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Judgment
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
The present Civil Revision Petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed assailing the order dated 19.05.2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Titilagarh in C.S. No.16 of 2020, whereby the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by law has been rejected.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
The brief facts of the case are as follows:
Opposite Party No.1-Plaintiff instituted C.S. No.16 of 2020 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Titilagarh seeking specific performance of the contract, with a prayer to direct the defendants to obtain the necessary permission from the competent authority and thereafter execute a registered sale deed in his favour in respect of the suit land.
The case of the Plaintiff is that Late Ashima Mahananda, the owner of the suit land, had executed a General Power of Attorney dated 02.03.2013 in favour of her son, namely, Avilash Mahananda, the present Petitioner-Defendant No.1. Thereafter, an unregistered agreement for sale dated 02.04.2013 was executed between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1, acting as the General Power of Attorney holder of Late Ashima Mahananda, in respect of Ac.1.00 of land for a total consideration of Rs.11,00,000/-. Out of the said consideration, a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- is stated to have been paid by the Plaintiff, with the balance amount of Rs.3,00,000/- being payable at the time of execution of the registered sale deed.
It was further stipulated in the agreement that Defendant No.1 would obtain the requisite permission under Section 22 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 from the competent authority within a period of two years from the date of the agreement. Late Ashima Mahananda died on 27.07.2013. According to the plaintiff, the defendants thereafter sought time to obtain the requisite permission and ultimately, on 22.10.2019, expressed their inability to obtain the same, whereafter the suit came to be instituted on 04.02.2020.
During the pendency of the suit, Bijay Kumar Mahananda, husband of Late Ashima Mahananda, died on 11.02.2026, leaving behind Defendant Nos.1, 2 and 3 as his legal heirs/successors. The suit property is stated to belong to members of the Scheduled Caste community and, according to the parties, transfer thereof in favour of a non-Scheduled Caste person requires permission under Section 22 of the OLR Act.
On 15.04.2026, Defendant Nos.1 and 3 filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. seeking rejection of the plaint, inter alia, on the grounds that the suit was barred by the provisions of the OLR Act in the absence of prior permission of the competent authority and was also barred by limitation. Opposite Party No.1-Plaintiff filed an objection to the said application.
The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Titilagarh, by order dated 19.05.2026, rejected the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C., holding, inter alia, that the Plaintiff had disclosed a cause of action and that the questions as to the validity of the agreement and whether the suit was barred by law required determination upon consideration of the evidence of the parties. Aggrieved thereby, Defendant No.1 has approached this Court in the present Civil Revision Petition.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
The learned counsel for the Petitioner respectfully and earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:
The learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. without considering the principal objection raised by the Petitioner that the suit itself was barred by law in view of Section 22 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960, as the suit property belongs to members of the Scheduled Caste community and the proposed transfer in favour of a non-Scheduled Caste person could not be effected without prior permission of the competent Revenue Authority.
It was submitted that the unregistered agreement for sale dated 02.04.2013 could not form the basis of a suit for specific performance in the absence of the statutory permission contemplated under Section 22 of the OLR Act. Learned counsel contended that the expression “transfer of immovable property” ought to be given a wider meaning so as to include any transaction or dealing with the property which would have the effect of extinguishing the title, possession or right to possess such property in a member of the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community and vesting the same in a non-member.
It was further submitted that the Plaintiff had paid a substantial part of the consideration amount under the agreement and that possession of the suit property had been delivered to him. According to the Petitioner, the payment of consideration coupled with delivery of possession constituted a transaction or dealing attracting the statutory restriction and in the absence of prior permission of the Revenue Officer, the same was void and unenforceable.
It was further contended that Section 67 of the OLR Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of matters which the competent authority under the Act is empowered to decide. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the Civil Court could not compel the defendants to obtain permission under Section 22 of the OLR Act and proceed to enforce the agreement in respect of the suit land.
It was submitted that the General Power of Attorney had been executed by Late Ashima Mahananda in favour of the present Petitioner and that, upon her death on 27.07.2013, the authority conferred thereunder ceased to operate. It was further submitted that, after the death of Late Ashima Mahananda and her husband, Defendant Nos.1 to 3 succeeded to the property as legal heirs and that the present Petitioner alone could not be compelled to seek permission for transfer of the suit property, especially when the other legal heirs were not agreeable to make such application and the property was not partitioned amongst them.
It was further submitted that even if the suit were permitted to proceed, the competent Revenue Authority was not bound to grant permission under Section 22 of the OLR Act and that, at best, a direction could be issued to apply for such permission. It was therefore contended that execution of a registered sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff could not be directed unless the requisite permission was granted by the competent authority.
It was contended that the suit was also barred by limitation, inasmuch as the agreement for sale dated 02.04.2013 contemplated obtaining permission within a period of two years, whereas the suit came to be instituted only on 04.02.2020. It was therefore submitted that the plaint ought to have been rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
The learned counsel for the Opposite Parties made the following submissions in support of his contentions:
It was submitted that the Petitioner had not made out a case that the learned Trial Court had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. and that the challenge, at best, related to the exercise of such jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. It was therefore contended that no case warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction was made out.
It was submitted that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the C.P.C., the Court is required to consider only the averments made in the plaint, and neither the written statement nor the defence raised by the defendants can be taken into account. Reliance was placed on Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat and Others1, and Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal2.
It was submitted that the contention of the Petitioner that the agreement for sale ought to be treated as a “transfer” within the meaning of Regulation II of 1956 which could not be accepted at the stage of consideration of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. Learned counsel further contended that, in view of Sections 5 and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an agreement for sale does not itself amount to a transfer and does not create any interest or charge in the property.
It was further submitted that Regulation II of 1956 was not applicable to the suit property, the same being situated in the district of Balangir. It was further contended that the decree sought for specific performance would not amount to a direction for registration of the sale deed without obtaining the requisite permission from the competent authority under Section 22 of the OLR Act.
It was further submitted that the suit for specific performance did not involve exercise of the powers vested in the competent authority under the OLR Act and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court could not be said to be barred by Section 67 of the OLR Act merely on account of the requirement of permission from the Revenue Officer.
Reliance was placed on Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde3, wherein, relying upon Nathulal v. Phoolchand4, it was held that where an agreement for sale cannot be specifically performed without permission or sanction of the competent authority, a decree for specific performance can nevertheless be granted subject to obtaining such permission or sanction.
Reliance was also placed on Manzoor Ahmed Margray v. Gulam Hassan Aram and Others5, to contend that the requisite permission may be obtained by filing a proper application after the decree is passed and that the mere requirement of such permission does not bar the grant of a decree for specific performance.
Further reliance was placed upon Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corporation Pvt. Ltd. and Others6, to contend that where the vendor has agreed to sell property which can be transferred only with the sanction of a Government authority, the Court can direct the vendor to apply to the competent authority and, if sanction is obtained, thereafter execute the conveyance.
On the question of limitation, it was submitted that the same was mixed with the facts of the case and could not be decided merely on the basis of the date of the agreement. Learned counsel submitted that, where the vendor was under an obligation to obtain permission before execution of the sale deed and failed to do so, the purchaser could not be faulted for not instituting the suit earlier.
It was further submitted that although Clause 5 of the agreement contemplated obtaining permission within two years from the date of the agreement, Late Ashima Mahananda died on 27.07.2013 and thereafter Defendant Nos.1 to 3 assured the Plaintiff that they would obtain the requisite permission and transfer the land upon receipt of the balance consideration. According to the plaint, the defendants ultimately expressed their inability to obtain permission on 22.10.2019 and the suit was instituted within three years thereof. It was therefore submitted that the suit could not, at that stage, be held to be barred by limitation.
It was accordingly submitted that the Civil Revision Petition was devoid of merit and was liable to be dismissed with costs.
IV. FINDINGS OF THE LEARNED CIVIL JUDGE (SENIOR DIVISION), TITILAGARH
The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Titilagarh, while rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C., recorded the following findings:
The power under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. is a drastic power which enables termination of a civil action at the threshold and, therefore, can be exercised only upon fulfilment of the conditions stipulated therein. For determining whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, only the averments contained in the plaint are required to be considered.
On perusal of the plaint, the learned Trial Court found that the Plaintiff had specifically disclosed the cause of action for institution of the suit. The Court noted that the suit arose out of the agreement for sale dated 02.04.2013, under which an advance consideration of Rs.8,00,000/- was stated to have been received.
The learned Trial Court further held that the questions as to whether the Plaintiff was ultimately entitled to the relief of specific performance and whether the agreement for sale was void were disputed questions which could not be determined at the stage of consideration of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. and would have to be adjudicated during trial upon consideration of the evidence of the parties.
It was further observed that a plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 where, from the averments made therein, the suit ex facie appears to be barred by any law. However, where such bar is not apparent on the face of the plaint and the issue requires further consideration, the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold. The defence taken by the defendants was held to be immaterial at that stage.
Considering that the Plaintiff had sought specific performance of an agreement for sale against the successors of the deceased executant, who belonged to the Scheduled Caste category, the learned Trial Court held that it could not, at that stage, be concluded that the suit was barred by any Act or Rule, as the dispute required determination upon evidence.
Accordingly, observing that the decisions relied upon by the defendants would not be of assistance at that stage and that the application was devoid of merit, the learned Trial Court rejected the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. and directed the suit to be posted for further hearing.
V. COURT’S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed before this Court.
At the outset, it is apposite to note that the application before the learned Trial Court was one under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by law. Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the C.P.C., a plaint is liable to be rejected where the suit appears, from the statements contained in the plaint, to be barred by any law. The Court is, therefore, required to examine the plaint as a whole and ascertain whether the bar pleaded is apparent from the case set up by the Plaintiff himself. The defence raised by the defendants cannot ordinarily be taken into consideration for such purpose.
The principal objection raised by the Petitioner is based on Section 22 of the OLR Act and the Section 22(1) provides that any transfer of a holding or part thereof by a raiyat belonging to a Scheduled Tribe shall be void except where such transfer is made in favour of a person belonging to a Scheduled Tribe or, where the transferee does not belong to a Scheduled Tribe, with the previous permission in writing of the Revenue Officer. By virtue of sub-section (5), the provisions contained in sub-sections (1) to (4) apply mutatis mutandis to the transfer of a holding or part thereof by a raiyat belonging to a Scheduled Caste. Thus, where the holding of a Scheduled Caste raiyat is sought to be transferred in favour of a person not belonging to the Scheduled Caste, previous permission in writing of the Revenue Officer is a statutory requirement which cannot be diluted.
Further, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines a “sale” as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. It further provides that a contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on the terms settled between the parties and that such contract does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on the property.
A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions shows that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with a “sale” as a transfer of ownership, whereas Section 22 of the OLR Act employs the expression “any transfer” of a holding or part thereof. The proviso to Section 22(1) specifically refers to a “transfer by sale”.
The statutory scheme under Section 22 is also material. The permission contemplated therein is expressly required to be previous permission in writing of the Revenue Officer. Sub-section (4), which prohibits registration of a document purporting to effect such transfer unless accompanied by the written permission of the Revenue Officer, operates in addition to the restriction contained in sub-section (1). The requirement under Section 22(1), therefore, is not confined merely to the stage of registration of the sale deed.
Section 3 of the OLR Act further provides that, save as otherwise provided, the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, custom or usage or agreement, decree or order of Court. Therefore, while Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act governs the legal effect of a contract for sale in general and the transaction in the present case has necessarily to satisfy the restriction specifically imposed under Section 22 of the OLR Act.
The present case has to be examined in the light of the transaction which forms the foundation of the suit. The agreement dated 02.04.2013 records that, out of the total consideration of Rs.11,00,000/-, a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- has been received as part consideration. It further records that, after receipt of the major portion of the consideration, vacant possession of the scheduled property had been delivered to the purchaser for its development. Moreover, the agreement contemplates obtaining the requisite permission under Section 22 of the OLR Act before execution of the registered sale deed.
The Plaintiff himself has pleaded that permission under Section 22 of the OLR Act was necessary for valid alienation of the suit property. The relief sought in the suit is also for a direction to the defendants to obtain such permission and thereafter execute the registered sale deed. The requirement of previous permission, therefore, forms part of the Plaintiff’s own case and is not a matter introduced by the defendants.
In the present case, although the agreement for sale did not, by itself, transfer ownership in the suit property in view of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the agreement further records that vacant possession of the suit land had been delivered to the purchaser before obtaining the previous permission contemplated under Section 22 of the OLR Act. The effect of such delivery of possession has therefore to be considered in the light of the statutory restriction contained in Section 22 of the OLR Act.
It is true that Section 22(1) does not employ the expression “sale” alone, but refers to “any transfer” of a holding or part thereof. The proviso thereto separately refers to a “transfer by sale”, while sub-section (4) separately deals with registration of documents purporting to effect such transfer. The statutory restriction under sub-section (1), therefore, cannot be confined only to the eventual execution and registration of a sale deed.
In the present case, the transaction disclosed by the agreement had already been acted upon to the extent that a substantial part of the consideration had been received and vacant possession of the suit land had been delivered to the purchaser. Such delivery of possession cannot be treated as having no bearing upon the restriction contained in Section 22 merely because formal ownership was contemplated to pass subsequently by execution of a registered sale deed.
The agreement sought to be specifically enforced thus records, on the one hand, that permission under Section 22 was to be obtained before execution of the sale deed and, on the other hand, that possession of the suit land had already been delivered to the purchaser. The transaction has therefore to be tested as a whole against the requirement of previous permission contained in Section 22 and not merely with reference to the stage at which the registered sale deed was proposed to be executed.
The contention of Opposite Party No.1 that the defendants may now be directed to obtain permission does not alter the position emerging from the agreement itself. Whether permission under Section 22 is to be granted is a matter within the statutory domain of the Revenue Officer and has to be determined in accordance with the conditions prescribed under the OLR Act. The Civil Court cannot proceed on the assumption that such permission would necessarily be granted so as to complete a transaction which had already been acted upon in relation to possession before such permission was obtained.
The decisions relied upon by Opposite Party No.1 concerning specific performance subject to obtaining permission or sanction were rendered in the context of different statutory provisions. They do not determine the effect of Section 22 of the OLR Act upon a transaction under which possession of the protected holding had already been delivered prior to obtaining the previous permission contemplated thereunder.
It is also relevant that the agreement dated 02.04.2013 is expressly relied upon in the plaint and constitutes the foundation of the relief of specific performance. The material circumstances relevant to the statutory objection, namely, the status of the vendor, the requirement of permission under Section 22, receipt of part consideration and delivery of possession, therefore, arise from the Plaintiff’s own case and the document relied upon by him.
The consideration of the aforesaid issue, therefore, does not require the Court to enter into any defence raised independently by the Petitioner or to undertake an enquiry into disputed facts. The agreement relied upon by the Plaintiff himself records the payment of part consideration, delivery of possession and the requirement of obtaining permission under Section 22 of the OLR Act.
The learned Trial Court proceeded on the footing that the validity of the agreement and the applicability of the statutory bar could be determined only upon consideration of the evidence of the parties. However, the material facts relevant for examining the bar under Section 22 emerge from the Plaintiff’s own case and the agreement forming the foundation of the relief sought. The issue, therefore, did not require reception of evidence for its determination at the stage of consideration of the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the C.P.C.
On an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint together with the agreement relied upon therein, this Court finds that the transaction sought to be specifically enforced had already been acted upon by delivery of possession of the suit land before obtaining the previous permission contemplated under Section 22 of the OLR Act. In view of the statutory scheme noticed hereinabove, the requirement of previous permission cannot, especially considering in the facts of the present case, be treated as one relatable only to the subsequent execution and registration of the sale deed.
Consequently, having regard to the delivery of possession of the protected holding pursuant to the agreement before obtaining the previous permission contemplated under Section 22 of the OLR Act, the transaction sought to be specifically enforced is hit by the restriction contained therein. Since the material giving rise to such statutory bar emerges from the Plaintiff’s own case and the agreement sought to be enforced, the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the C.P.C.
In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary for this Court to return any final finding on the further objections raised by the Petitioner with regard to Section 67 of the OLR Act, cessation of the General Power of Attorney upon the death of Late Ashima Mahananda, the rights inter se of her successors or the plea of limitation.
The learned Trial Court, in declining to reject the plaint on the ground that the matter required adjudication upon evidence, failed to consider the statutory effect of the transaction disclosed by the Plaintiff’s own case in the light of Section 22 of the OLR Act. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from material irregularity warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the C.P.C.
VI. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the plaint in C.S. No.16 of 2020 is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the C.P.C., the transaction sought to be specifically enforced being hit by the restriction contained in Section 22 of the OLR Act.
Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The order dated 19.05.2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Titilagarh in C.S. No.16 of 2020 is hereby set aside. Consequently, the application filed by Defendant Nos.1 and 3 under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. stands allowed and the plaint in C.S. No.16 of 2020 stands rejected.
Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.