B. Anandan vs The Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department, Govt, of Tamil Nadu, Fort St. George, Chennai-9 and The District Collector and District Magistrate, Thoothukudi District, Thoothukudi

V.S. Sirpurkar, J.—An order dated 12.9.1998 passed by the District Collector and District Magistrate, Tuticorin u/s 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Forest-Offenders and Slum-Grabbers Act, 1982 (Act No. 14 of 1982), directing the detention of one Buckle Nadar, son of Ramaiah Nadar is in challenge in this petition. The said Buckle Nadar has been dubbed is a Bootlegger in the aforementioned Order.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner at the outset invited our attention to the fact that the Sponsoring Authority had sworn to an affidavit only on 9-9-1998 while the order was passed on 12.9.1998. The learned Counsel pointed out that the Sponsoring Authority, therefore, was not in a position to know that the remand was extended on 11.9.1998, as the earlier remand had ended on 11.9.1998 which was a date after the swearing of the affidavit. From this, the learned Counsel carries his further argument that, there was no material before the detaining authority to come to the conclusion that the remand was extended from 11.9.1998 to 25.9.1998. The learned Counsel, therefore, suggests that the detaining authority has acted without application of mind and has relied upon certain materials which were extraneous to the records, as in fact there was nothing before the detaining authority to show that the remand was extended.

The learned Public Prosecutor, however, countered these arguments by suggesting that the affidavit dated 9-9-1998 was not the last affidavit and in fact the Sponsoring Authority had filed an affidavit on 11-9-1998 on which date he also collected certain documents, they being the remand order dated 11-9-1998 extending the same up to 25-9-1998 as also an extract of total number of remands and their duration. The learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the two documents which the Sponsoring Authority had filed along with the affidavit dated 11-9-1998 have actually been supplied to the detenu on 13-9-1998 itself which would be clear to suggest that the relied upon documents have actually been supplied and that the detaining authority was aware of the remand having been extended from 11-9-1998 to 25-9-1998. We have ourselves seen the documents. The learned Counsel for the petitioner however complains that the affidavit of the Sponsoring Authority has not been supplied to the detenu at all. Now it is not necessary for the authorities to supply the affidavit of the Sponsoring Authority particularly because such affidavit in all these matters cannot be said to be a relied upon document. We have ourselves seen the affidavit, wherein a specific reference has been made to the documents to which we have already adverted to meaning, the remand order and the special report by the Sponsoring Authority This convinces us to suggest that the fact that the remand was extended from 11-9-1998 to 25-9-1998 was well within the knowledge of the detaining authority because of the documents having been placed before him and also because the said documents ultimately came to be relied on and therefore, supplied to the detenu. In our view, the non-supply of the affidavit by the Sponsoring Authority would not be of any consequence. In view of this, the argument of the learned Counsel that there was no material before the detaining authority to come to the conclusion that the detenu was a remand prisoner on the day when the detention order was passed and that his remand was extended from 11-9-1998 to 25-9-1998 is without any substance.

The learned Counsel then submitted that there are some blanks at pages 13 and 25. We have ourselves examined the records. What is left blank is Property Register Number. We are not impressed by this omission which could be even due to the typographical error or because of the mechanical error. No prejudice is caused to the detenu on account of the non-mention of the Property Register Numbers at page No. 25. Therefore, we are not in a position to accept the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the non-mention of the Property Register Number in the Book is fatal to the detention. No other point has been argued before us. In short, there is no merit in the petition and it must be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed.