B. Savithri vs Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Tribunal

The present Writ Appeal is arising out of an Order dated 08.12.2017 passed in W.P.No.3035 of 2011 by the learned Single Judge.

The facts of the case reveal that the appellant before this Court purchased plot Nos.683 and 684, admeasuring 280 square yards each situated in Survey No.227/1 of Bahadurpalli Village, Medchal Taluk, Ranga Reddy District, under registered sale deeds bearing document Nos.285 of 1982 and 294 of 1982, dated 21.01.1982 from Sri Sainath Cooperative Housing Society Limited. The undisputed facts of the case also reveal that the appellant has not paid development charges and in those circumstances, the dispute was referred under Section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 ('Cooperative Societies Act', for short) and an Award was passed under Section 62 of the Cooperative Societies Act directing the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.28,000/-(Rupees twenty eight thousand only) on or before 31.03.2002 and it was also observed that failing to pay the said amount, the registration of the plots shall be cancelled. However, the appellant did not pay the amount on or before 31.03.2002 and by registered document dated 09.03.2004, the Society cancelled the sale deeds executed in favour of the appellant and sold the said plots by executing registered sale deeds on 23.04.2004 to other persons waiting in the queue. The appellant preferred an Appeal under Section 76(3) of the Cooperative Societies Act before the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Tribunal, Hyderabad and also preferred an application for condonation of delay as the Appeal was preferred after expiry of 6 years 4 months and 14 days and the Tribunal has dismissed the Application preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The Order was passed by the Tribunal on 03.06.2009 and the same was challenged before the learned Single Judge vide W.P.No.3035 of 2011 and the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition by Order dated 08.12.2017. The same is reproduced as under:-

"Before examining the submission of Smt B.Vasantha Lakshmi, learned counsel for the petitioner it is necessary to bear in mind that the jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been invoked by the petitioner seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction such as in cases where orders are passed without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction or where, in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a Writ, but not an error of fact however grave it may appear to be. The adequacy or sufficient of evidence, and the inference of fact to be drawn therefrom, cannot be agitated in certiorari proceedings. (Syed Yakoob v. K.S.Radhakrishnan) AIR 1964 SC 477.

If the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or has erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence, or if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, it would be an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Where the conclusion of law by the Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, or in ignorance of it or even in disregard of it or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Whether or not an error is an error of law, and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and upon the nature and scope of the legal provisions which are alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened (Syed Yakoob).

Unlike an appellate authority which can re-appreciate the evidence on record, the High Court, in the exercise of its powers of judicial review, would not substitute its view for that of the Tribunal nor would it re-appreciate the evidence on record to arrive at a conclusion different from that of the Tribunal whose order is impugned, in certiorari proceedings, before it. Even if two views are possible, and the Tribunal has taken one of the possible views, the High Court would not interfere, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, even if it were to be satisfied that other possible view, canvassed before it, is more attractive.

Bearing these principles in mind, let us now examine whether the order passed by the Cooperative Tribunal necessitates interference. It is not in dispute that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was invoked by the petitioner six years four months and fourteen days after the award was passed. The petitioner claims that she secured a copy of the order on 14.02.2008, and filed an appeal well within the sixty days limitation prescribed under Section 76(3) of the Act. From the facts, as noted in the order passed by the Tribunal, it is evident that the respondent society had sent a notice to the petitioner at her last known address; they had, thereafter, caused publication, in Eenadu newspaper, of an award having been passed. The Tribunal has held, not without jurisdiction, that Eenadu was a largely circulated newspaper; when she changed her address, the petitioner had failed to inform the respondent-Society of the change in her address; and it is not even the petitioner's case that the society had sent notices to an address other than the one which he had furnished to them.

The Tribunal, therefore, computed the period of limitation, for preferring an appeal, from the date of the award, and not from the date on which the petitioner procured a copy thereof. The Tribunal has furnished reasons for its refusal to condone the inordinate delay of six years four months and fourteen days from the date of the award till the date on which the appeal was preferred. The findings, recorded in the impugned order, cannot be said either to be perverse or to be based on no evidence. The order under challenge in these proceedings does not also suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record necessitating interference in certiorari proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. I see no reason, therefore, to interfere with the order. It is, however, made clear that the petitioner's contention that a registered sale deed could not have been cancelled by the society or by the arbitrator, and the only recourse the society had, to have the registered sale deeds cancelled, was to file a suit before the competent Civil Court, has not been examined in these proceedings, since the only question, which arises for consideration in these writ proceedings, is whether the Tribunal was justified in refusing to exercise its discretion to condone the delay in preferring the appeal, of six years four months and fourteen days from the date of the award. The Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. The miscellaneous pending, if any, shall stand closed. No costs."

The undisputed facts of the case make it clear that the appellant did not pay the development charges in spite of therebeing an Award passed in the matter and the publication in respect of payment of development charges was made in Eenadu Telugu daily newspaper and the Award was also published in Eenadu Telugu daily newspaper and the newspaper is a popular Telugu daily having wide circulation. The statement of the appellant that she was not aware of the Award does not help the appellant as held by the Tribunal as well as by the learned Single Judge. The appellant has also taken a stand that because of the change of her address, she could not receive notice issued by the Arbitrator.

In the considered opinion of this Court, in case of change of address, the appellant should have informed the Society about the change of address and the Society has sent notices to the address furnished by the appellant only. The Tribunal was justified in computing the period of limitation for preferring the Appeal is from the date of award, i.e., 01.12.2001 and not from the date on which the petitioner obtained a copy of the Award, i.e., 14.02.2008 and the petitioner obtained the certified copy after six years of passing of the Award. The Award was published in newspaper and undisputedly, there was a delay of more than six years in filing the Appeal before the Tribunal. The other important aspect of the case is that the plots in question, which are the subject matter of the dispute, were allotted to other persons and it has been brought to the notice of this Court that the said other persons have also constructed houses on the said plots and therefore, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the Order passed by the Tribunal in dismissing the application for condonation of delay as well as the Order passed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition.

Resultantly, the writ appeal is dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.