Babaso Shamgonda Patil & Ors. vs Bhauso Balaso Mulik & Ors.

Appellant/third parties/pendete lite purchasers impugns judgment and order dated 30th October 2025 passed below Exhibit-1 in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 42 of 2024 by District Judge-2, Ichalkaranji, thereby refusing to condone delay caused in filing appeal against judgment and order dated 9th September 2019 passed by Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ichalkaranji in Regular Civil Suit No. 287 of 1991.

Respondent no. 1 (original plaintiff) instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 287 of 1991 seeking decree of partition, separate possession and permanent injunction against defendants. It is contention of plaintiff that suit land was originally owned by Raghunathrao Annaso Mulik, who died on 29th December 1979. Plaintiff, defendant nos. 1, 2 and 4 are legal heirs having ¼ share each in suit property. Other defendants have no right or concern with suit property, but they were causing obstruction to plaintiff’s possession. Hence, as parties for the relief of perpetual injunction.

Defendant nos. 1 and 2 admitted that plaintiff and defendant nos. 1 and 2 have ¼ share each in suit property but denied share of defendant no. 4. Defendant no. 4 filed written statement and denied that plaintiff was in possession of suit property. According to defendant no. 4, plaintiff and defendant nos. 1 and 2 have no share in suit property.

The Trial Court framed issues based on pleadings of parties, recorded evidence and partly decreed suit, declaring that heirs of Khanderao, i.e., defendant nos. 1A to 1C, have 2/5 share in suit property, defendant no. 2A has 2/5 share and defendant no. 4 has 1/5 share in suit property.

During pendency of aforesaid suit, present appellants purchased portions of suit lands under different sale deeds executed during period from 1994 to 2002. As such, all appellants are pendente lite purchasers of suit property. They were not parties to suit. Their vendors have not challenged decree or filed appeal. However, present appellants assailed decree before District Judge in appeal. Since there was delay in filing appeal, Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 42 of 2024 was filed seeking delay condonation with appeal. Only plea was employed in application is that appellants were not having knowledge of decree and that they became aware of it only when they received notice on 5^th February 2024 for measurement of suit property in pursuance to execution of decree of partition.

The District Court, after considering submissions, opined that reason given does not constitute sufficient cause, accordingly refused to condone delay and dismissed application vide impugned order dated 13^th October 2025. Hence, this Second Appeal.

Mr. Yuvraj Narwankar, learned Advocate appearing for appellants, submits that decree is passed behind back of appellants/purchasers, who were not made parties to suit. They purchased property for valuable consideration under registered sale deed without knowledge of pending suit. Appellants had made paper publication before purchase of property, to which neither plaintiff nor anyone else raised objection. Appellants got knowledge of decree only after receipt of notice of execution of decree passed in suit. Immediately, they made representations to Tahsildar and revenue authorities against execution. Lastly, they filed appeal before District Court along with application seeking condonation of delay, which has been erroneously rejected.

Per contra, Mr. Manoj Patil, learned Advocate appearing for respondents, submits that plaintiffs have been litigating for their rights since 1991 and ultimately on 9^th September 2019 a decree for partition and separate possession has been passed. Defendants have not challenged decree passed by Trial Court. Appellants, being pendente lite purchasers, have no right to file appeal without leave of Court. In present case, there are no grounds for grant of leave to file appeal. Appeal has been filed after four years of passing of decree. Only reason sought to be made out for delay is that appellants had no knowledge of decree. However, such contention is fallacious. Appellants, in collusion with original defendants, are making attempts to protract execution of decree.

Having considered submissions advanced by learned Advocates appearing for respective parties, it can be observed that appellants are third parties and pendente lite purchasers of suit property. They purchased suit properties under different sale deeds during period from 1994 to 2002 from original defendants. Regular Civil Suit No. 287 of 1991 filed by respondents/plaintiffs came to be decreed on 9th September 2019. Appellants filed appeal before District Judge along with Miscellaneous Application No. 42 of 2024 seeking condonation of delay of about four years in filing appeal. District Judge rejected application observing that appellants failed to make out sufficient cause for condoning delay. Appellate Court observed that reason put forth by appellants regarding ignorance of decree passed in year 2019 is fallacious, as forefathers of purchasers or family members of purchasers were originally parties to suit. As such, they had knowledge of pending litigation in Regular Civil Suit No. 287 of 1991.

It is trite that pendente lite purchasers step into the shoe of vendors and bound by decree passed against them. Their rights are subordinate to rights of parties to suit. Such purchasers are not entitled to challenge decree as a matter of right without making out valid grounds. In such cases, it is for purchasers to demonstrate that they are bona fide purchasers without notice and that their rights are likely to be affected by decree. The Court in appropriate cases, may exercise discretion and permit pendente lite purchasers to file appeal. In such cases, pendente lite purchasers are required to file independent application seeking leave to file appeal against judgment and decree passed against vendor. In present case, it is not discernible from record that appeal filed before District Court was accompanied by any independent application seeking leave to file appeal.

So far as impugned order declining condonation of delay in filing appeal is concerned, copy of plaint shows that plaintiffs and defendant nos. 1 to 4 were legal heirs of original owner Raghunathrao Annaso Mulik, whereas other defendants were added as parties on contention that they were obstructing possession of plaintiffs over suit property. District Judge has rightly observed that family members and close relatives of present appellants were originally parties to suit and were later deleted.

Appellant nos. 1 to 10, 11 and 12 are related to original defendant no. 16. Appellant no. 13 is son of original defendant no. 18. Appellant nos. 22 to 25 are family members of defendant no. 15, whereas appellant nos. 26 to 29 are family members of original defendant no. 13. Defendant nos. 12 to 18 were later deleted from proceedings of suit. In light of aforesaid factual aspects, learned District Judge observed in impugned order that it cannot be believed that appellants were unaware of proceedings in Regular Civil Suit No. 287 of 1991 or that they were bona fide purchasers without notice. Record indicates that all appellants are residents of Tilawani, Taluka. Hatkanangale and suit properties are situated at same place. Plaintiffs and defendants are also residents of same place. These factual aspects further demonstrate, falsity in contention of appellants that they purchased property without notice or that they had no knowledge of decree passed in suit.

Doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act applies to transfer of suit property during pendency of litigation. Only exception to principle is when transfer is effected under authority of Court and on terms imposed by it. Purchaser from party to suit is bound by result of proceedings, even if he had no notice of suit or proceedings. In case of Bellamy v. Sabine, decided by English Court of Chancery reported in (1857) 1 De G & J 566, rationale underlying lis pendens has been explained by observing that if any alienation or material change to subject matter during pendency of proceedings were permitted to prevail, it would defeat very course of such proceedings. Keeping in mind aforesaid principles of law, delay of almost four years caused in filing third party appeal before District Court cannot be condoned. Rigors of law of limitation must be applied in such cases. Plaintiff has been litigating for last 35 years to secure rights in respect of ancestral property. During pendency of suit, defendants made reckless transfers of property. Apparently, with intent to obstruct decree, when execution reached final stage, purchasers filed appeal along with application for condonation of delay on ground that they had no knowledge of decree. In present case, reasons assigned for condonation of delay as well as very appeal do not appear to be bona fide.

Appellants can exercise their right for equitable partition in share of their vendors, in light of law laid down by Supreme Court of India in case of Khemchand Shankar Choudhari and Another Vs. Vishnu Hari Patil and Others, reported in (1983) 1 SCC 18 observed in paragraph no.6 as under :

In that view of matter, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal.

In result, Second Appeal stands dismissed.

Learned counsel appearing for Appellant after dismissal of Second Appeal seeks continuation of interim protection that was granted during pendency of Second Appeal for period of 8 weeks.

The perusal of order granting interim protection would show that in fact this Court had specifically observed that Respondent is in possession of suit property. As such, no interim protection was granted.

In that view of matter, the prayer cannot be considered.