Baidya Nath Karmakar vs Golak Nath Karmakar

Laik, J.—This Rule is obtained by the Plaintiffs for themselves and as paricharakas of Sri Sri Siva Thakur Jew and is directed against an order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Bankura, by which he directed the Plaintiffs to pay the deficit Court-fees on the valuation at a sum of Rs. 1,12,000.

It was a suit, inter alia, for a declaration that the disputed property was debottar and that it belongs to Siva Thakur and for a further declaration that certain pattas relating to the debater lands described in schedules kha and ga and the auction sales in respect of the properties described in schedules gha, una and cha are collusive and void and also for a declaration that the said transactions were not binding on the deity. The cancellation of the said documents, if necessary, was also prayed for The Plaintiffs have also prayed for framing a scheme for the purpose of seva puja of the deity.

The suit was filed against all the Defendants personally as well as paricharakas of the said deity. The suit was being contested.

For the purpose of jurisdiction, the valuation of the subject-matter was given at a sum of Rs. 1,12,000 being the total value of ka schedule property. For the purposes of Court-fees, however, the Plaintiffs gave different valuations in respect of the prayers made in the plaint. The Defendants challenged that the plaint was insufficiently stamped and that proper Court-fees have not been paid by the Plaintiffs.

The learned Subordinate Judge accepted the contention of the Defendants and directed the Plaintiffs to pay ad valorem Court-fees on the said valuation of Rs. 1,12,000.

Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing in support of the Rule, contended that the principle on which the learned Subordinate Judge has decided the question of Court-fees is erroneous. The view of the learned Subordinate Judge was that the value put by the Plaintiffs for the purposes of jurisdiction should be regarded as the same as value for the purposes of Court-fees. In support of the said principle the learned Subordinate Judge has referred to two decisions, one of the Full Bench of Lahore High Court in the case of AIR 1941 97 (Lahore) and a judgment of Rankin C.J. of this Court in the case of In Re: Court-fee Act and Kalipada Mukharjee, . Mr. Mukherjee rightly pointed out that the aforesaid Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court has been over-ruled by the later Full Bench of the said Lahore High Court in the case of AIR 1949 116 (Lahore) . He further pointed out and again rightly that the principle laid down in the later Full Bench of the Lahore High Court, namely, in the case of Karam llahi has been approved expressly by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, . Our attention was drawn specially to paras. 13, 15 and 16 at pp. 251 and 252 of the said report where the principle has been clearly laid down. In the judgment of Rankin C.J. (2) he himself observed to the following effect:

However that may be, I am sitting here as a taxing Judge and I do not think that it is admissible that in the capacity in which I am really representing the interest of revenue, I should undertake, unless I am obliged, to pronounce finally upon matters which have produced differences of opinion by the Divisional Benches.

However, on the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court it is clear that the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is erroneous and the same must be set aside except that where he has directed the Plaintiffs to put a single sum as representing the total value of all the relief�s claimed.

Mr. Mukherjee at his opening himself stated that the claims should have been split up for the purposes of valuation and the same is not warranted in law and he did not object to the direction of the learned Subordinate Judge to the above effect.

Though Mr. Mukherjee placed before us another Supreme Court decision in the case of Sri Ratnavaramaraja Vs. Smt. Vimla, and contended that whether proper Court-fees are paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the Plaintiff and the State and the Defendant, who may believe and even honestly, that proper Court-fees have not been paid by the Plaintiff, he has still no right to move the superior Court by appeal or in revision against the order adjudging payment of Court-fees payable on the plaint, yet we have heard Mr. Sen, appearing for one of the Defendants opposite parties in this Rule and we have passed the aforesaid order after hearing him.

Accordingly, we set aside the order passed by the Court below, and in lieu thereof the following order is passed. The Plaintiffs would be at liberty to amend their pleadings and would be also at liberty to put their own valuation by one single sum representing the total value of all the claims for the purpose of Court-fees. The Plaintiffs would pay the ad valorem Court-fees under the provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act on their own valuation, as aforesaid! We are making it clear that the valuation of Rs. 1,12,000 given for the purposes of jurisdiction would not be the valuation for the purposes of Court-fees in any event.

The Rule is thus made absolute. There would, however, be no order for costs in this Rule.

Let the records go down immediately.

A.K. Sinha, J.

I agree.