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Judgment
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 14.08.2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, HP. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.02.2012 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 2, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Gulrej Mohammad (PW1) was driving a Maruti car bearing registration No. HP-31-6251 on 30.01.2008. Kuleeep Singh (PW5) and Surekha Devi (PW2) were travelling with him. The car reached near Dadhol bridge at about 7:45 am. A truck bearing registration No. HP-24A-4723 came from the opposite side at a high speed. The informant drove the car towards the unpaved portion of the road. However, the truck hit the car. The informant and Surekha Devi sustained injuries. The driver identified himself as Avtar Chand (the accused). The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused and the high speed of the truck. The matter was reported to the police, and the police recorded an entry No. 2 in the daily diary. SI Mahender Singh (PW13) went to the spot for verification. He recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW1/B) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW1/B) was registered. SI Mahinder Singh (PW13) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW13/B). Gandak Chand (PW9) took photographs of the spot (Ext.PW9/A to Ext.PW9/E), whose negatives are Ext.PW9/A1 to Ext.PW9/A5. SI Mahinder Singh seized the truck bearing registration No. HP-24A-4723 and the car bearing registration No. HP-31-6251 vide memos (Ext.PW1/D and Ext.PW1/C). Dalel Singh (PW7) examined the truck and found no defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued a report (Ext.PW7/A). HHC Dev Raj (PW8) examined the Car and found that there was no defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW8/A). Dr Singara Singh (PW4) examined Surekha Devi and found that she had sustained multiple injuries which could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW4/B). He also examined the informant and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. He advised X-ray. Dr D. Bhangal (PW10) went through the X-ray and found that there was no fracture in the X-ray. Dr Singara Singh (PW4) issued an MLC (Ext.PW4/A) stating that the nature of injury was simple and the injuries could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
The prosecution examined thirteen witnesses to prove its case. Informant Gulrej Mohammad (PW1), Surekha Devi (PW2) and Kuldeep Singh (PW5) were travelling in the car. Virender Kumar (PW3) was posted as a radiographer who took the X-rays of the injured. Dr Singara Singh (PW4) conducted the medical examination of the injured. HC Ramesh Kumar (PW6) witnessed the recoveries. Dalel Singh (PW7) examined the truck. HHC Dev Raj (PW8) examined the car. Gandak Chand (PW9) took the photographs. Dr D Bhangal (PW10) went through the X-rays. SI Ram Dass (PW11) prepared the challan. Rajesh Kumar (PW12) proved the entry in the daily diary. Mahinder Singh (PW13) investigated the matter.
The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He stated that the driver of the car had hit the truck. The witnesses demanded money from him, and when he refused, a false case was made against him. He was innocent. He examined Subhash Chand (DW1) in his defence.
The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the occupants of the car corroborated each other. There was nothing in their cross-examination to show that they made false statements. The accused did not dispute the fact that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident. The accident had occurred on the extreme left side of the road, which corroborated the informant's version that he had stopped the car after seeing the truck being driven at a high speed. The informant and Surekha Devi (PW2) had sustained simple injuries in the accident. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as follows:
| Sections | Sentences |
279 of the Indian Penal Code | The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for four months, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days. |
| 337 of the Indian Penal Code | The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹300/-, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 8 days. |
Both the sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. | |
Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the statements of the prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. The site plan showed that the car was on the unpaved portion of the road 2 feet away from the paved portion, whereas the truck was towards its right side. The site plan corroborated the informant's version that he had stopped the car after seeing the truck and the truck had hit him on the wrong side of the road. The prosecution witnesses consistently stated that the truck was being driven towards the wrong side of the road, which violated the Rule of the Road regulation. The mechanical reports did not show any defect in the truck that could have led to the accident. The learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, and no interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.
Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The statement of Subhash Chand was ignored by the learned Courts below. The defence version that the informant was driving the car in a negligent manner and the car had hit the truck was highly probable. The site plan was prepared after changing the position of the vehicle, and no reliance can be placed upon it. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
I have heard Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Karanveer Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.
Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the defence taken by the accused, that the car was being driven negligently, is proved by the photographs wherein the damage is shown to have been caused to the middle portion of the car. The front portion of the car would have sustained injuries had the accident occurred in a manner suggested by the informant. The statement of the defence witness cannot be discarded simply because he happened to be a defence witness. When two versions are appearing on the record, the version in favour of the defence has to be preferred to the version in favour of the prosecution. Learned Courts below ignored this fundamental principle of criminal law. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent/State, submitted that both the learned Courts below have held that the testimonies of the occupants of the car are satisfactory and they corroborate each other in material particulars. There is nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were making false statements. These are pure findings of fact, and this Court should not interfere with the pure findings of fact while deciding the revision. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed:
“7.Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder:
“438. Calling for records to exercise powers of
revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439.
(2)The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3)If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record.
7.1.This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts.
7.2.Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case, which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following:
“5.… In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
7.3.The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless:
i.The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law.
ii.The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all.
iii.There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.
7.4.This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under:
“27.It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.
28.Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.”
7.5.In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction.
The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The informant, Gulrej Mohammed, stated that he was driving a Maruti car bearing registration No. HP-31-6251 on 30.01.2008. Kuldeep Sen and Surekha were also travelling with him. The car reached near the Dadhol Bridge at about 07:45 p.m. He saw a truck bearing registration No. HP-24A-4723 coming from the opposite side at a high speed. He stopped the car on the unpaved portion of the road. However, the driver hit the car. The doors were damaged in the accident. He and Surekha Devi (PW2) sustained injuries. The truck was stopped after some distance. The driver identified himself as Avtar Chand. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused. He stated in his cross-examination that he had started from Sunder Nagar at about 06:30 a.m. He admitted that 2-3 houses are located near the place of the incident. He admitted that the curve was dangerous and volunteered to say that he had stopped the car after seeing the truck. He admitted that the place of the accident was located on a highway and many vehicles crossed the road. He denied that there was fog on the date of the accident and that it was difficult to drive the vehicle. He denied that his negligence had led to the accident.
His statement is corroborated by Surekha Devi (PW2), who stated that she was travelling in the car. When the car reached the Dadhol bridge, a truck came from the opposite side. The informant stopped the car on the unpaved portion of the road; however, the truck hit the car at a high speed. She and the informant sustained injuries in the accident. The accused was driving the truck on the date of the accident, and his negligence led to the accident. The place of the accident was quite wide, and two vehicles could have easily crossed the road. She identified the photographs of the spot. She stated in her cross-examination that her husband had accompanied her. 30-40 people had gathered on the spot. She had sustained injuries on her face. She admitted that the accident had taken place during the winter and that fog is usually present during the winter. She volunteered to say that there was no fog on the date of the accident. She denied that the accident occurred because of the informant’s negligence and that a false case was made against the accused.
Kuldeep Singh (PW5) also supported the prosecution version. He stated that he was travelling in a Maruti car being driven by the informant. When the car reached near Dadhol Bridge, a truck bearing registration No. HP-24A-4723 came from the opposite side at a high speed. The informant stopped the car on the unpaved portion of the road. However, the truck hit the car. The car suffered damage. The informant and Surekha Devi (PW2) had sustained injuries. The accused was driving the truck, and the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the accused. There was sufficient space available for the truck to cross the spot. He stated in his cross-examination that they had started from Sundarnagar at about 06:30 a.m. He admitted that the place of the accident is located on a national highway and many vehicles cross the road. He admitted that the informant was his friend. He was not aware that 10-15 accidents had earlier taken place at the place of the accident. He denied that there was no negligence of the accused and the accident had occurred because of the informant’s negligence.
Learned Courts below had rightly held that there is nothing in the cross-examination of the witnesses to show that they had any motive to depose falsely against the accused or that they were making the false statements. The testimonies of the witnesses are duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW13/B), wherein the place of accident is shown to be 22 feet wide. The car was parked on the unpaved portion of the road on a sharp curve towards its left side. The truck had hit the car after crossing the bridge. The site plan shows that the truck had failed to negotiate the curve and hit the car directly.
The photographs of the spot (Ext.PW9/A to Ext.PW9/E) also show that the car is parked on the unpaved portion of the road. Therefore, the statements of the prosecution witnesses that the informant had parked the car towards the unpaved portion of the road but the truck had hit the car on the right side of the truck are duly corroborated by the photographs and the site plan.
Gandhak Chand (PW9) stated in his cross-examination that the vehicles had moved after the accident. However, this statement cannot be accepted because the broken pieces of window pane are visible below the car in the photograph (Ext.PW9/B), clearly showing that the car had not moved from its position.
Subhash Chand (DW1) stated that there was some noise in the truck bearing registration No. HP 24A-4723 ahead of the Dadhol bridge. The driver stopped the truck on the side of the road and started checking the truck. He, Subhash Chand, also reached the spot. He enquired from the driver as to what had happened. The driver of the truck revealed that the wheel of the truck was not moving. A Maruti car, bearing registration No. HP-31-6251, came and hit the parked truck. 5 people were travelling in the vehicle. They demanded money from the accused. The police reached the spot and asked the accused to pay the money. Many people had gathered on the spot.
The testimony of this witness is not acceptable. As already stated, the photograph (Ext.PW9/B) shows the pieces of the broken glass, clearly showing that the accident had occurred where the car was parked. No broken glass is visible near the truck in the photograph (Ext.PW9/C). Further, the truck is shown to be parked towards the extreme right side of the road in the photograph (Ext.PW9/E), and no space is available towards its right side. Had the car hit the truck, its left side would have been damaged and not the right side because of insufficient space towards the right side of the Truck to enable the car to cross the truck. Therefore, the testimony of this witness was rightly discarded by the learned Courts below.
It was submitted that the mid-portion of the car was damaged in the accident, which was not possible if the accident had occurred in a manner suggested by the prosecution. This submission cannot be accepted. As already stated, the accident had occurred on a sharp curve of the road after the truck had crossed a bridge. Therefore, the truck would have hit the mid portion of the parked car while negotiating the curve, and there is nothing inherently improbable in the prosecution version.
It was submitted that the photograph (Ext.PW9/D) shows that the police vehicle is parked adjacent to the car, which shows that there was sufficient space towards the left side of the car. This submission will not help. The car had already left the road and was parked on the unpaved portion of the road. The whole 22-foot road was available to the driver of the truck, where he could have negotiated the curve; however, the truck was taken towards the unpaved portion of the road towards its right side.
The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed:
“The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.”
Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed:
“The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were bloodstain marks and a V-shaped slipper of the deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.”
This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held:
“16.The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.”
In the present case, the accused had breached the rules of the Road Regulation, which led to the accident, and both the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the truck.
Dr Singara Singh (PW4) examined the victims Surekha and the informant and found that they had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. He admitted in his cross-examination that injuries can be caused by way of a fall from stairs, but this admission will not help because the defence evidence itself shows that the accident had occurred, and the alternative version that the injuries can be caused by a fall from the stairs is contrary even to the defence version.
Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the truck and his negligence led to the accident causing injuries to the informant and Surekha Devi.
It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving. It was observed:
“11.Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus :
"Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces."
12.In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C., to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine.
13.Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in motion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.”
A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: -
“13.It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208].
Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196:
“25.Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.”
The learned Trial Court had imposed a sentence of 4 months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC and 3 months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337 of IPC. Considering that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded in cases involving the Motor Vehicle accident, the sentences imposed by the learned Courts below cannot be said to be excessive, requiring any interference from this Court.
No other point was urged.
In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed.
The present revision stands disposed of, and so are the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment.