B. Anand Mohan vs Government of Andhra Pradesh and others

Umesh Chandra Banerjee, C.J.—Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others, the law as regards the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of issuance of a Writ of Certiorari is well settled and one need not dilate much on that score, excepting however recording that the jurisdiction as conferred under the Constitution is a supervisory one and the High Court exercising such jurisdiction is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. Appreciation of evidence cannot be had by the High Court and the High Court is, though, authorised to correct an error of law apparent on the face of the record, but an error effect, however grave it may appear to be, cannot be interfered with in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is, however, to be noted that in regard to a finding of feet recorded by the Tribunal, a Writ of Certiorari can be issued, if it is shown that in recording the said finding the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence, which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, a finding of fact based on no evidence would be regarded as an error of law, which can be corrected by a Writ of Certiorari. Insufficiency or inadequacy of evidence cannot be said to be a ground for interference by the writ Court. In this context, reference can be made to the two decisions of the Patna High Court in the case of Management of Junkundar Colliery of Messrs B. Mondal & Co., v. Sahadeo Thakur, 1974 Lab. I.C. 417 and Bihar Khadi Gram Udyog Samity, Muzaffarpur v. State of Bihar, 1977 Lab.I.C. 466 as also Calcutta High Court decision in the case of Tollygunge Club Ltd. v. Fifth Industrial Tribunal, 1985 (1) L.L.J. 258 ought to be noted. The Patna High Court, in no uncertain terms observed that even in the event of a wrong perusal of evidence by the Labour Court, the High Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be justified in weighing the evidence for itself as if it were sitting in an appeal against an order of the Labour Court. In the second noted decision of the Patna High Court it has been observed that even if the Court can reasonably arrive at a conclusion different from that of the Labour Court but that cannot clothe the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with the power to interfere with the findings of the Labour Court, The Calcutta High Court also in the same view recorded that there should not be any interference unless, of course, the rinding of the Labour Court is such that no reasonable person could come to such a finding and on the ground of perversity the finding can be interfered with by the writ Court and for no others.

This obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities ought to be the guiding principle so as to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Financial Corporation Vs. Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others, of the Report, observed :

"The obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. This doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi-judicial authorities are bound to observe. It is true that the distinction between a quasi-judicial and the administrative action has become thin, as pointed out by this Court as far back as 1970 in A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . Even to the extent of judicial scrutiny/ judicial review in the case of administrative action cannot be larger than in the case of quasi-judicial action. If the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decisions and orders of quasi-judicial authorities it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative authorities. In the matter of administrative action, it is well known, more than one choice is available to the administrative authorities; they have a certain amount of discretion available to them. They have "a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred'''' (Lord Diplock in Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Metropolitan Borough Council of Tameside, 1977 AC 1014, 1064 :(1976) 3A11.ER665). The Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of administrative authorities in such cases. Only when the action of the administrative authority is so unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, can the Court intervene. To quote the classic passage from the judgment of Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesday Corporation, (1948) 1 KB 223, 229 :(1947) 2 All.ER 680).

"It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word ''unreasonable'' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with the discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting ''unreasonably''. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it may within the powers of the authority."

Having discussed the law on the subject briefly, it would be convenient at this juncture to advert to the contextual tacts briefly. The factual score depict that one Sri B. Ananda Mohan, Sub-Judge, was subjected to a regular departmental enquiry by reason of specific reports of misconduct and on receipt of a preliminary enquiry report it w:as decided by the High Court that a regular departmental enquiry ought to be initiated against the said Judicial Officer B. Ananda Mohan and in term therewith a regular departmental enquiry did take place and one Sri Dubagunta Subrahmanyam, Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad was appointed as the Enquiry Officer to conduct the enquiry. The charge sheet available from the record depicts that there were fourteen (14) charges levelled against the charged officer though, however, the enquiry officer did exonerate the officer concerned from charges 4, 5 and 9 but did find him guilty of charges 1 to 3, 6 to 8 and 10 to 14.

The records depict that all the fourteen (14) charges were communicated to the charged officer along with Form No.I requiring him to submit his written statement in his defence. The charged officer submitted statement in his defence and requested for an oral enquiry. During the enquiry, as the facts record, the enquiry officer examined 23 witnesses, three documents Exs. P-l to P-3 in support of the charges. Three other witnesses were examined as D.Ws. 1 to 3 and a set of 35 documents were also marked on behalf of the defence. The charged officer also filed additional written statement, after, however, the closure of evidence. The enquiry officer, however, on consideration of the material and record, came to the conclusion as above. The records further depict that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh considered the enquiry report and the entire record of enquiry was supplied to the charged officer requiring him to submit his comments and explanation in regard thereto and the charged officer in fact has submitted his explanation. The records further depict that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh did consider the explanation of the charged officer, as also the contentions raised by him in the written note and on consideration of the same the High Court rejected the contentions of the charged officer as they are not satisfactory and agreed with the finding of the enquiry officer in respect of charges 1 to 3, 6 to 8 and 10 to 14 which were framed and proved against the charged officer and the High Court came to a conclusion that in view of the gravity of the charges, the punishment of compulsory retirement from service should be imposed on the charged officer.

The records further depict that subsequently the High Court of Andhra Pradesh recommended to the Governor of Andhra Pradesh to issue orders accordingly imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement from service upon the charged officer, and approached the Government with a request to cause issuance of final orders accordingly. The records further depict that in terms therewith a notification was published in the A.P. Gazette dated 24-06-1997 recording the finding: "Under sub-rule (4) of Rule 21 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby impose upon Sri B. Ananda Mohan, formerly Sub-Judge, Nandyal now Sub-Judge, Medak, the punishment of compulsory retirement from service with immediate effect."

It is this order of compulsory retirement which is under challenge in this writ proceeding, the principle contention being that there was total lack of reliable evidence and the enquiry officer clearly fell into an error and the High Court also in its administrative side did not apply its mind to recommend the" punishment for compulsory retirement. The contention of the writ petitioner has been that compulsory retirement is a stigma attached to the service conditions and as such both the enquiry officer and the High Court ought to have dealt with the matter in a manner and in accordance with the known principles of law and not de hors the same. A faint attempt has also been made to bring home the submissions as regards applicability of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Mitter Vs. The Union of India (UOI), was relied upon. We, however, do not sec in the contextual facts to draw any support from the decision of the Supreme Court. The facts are completely different and are clearly distinguishable in nature and as such we need not dilate much on that score.

The other contention of the writ petitioner is in regard to having a discriminatory treatment being meted out by the High Court. A glimpse of the charge would, however, depict that while constructing a residential building at Madanapalle, though the factum of construction by itself would not be taken to be an offence, but the charged officer had been in the habit of pestering some advocates and others to arrange building material on most favourable terms or free of cost and transport of the same by lorries without payment of any transport charges- It is further noticed that the charged officer has strange and unheard of, behavioural pattern and no sooner he would pronounce the judgment in a case he was in the habit of calling the advocates, against whom he made the decision, to the chambers and discuss and explain as to why and how he was not wrong in deciding the case in that manner. The report of the District Judge show that the preliminary enquiry revealed that this practice of the learned Judge is not restrictive to the advocates appearing for the parties but also for even some other advocates wholly unconnected with the matter. The fourteen (14) charges framed in the matter against the charged officer have been deliberately omitted so as to achieve brevity in the matter by reason of the same being rather bugish in nature but the charges are far too serious in nature and ought not to brushed aside. A Judicial Officer not only must administer justice in a manner and in consonance with the known principles of law but the situation demands that the other behavioural conduct apart from the Court proceedings ought to be such so as to be worthy of the office of the Judicial Officer. Judiciary is one of the pivotal pillars of our democratic system and no erosion, even a pretended erosion can be permitted, otherwise, the people would lose faith in the judiciary which would mean and imply a dent in the entire judicial system of the country.

In any event, judicial review as envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution also has its limitation and since the days of Syed Yakoob''s case (supra) there is total identity of expression of views pertaining to the jurisdiction of the law Courts in a matter like this. A long catena of decisions without any exception decided that the High Court in cases of Departmenlal enquiries and findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of the appellate Court and the jurisdiction of the High Court is very restricted and limited and it is only in exceptional cases that such jurisdiction is to be exercised to wit, when it is found that the domestic enquiry stands vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice or denial of reasonable opportunity or the findings are based on no evidence or the punishment imposed is totally disproportionate to the proven misconduct of an employee. The list above may not be exhaustive but law Courts are quite categorical as regards the availability of judicial review insofar as interference with the findings of the lower appellate authorities are concerned. In this context reference maybe made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and another Vs. Ashok Kumar Arora, wherein the Supreme Court in paragraph 18 of the report observed:

"18. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate Court/Authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity, findings are based on no evidence, and or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proven misconduct of an employee. There is catena of judgments of this Court which had settled the law on this topic and it is not necessary to refer to all these decisions. Suffice it to refer to few decisions of this Court on this topic viz State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Sree Rama Rao, , State of Andhra Pradesh and Others Vs. Chitra Venkata Rao, , Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil Lines, Nagpur and another Vs. Ramchandra and others, and Nelson Motis Vs. Union of India and another, ."

In view of the factum of the law being so well settled we do not see any infirmity in the decision of the High Court in the facts of the matter under consideration, as such no exception can be taken to the recommendation neither the subsequent issuance of the Government Order being the subject-matter under challenge in the writ petition can be assailed in any way.

The High Court in its wisdom and discretion having regard to the contextual facts has acted in a manner which cannot by any stretch be termed to be perverse or de hors the provisions of any law warranting intervention of the Writ Court.

On the wake of the reasonings as above, we do not find any merit in the matter, as such this writ petition foils and is dismissed. No order as to costs.