B. Sridevi vs State Of Telangana

This Writ Petition is filed seeking a Writ of Certiorari calling for all the connected records pertaining to the order of punishment issued by the 2nd respondent vide proceedings dt.25-10-2018 imposing a penalty of stoppage of increments for two years with cumulative effect as being perverse, illegal and arbitrary and consequently direct the respondents to restore the seniority of the petitioner with all consequential benefits.

Heard Sri D.V. Sitharam Murthy, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for Sri N.Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Law and Legislative Affairs appearing for 1st respondent and Sri Y.Rama Rao, learned counsel for 2nd respondent.

It has been contended by the petitioner that she was initially appointed as a Junior Civil Judge on 01-05-2008 after undergoing regular selection process and after rendering considerable length of service, she was promoted as Senior Civil Judge in the year 2017 and while she was working as II Metropolitan Magistrate (Juvenile Court), Ranga Reddy District, certain complaints were made against her alleging that the bails have been granted in a biased manner and the Registrar (Vigilance) High Court, had issued proceedings on 14-11-2016 directing the Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, to enquire into the said allegations and submit a report. Thereafter, the District Judge, Ranga Reddy, has issued a memo on 22-11-2016 directing her to submit explanation and remarks on the said complaint. She has submitted an explanation and remarks on 29-11-2016 denying the said allegations. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent vide proceedings dt.29-07-2017 was pleased to issue a memorandum of charges, in all, two articles of charges were framed, which reads as under:

“Articles of Charge No.1:-

That you smt. B.Sridevi, II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy, while working as II Metropolitan Magistrate (Juvenile Court), Cyberabad at L.B.Nagar, during the relevant period, on 06-09-2016 on the requisition filed by the Police Meerpet in Cr. No.639 of 2016 seeking custody of the accused for seven days, namely, Sri Khaza Farazz Hussain (A-1), Sri Godala Ravinder Reddy (A-2) and Sri Anthati Ramesh @ Ramesh Goud (A-3) for recovery of fabricated documents, you passed orders on 08-09-2016 granting police custody of accused Nos.1 to 3 and 6 also for 7 days though the police did not pray for police custody of accused No.6, thus, contrary to the provision of law acted in a biased manner detriment to the interest of the parties, which act of yours, if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct and unbecoming of a judicial officer within the meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

Article of Charge No.2:-

While so,

(i) On 12-09-2016, on the bail application filed by Sri M.P. Bhargav, Advocate, for accused No.3 vide Crl.M.P.No.1602/2016 in Cr.No.644 of 2016, you posted the same to 15-09-2016 for arguments and on the same day, having heard arguments, granted bail to the accused No.3, and

(ii) Similarly, on 12-09-2016 on the bail application filed by Sri R.Rajender and Sri Srikanth Mudaliar, Advocates for accused No.6, vide Crl. M.P.No.1639 of 2016 in Cr. No.644 of 2016, you after having heard on 15-09-2016 posted the same to 17-09-2016 for arguments; but on 15-09-2016, the counsel for accused No.6 not pressed the application in Crl.M.P.No.1639 of 2016, but filed another bail application vide Crl.M.P.No.1779 of 2016 in Cr.No.644 of 2016 for A-6 and on the same day, you heard the matter and passed order on 16-09-2016 granting bail and

(iii) On 15-09-2016, on the bail application filed by Sri K.Srinivasa Reddy, Advocate, for accused No.7 vide Crl.M.P.No.1762 of 2016 in Cr.No.644 of 2016, you having heard the same allowed it on the same day, and

Thus, contrary to the hearing of the matters in Crl.M.P.No.1602 of 2016, Crl.M.P.No.1639 of 2016 and Crl.M.P.No.1762 of 2016 on 15-09-2016, you submitted in your remarks, dated 29-11-2016 addressed to the District Judge, Ranga Reddy to the effect that the bail applications of accused Nos.3 and 7 in Crl.M.P.No.644 of 2016 were not considered and no such orders were passed on 15-09-2016 as you wre presiding Juvenile Justice Board at Nagole on 15-09-2016 and made misleading statements against the records and gave wrong signals in deciding the matters filed by different advocates in a same case for the reasons best known to you, which act of yours, if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct and unbecoming of a judicial officer within the meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.”

The petitioner has submitted a detailed explanation on 03-11-2017 denying the charges and requested to exonerate her from the charges. Not satisfied with her explanation, the 2nd respondent had appointed an enquiry officer to enquire into the allegations levelled against her and the enquiry officer, without appreciating any of the contentions raised by the petitioner, has held the charges were proved. The enquiry report dt.25-07-2018 was communicated to the petitioner and she has submitted objections to the enquiry officer’s report on 21-08-2018 and the 2nd respondent has imposed a penalty of stoppage of two increments for a period of two years with cumulative effect vide proceedings dt.25-10-2018.

Learned counsel for the petitioner had contended that the charge itself could not have been framed because the allegations levelled against the petitioner are all pertaining to discharge of her official duties and also in respect of exercise of discretion powers given to the judicial officer. If a Judicial Officer has exercised his/ her discretion in one particular matter, it cannot be questioned as a misconduct and no mala fides can be attributed while discharging her duties as the Judicial Officer and imposing major penalty of stoppage of two increments for two years with cumulative effect is too harsh punishment and a perusal of the charge itself is not definite and the allegations in the charge memo are also vague and if a Judicial Officer exercised his/her power in order to discharge her duties as a Judicial Officer, no misconduct can be alleged.

Learned counsel for the petitioner had relied upon a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court reported in Union of India and others v. K.K.Dhawan AIR 1993 S.C. 1478, wherein the Supreme Court held as under:

“28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases:

(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;

(ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;

(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant;

(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers;

(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;

(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago “though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great”.

The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive. However, we may add that for a mere technical violation or merely because the order is wrong and the action not falling under the above enumerated instances, disciplinary action is not warranted. Here, we may utter a word of caution. Each case will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postulated.”

Learned counsel for the petitioner had further contended that admittedly, in the instant case, no allegation of corruption has been attributed against the petitioner even in the charge memo. The bail orders which were granted by the petitioner were all in exercise of her power while discharging duties as Judicial Officer. In some bail applications, if the situation warranted, the petitioner has granted bails on the same day, and in respect of certain cases, where some instructions were to be received by the Public Prosecutor, those bail applications could have been delayed by few days that itself would not constitute a misconduct. Therefore, appropriate orders be passed in the Writ Petition by setting aside the punishment of stoppage of two increments for two years with cumulative effect, as no case is made out against the petitioner and the allegations levelled against the petitioner were all pertaining to the discretion of a Judicial Officer, which the petitioner has exercised, by performing her duties as a Judicial Officer. Therefore, the Writ Petition be allowed with al consequential benefits.

Learned  Government  Pleader  for  the  1st respondent and the learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent had contended that no doubt, the allegations levelled against the petitioner in the charge memo are all against the petitioner in granting bails in certain cases and ought not granting bails in few other cases, and the manner in which the petitioner has been granting bails amounts to misconduct as the petitioner was acting in a biased manner while discharge of her discretionary powers. Therefore, the disciplinary authority has rightly imposed punishment of stoppage of two increments for two years with cumulative effect and the disciplinary authority has imposed the above said punishment for the proven misconduct in the enquiry. Therefore, there are no merits in the Writ Petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.

This Court, having considered the rival submissions by the parties, is of the considered view that the nature of allegations levelled against the petitioner is that the petitioner has granted custody of the accused. Even though the police did not pray for custody of A-6 and the next allegation is that the petitioner had granted bail in certain cases within few days which is not in accordance with law. In the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in K.K.Dhawan (cited supra), it was held in paras 28 and 29 that the discretionary powers exercised by the Judicial Officer cannot be found faulted and a perusal of the allegations in the charge memo also are not serious in nature. It only deals with discretionary powers exercised by the Judicial Officer. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the charges levelled against the petitioner itself is not only definite but also vague and it deals with discharge of discretionary powers of the Judicial Officers, and therefore, no case is made out against the petitioner. Hence, imposing a punishment of stoppage of two increments for a period of two years with cumulative effect is too harsh punishment and accordingly the same is liable to be set aside and therefore the Writ Petition is deserved to be allowed.

Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed setting aside the impugned proceedings dt.25-10-2018 issued by the 2nd respondent and the respondents are directed to restore the seniority of the petitioner with all consequential benefits. There shall be no order as to costs.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.