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Judgment
S.C. Mittal, J. (Oral)
The suit for the redemption of the properties in question having been dismissed as barred by time by the trial Court, Balkishan preferred an appeal which was also dismissed on the same ground by the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon. Hence, the present regular second appeal has been filed by him in this Court.
The sole contention urged before me by Mr. H.L. Sarin, learned counsel for Balkishan appellant is that with regard to two mortgages, Mutation No. 162/1, dated 26th April, 1910, (Exhibit P. 5) and Mutation No. 967, dated 1st June, 1914 (Exhibit P. 6) amounted to acknowledgment within the meaning of section 18 of the Limitation Act. As such, contended the learned counsel, if the period is computed from the said two dates the suit for redemption of these two mortgages was within time. I have been taken through the contents of the two mutations conducted by the revenue authorities in the discharge of their official duties. It is true that as laid down in NizamudDin and others v. Fateh Din, A.I.R. 1940 Lahore 118, on carries with it the presumption of truth and entries in the mutation proceedings are admissible per se, but having regard to the terms of section 18 of the Limitation Act, I fail to see how in the facts and circumstances of this case, its essential ingredient that an acknowledgement has to be signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, stands satisfied. It is patent that the mutation proceedings do not contain the signatures or thumb impression of the party concerned. Support of this view can be had from Sheo Prasad and others v. Rama Kant and others, A.I.R. 1948 Oudh 257, wherein it was held :
"Entries in a Settlement Khewat mentioning the predecessors of the defendants as mortgagors and the plaintiff's predecessors as mortgagees and signed and attested by the mortgagees and verified by the Settlement Officer, are conscious acknowledgement of the existence of the liability in respect of the mortgage within the meaning of section 19 of the Limitation Act."
For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this appeal. The same is, therefore, dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.