Bal Kishan Singh vs Union Of India & Ors.

O R D E R

“i.

Issue an appropriate order or direction quashing and setting aside the Inquiry Report dated 19.05.2026 submitted by the Inquiry Officer and the consequential order dated 16.06.2026 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, whereby the Applicant has been inflicted with the major penalty of dismissal from service;

ii.

Issue an appropriate order or direction declaring the impugned disciplinary proceedings, culminating in the Inquiry Report dated 19.05.2026 and the dismissal order dated 16.06.2026, as illegal, arbitrary, violative of the provisions of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 and the principles of natural justice, and consequently set aside the same;

iii.

Direct the Respondents to reinstate the Applicant in service to the post of Pointsman/HRDR, or to an equivalent post, with continuity of service and all consequential service benefits, including restoration of seniority, notional fixation of pay and continuity for all service purposes;

iv.

Direct the Respondents to release all consequential monetary benefits, including arrears of pay and allowances, together with admissible interest at such rate as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case;

v.

In the alternative, if this Hon'ble Tribunal is of the opinion that any procedural defect requires reconsideration by the departmental authorities, remit the matter to the Disciplinary Authority for fresh consideration strictly in accordance with law after setting aside the impugned Inquiry Report and dismissal order, with liberty to conduct further proceedings only after complying with the provisions of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 and the principles of natural justice;

vi.

Award the costs of the present Original Application in favour of the Applicant and against the Respondents; and

vii.

Pass such other or further order or direction as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit, just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

viii.

Cost of the application may also be awarded.”

“6.

We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length. At the outset, it is required to be noted that against the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer under the provisions of the MVAT Act and CST Act, the assessee straightway preferred writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is not in dispute that the statutes provide for the right of appeal against the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer and against the order passed by the first appellate authority, an appeal/revision before the Tribunal. In that view of the matter, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the assessment order in view of the availability of statutory remedy under the Act. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Satyawati Tondon (supra) in which this Court had an occasion to consider the entertainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by by-passing the statutory remedies, is required to be referred to. After considering the earlier decisions of this Court, in paragraphs 49 to 52, it was observed and held as under:

“49.

The views expressed in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433 were echoed in CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985) 1 SCC 260 in the following words: (SCC p. 264, para 3) “3. … Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute.Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged.”

50.

In Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan (2001) 6 SCC 569 this Court considered the question whether a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was maintainable against an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 19 of the DRT Act and observed: (SCC p. 570, paras 5-6)

“5.

In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short „the Act‟). The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. We do not propose to go into the correctness of the decision of the High Court and whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct or not has to be decided before an appropriate forum.

6.

The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act.”

51.

In CCT v. Indian Explosives Ltd. [(2008) 3 SCC 688] the Court reversed an order passed by the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court quashing the show-cause notice issued to the respondent under the Orissa Sales Tax Act by observing that the High Court had completely ignored the parameters laid down by this Court in a large number of cases relating to exhaustion of alternative remedy.

52.

In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala [(2009) 1 SCC 168] the Court highlighted the parameters which are required to be kept in view by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Paras 29 and 30 of that judgment which contain the views of this Court read as under: (SCC pp. 175-76)

“29.

In our opinion, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration and decide for itself even in the absence of proper affidavits from the State and its instrumentalities as to whether any case at all is made out requiring its interference on the basis of the material made available on record. There is nothing like issuing an ex parte writ of mandamus, order or direction in a public law remedy. Further, while considering the validity of impugned action or inaction the Court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State but would be free to satisfy itself whether any case as such is made out by a person invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

30.

The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether:

(a)

adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;

(b)

the petition reveals all material facts;

(c)

the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute;

(d)

person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches;

(e)

ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;

(f)

grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors. The Court in appropriate cases in its discretion may direct the State or its instrumentalities as the case may be to file proper affidavits placing all the relevant facts truly and accurately for the consideration of the Court and particularly in cases where public revenue and public interest are involved. Such directions are always required to be complied with by the State. No relief could be granted in a public law remedy as a matter of course only on the ground that the State did not file its counter-affidavit opposing the writ petition. Further, empty and self-defeating affidavits or statements of Government spokesmen by themselves do not form basis to grant any relief to a person in a public law remedy to which he is not otherwise entitled to in law.”

53.

In Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Directorate of Enforcement [(2010) 4 SCC 772] the Court was dealing with the issue whether the alternative statutory remedy available under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 can be bypassed and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked. After examining the scheme of the Act, the Court observed: (SCC p. 781, paras 31-32)

“31.

When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. In this case the High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 32. No reason could be assigned by the appellant's counsel to demonstrate why the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 35 of FEMA does not provide an efficacious remedy. In fact there could hardly be any reason since the High Court itself is the appellate forum.”

7.

Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision, the High Court has seriously erred in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the assessment order, by- passing the statutory remedies.

8.

Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this Court by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, referred to hereinabove, are concerned, the question is not about the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, but the question is about the entertainability of the writ petition against the order of assessment by-passing the statutory remedy of appeal. There are serious disputes on facts as to whether the assessment order was passed on 20.03.2020 or 14.07.2020 (as alleged by the assessee). No valid reasons have been shown by the assessee to by-pass the statutory remedy of appeal. This Court has consistently taken the view that when there is an alternate remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under constitutional provisions.

9.

In view of the above and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has seriously erred in entertaining the writ petition against the assessment order. The High Court ought to have relegated the writ petitioner – assessee to avail the statutory remedy of appeal and thereafter to avail other remedies provided under the statute.”

“The second argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the Writ Court ought to have heard the petition on merits also cannot be accepted in view of the settled legal preposition that where an alternative remedy is available, the Writ Court would be slow in entertaining the petitions directly. Further even where the matter had remained pending before the Writ Court for substantial period there was nothing wrong or illegal in relegating the party to approach the Appellate Authority provided under the statute. There can be no issue that the Appellate Authority would be having wider scope and jurisdiction as compared to the writ jurisdiction and, therefore, apparently no prejudice can be caused to the appellant. It is also an admitted fact that there is no interim order operative in favour of the appellant during the pendency of the writ petition.”