Baidyanath Mahto and Others vs The Agricultural Produce Market Committee and Another

S.N. Mishra and A.K. Ganguly, JJ.—This writ petition has been filed by several firms having their place of business at Principal Market Yard, Shivdhara, Darbhanga. In this writ petition they have challenged the notices issued to them by the Secretary, Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Darbhanga, asking them to deposit monthly licence fee at various rates against allotment of shops to them in the Principle Market Yard. The said notices contained also the directions that the licence fee should be deposited along with the monthly returns required to be filed in respect of their safes and purchase.

The principal contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the ''said Act'') and the rules framed thereunder do not authorise the said Market Committee to realise the monthly licence fee as has been demanded under the impugned notices. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that such fee is nothing but rent which was demanded for providing suitable accommodation for sales and purchase of the agricultural produce. He has further contended that the Petitioners are all paying appropriate market fee to the said market committee as provided u/s 27 of the said Act. The Market Committee, learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended, is therefore, under an obligation to render services and it is by way of rendering such services they have provided accommodation to the Petitioners to deal in agricultural produce. Therefore, further demand for licence fee under the impugned notice is wholly unauthorised and without jurisdiction.

In aid to this main various other ancillary submissions were heard on a number of days by the Division Bench. Various decisions were also cited but this Court having regard to the conduct of the Petitioners In the writ petition refuses to examine the aforesaid contentions on merits for the reasons indicated herein-below.

In the course of argument it was pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the writ Petitioners have suppressed the fact that there are existing lease agreement which were entered into between the Petitioners and the said Market Committee whereunder the Petitioners agreed to pay such licence fee. Such submission was made with reference tip Annexure-E to the rejoinder to the reply of the counter ''affidavit filed by the Respondents and the learned Counsel for the Petitioners contradicted by saying that there is no such argeement and the signatures of the Petitioners have merely been obtained on blank paper. Thereupon, the Court on 22nd March, 1995 directed the learned Counsel for the Respondent Market Committee to produce the original agreement. Pursuant to such orders passed by this Court a supplementary counter affidavit was filed by the said Market Committee disclosing such agreement. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners, however, tried to contend that these agreements are not valid in the eye of law and those agreements cannot be called lease agreement according to the legal connotation of the lease and so on.

Be that as It may, the fact remains that in the writ petition there is no whisper of the fact that such agreement was entered into between the Petitioners and the said Market Committee. This Court considers that the existence of the said agreement between the said agreement between the parties is a vital and also material fact and the same has been suppressed by the Petitioner In the writ petition.

Such conduct on the part of the Petitioners disentitled them to any relief under the writ jurisdiction on this Court. This position is well settled that when an applicant approaches the Court for discretionary and equitable relief, he must approach the Court with clean hands and must display utmost candour and clarity. There must not be any misrepresentation of vital facts in the writ petition on the basis of which the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked. This position has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Vijay Kumar Kathuria Vs. State of Haryana and Others, and again in the case of Welcom Hotel and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, In an Anr. recent judgment in the case of T.N. Rugmani and Another Vs. C. Achutha Menon and Others, the Supreme Court was pleased to observe at page 985 in Paragraphs as follows;

Even an assailable cause or illegal and arbitrary order may fail to move the conscience of the Court due to inequitable and unjustifiable behaviour or conduct in equitable jurisdiction.

As early as in 1917 the same principles were propounded in the judgment of the King''s Bench Division reported in (1917) 1 KB 486 wherein Lord Viscount Reading C.J., was pleased to observe as follows:

Where an exparte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the trus facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant''s affidavit and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing it to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit.

In this case also, this Court has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the suppression of material facts have been deliberately made in order to deceive the Hon''ble Court and obtain an order from this Court without full disclosure of facts. Therefore, this Court without deciding the writ petition on merits dismissed the same on the ground of suppression of material facts. The writ petition is thus dismissed with cost which is assessed at Rs. 5,000/- (Five thousand). Such cost must be paid by the Petitioner to the fund of Legal Aid Committee of Patna High Court.