notices, except to grant liberty to the first respondent to take
appropriate steps in accordance with law.
In the light of the above, the impugned order, dated 8.8.2009 will stand set aside. Hence, all the writ petitions being W.P. Nos. 16363 to
16376 of 2009 will stand allowed. The connected M.Ps filed thereon will stand dismissed as infructuous. However, liberty is granted to the first
respondent Corporation to take appropriate steps in accordance with law before revoking the licence granted in favour of the petitioners.
In respect of the batch of writ petitions challenging notices, dated 5.8.2009, the learned Advocate General stated that already taking into
account the plight of the petitioners, the Corporation had agreed to provide them an alternative place in Lillypond Shopping Complex, (which is
nearby), on terms and conditions in accordance with the rules. Even though such an offer was made, the petitioners have not accepted the alternate
accommodation and have spurned the offers made by the Corporation. The learned Advocate General stated that even now, the said offer is open
and such of those petitioners who wanted alternate accommodation can make applications to the Corporation and it shall be considered in
accordance with the rules and appropriate allotments shall be made.
Mr. R. Krishnamurthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners'' possession of the property cannot
be said to be illegal. They have lawful lease from the V.P. Hall Trust Board. It is not open to the trustee to abandon and surrender the possession
of the property for which the trust was created. He also submitted that the notices given for seven days to quit was not in accordance with law.
In this context, the learned Counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Anamallai Club Vs. Government of Tamil
Nadu and others, . The learned senior counsel placed reliance upon the following passages found in paragraphs 8 to 10 of the said judgment,
which are as follows:
Law makes a distinction between persons in juridical possession and rank trespassers. Law respects possession even if there is no valid title to
support it. Law does not permit any person to take law into his hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a
court. The object thereby is to encourage compliance of the rule of law and to deprive the person who wanted a person in lawful possession
removed from possession according to proper form and to prevent him from going with a high band and eject such person. Undoubtedly, the true
owner is entitled to retain possession even though he had obtained it by force or by other unlawful means but that would not be a ground to permit
the owner to take the law into his own hands and eject the person in juridical possession or settled possession without recourse to law.
Thus, it could be seen that even after determination of the licence under the Government Grants Act, the Government is entitled to resume
possession but resumption of possession does not mean unilaterally taking possession without recourse to law. The Eviction Act contemplates such
a procedure. ''Premises'' defined u/s 2(d) of the Act means any land or any building or a part of a building or hut or any enclosure appurtenant
thereto. Section 4 prescribes procedure of issuance of a notice of show-cause before eviction giving an opportunity and thereafter taking action u/s
5 of the Act. Unfortunately, on the facts of the case on hand, the respondent has not adopted the procedure prescribed under Sections 4 and 5 of
the Eviction Act after determination of the licence granted under the Government Grants Act. The High Court, therefore, was not right in its
conclusion that the procedure prescribed under the PPE Act is not applicable to the grants made under the Government Grants Act since the
appellants remained in settled possession since a long time pursuant to the grant. After determination of the grant, though they have no right to
remain in possession, the State cannot take unilateral possession without taking recourse to the procedure provided under the Act. It is, therefore,
clear that it would have been open to the respondent to have a notice issued to the appellant and give time to vacate the premises within 10 days or
15 days and, therefore, could leave resumed possession with minimal use of police force. We cannot give any direction in this case since
possession was already resumed. We have directed not to create third party right in the property. We are not inclined to interfere with the order.
Shri Sorabjee contended that the appellant is entitled to notice before the order of termination of grant made and so the action is bad in law
and so the appellant is entitled to restitution of the property. We are not inclined to agree with him. The recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution,
to establish title would not be a proper remedy. In this case, we are not inclined to go into the question for the reason that the High Court has held
that the writ petition is not maintainable. After termination of the licence by the Government under the Government Grants Act, the Estate Officer
appointed u/s 3 cannot go into its correctness and adjudicate in the proceedings u/s 3 thereof. In our view, the Division Bench of the High Court is
right in its finding. The Government having determined the licence, the Estate Officer cannot go into the question of legality of the termination of the
licence under the Crown (Government) Grants Act to take further steps under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. In that view of the situation in this case,
we think that it is not necessary for the State Government to nominate the Estate Officer and for the Estate Officer to give notice under Sections 4
and 5. There is no need for the State to file a suit for eviction. But notice in compliance of principles of natural justice should have been given giving
reasonable time of 10 or 15 days to vacate the premises and to deliver vacant and peaceful possession; thereafter, the Government would be free
to resume possession. Since possession was already taken, though we are not approving of the manner in which the same was taken, we do not
think that in this matter notice afresh needs to be given to the appellant. It may be open to the appellant to avail of any remedy available in law.
On the strength of the above said judgment, the learned Senior Counsel contended that the petitioners are not rank trespassers. The provisions
of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 will have to be followed. Therefore, asking them to quit and hand over
possession was totally unwarranted.
Per contra, the learned Advocate General stated that though the petitioners claimed that they were sublessees from the V.P. Hall Trust Board,
despite notice to them they have not produced any lease agreements, which they claim to have entered into with the Trust Board. On the contrary,
through some private arrangements with the Board, they were allowed to continue in the said place. Since the lease with the Trust Board had come
to an end in 1985 and there was no right under which the petitioners can continue in possession of the premises. The petitioners are entitled to be
evicted from the said premises.
Learned Advocate General, by placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vaishakhi Ram and Others Vs. Sanjeev Kumar
Bhatiani, , stated that the burden of proving the subletting is on the landlord. But if the landlord proves that the sub tenant is in exclusive possession
of the suit premises, then the onus is shifted to the tenant to prove that it was not a case of subletting. By placing reliance upon paragraph 12 of the
said judgment, he contended that long exclusive possession cannot be taken to be a waiver of right to evict the tenant on the ground of subletting.
On the contrary, the courts have consistently reiterated the principle that in the absence of conscious relinquishment of right to eviction, the question
of waiver on the ground of subletting for eviction by the landlord did not arise. Therefore, the petitioners having been given notices are expected to
quit the premises, which are under their occupation. The Corporation has gone out of its way by taking into account humanitarian considerations
and is willing to provide alternative accommodations on mutual terms and conditions.
In this context, it is necessary to refer to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court presided over by A.P. Shah, C.J. (as he then was) in
W.A. No. 1369 of 2005 and other cases, dated 31.3.2006. In paragraph 37 of the order, wherein similar contentions were raised and in answer
to the contentions raised, in paragraph 13, the Division Bench has held as follows:
...Therefore, assuming without granting that the petitioner derived any right under the aforesaid documents, it shall not continue anymore since it
is clear that the land is required for a public purpose, viz., widening of the road. That apart, the documents themselves restrict the right given to the
lessees thereunder to one year only and that time has expired long ago. Therefore, the petitioner can claim no right under these documents. The
fact that the property taxes have been received from the petitioner and amounts received towards illegal use and damages will not, by themselves,
confer any right on the petitioner to continue in the premises.
Another Division bench judgment of this Court presided over by Markendey Katju, C.J. (as he then was) vide its judgment in A. Thayal
Nayagi Vs. Union of India (UOI), had set out the object of the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 in the following
lines:
...The object of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 is to forcibly evict unauthorised occupants who are
deliberately remaining in occupation of public premises unauthorisedly. Hence the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge is fulfilling exactly
the same object which the aforesaid Act aims at, namely, to forcibly throw out unauthorised occupants from public property. Decent people vacate
the premises when the period of lease or license expires. When a person does not behave in a decent manner, the only way left is to forcibly throw
him out. It is for this purpose that the aforesaid Act was enacted, and the same object has been achieved by the learned single Judge namely, to
throw out an unauthorised occupant. Hence, we see no reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge, which is eminently just
and fair. The writ appeal is dismissed....
The above observations may not be in tune with the spirit of the Act over which interpretations were given by the Supreme Court. To highlight
the said proposition it will be useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. Nusli Neville Wadia
and Another, . The following passages found in paragraphs 40, 41 and 57 from the said judgment may be extracted below:
For the said purpose, Sections 4 and 5 of the Act must be read together. Even the Rules which are validly framed must be read along with the
statutory provisions. Ordinarily although a tenant occupying the property belonging to a government may be somewhat in a worse position than a
tenant having protection under the Rent Control Act as has been held by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Standard Literature Co.
Private Ltd. and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI), but with a view to interpret the provisions of the Act, we must take into consideration the
decisions of this Court laying down the concept of ""bona fide act"" and the ""fair action"" on the part of the owner as laid down in Dwarkadas
Marfatia and Sons Vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, and Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and another Vs. Punjab National Bank and others, .
In Dwarkadas Marfatia this Court clearly held that :(SCC p.303, para 17)
...the public authorities which enjoy this benefit without being hidebound by the requirements of the Rent Act must act for public benefit.
Hence, to that extent, that is liable to be gone into and can be the subject-matter of adjudication.
....
We, however, must not shut our eyes to the objects for which the Act was enacted. It provided for a speedy remedy. The Estate Officer is
expected to arrive at a decision as expeditiously as possible. The provisions of the CPC and the Evidence Act being not applicable, what is
necessary to be complied with is the principles of natural justice.
In view of the above facts, it can be clearly stated that the petitioners did not possess any lease or sublease either from the Corporation or
from the second respondent Trust Board. Even if they had permitted to be in possession by the Trust Board, the original lease having expired in
1985 and there being no further continuance of lease, they are not entitled to contend that they are still under permissive occupation of place at the
instance of the second respondent Trust. On the contrary, in resolution No. 5 of the Trust Board meeting, dated 11.3.2009, the Trust had agreed
that appropriate action should be taken to evict the petitioners and the Commissioner was fully authorised to take action against the so-called
sublessees of the trust. Even the Trust had stopped receiving rents from the petitioners.
In the impugned notice, dated 5.8.2009, the Corporation had clearly stated that if the petitioners did not vacate the premises within seven
days, appropriate legal action will be taken against them. Therefore, the challenge to the impugned notice is misconceived and not based upon any
enforceable legal right. This court, for the reasons set out above, is not inclined to interfere with the impugned notice, dated 5.8.2009. If they are
interested in accepting the offer of alternative accommodation, they can make applications to the Commissioner of Corporation, Chennai for
allotment of places on the terms and conditions as per law. It is open to the Corporation of Chennai to take appropriate legal action for getting
possession of the premises occupied by the petitioners.
In the light of the above, all the writ petitions, i.e. W.P. Nos. 16270 to 16285, 16293 to 16301 and 16303 to 16309 of 2009 will stand
dismissed. W.P. Nos. 16363 to 16376 of 2009 will stand allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected
M.Ps. also will stand dismissed.